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Abstract  
 
At the heart of China’s economic transition is the privatisation reform launched in the 
late 1990s. This thesis identifies the driving force behind the dynamics, characterising 
the privatisation story in China, in terms of the shrinkage of state sector. Nine 
hypotheses are established to test the influence of a variety of factors across 
macroeconomic environment, microeconomic condition and the context of political 
economy. Two panel datasets, generated from public data sources with respectively 
450 and 3,300 observations during the period from 1994 to 2008, are analyzed by 
system general method of moments (system-GMM) in a dynamic specification. New 
empirical evidence adds to our understanding of privatisation in China by rejecting a 
uniformly consistent path, but highlighting its enormous complexity, captured in its 
evolutionary, regionally and sectorally diverse nature. The process of privatisation 
appears to be multi-dimensional, which not only reflected a centrally-determined 
national policy, but was played out as a drama in which the principal actors were the 
central reformers, local bureaucrats, enterprise managers, bank lenders and private 
investors.  
 
Word count: 91,908 (including main chapters with footnotes)  
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
 
Importance of research 
 
When I was a youngster living in Taiwan in the 1970s, government propaganda 
always described Mainland China across the narrow Taiwan Strait as a place where 
people lived and worked in an abyss of deprivation and misery. The mission for every 
young patriot was to launch a military counter-invasion of the mainland, overthrow 
the communist regime, and liberate beloved compatriots from their endless suffering. 
This anti-communist education was so successful that it provided the first motivation 
to me – a young researcher – who felt the need to redeem his childhood dream of 
three decades ago. Yet, even allowing for the exaggeration of rhetoric, the reality has 
of course changed: the China of impoverishment and immiseration no longer exists, 
thanks to three decades of unprecedented growth brought about by post-1978 
economic reform.  
China’s transition, launched in the late 1970s, is one of the most spectacular 
phenomena in recent world history. The importance of state sector continued to fell. 
(Huyghebaert and Quan, 2009). In terms of the industrial product, China’s state share 
shrank from around 70 per cent in early 1980s to less than 10 per cent in the 
mid-2000s (See Figure 2.5). This almost unprecedented state contraction has attracted 
worldwide attention. Economists are eager to know how China has been able to 
transform itself from a central-command economy to a market-oriented system – and 
to have done so quite smoothly and peacefully, compared with the more painful 
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transition experiences of countries in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.1 
At the heart of this economic ‘transfiguration’ (to adopt a religious analogy) has been 
privatisation reform.2  
Yet, this ownership reform was not a priority task for Chinese leaders in the first 
two decades of the Reform Era (i.e., the 1980s and 1990s). Instead, this period 
witnessed a rapid growth in China’s state sector, which expanded by more than 50 per 
cent, creating 60.6 thousand enterprises and 25.6 million new jobs. The apparent 
inference is that in pursuit of growth, China adopted a strategy that fostered a strong 
state sector – a typical socialist strategy based on a firm belief in the superiority of 
public ownership. This boom approaches its peak in the mid-1990s, or precisely in 
1996 in statistics. During the following decade, the state sector lost its dominant role 
to the private sector, with 97.3 thousand enterprises gone and a loss of 27.8 million 
employees. Only during these years did China follow the opposite strategy, embracing 
capitalism and promoting private ownership.  
With respect to the topic of ‘privatisation in China’, there is no literature to be 
found that can date publication back to the last century in the Social Science Citation 
Index (SSCI). This research field emerges only after 2000, and, even today, the 
volume of SSCI literatures is still limited. Nevertheless, the topic is interesting for its 
sui generic character, with its own agenda, unique stresses and data that have different 
                                                 
1
 Quite rapid privatisation reform, also known as ‘voucher privatisation’ was carried out in Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine as the primary 
method of economic transition; whilst in Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Slovak and 
Slovenia it has been the secondary method; see EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND 
DEVELOPMENT (1998) Transition report: Financial sector in transition, London. Reformers in these 
countries seemed to believe that there would be a small window of opportunity in a rather short period 
in which they could take economic reforms; see FRIEBEL, G. (2000) Bureaucracies in the Russian 
voucher privatization. Economics of Transition, 8, 37-57. 
2
 As Naughton says, the reason for studying the Chinese transition cannot be to provide a model for the 
next big socialist economy to follow, because, except for China itself, there no such economy (at least, 
none of any significance) any longer exists. Rather, an examination of transition in this huge country 
may provide invaluable information about the nature of economic change; see NAUGHTON, B. 
(1994b) What is distinctive about China economic transition - state enterprise reform and overall 
system transformation. Journal of Comparative Economics, 18, 470-490.  
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definition with (and so cannot be compared with) data deriving from research in other 
parts of the world. This would seem to point to a field of considerable individuality – 
what we might refer to as ‘privatisation research with Chinese characteristics’. Some 
theorists, especially Chinese theorists, may see China as the most effective 
development model, at least in terms of enterprise reform, not least because its size 
and unique character defied ‘mainstream’ theoretic explanations. This popular 
argument has often required the re-writing of theoretical textbooks in order to 
encompass the Chinese experience. This research does not follow this convention, but 
seeks to show to what extent privatisation reform in China is unique.  
 
Research questions 
 
The research that follows addresses following questions:  
 
1. In China’s Reform Era, where are we to find the seeds that subsequently grew 
into a comprehensive privatisation reform process?  
2. What are the main themes in the privatisation literature, and what light does it 
throw on China’s experience?  
3. What has been the driving force behind the dynamics of privatisation, and how 
effective has it in fact in driving privatisation?  
4. Can the privatisation, as it has occurred and evolved in China, be fitted into 
mainstream theories, or do we need alternative theories?  
5. From a methodological perspective, can we construct a framework that will 
enable us to integrate the different privatisation reforms of China and other 
transitional economies, and make possible a comparative analysis?  
6. (In short), what has been the ‘story’ of the privatisation in China? Does this story 
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suggest the existence of ‘privatisation with Chinese characteristics’?  
 
Research methodology 
 
This research is based on nine hypotheses, all of which are generated in a 
bottom-up approach. In what follows, I conduct a systematic review of privatisation 
theories and empirical studies, before summarising relevant arguments and 
propositions into nine groups of distinctive hypotheses. A new multi-level framework 
to study privatisation is developed, based on the work of Ramamurti (2000). Using 
the latest regression techniques, I use two unique datasets to rigorously generate 
empirical evidence, subject to various strict econometric criteria. Data sources are all 
in the public domain; there is detailed and thorough discussion of the selection of 
variables; and the econometric specification is mathematically justified. More details 
about methodological issues are set out in a later paragraph about Chapter 4.  
 
The story from reform to privatisation in China 
 
The structure of this research comprises seven chapters. After a general 
introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 goes back to the beginning of the Reform Era to 
explore the story of China’s bumpy road toward privatisation. This story is told 
through a chronological framework defined by three rounds of enterprise reform.  
Before 1986, the core thrust of reform was to increase enterprise autonomy by 
means of a new distribution system of profits between government and enterprise. In 
the event, however, misarrangement of incentives soon signalled the failure of these 
early reforms. With the government hard pressed to find out the true level of profits 
earned by enterprises, distribution was inevitably biased in their favour – a situation, 
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which if left unaddressed, would leave the decline in government revenue to continue 
unchecked. Thus, the next distribution system initiative – the introduction of the 
Contract Responsibility System during 1987-1992 – was designed to avoid this 
problem of information asymmetry by imposing on enterprises a fixed level of 
profit-deliveries. This policy change was successful in protecting government revenue, 
but the outcome had some consequences that were not anticipated. In particular, the 
banking sector became a new victim. Enterprises started to borrow money from state 
banks and hence the financial burden was effectively transferred to the state banks. 
This created a serious debt crisis, which then caused the Chinese government to shift 
the focus of its work to reforming the internal structure enterprises. In order to 
establish a modern enterprise system, a series of more deep-seated reforms was 
introduced. They included the diversification of ownership types, the establishment of 
auditing institutions, the upgrading of the statistical system, enhancement of the 
independent role of enterprise manager, and enlargement of enterprise autonomy. Yet 
these reforms were also ineffective, because they led to a continuing decline in 
profitability and an accelerated increase in the number of loss-making state enterprises. 
Finally, privatisation was implemented. One way of interpreting this chronological 
process is that the privatisation reform was an inevitable outcome, eventually 
embraced as a last resort for the Chinese government and a means of escaping from 
the two-decade-long vicious circle of failing reforms among state enterprises.  
Inspired by some local experiments, the formal policy of privatisation – “grasp 
the large while letting go of the small” – was first implemented at the end of 1995. 
State enterprises were encouraged to approach ownership restructuring in a variety of 
ways, including bankruptcy, ownership diversification, shareholding cooperation, 
auctions, leases or merges. Several arguments in the literature tried to explain this 
event – what one may call the ‘Chinese variant of the Big Bang’ – in terms of changes 
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taking place in the surrounding environment, such as rising competition in the product 
market, the deterioration of central finance, the reform of local budget and bank credit 
systems, and, as I try to argue, the shrinking space for rent-seeking behaviour among 
state managers.  
The origin of ownership diversification in China dates back to the mid-1980s, 
although the process continued during the next decade. It began with the first-ever 
acceptance that an enterprise could be registered as ‘cooperative’ or ‘individual’ 
(previously, enterprises could only be registered as state or collectively owned). 
Subsequent new legislation introduced even more profound initiatives in terms of new 
ownership types. Share-holding ownership, including limited liability and joint stock 
limited enterprises, dates from the mid-1990s. Finally – and most momentously – a 
few years later, private ownership was given legal backing and listed alongside state, 
collective and foreign ownerships. Meanwhile, the importance of the Chinese state 
sector within the national economy was in decline. In terms of total industrial output, 
the share of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) started to shrink in the early 1970s, a time 
when the township and village enterprises (under collective ownership) began a rapid 
expansion. This pace accelerated in the 1990s when the non-public enterprises started 
to boom.  
The final section of this chapter consists of a detailed summary of the empirical 
evidences to be found in the existing literature of China. By various proxies of 
performance, most findings reach a similar conclusion that suggests a positive 
outcome and interpretation of privatisation reform among state enterprises.  
 
Privatisation theories and evidence in the literature 
 
The Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive and systematic review of the theoretical 
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and empirically-based privatisation literature. The literature discussed in this chapter 
is limited to that part of it that is concerned with the determinants of privatisation. In 
other words, the dependent variable in the theoretical or empirical model is the 
likelihood of privatisation, not the overall impact of privatisation.  
The first section demonstrates the literature in a way that provides a better 
genealogy for understanding the creation and development of privatisation arguments. 
Empirical studies designed to identify the determinants of privatisation emerged in the 
early 1990s, and placed much emphasis on international comparisons among 
developing countries. Initially, analysis focused on various economic factors – for 
example, financial performance, deficit or debt. Only matters of political factors, such 
as ideological issue and soft budget constraint, were discussed. Institutional factor and 
microeconomic condition did not attract academic attention until even more recently.  
As for the privatisation process in China, the first empirical studies emerged in 
the literature after 2000, with many of them offering viewpoints that deviated from 
the ‘mainstream’ thought. Most early research focused more on the micro-level 
conditions than on macro, let alone political conditions. When analysis extended to 
political influences, whereas on transitional countries other than China had focused 
mainly on shifts in ideology, in China it was the removal of the soft budget constraint 
in the wake of the 1994 fiscal reform had attracted the greatest attention. The role of 
competition was another factor that became a major theme in the literature on China, 
where various arguments were put forward in an attempt to examine the effect of 
rising competition in the product market on privatisation reform. Institutional factor 
has been a topic of less concerned in the literature on China.  
To model the dynamics of privatisation, early attention was given in the literature 
to bureaucratic behaviour and the way in which it can use privatisation as a tool to 
reduce risks and uncertainties in production. Budget constraint, the next factor 
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introduced into the model, draws attention to the relationship between privatisation 
and budgetary reform. Later analysis focused on election factors, such as the role of 
politicians, campaign strategies, or the stance of political parties. As for economic 
factors, the nature of the market – whether it is competitive or monopolistic – has 
most often been cited in order to justify the optimal scale of government ownership, 
as opposed to, private ownership. Transaction cost and institutional effect are two 
other factors that have been incorporated into the model in order to determine the best 
timing for a state enterprise to embark on privatisation reform. Research has shed 
light on other factors, such as firm size, economic efficiency or informational factors, 
and investigated how these factors affect privatisation decision-making.  
The second section of Chapter 3 distils these arguments into nine categories of 
hypotheses, which embrace considerations relating to soft budget constraint, political 
ideology, decentralisation, market competition, financial pressure, institutional 
infrastructure, economic efficiency, firm size and human capital. Each category is 
followed by a systematic discussion of the development of relevant theories and 
empirical findings. A table summarising all the hypotheses, theories, arguments, 
models and evidence is presented in the final part of the chapter.  
 
Hypotheses, econometrics, data and variables 
 
The methodology of research is discussed in some detail in Chapter 4. The first 
section incorporates these theoretical hypotheses into the realities of Chinese 
privatisation. For each hypothesis group, I show relevant previous developments in 
China, defend the assumptions that are made, and finally detail the operational 
definition of each hypothesis prior to further quantitative examination.  
These hypotheses are as follows:  
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(1) The hardening process of SOEs’ budget system will encourage local state 
enterprises to embark on privatisation.3  
(2) The greater the commitment by a local government to the ideology of 
private ownership, the more extensive will be the privatisation of its state 
sector.  
(3) The decentralisation process will lead to a greater incidence of privatisation 
in China’s state sector.  
(4) Intensified competition in Chinese product markets will encourage more 
SOEs to implement privatisation reform.  
(5) Severe financial pressure facing SOEs will encourage privatisation in 
China’s state sector.  
(6) The more the institutional infrastructure is strengthened and improved, the 
more likely it will be that privatisation will take place.  
(7) Less efficient SOEs are more likely to be privatised than more efficient 
SOEs in China’s state sector.  
(8) In the early stage of privatisation reform in China, small-scale SOEs are 
more likely to be privatised.  
(9) The improvement of human capital among SOEs will lead to more 
privatisation in China’s state sector.  
 
To explain the privatisation dynamics, the next section establishes a multi-level 
framework, which modifies Ramamurti’s pioneer work and re-categorises most of the 
privatisation arguments. Some of his arguments have been omitted on the grounds that 
                                                 
3
 The reason why I define privatisation in operation as the shrinkage of state sector is justified in 
section 4.3.  
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they have no application to China; others are added for the opposite reason. The pros 
and cons are discussed.  
Section 3 justifies the econometrics. Based on the current development of 
econometric techniques, I mathematically justify the appropriateness of using the 
system general method of moments (system-GMM) as the estimator for a dynamic 
specification. The primary reason for its use here is to avoid biases that would be 
introduced through the adoption of traditional and widely-used estimators, such as the 
pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), the fixed effect OLS, and the difference-GMM. 
Use of system-GMM can help avoid generating econometric problems, such as (1) the 
bias of endogeneity among correlated independent variables; (2) the upward or 
downward bias of coefficient in the fixed effect OLS or difference-GMM; (3) the 
inconsistency problem introduced by the lagged dependent variable as an independent 
variable in regressions; and (4) the high persistency problem associated with the 
difference-GMM estimator. All regression results are derived from the two-step GMM 
with Windmeijer corrections. The validity of the instruments is detected by Hansen 
test. The potential problem of over-identification caused by the proliferation of 
instruments (also known as the bias of “too many instruments”) is tackled by the latest 
regression technique developed by Roodman in 2009. Robustness checks are 
conducted by using a smaller dataset that excludes data that may contain relatively 
extreme values in the first or last few periods. In short, a strictly conservative manner 
is adopted in setting up the defaults of econometrics.  
The reason for utilising two different datasets is to provide a better means of 
generalising and comparing the varied patterns of China’s privatisation experience. 
The provincial panel dataset includes 30 cross-sections from 31 provinces 
(Chongqing’s data are included in Sichuan’s) over 15 time-periods from 1994 to 2008, 
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and thus contains 450 observations.4  The industrial panel dataset includes 220 
cross-sections from 37 major industries in six provinces (Guangdong, Jiangsu, 
Shandong, Jiangxi, Shanxi and Heilongjiang) over the same 15 periods and so 
contains 3,300 observations.5 Data are all public and were obtained from a wide 
variety of central and local statistics.6  
Variable selection is based on the same or similar usage as that of the wider 
privatisation literature. Where variables are specially designed, a full explanation is 
given. The choice of the operational definition of privatisation, i.e. the dependent 
variable, is justified through a comprehensive discussion of the relevant literature with 
justification. All independent variables are chosen after considering their 
appropriateness, feasibility, authenticity and consistency.  
It is noteworthy that all values of variables are transformed into a limited range 
between minus one and plus one before being placed into regression. This 
transformation provides an easy way to see through the correlation among variables 
by relatively moderate coefficients – a technique that can reduce the disturbance in 
coefficients brought about by different variable scale, such as money, people, cases, 
units, lengths, and so on.  
 
Empirical findings, interpretations and implications 
 
Chapter 5 reports the findings, analyses and implications derived from regression 
results, based on the provincial-level data. After descriptive statistics, the preliminary 
analysis of a non-parameter comparison shows the changes in political contexts, 
                                                 
4
 The latest data available at the time of writing were released in official statistical yearbooks for 2009, 
and were not made public until end of 2009 or even mid-2010.  
5
 Why the cross-sections are not 222 (i.e., 37 times 6) but 220 is because the petroleum extraction 
industry does not exist in two provinces (Jiangsu and Shanxi).  
6
 More than one year was spent in the collection of data in generating these two unique datasets.  
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macroeconomic environment and microeconomic conditions in China. There is a 
discussion of each independent variable, followed by a simple regression analysis 
designed to confirm the appropriateness of hypothesis establishment.  
In terms of the regression strategy, every hypothesis is tested one by one in order 
initially to highlight the individual impact of each, before being put together for a 
broader comparison in a principal component analysis. Checks are carried out of the 
results from baseline models and the models with a shorter time period. In order to 
maintain a high quality of econometrics, results are reported only if a number of strict 
testing requirements have been strictly fulfilled. Findings, analyses and implications 
are fully discussed for each hypothesis. Nevertheless, the number of observations is 
too small to make it possible to regress all variables together, since this would 
compromise some strict econometric requirements. The author therefore adopts a 
principal component analysis to generate a smaller number of hypothesis variables, 
thereby making a broader comparison possible.  
Results derived from the industrial-level data are presented in Chapter 6 after 
setting out the descriptive statistics with a short preliminary analysis of the hypothesis 
variables. Hypotheses of political economy have had to be dropped for lack of 
relevant data, although these factors are still technically under control since they are 
included as control variables in regression. The remaining hypotheses are slightly 
adjusted in terms of their operational definition to fit this dataset. Thus, the 
hypotheses are as follows:  
 
(1) Intensified market competition within an industry will encourage more 
SOEs in that industry to undertake privatisation reform.  
(2) The degree of privatisation within an industry will increase when the 
financial pressure of its SOEs is mitigated.  
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(3) The incidence of privatisation will increase in an industry when more 
capital for infrastructure construction is invested there.  
(4) The greater the concentration of inefficient SOEs in an industry, the more 
likely it will be for privatisation to take place in that industry.  
(5) Since small-size SOEs should be privatised first, the average size of SOEs 
within an industry will increase along with the progress of privatisation.  
(6) Improvements in human capital among SOEs in an industry will encourage 
a greater scale of privatisation within that industry.  
 
Chapter 6 introduces a typology of sectors. The data are arranged into three 
major sectoral groups – light manufacturing, heavy manufacturing, and the mining 
and energy sector.7 Models for robustness check are presented and discussed. With its 
larger number of observations, this dataset makes it possible to construct a 
comprehensive model including all hypothesis variables. These results are compared 
with those derived from individual tests. The next concern is the regional dimension 
and the difference it generates. Data are again divided into two groups by regions – 
coastal and inland – each of which contains data for three provinces. The final 
concern relates to time dimension. This is explored by dividing the data into two 
sections; the first includes data during 1994-2001, the second, during 2002-2008.  
 
Integrated analysis 
 
The first section of Chapter 7 integrates the findings of the previous two chapters 
and generalises them into nine significant conclusions. Privatisation in China’s 
                                                 
7
 Mining and energy have to be combined into a single joint sector because the mining sector contains 
only five industries, while the energy sector contains only three. Only by combining them is it possible 
to make the number of cross-section items large enough to run GMM estimations.  
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industrial state sector after the mid-1990s is found to have been strongly 
policy-dominated. There is evidence of a strong and consistent cash cow effect, and a 
smaller ice-pop effect having made itself felt. Privatisation is found to have 
demonstrated many regional characteristics. It was also subject to a soft budget 
constraint, showed a strong influence from competition, and demonstrated a screening 
strategy in human capital. The entire process of privatisation is shown to have been 
evolutionary and dynamic.  
The second section offers an overall narrative of privatisation in China. The 
series of failures in enterprise reform throughout the first two decades of the Reform 
Era precipitated a fundamental change to approach, which manifested itself as 
large-scale privatisation. Under the central guideline of “grasping the large while 
letting go of the small”, this process was driven by shrinking soft budgets, rising 
competitive pressures and improvements in infrastructure, although it was also to 
some extent constrained by the liability burden and/or enhanced capital and labour 
productivity.  
The next section tries to investigate whether or not there is such a thing as 
‘privatisation with Chinese characteristics’. In doing so, the author compares and 
contrasts his findings with those of other in the privatisation literature, and identifies a 
number of characteristics that have been unique to privatisation in China.  
The final section discusses the contribution, as well as the limitation, of thesis, 
and identifies questions that require further exploration.  
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Chapter Two 
 
From Enterprise Reform to Privatisation (1978-1997) 
 
2.1 Bumpy road toward SOE reforms 
 
The most serious legacy left by socialist China in the late 1970s was a huge 
shortage of consumer goods, brought by long-term, excessive emphasis on the 
development of heavy and military industries. Unfulfilled needs were to be found 
everywhere. Some reflected China’s extreme poverty and underdevelopment, whilst 
some were caused by the waste associated with central command economy (Naughton, 
2007:89). The socialist incentive inherent in the egalitarian wage system failed to 
raise productivity (Howe et al., 2003:12-13).  
This central command system gradually began to be opened up at the end of 1978, 
when the China’s reforms were launched in an attempt to stimulate production to meet 
consumer demands by giving individuals and groups the opportunity to act 
independently in an entrepreneurial capacity (Naughton, 2007:87). The previous 
emphasis on egalitarianism was loosened and gradually replaced by a development 
strategy that was reflected in growing inequalities across regions and sectors. The 
early success in rural reform through de-collectivisation encouraged and guided the 
subsequent reforms in other sectors. The prolonged process of institutional 
experimentation characterised the gradualist approach, allowing the transition to take 
place with a steady introduction of competition and market mechanisms (Hassard et 
al., 2007:41, Nolan, 2004:6). At the heart of this gradualism was a series of enterprise 
reforms.  
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First round of reform (1978-1986) 
 
There were three rounds of enterprise reforms preceding the massive privatisation 
of the late 1990s. The first round of reform started immediately after 1978. 
Government’s logic was to disarticulate the close tie between state and enterprises so 
as to improve efficiency (see Table 2.1). The priority mission was to shift enterprise 
responsibility away from mere plan fulfilment towards the inculcation of profitability 
as the main criterion of performance (Naughton, 2007:95). Reform leaders believed 
that to decentralise the control rights from the government to enterprise managers 
would encourage them to exercise self-stimulation, self-development, and 
self-restraint (Lin et al., 2000:51, Lin et al., 1997). Two key components in the reform 
package were the increase of enterprise autonomy and the introduction of profit 
distribution. For the first time, the enterprise was given a certain degree of decision 
flexibility in terms of production plans, product marketing, worker employment and 
technological innovation (Hassard et al., 2007:87). The role of enterprise manager 
was reintroduced to address these issues. The enterprise was also allowed to retain 
and spend profits above the planned amount negotiated in advance between the 
government and enterprises (Yusuf et al., 2006:53). The wage system was liberalised 
to a small extent and linked with workers’ performance.8 In order to enhance their 
profit margin, enterprises were allowed to sell the excess products at the prices they 
set. Hence, market prices emerged and coexisted with the central determined prices. 
The prices of most inputs and outputs were liberalised through this dual-track pricing 
system (Brandt et al., 2007, Yang, 2004).9 By the early 1980s, it seems that China had 
                                                 
8
 Material incentives were strictly forbidden in the last decade of the Mao period (i.e., during 
1967-1976); see BYRD, W. (1983) Enterprise-level reforms in Chinese state-owned industry. American 
Economic Review, 73, 329-332. 
9
 Price liberalisation was accelerated after 1989 and by 1993 the dual-track pricing system had almost 
disappeared; see QIAN, Y. Y. (2000) The process of China's market transition (1978-1998): the 
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started the journey of improving the efficiency of its state sector (Byrd, 1983).  
 
Table 2.1 
Chronological table of enterprise reforms in China (1978-1999).  
Year Enterprise reforms Other related reforms 
   
1978 Enterprise reform: 
 Separate state and enterprise to 
increase enterprise autonomy 
 Introduce profit delivery system to 
encourage efficiency 
 
1979  Dual-track pricing system 
1981 Replace government appropriation by 
repayable loan system 
 
1983 Expand the coverage of repayable loan 
system 
Impose enterprise income tax on profits 
 
1985 Extend scale of enterprise income tax 
Impose adjustment tax 
Wage liberalisation 
1987 Contract Responsibility System: 
 Written contract between state and 
enterprise to guarantee 
performance, tax and delivered 
profits 
Performance evaluation system to link 
wages with enterprise bonuses 
 
1988  Enactment of Bankruptcy Law 
1992 Share-holding reform:  
 Legislation to regulate the issue 
and trading of shares  
 New typology of categories of 
ownership – including state 
ownership, corporate ownership, 
individual ownership and foreign 
ownership 
First monitoring agency, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC), established 
1994 Corporatisation: 
 Clarify property rights of the 
government and enterprises 
 Separate management from 
ownership  
 Install corporate governance 
 Introduce loss-making 
responsibility to enterprises 
Enactment of Company Law 
1993  Application of national minimum wages 
1994  New external auditing and accounting 
systems 
1995 Privatisation policy “grasping the large 
and let go of the small” 
 
1997 Authorisation of private ownership  
1999 Implementation of dept-equity swaps  
   
Source: Author’s summaries  
                                                                                                                                            
evolutionary, historical, and comparative perspectives. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics-Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 156, 151-171.  
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However, the profit-sharing arrangement between the government and enterprises 
did not work well. Government revenue collected from enterprise income was not 
raised to the extent that was expected but, on the contrary, dropped sharply after 
reform (Hay et al., 1994:6). Total revenue decreased from 57.2 billion yuan in 1978 to 
27.7 billion yuan in 1984. The major cause lay in the ambiguity of the distribution 
rule of profits. Since profit-delivery was negotiated on a firm-by-firm basis, 
enterprises and supervisory agencies could effectively conspire to cut their remittance 
burden (Hay et al., 1994:23). The bargaining position of government was 
disadvantageous because it lacked detailed knowledge about the real operations of 
enterprise, making the haemorrhage of revenue inevitable and widespread. To a 
certain extent, what enterprise managers really negotiated with government agents 
was not profits, but “rents” (Otsuka et al., 1998:32). The minor cause was the 
incentive misarrangement in the profit-sharing system; whereas the yearly renewal of 
profit-delivery arrangement based on last year’s performance discouraged the 
improvement in efficiency. A good performance this year would result in even heavier 
demands being made next year. Consequently, this form of negotiation generated 
negative incentives, creating a ‘race to the bottom’. That is why Chinese government 
wished to abandon this profit-delivery system and replace it with an income taxation 
system, thereby eliminating the bargaining disadvantage inherent in the negotiation 
process and enhancing the stability of government revenue. After two waves of tax 
reforms, income tax was imposed on profits (i.e., the tax-for-profits policy, or 
ligaishui 利改稅). In the 1983 measure, the tax base was first limited to 50 per cent 
of the total profits; but in 1985 a new measure extended this to 100 per cent. A new 
kind of adjustment tax (tiaojieshui 調節稅) was also imposed (Zhang and Zhang, 
2007:34), designed to reduce the rent opportunity for enterprises and to make profit 
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retention uniform among them. The government’s apparent intention was to regulate 
profit distribution, as well as to make enterprise profits more transparent. In the event, 
during the next 22 months profits slumped, or concealed, highlighting the failure of 
these initiatives (Zhang and Zhang, 2007:49). The contradiction inherent in 
government loss of revenue at a time when enterprises were improving their 
efficiency merely highlighted the reality that resistance to transparency among 
enterprises was simply too strong to tackle. A fair judgement is that the government’s 
capacity to use taxation tools to manage enterprise behaviour was not mature enough 
in the early 1980s.  
Another separate effort that took place in parallel with those described in the 
previous paragraph was to normalise the relationship between the government and 
enterprises by transferring financial responsibility downward to the enterprises 
themselves in order to make them accountable for investment and performance (Yang, 
2004). The new approach was captured in a repayable loan system, which replaced the 
free grants of government appropriation (i.e., the loan-for-grant policy, or bogaidai 
撥改貸) (Hassard et al., 2007:89). In future, investment should no longer be given 
directly by the state; rather, enterprises should have to make their own investment 
plan and secure funding from banks by themselves. The first round of measures, 
released in 1981, covered fixed asset investment, but the second round, released in 
late 1983, expanded the coverage to cash flows (Zhang and Zhang, 2007:32-33). The 
aim was not only to reduce the heavy burden of government appropriation, but also to 
eliminate opportunist misuse of long-term investment and the short-term cash flows.10 
However, these measures completely failed, too, because state banks could not 
effectively force unprofitable enterprises to repay loans (Hassard et al., 2007:90). 
                                                 
10
 Yet the interest payment was still afforded by the state until 1998 when this payment was no longer 
included as a part of profit-delivery.  
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Superficially, government appropriation seemed to have been successfully replaced by 
bank loans, but, in reality, the government continued to shoulder financial 
responsibility. This was because state banks did not manage loans in a commercial 
manner, but made available loans by fiat. In this way, government was still the de 
facto sponsor of funding the various needs of enterprises. As a result, enterprises 
began to accumulate huge debts. Between 1980 and 1993, the share of loss-making 
state enterprises rose from 18.7 per cent to 67.5 per cent (Zhang and Zhang, 2007:36). 
In short, these reform initiatives generated a serious debt chain crisis, the so-called 
“triangular debt” (sanjiaozhai 三角債), which eventually, in the mid 1990s, led to 
far-reaching reform of the banking sector.11  
A fair assessment is that the first round of enterprise reforms was achieved in the 
absence of a coherent strategic blueprint (Hassard et al., 2007:88, Rawski, 1994). The 
overall efficiency of state enterprises was enhanced by new incentives. Control was 
transferred downward in an attempt to establish enterprise autonomy, but financial 
responsibility was still largely rooted in the government itself. The intended 
disarticulation failed to address enterprises’ opportunist behaviour and make them 
more accountable. Reforms were introduced into the banking sector and it assumed an 
uneasy position between government and enterprises. Profits were gradually eroded 
by the ‘ratchet effect’ in the wage and bonus system, and this effect was once more in 
evidence under the impact of the repayable loan reform.12 Enterprises had various 
reasons and channels for obtaining loans, but had no way to pay them back to banks. 
                                                 
11
 It refers to the fact that the bank loans and trade credits were largely extended to the third enterprise 
and hence a great number of SOEs were in debts to one another; see SUN, Q., TONG, J. & TONG, W. 
H. S. (2002) How does government ownership affect firm performance? Evidence from China's 
privatization experience. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 29, 1-27. And SUN, Q. & TONG, 
W. H. S. (2003) China share issue privatization: the extent of its success. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 70, 183-222.  
12
 Ratchet, according to the Oxford Dictionary, is a mechanical devise that allows motion in only one 
direction. Ratchet effect means that all decisions to increase wages or bonuses were welcomed, but 
punishment of poor performance by reducing wages or bonuses was simply not politically acceptable; 
see p.38 in CHEN, J. (2005) Corporate Governance in China, Oxford, U.K., RoutledgeCruzon.  
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Government did not benefit as much as was expected from the profit-sharing system, 
because lack of information weakened its bargaining power to the extent that the 
negotiation result was usually biased in favour of the enterprise. In addition, its 
attempt to make hidden profits visible through the implementation of an income 
taxation system proved to be a major failure. As a result, the Chinese government was 
compelled to compromise in the next round of enterprise reforms, in which it shelved 
the transparency agenda and made the profit-sharing system even more 
institutionalised.  
 
Second round of enterprise reform (1987-1992)  
 
The main goal of the second round of enterprise reforms remained unchanged: 
namely, to address the problem of unstable government revenue (Hay et al., 1994:23). 
Government should enhance its ability in securing its stake out of the profit-sharing 
system, which had appeared to be a game extremely unfair to the government. After 
the first round of reforms, it was evident that ambiguities in the profit-sharing 
arrangement were the root of problem, and that information asymmetry created 
uncertainties and led to a bias in distribution that favoured the enterprise. Thus, the 
government first tried to clarify these informational ambiguities by implementing a 
taxation system that responded to the operational details and thereby reconciled 
problems of informational asymmetry in such a way as to strengthen its bargaining 
power. Yet this experiment was a failure. The government was eventually forced to 
compromise with the enterprise, to align the interests of both parties, and to formulate 
a strategy to avoid the information gap in order to secure its share of profits.  
This compromise was the Contract Responsibility System (CRS). By making a 
written contract with the enterprise, the government sought to reduce uncertainties 
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and guarantee a fixed amount of its profit share without having the information about 
operational details and the real amount of retained profits of enterprise. The idea of 
CRS was inspired by the successful trials of the Household Responsibility System 
(HRS) in rural areas in the late 1970s (Yang, 2004, Wu, 2003:139). It had previously 
been promoted for a few months in early 1983, but soon replaced by the taxation 
reform. In 1987, the CRS was revived in order to tackle the failure of taxation system 
by introducing the following changes. Enterprises would sign a negotiated three-year 
performance contract with the government, and managers would undertake to meet 
various performance targets, including sales, profitability and capital accumulation 
within a specific time frame (Garnaut et al., 2005:2). A new kind of performance 
evaluation system was simultaneously introduced (Naughton, 2007:94). The 
stereotype of the performance contract could be generalised as “two commitments and 
one hook-up” (liangbao yigua 兩 包 一 掛 ). A contracted amount of tax and 
profit-delivery would be guaranteed by the enterprise, so that government revenue 
would be placed on a more stable basis. Technical renovation would be promised and 
funded through the use of retained profits, enabling the government to relinquish the 
burden of upgrading construction. Wages and bonuses would be hooked-up with, or 
linked to, the realised profits in order to stop prevalent misuse (Lin et al., 1997). This 
system was enthusiastically accepted by enterprise managers and its inherent stability 
led to it being widely adopted (Lin et al., 1997, Naughton, 2007:94). By the end of 
1987, 80 per cent of state enterprises were covered by the CRS, and, in 1989, nearly 
all enterprises had signed contracts lasting through 1993 (Yusuf et al., 2006:59). 
However, numerous problems remained unsolved in the CRS (Hassard et al., 
2007:92-94).  
First, disparities among performance contracts were still significant. The 
negotiated profit quota fluctuated considerably between 5 and 20 per cent. 
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Discrepancies were considered necessary in order to establish a standardised target 
attainable for enterprise managers (Forrester and Porter, 1999). Enterprises therefore 
continued to complain about the unequal profit retention/margins that favoured some 
enterprises more than others. Second, property rights ambiguities facing enterprises 
were not clarified by the new system. Instead, the contract negotiation tended to 
institutionalise previous practices of direct government interference, thereby impeding 
efforts to separate enterprise management from state ownership (Hassard et al., 
2007:91). Thirdly, opportunist behaviour was encouraged. The short-term nature of 
CRS encouraged enterprise managers to emphasise short-termism in performance to 
the detriment of maintaining fixed assets, undertaking technical upgrading and 
formulating long-term strategies (Forrester and Porter, 1999). Last but not least, the 
new system generated a serious conflict in incentive arrangements between the 
government and enterprises. This led to the accumulation of losses on a huge scale, 
and left the state a heavy burden of having to bail out loss-making enterprises.  
The debt accumulation issue was the most serious problem to emerge from the 
second round. The intensified competition brought by the booming non-state sector 
was only a minor contributory factor. The huge losses were mainly generated by the 
institutional failure of the CRS. One outcome was reflected in the ‘hostage effect’, 
meaning that the enterprise viewed outstanding loans as the hostage of the bank, 
which was unable to stop funding enterprise operations even though it was unlikely to 
gain back anything except non-performing loans (NPLs). This effect was magnified 
by the fact that banks acted like state agencies in most lending businesses. Bank credit 
become a cheap commodity with the enterprise preferring to pay higher wages and 
bonuses to themselves, rather than repaying loans to the bank (Li and Li, 1997). As a 
result, the debt crisis became the most serious legacy of the CRS. In order to inflate 
wages and bonuses under the profit-sharing system, enterprises tended to over-report 
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profits and hide losses so as to maximise the retained share (Holz, 2003:78-82). Since 
hidden losses were not subsidised by the government, they were eventually 
transferred to the NPLs owed to the banks. Nearly a half of SOEs reported losses in 
1994 and a third had losses unreported (Tung, 1996b). According to official surveys, 
hidden losses among all state enterprises accounted for 172-180 per cent of total 
reported losses, suggesting that about two-third of losses were hidden. Debt 
accumulation became extremely high. By 1993 NPLs accounted for around 20-30 per 
cent of state banks’ total outstanding debts, or about 17-25 per cent of national gross 
domestic product (GDP) (Li and Li, 1997).  
In summary, Chinese reformers instituted the second round of enterprise reform 
by making a compromise with the enterprise in the profit distribution arrangements, 
thereby making a strategic retreat for the purpose of securing government revenue. 
They fully understood that conditions, even after the first round of reform in the early 
1980s, were still not mature enough to allow the implementation of a universal 
taxation system to replace various kinds of profit distribution arrangements among 
enterprises. That explains why the CRS was a second best option. As intended, it did 
stabilise government revenue. Control over investment was decentralised to 
enterprises, while funding responsibilities were transferred to banks. Since interests 
were better aligned between the government and enterprises, the CRS was soon 
widely accepted and retained until mid-1990s. However, the CRS was only partially 
successful while many problems remained unchanged or even got worse (Forrester 
and Porter, 1999). Huge differences in tax burdens were reflected in what continued to 
be an unfair environment facing enterprises. The attempt to separate the enterprise 
management from state ownership failed. Management decisions were guided by 
short-term considerations. In short, the huge accumulation of enterprise debts and 
bank NPLs caused by various incentive conflicts became the most serious legacy of 
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the CRS policy, paving the way for the next round of reform.  
 
Third round of reform (1993-1997)  
 
The second round of enterprise reform secured government revenue, but 
achieved very little in terms of enterprise management. The outcome of the 
short-termism associated with the CRS was a continuing deterioration in enterprises’ 
long-term performance. A nationwide survey in 1991 revealed that 80 per cent of 
large and medium-scale state enterprises were facing difficulties, with 30 per cent of 
them on the edge of bankruptcy (Zhang and Zhang, 2007:67). After a decade of 
reform, enterprises were still not accountable for their performances. It was obvious 
that the CRS could be no more than an interim policy, and there was a growing 
consensus that the various incentive conflicts between the government and enterprises 
would not be removed unless a rearrangement of property rights was made. Thus, the 
spotlight of reform shifted from the autonomy issue to the ownership issue, with the 
goal of establishing a modern enterprise system (MES), based on corporatisation and 
share-holding reform. With hindsight, however, the institutional changes that were to 
take place did not touch an overall ownership reform, but offered a new hybrid 
ownership form that would eventually facilitate privatisation (Naughton, 2007:301).  
Corporatisation was the core of the MES policy. It sought to achieve several 
goals: viz., to clarify property rights of the government and enterprises, to separate 
management from ownership, to install corporate governance and to introduce 
loss-making responsibility to enterprises (Green and Liu, 2005, Zhang, 2008:34). This 
process was framed by the first Company Law (1994) ever to be enacted in China, 
which provided detailed guidance for the transformation of a traditional enterprise 
into a modern legal corporation (Naughton, 2007:301).  
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There were four principal strands to the Law. First, the creation of corporate 
ownership out of the state ownership was to be the first step towards corporatisation. 
Ambiguities in property relation were clarified by granting to the corporate entity 
entitlement to a clear bundle of property rights. A government branch should not be 
entitled as a corporate shareholder. All state enterprises were to be transformed into 
wholly state-owned enterprises, limited-liability enterprises, or joint-stock enterprises 
(Leng, 2009:45). Second, separate the functions responsible for government and 
enterprises. Government would completely retreat from enterprise management 
(Hassard et al., 2007:94-95).13 The enterprise would not carry the burden of social 
welfare provision, nor would the government take the bailout responsibility of the 
poorly-performing enterprises. Thirdly, a sound system of auditing and monitoring 
would be established in order to reduce opportunist managerial behaviours (Hassard et 
al., 2007:94). Independent organisations – for example, boards of directors, general 
shareholder meetings and supervisory boards – were set up to separate 
decision-making, executive and supervisory powers in order to achieve a more 
effective system of checks and balances (Leng, 2009:45). External auditing and 
accounting systems were also introduced in an effort to reduce monitoring costs. 
Fourthly, inner conflicts of the overlapping bureaucratic and entrepreneurial 
responsibilities were to be resolved. Instead of being planned bureaucrats, enterprise 
managers should become market entrepreneurs, thereby removing the previous 
bureaucratic identity of managers. In accordance with labour contracts signed when 
they were recruited, state workers should be turned to be state “employees”, on longer 
in receipt of lifetime employment guarantees (Zhang and Zhang, 2007:101-102). 
                                                 
13
 An official survey conducted between August and November 1994 by the central government over 
9,000 heads of SOEs shows that 77.2 percent of respondents singled out changing the functions of the 
government as the most decisive step for establishing a modern enterprise system; on Jingji Ribao 
(Economic Daily) (Beijing), March 12, 1995, 2, quoted from TUNG, R. (1996b) Obstacles hindering 
the establishment of a modern state-owned enterprise system in mainland China. Issues & Studies, 32, 
32-51. 
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Meanwhile, a national minimum wage was applied in the liberalised wage system.  
Some breakthroughs in share-holding reform during the early 1990s eased the 
process of corporatisation. A typology of categories of ownership – including state 
ownership, corporate ownership, individual ownership and foreign ownership – was 
made explicit in a nationwide promotion of share-holding enterprises (SHEs) in 1992. 
In the same year, China’s first ever monitoring agency, the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC), was established to supervise the transactions in the 
security market. In 1994 the first national legislation designed to regulate the issue 
and trading of shares was promulgated. Therefore, the spread of the share-holding 
system brought to an end a decade of experimental reforms and signalled the 
diversification of the ownership categories on a national scale.  
During 1993-96 the corporatisation reform initiative expanded rapidly among 
targeted enterprises with the total number of SHEs increasing from 2,580 to 7,760, 
and more than 10 million state workers caught up in the restructuring plans (Ma, 
2010:32). By the end of 1996, 84.4 per cent of targeted enterprises had been 
restructured: of these 42 per cent were transformed into wholly state-owned enterprise, 
29 per cent into join-stock enterprises, and 29 per cent into limited-liability 
enterprises. Among targeted enterprises, 71 per cent established boards of directors; 
63 per cent, supervisory boards: and 33 per cent, introduced share-holder meetings 
(Zhang and Zhang, 2007:109). Even so, the results were not wholly satisfactory. In an 
official survey of managers of targeted enterprises in 1997, only 41.1 per cent took a 
positive view of the corporatisation reform. Even worse, there was an unexpected 
deterioration in the performance of SHEs. In 1996, their annual profits decreased by 
11 per cent, whilst their profit-capital ratio fell from 6.1 per cent to 5.0 per cent. The 
increasing turnover time of working capital also pointed to a deterioration in 
efficiency in the use of capital (Zhang and Zhang, 2007:109-110).  
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To a large extent, the corporatisation made up for what had been lost in the 
second round of enterprise reform. Following a series of comprehensive 
rearrangements and clarification of property rights, a modern market-oriented 
enterprise system was established. Previous incentive conflicts between the 
government and enterprises in regard to welfare provision and overlapping 
responsibilities between bureaucrats and entrepreneurs were, to a large extent, 
removed. Monitoring costs were reduced through the introduction of external auditing 
and accounting systems. For the first time, the definition of state ownership was 
enshrined in legislation and further diversified through the sanctioning of other types 
of ownership. Nevertheless, less favourable outcomes were an unwelcome reminder 
that although enterprises had been granted unprecedented managerial autonomy and 
enjoyed full responsibility for performance, their overall profitability remained low or 
had even declined. The message was clear: Further ownership reform was urgently 
required.  
 
2.2 From enterprise reform to ownership revolution 
 
Launch of privatisation 
 
It could not have been predicted that the central policy of comprehensive 
privatisation would be inspired by a local experiment. In an attempt to relieve the 
heavy burden of city finance, in 1994, Chongqing government launched an 
experimental privatisation initiative by retaining just 50 large SOEs – accounting for 
0.7 per cent of total enterprises but 50 per cent of gross industrial output – and 
releasing the remaining small SOEs to the market (Zhang and Zhang, 2007:235). 
Inspired by Chongqing’s success, in September 1995 the Chinese central government 
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decided to adopt this strategy as a national policy. As the document of the Fifth 
Plenum of the Fourteenth Congress of Communist Party put it, “The point is to grasp 
a number of large enterprises and enterprise groups and use capital leverage to 
encourage the restructuring and development of other enterprises to achieve the 
economy of scale … to utilise ways of restructuring, joint venture, merging, share 
cooperation, leasing, contracts or sales in different situations in order to hasten the 
reform steps of small SOEs” (Zhang and Zhang, 2007:236). These sentences were the 
origin of the famous slogan of Chinese privatisation – “grasp the large and let go of 
the small” (zhuada fangxiao 抓 大 放 小 ). A large-scale process of ownership 
diversification within China’s state sector was not only permitted and also actively 
promoted, and a legal position for private ownership was for the first time authorised 
by the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1997 (Yeh, 1998).14  
There were two main elements to the initiative. The first – “grasp the large” – 
targeted the restructuring of the largest 1,000 SOEs, comprising 63 per cent of state 
assets, 69 per cent of value-output and 74 per cent of government revenue (Smyth, 
1998). These enterprises were mainly in industries of strategic importance, such as 
electricity, automobiles, electronics, iron and steel, machinery, chemicals, 
construction materials, transport, aerospace and pharmaceuticals (Hassard et al., 
2007:96). Through the restructuring programme the central government sought to 
fulfil three goals: to convert large SOEs into joint stock companies; to create large 
enterprise groups through mergers in pillar industries; and to encourage 
better-performing large SOEs to list on the stock exchange (Smyth, 1998).15,16 The 
                                                 
14
 In the relevant plenary document, the term “private ownership” was not explicitly used, but was 
included among the “various types of ownerships” that would coexist with the “public ownership” 
without a dominant position.  
15
 In details, central government intended to establish 57 large enterprise groups in national heavy 
industries and some others in the local level, such as 70 groups in Guangdong, 54 groups in Shanghai, 
31 groups in Zhejiang and 20 in Liaoning; see SMYTH, R. (1998) Toward "the modern corporation": 
recent developments in the institutional reform of state-owned enterprises in mainland China". Issues & 
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second element – “let go of the small” – enabled small and medium SOEs to take a 
greater scale of ownership reforms through various methods. They included:  
 
(1) Bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Law, particularly for SOEs, was enacted in 
1988, but was not widely applied until 1996 when bankruptcy cases jumped 
from 2,200 to 6,332 within a year (Smyth, 1998).  
(2) Ownership diversification. This could be done by inviting outside 
investors through initial public offerings, private replacements or private 
offerings while maintaining the state as majority owner (Garnaut et al., 
2005:48).  
(3) Shareholding cooperation. This method – the equivalent of employee 
shareholding – was welcome by many state workers for a special design that 
allowed employees to take a decisive role to the initiative of privatisation 
(Garnaut et al., 2005:49). The successful story of shareholding reform in 
Zhucheng, Hebei, in 1993 enhanced the popularity of this method.  
(4) Auctions. This kind of open sale began in 1987. But it was soon halted in 
an ideological retreat, and only resumed in 1992. Ownership transactions 
had to be made in 25 exchanges of property rights across provinces. Private 
entrepreneurs were major buyers in auctions (Ma, 2010:22).  
(5) Leases. This method was often adopted when the lessee was incapable of 
buying out the firm (Garnaut et al., 2005:50).  
(6) Mergers. This included joint ventures and involved separating the assets 
from an existing enterprise and forming a new enterprise in conjunction 
                                                                                                                                            
Studies, 34, 102-131.  
16
 Large SOEs with better performance were particularly encouraged to launch initial public offerings 
in any of Shenzhen, Shanghai, Hong Kong or New York Stock Exchange to promote ownership 
diversification and raise revenue from restructuring.  
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with a domestic or foreign firm (Garnaut et al., 2005:50).  
 
In addition, four state asset management companies were established in 1999, as 
part of the implementation of a new policy of “debt-equity swaps (zaihuangu 債換
股)” designed to alleviate the problem of huge NPLs accumulated in state banks 
during the privatisation reforms. This strategy had previously been implemented as 
part of privatisation processes in Argentina, Chile, Mexico and the Philippines, where 
it had been successful in attracting external capital and thereby helping rescue these 
highly indebted governments (Kikeri et al., 1994, Bortolotti et al., 2004). The 
outcome of China’s first-ever privatisation policy was significant (see Figure 2.1). The 
total number of SOEs reached its peak in 1996 at 127,600 but then decreased 
drastically in 1997 (by 13.79 per cent) and 1998 (by 41.18 per cent). In the space of 
two years, 62,900 SOEs were either transformed into other types of ownership or 
simply driven out of market. In short, this “Chinese Big Bang” was massive, rapid 
and profound.  
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 Figure 2.1: Total number and annual growth rate of SOEs (1980-2008).  
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (various years).  
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Triggers of the massive privatisation 
 
Several different arguments have been put forward to justify the massive 
privatisation in China of the late 1990s. The market perspective focuses on the 
induced process and attributes privatisation to the intensified competition generated 
by the boom of non-state sector production after the late 1980s (Jefferson and Su, 
2006, Guo and Yao, 2005, Hassard et al., 2007:98, Naughton, 2007:105, Qian and 
Roland, 1998, Li et al., 2000, Cao et al., 1999, Garnaut et al., 2005:41). The 
government perspective highlights the motivations of central and local governments in 
the face of the roaring costs of maintaining a large but inefficient state industrial 
sector (Qian and Roland, 1998, Garnaut et al., 2005:3-4,40, Yusuf et al., 2006:77-81, 
Smyth, 1998, Guo and Yao, 2005, Li et al., 2000, Li, 2003, Cao et al., 1999). The 
bank perspective highlights the withdrawal of state support from a decade-long 
financial suppression and its harsh impact on the fundraising activities of public 
enterprises. Finally, the manager perspective shines the spotlight on the strategic 
behaviour of SOE managers under the impact of efforts to make transparent Chinese 
fiscal, taxation, statistical and legal systems in the mid-1990s.  
Market perspective. The market-induced argument ascribes privatisation to the 
rapid expansion of the non-state sector in the product market emerging in and after the 
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late 1980s, particularly after Deng Xiaoping’s “southern tour” (nanxun 南巡) in 1992, 
a tour intended to reaffirm the Open Door Policy. Various kinds of preferential 
treatment were offered to promote the development of non-state sectors, thereby 
significantly intensifying competition in product markets (Hassard et al., 2007:98). 
There were three main sources of increased competition: township and village 
enterprises (TVEs), individually-owned enterprises (IOEs) (getihu 個體戶 ) and 
foreign-funded enterprises (sanzi qiye 三資企業) (Jefferson and Su, 2006, Naughton, 
1994b). Thanks to the successful rural reforms of the late 1980s, accumulated capital 
and released labour force started to leave agriculture in favour of industrial work in 
rural areas. Over one million TVEs emerged in the 1980s.17 IOEs – enterprises that 
had fewer than eight employees – were for the first time permitted in 1981, and their 
total number thereafter increased rapidly to peak at more than 8 million in 1994. 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) – mainly from overseas Chinese in Hong Kong, 
Macau and Taiwan – was greatly encouraged to form joint venture companies with 
Chinese capital in the early 1990s. Total FDI inflows increased from US$ 4.4 billion 
in 1991 to US$ 33.8 billion in 1994 (during which period when about 30,000 
enterprises were established) (Cao et al., 1999). The proliferation of these new 
competitors gradually came to dominate the product market, leaving the output value 
                                                 
17
 More discussion about the nature of TVEs are seen in NAUGHTON, B. (1994a) Chinese 
institutional innovation and privatization from below. American Economic Review, 84, 266-270. 
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of state enterprises to fall from a majority share of 78.5 per cent in 1980 to a minority 
share of 37.3 per cent in 1994. The profit space of SOEs was considerably squeezed 
by severe price competition. Facing growing pressure of having to compete with 
non-state products, SOE managers had no alternative but to seek more 
decision-making freedom decentralised from the state (Hassard et al., 2007:98). 
Hence, the ownership reform – equivalent to de facto privatisation – turned out to be a 
natural consequence. Privatisation was thus induced by the intensification of market 
competition.  
Central government perspective. The poor performance of SOEs was a 
constant headache to the central government. Their declining profitability not only 
caused major fluctuations in the fiscal revenue of the government, but also seriously 
constrained its financial capacity. Thus, the efficiency argument regards ownership 
reform as a tool to improve SOE efficiency. In the final two decades of the last 
century, the performance of China’s SOEs drew worldwide attention and was the 
source of heated debate in literature (Huang et al., 1999, Naughton, 1992, Ash and He, 
1998, Jefferson and Rawski, 1994, Cheng and Lo, 2002, Fan and Woo, 1996, Holz, 
2003:289, Zhang, 1998). Average SOE profitability dropped by 14 per cent between 
1985 and 1993 (see Table 2.2) – a phenomenon that contradicted claims of continuing 
improvement in productivity (Groves et al., 1994). The loss-profit ratio increased 
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from 4.2 per cent in 1985 to 35.6 per cent in 1993, and rose further to 68.7 per cent in 
1998. The spread of loss-making SOEs expanded by over 20 per cent within a single 
decade. In 1995, 72.5 per cent of local SOEs failed to show a profit, and huge debts 
were accumulated everywhere. 18  During 1987-1991, the losses made by SOEs 
totalled about 5.1 billion yuan, of which only 1.9 billion yuan (37 per cent of the total) 
was repaid by the SOEs themselves (Wu, 2003:254), the balance being eventually 
absorbed by the state. Indeed, bailing out these losses crowded out a large part of 
government revenue. For reform leaders in Beijing, the message could not be clearer: 
unless they restored efficiency in local SOEs, the central government would never be 
assured of a stable and high-level income. Accordingly, ownership reform was 
regarded as a necessary measure to reduce agency costs and improve SOE 
performance. In so doing, the central government would also be relieved of a 
significant part of the subsidy burden. These were the motives that justified the 
privatisation initiative.  
 
Table 2.2 
SOE performance in selected years. 
 Profitability Loss-Profit Ratio Loss-Making SOEs 
    
1985 25.4% 4.2% 9.7% 
1989 17.6% 19.5% 16.0% 
1993 11.4% 35.6% 30.3% 
                                                 
18
 For instance, in Zhucheng, Shandong, a pioneering city in the exploration of enterprise reform, 103 
out of its 150 SOEs were financially in the red by the end of 1992, with the losses amounting to147 
million yuan, equivalent to 1.5 times its yearly city revenue; see p.3 in GARNAUT, R., SONG, L., 
TENEV, S. & YAO, Y. (2005) China's Ownership Transformation: Process, Outcomes, Prospects, 
Washington, U.S.A., The World Bank.  
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1998 10.4% 68.7% 28.9% 
    
Source: Holz (2003:60); China Statistical Yearbook 2005.  
Note: Profitability is the ratio of the pre-tax profits to sales revenue.  
 
Local government perspective. For the central government, poor performance 
was the major concern, but for local governments there were other preoccupations. 
The soft budget constraint argument suggests that the motivation for privatisation was 
the change in the calculation of costs and benefits made by local governments in the 
wake of the series of fiscal reforms in mid-1990s (Cao et al., 1999, Guo and Yao, 
2005). The initial participating factor was the 1994 fiscal reform, which largely 
decentralised financial power down to local governments, but also transferred a huge 
amount of subsidies to them. Under the new system, local governments were allowed 
to keep enterprise income tax, but were compelled to assume the responsibility for 
subsidising loss-making SOEs. On balance, this was not a good deal for local 
governments. In the first year after this system was enforced (i.e., in 1995), over 36 
billion yuan of enterprise income tax (EIT), accounting for 12.95 per cent of local 
revenue, was generated (see Table 2.3). However, almost three-quarters (72.86 per 
cent) of this was offset by the 28 billion yuan in subsidies, which were transferred to 
local governments. Total subsidies suddenly doubled (from 36.6 to 60.8 billion yuan) 
in 1995 (see Figure 2.2). Unlike central government, which also faced a major subsidy 
challenge, local governments had no capacity to print money for bailing themselves 
out (Yusuf et al., 2006:81). The logical inference seemed to be that if they could not 
turn SOEs profitable, local governments would have to dispose of the subsidies. 
Otherwise, budgets would not be balanced and the strict requirement of the new  
Budget Law (1995) would not be fulfilled (Cao et al., 1999). This hard budget 
pressure, together with intensified competition from the growing participation of 
non-state sectors in product market, formed the famous Chinese-style federalism 
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argument, which justifies the ownership reform by the joint impetus of market 
competition and hard budget constraint (Qian and Roland, 1996, Qian and Roland, 
1998, Cao et al., 1999). This argument therefore sheds light on the local-driven and 
bottom-up nature of the massive privatisation in China.  
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 Figure 2.2: Subsidies to loss-making SOEs (1985-2006).  
Source: China Statistical Yearbooks 2007.  
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Table 2.3 
Subsidies to loss-making SOEs in central and local governments (1978-2006).                                                              100 million yuan 
  Central revenue  Local revenue 
EIT% Subsidy% 
  
Total Taxes 
Enterprise   Enterprise 
  
Revenue 
Subsidies 
for 
loss-maki
ng 
 Total Income tax 
Return 
of 
income 
tax 
Profits of 
state 
assets 
Subsidies 
for 
loss-maki
ng 
       A B C D E (B+C+D)/A 
E/(B+C+
D) 
              
1978  1132.26 519.28 571.99          
1980  1159.93 571.70 435.24          
1985  2004.82 2040.79 43.75 -507.02         
1990  2937.10 2821.86 78.30 -578.88         
1991  3149.48 2990.17 74.69 -510.24         
1992  3483.37 3296.91 59.97 -444.96         
1993  4348.95 4255.30 49.49 -411.29         
1994  5218.10 5126.88  -366.22         
1995  6242.20 6038.04  -327.77  2985.58 366.62  19.05 -281.01 12.92% -72.86% 
1996  7407.99 6909.82  -337.40  3746.92 421.99  21.46 -280.21 11.84% -63.19% 
1997  8651.14 8234.04  -368.49  4263.20 534.94  30.06 -272.76 13.25% -48.28% 
1998  9875.95 9262.80  -333.49  4983.95 515.14  - -258.81 10.34% -50.24% 
1999  11444.08 10682.58  -290.03  5594.87 781.29 -28.28 45.91 -238.38 14.28% -29.84% 
2000  13395.23 12581.51  -278.78  6406.06 1005.50 -13.85 60.17 -230.15 16.42% -21.88% 
2001  16386.04 15301.38  -300.04  7803.30 1636.13 -7.76 57.21 -261.76 21.60% -15.53% 
2002  18903.64 17636.45  -259.60  8515.00 1118.17 -2.71 85.12 -214.01 14.10% -17.83% 
2003  21715.25 20017.31  -226.38  9849.98 1043.50 -0.14 135.44 -194.04 11.97% -16.46% 
2004  26396.47 24165.68  -217.93  11693.37 1373.34 -0.07 222.73 -181.98 13.65% -11.40% 
2005  31649.29 28778.54  -193.26  14884.22 1745.90 -0.76 394.75 -166.57 14.38% -7.78% 
2006  38760.20 34809.72  -180.22  18303.58 2182.50 -1.82 500.47 -149.07 14.65% -5.56% 
              
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (various years).  
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Table 2.4 
Ownership diversification and enterprise numbers (1980-2008). 
Unit: 10 thousand enterprises 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986       
              
National 37.73 38.15 38.86 39.25 43.72 46.32 49.93       
Whole nation ownership industry 8.34 8.42 8.60 8.71 8.41 9.37 9.68       
Collective ownership industry 29.35 29.68 30.19 30.46 35.21 36.78 40.01       
# Township-run industry 18.66 18.55 18.58 18.61 21.72 21.71 24.60       
Other types industry 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.17 0.24       
              
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
              
National enterprises 518.53 670.67 747.41 810.56 798.07 795.78 807.96 861.21 991.16 1001.71 734.15 798.65 792.29 
State-owned industry 9.37 9.68 9.76 9.91 10.23 10.44 10.47 10.33 10.47 10.22 11.80 11.38 9.86 
Collective-owned industry 174.21 182.30 181.93 185.30 174.70 166.85 157.72 164.06 180.36 186.30 147.50 159.18 177.23 
# Township-run industry 21.71 24.60 23.79 23.77 23.43 22.87 22.96 22.95 20.98 21.77 22.88 20.23  
Village-run industry 63.26 62.91 70.80 73.38 72.16 68.08 67.52 70.97 77.73 78.87 68.99 67.84 63.14 
Cooperative industry 74.17 79.38 71.92 72.38 62.95 59.66  54.64 64.42 68.92 37.16 51.86 78.25 
    Urban cooperative industry  3.33 3.63 3.72 3.54 3.09 2.95 3.96 6.81 6.73    
    Rural cooperative industry 74.17 76.05 68.29 68.66 59.41 56.57 48.35 50.68 57.61 62.19    
Individual industry 334.78 478.45 555.33 614.81 612.42 617.60 638.67 685.40 797.12 800.74 568.82 621.07 597.47 
    Urban individual industry 33.01 36.74 49.15 45.28 42.49 43.25 45.06 50.70 68.17 88.18    
    Rural individual industry 301.77 441.72 506.18 301.77 569.53 574.35 593.62 634.70 728.95 712.56    
Other economic types industry 0.17 0.24 0.39 0.54 0.72 0.88 1.08 1.42 3.21 4.45 6.03 7.02 7.73 
              
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999        
              
National enterprises 1001.71 734.15 798.65 792.29 797.46 792.99        
State-owned and state-holding enterprises 10.22 11.80 12.76 11.00 6.47 6.13        
Collective-owned enterprises 186.30 147.50 159.18 177.23 179.78 165.92        
Individual enterprises 800.74 568.82 621.07 597.47 603.38 612.68        
Other economic types enterprises 4.45 6.03 7.02 7.73 8.57 9.18        
# Share-holding economy 0.46 0.59 0.83 1.31 1.14 1.42        
Enterprises with funds from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan 3.00 5.40 4.43 4.38 6.25 6.23        
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Unit: One enterprise 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2006 2007 2008      
              
National 162885 171256 181557 196222 276474 301961 336768 426113      
Domestic funded 134440 139833 147091 157641 219309 241089 269312 348266      
# State-owned and state-holding enterprises 53489 46767 41125 34280 35597 24961 20680 21313      
   State-owned enterprises 42426 34530 29449 23228 23417 14555 10074 9682      
   Collective-owned enterprises 37841 31018 27477 22478 18095 14203 13032 11737      
   Cooperative enterprises 10852 10864 10193 9283 8215 6313 5880 5612      
   Joint ownership enterprises 2510 2234 1964 1689 1439 1075 999 833      
      State joint ownership enterprises 419 384 330 296 278 175 169 152      
      Collective joint ownership enterprises 736 639 546 486 395 320 299 277      
       Joint state-collective enterprises 954 829 733 549 427 294 262 206      
      Other joint ownership enterprises     339 286 269 198      
   Limited liability corporations 13215 18956 22486 26606 41234 47081 53326 62835      
      State sole funded corporations 1226 1372 1349 1330 1449 1343 1329 1398      
      Other limited liability corporations     39785 45738 51997 61437      
   Share-holding corporations limited 5086 5692 5998 6313 7171 7210 7782 9422      
      Private enterprises 22128 36218 49176 67607 119357 149736 177080 245850      
      Private-funded enterprises     26525 33976 39549 55784      
      Private partnership enterprises     6049 7316 8044 10223      
      Private limited liability corporations     82078 102199 122360 171150      
      Private share-holding corporations ltd.     4705 6245 7127 8693      
   Other enterprises 382 321 348 437 381 916 1139 2295      
Enterprises with funds from Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan 16490 18257 19546 21152 28399 29181 31949 35578      
   Joint-ventures enterprises     10694 10212 10927 11297      
   Cooperative enterprises     1863 1637 1673 1404      
   Enterprises with sole investment     15541 17038 19008 22288      
   Share-holding corporations ltd.     301 294 341 589      
Foreign funded enterprises 11955 13166 14920 17429 28766 31691 35507 42269      
   Joint-venture enterprises     12930 13256 14485 16130      
   Cooperation enterprises     1711 1499 1537 1448      
   Enterprises with sole funds     13758 16552 18968 24028      
   Share-holding corporations ltd. with foreign investment    367 384 517 663      
              
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (various years).  
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Bank perspective. Banking support became crucial to the daily operation of 
SOEs in the early 1980s, when unconditional loans from state banks to a considerable 
extent replaced the previous role played by government budgets. However, banking 
reforms subsequently launched in the mid-1990s ended this preferential support and 
increased financial stringency, thereby giving a further impetus to SOEs to adopt 
privatisation.19  
The 1994 banking reform sought to fulfil three targets: (1) To turn People’s Bank 
of China (PBOC) into a modern central bank fully in charge of monetary policy; (2) to 
build up a truly efficient banking system that would conduct business under modern 
methods of risk supervision and control; and (3) to marketise deposit and lending rates 
in order to enable the banking sector to help the economy attain optimal efficiency. 
The impact of the 1994 reform was profound and direct. The new risk control system 
required banks to withdraw unconditional support to the state sector. As Figure 2.3 
shows, total industrial loans maintained a high rate of increase for a decade after 1985, 
growing on average, by 25.29 per cent p.a. However, in 1995, in the immediate 
aftermath of banking reform, growth fell sharply, and thereafter the average annual 
rate of increase declined to 10.04 per cent. Limited bank credits were largely crowded 
out. It became much more difficult to get loans from banks. As a result, the new 
stringent banking requirements squeezed profit margins, hardened budget constraints 
and encouraged eventual privatisation (Cao et al., 1999, Green and Liu, 2005:32).  
 
                                                 
19
 In the 1979 reform, one of the priority tasks was to cut the economic dependence of SOEs on the 
state, and to replace it with a normal lending/borrowing relationship between commercial banks and 
state firms. Two waves of bogaidai (撥改貸; i.e., to replace allocations with loans) policy were 
announced in 1981 and 1983 in an effort to abolish the government budgetary allocation system and to 
replace it with commercial bank loans as the major source of SOE funding for purposes of construction 
and generating circulating cash flows.  
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 Figure 2.3: Industrial loans and growth changes (1979-2008).  
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (various years).  
 
 
However, there is another crucial effect brought about by the banking reform that 
has attracted little attention in literature – namely, the rent-shifting effect. From the 
perspective of the theory of financial deepening, the decade from 1985 to 1994 could 
be regarded as a period of financial repression: in other words, a period when under 
which policy that interest rate spreads (IRS) (i.e., the difference between nominal 
deposit and nominal lending rate) and the real lending rates (i.e., the difference 
between nominal lending rate and the inflation rate) were both highly controlled and 
repressed at a very low (sometimes at zero) level by the government as a part of 
industrial policy in order to create economic rents favouring specific industries 
(Suzuki et al., 2008). Theoretically, IRS is the rent opportunity that will drive banks 
automatically to allocate economic resource, because this gives banks incentives to 
seek more deposits and credits.20 A chronology of changes in the IRS can be divided 
into three phases from 1955 to 2003 (see Figure 2.4). In the first phase (1955-1984), 
the average rate of IRS was 1.95 per cent. After the start of the first round enterprise 
reform in the mid-1980s, profit margins were clearly repressed and IRS rents were 
transferred from the banks to industrial (state) enterprises. During the second phase 
                                                 
20
 Although Marxist economics took exception to this financial surplus, it in fact never disappeared 
even after the Communist Party took over China in 1949.  
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(1985-1995), the average rate fell to 0.53 per cent. From 1984 to 1995, the number of 
SOEs increased by 40 per cent from 84,000 to 118,000 whilst the annual SOE 
industrial output increased fivefold from 517 to 3,122 billion yuan. Historical 
estimates of real lending rates reveal a similar but even more pronounced picture. 
During most of 1985-1995, the real lending rate remained at a negative level or a very 
low positive level, except for a very short period during 1990-1991 (see Figure 2.4). 
This policy of financial repression created a strong incentive for SOEs to try to 
borrow money from banks even for funding very poor investment projects (Wu, 
2003:211). After the banking reform, the phase three shows, the interest rate ceased to 
be negative and after 1996 became positive. This change shifted the rents back to the 
banking sector and also hardened the budget constraint of SOEs. In summary, the 
rent-shifting policy resulting from financial repression successfully promoted a 
long-term expansion in the state industrial sector, although it also left banks with a 
huge amount of NPLs. Consequently, the end of this policy not only paved the way 
for a modern banking system, but also ended the soft budget policy favouring SOEs 
and further facilitated the subsequent privatisation.  
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 Figure 2.4: Interest rate spreads for one year period (1955-2002) and the real lending rate 
(1985-2002).  
Source: Data of nominal deposit and lending rates from Li (2004); data of the consumption 
price index (CPI) from China Statistical Yearbook (various years).  
Note: Interest rate spread = Nominal lending rate – nominal deposit rate. Real lending rate 
= CPI – nominal lending rate.  
 
Managerial perspective. The ‘transparency argument’ shifts the analytical focus 
from the market, government and bank to the manager per se. It attributes 
privatisation to the strategic behaviour of SOE managers in response to the series of 
transparency reforms that took place in the mid-1990s. These reforms embraced three 
aspects – new accounting regulations, the introduction of the special invoices for 
value-added tax (VAT), and the revised Criminal Law.  
First, in 1993, China launched an accounting and statistical revision that clarified 
various definitions of profits and costs and further facilitated the next round of tax 
reform in 1994. This measure first prevented SOE losses from being revealed before 
the presentation of the final accounts. Its effect was successfully to remove the 
incentive to manipulate losses in order to conceal profits, which had been a 
widespread problem during the profit-retention and the CRS periods. It generated four 
distinct cost concepts: (1) Product sales costs; (2) sales costs (roughly equivalent to 
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marketing costs); (3) management costs (equivalent to the expenditure on 
administrative overheads); and (4) financial expenses (mainly the repayment of 
interest on loans) (Ash and He, 1998).21 A more accurate measure of financial 
performance was therefore available, and, more importantly, information relating to 
profits, losses and costs were made much more transparent.  
Second, the initiative of VAT special invoices in 1994 also made the production 
chain more transparent and reduced the rent-seeking opportunities available for SOE 
managers. One of the most crucial elements of the 1994 tax reform was to put the 
usage of VAT special invoices into the economic circulation process, allowing each 
purchase in the market to be doubly checked – from the buyer and seller sides – by 
accounting authorities.22 This double auditing system could effectively prevent the 
tax evasion (Zhou and Yang, 1994). Hence, for the first time, the industrial production 
chain was to a large extent made transparent to both public and, in particular, the state. 
All enterprise profits and costs were linked to the VAT revenue, which could be 
cross-checked in the production chain, so that the danger of manipulating was 
                                                 
21
 There were two concepts of profits reported in the old statistical reporting system: Profits from 
product sales (equal to the revenue from product sales less costs of goods sold less product taxes less 
fees for technology transfer) needed to assess an enterprise’s tax liability; and total profits (equal to the 
profits from product sales less profits on other sales plus non-operational income less non-operational 
expenses) needed to assess the profit remittance liability of an enterprise. There are three concepts of 
profits under the new statistical reporting system: Profits from product sales (equal to revenue from 
sales of goods less cost of good sold less selling expenses less tax on sales and other related taxes); 
sales profits (equal to profits from product sales plus profits on other sales less management expenses 
less financial expenses); and total profits (equal to sales profits plus net revenue from investment plus 
non-operational income less non-operational expenses); see ASH, R. & HE, L. (1998) Loss-making and 
the financial performance of China's industrial enterprises: data from the new accounting and statistical 
system. Journal of Contemporary China, 7, 5-20.  
22
 A nationwide VAT system was first formalised by the central government in 1984 when twelve 
machinery products were covered at various rates ranging from 6 to 16 per cent. The coverage was 
expanded again during 1986-1988 to over thirty-one products and services (70-80 per cent of total 
industrial products), at rates ranging from 8 to 45 per cent. However, problems emerged out of this new 
VAT system: The multiple rates were very difficult to administer. Various rates damaged the fairness of 
competition. The VAT liability was easily blurred because VAT was included in the product price, rather 
than being listed out of the sales price, so it was usually regarded as part of sale revenue, not 
independent cost. Further, the complicated method of VAT calculation not only made possible double 
taxation, but also left room for deliberate miscalculation. It finally led to the most serious problem – the 
auditing system often failed to detect miscalculation because of the lack of necessary information.  
56 
minimised. Meanwhile, the following form of strict legislation was also decisive.23 
Various forms of deliberate misuse of VAT special invoices were clearly defined, with 
associated severe punishments, in a Specific Decision released by the National 
Congress in 1995, and later written into the revised Criminal Law in 1997.24 
According to a survey, from January 1994 to May 2004, over ten thousand cases of 
VAT special invoice abuse were brought before the courts, and 195 people were 
sentenced to death (12 out of whom were state tax officials) (Wang, 2004a, Wang, 
2004b). Through these rigorous efforts, a certain degree of transparency was finally 
achieved, leading to a major reduction in rent-seeking opportunities among SOE 
managers.  
Third, a series of legal reforms aimed at combating corruption changed the 
incentive environment facing SOE managers and thereby encouraged eventual 
ownership reform. The slow development of a modern criminal legal system in China 
meant that legal initiatives that might have encouraged greater transparency in the 
state sector were absent until late 1980s.25 Enactment of the first Criminal Law was 
delayed until 1979. Although this legislation sought to regulate and eliminate 
corruption and bribery, the definitions of these terms were left too simple and vague to 
tackle the complex and manifold nature of corruption and bribery in the rapid 
                                                 
23
 Since VAT invoices are designed to deduct taxes paid in the last stage of production chain, any 
forging or falsely making out invoice would effectively reduce the costs and guarantee a profit of 17 
per cent of the transaction value. This explains why VAT invoices were widely recognised as more 
valuable than Renminbi notes. Within three weeks after the policy was announced, forged invoices 
were already circulating in the market; see WANG, Q. (2004b) A decade after the VAT special invoice 
(Zengzhi shuizhuan yong fapiao shinian huimou). China Taxation (Zhongguo Shuiwu), 7, 4-10.  
24
 For falsely issuing special invoices – the most popular type of abuse – criminal detention or 
imprisonment of up to three years with a fine between 20,000 and 200,000 yuan was the sentence. In 
“especially serious circumstances”, violators could be sentenced to life imprisonment or even 
sentenced to death, with a fine of between 50,000 and 500,000 yuan or the confiscation of property – a 
punishment even severe than for the crime of murder (murders could be sentenced to more than ten 
years’ imprisonment or receive the death penalty, but without any property confiscation).  
25
 For nearly three decades after 1949, criminal charges and punishments were not based on 
parliamentary (i.e., NPC-authorised) laws, but on policies or bureaucratic decisions taken 
independently by the Party.  
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transition towards a market economy.26 For this reason, a Supplementary Provision of 
the National People’s Congress took effect in 1988, which provided a clearer 
operational definition of corruption and some types of bribery. An attempt was made 
to clarify the concept of corruption by redefining the agents of such crime, the 
associated types of criminal behaviour, as well as accessories and punishments.27 
This new regulation also highlighted practices of seeking, receiving and making a 
bribe, and included within the general meaning of bribery “accepting commissions 
and various service charges for own possession in economic activities”. These 
changes were all written into the 1997 revised version of the Criminal Law. In 
addition to corruption and bribery, other forms of quasi-corrupt behaviours were for 
the first time banned.28 The most important effect of these legal reforms was to treat 
the same behaviour of SOE managers and private managers differently. SOE 
managers were strictly prohibited from engaging to other similar business, to the 
benefit of relatives or friends through outsourcing or purchasing, or to show 
favouritism in recruitment – practices that were common among private enterprises. 
Falling prey to bankruptcy or making losses were basic risks facing both public and 
private enterprises. But an SOE manager who failed on either of these counts was 
likely to be jailed. Furthermore, the manager of a private enterprise had no 
responsibility to report foreign deposits or to justify his personal accumulation of 
                                                 
26
 The behaviour of corruption was simply defined as to “take advantages of one’s office to embezzle 
public property”, while bribery was defined as “taking advantage of one’s office to accept bribes”.  
27
 The agent of corruption previously defined as “state functionary”, was now defined as “state 
personnel, personnel of collective economic organizations or other personnel handling or administering 
public property”, while corrupt behaviour was no longer simplistically defined as to “embezzle”, but 
rather to “appropriate, steal, swindle, or otherwise illegally take possession of public property”. Those 
who conspired with the agents of corruption were to be regarded as accessories and subject to the same 
punishment. Punishments were varied and the scale of punishment was linked to the amount of 
corruption proceeds.  
28
 Crimes of “failing to justify large amount of properties”, “hiding foreign deposits”, and “accepting 
foreigners’ gift without handing over to the state” were listed in 1988. Crimes of “abusing power”, 
“privately distributing state assets”, “privately distributing fines or confiscated goods”, “committing 
irregularities for favouritism”, “running similar business”, “benefiting relatives and friends”, “being 
defrauded in contracts”, and “bankruptcy or losses for practicing favouritism” were listed in 1997.  
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wealth to the state, whereas an SOE manager who failed to justify assets in his 
possession or found to have concealed foreign deposits would receive a prison 
sentence of several years. In short, only managers and those working in the state 
sector were penalised for such crimes.  
In summary, it is clear that the anti-corruption legislation made it more difficult 
for SOE managers to engage in rent-seeking behaviour. Thanks to such legislation, as 
well as the other “transparency reforms” affecting the taxation and accounting 
systems, the incentive arrangements of SOE managers were largely reshaped. 
Government ownership was much less beneficial than it had previously been, whilst 
the insider privatisation (i.e., the management buyout) became the means of 
continuing to engage in rent-seeking behaviour. Thus, this transparency argument 
offers a new explanation of the grass-root support for the massive privatisation in 
China in the late 1990s. 
 
2.3 Privatisation process 
 
Ownership diversification 
 
Prior to eventual privatisation, China had experienced a long-term process of 
ownership diversification since the mid-1980s. The change in Chinese official 
statistics captures this process clearly. There were three phases. In the first phase of 
the early 1980s, the ownership types listed in the industrial chapter of the China 
Statistical Yearbook (Zhongguo tongji nianjian 中國統計年鑑) were confined to 
“whole nation ownership industry (quanmin suoyouzhi gongye 全民所有制工業)”, 
“collectively owned industry (jiti suoyouzhi gongye 集體所有制工業)”, and “other 
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types industry (qita leixing gongye 其他類型工業)” (see Table 2.4).29 This simple 
categorisation, which disproportionately emphasised the importance of public 
ownership, reflected the conservative ideological attitude towards the non-public 
economy by that time. In the second phase, the enterprise reform of the mid-1980s 
allowed public enterprises to embark on a minor degree of ownership transformation 
in order to create performance-enhancing incentives. This was reflected in the 
emergence of a new sub-category of “cooperative industry (lienyin gongye 聯營工
業)”. Subsequently, small private businesses (getihu 個體戶) were promoted in an 
attempt to increase the provision of daily necessities, so giving rise to the 
sub-category of “individual industry (geti gongye 個體工業)” was created. These two 
new types of ownership were later formally authorised in the State Enterprise Law 
and the Registration Regulation of Legal Corporations, both promulgated in 
mid-1988, and related data were released in the next set of annual statistics.30  
This ownership classification lasted for over a decade until the third phase of 
diversification began in the mid-1990s. This phase started China’s first Company Law 
took effect in July 1994 and coincided with the national promotion of a modern 
enterprise system. In this law, more sophisticated company structures were created 
and defined, including “solely state-owned company” (guoyou duzi gongsi 國有獨資
公司), “limited liability company” (youxian zeren gongsi 有限責任公司) and “joint 
                                                 
29
 Meanwhile, the “township-run industry (xiangban gongye 鄉辦工業)” was included in the category 
of “collectively owned industry”.  
30
 In Article 34, Law of the People’s Republic of China of Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole 
People: “The enterprise shall have the right, in accordance with law and the provisions of the State 
Council, to engage in joint operations with other enterprises or institutions, to invest in other 
enterprises or institutions and to hold shares in other enterprises”. This article did not clarify the 
definition of “joint operation”, but this oversight was corrected by the registration regulation later 
announced by the State Council. In Article 2, Administrative Regulations of the People's Republic of 
China Governing the Registration of Legal Corporations, “cooperative enterprise (lienying qiye 聯營
企業)” and “private enterprise (siying qiye 私營企業)” were allowed for new registration, together 
with three new types of foreign funded enterprises: “Sino-foreign joint venture enterprise (zhongwai 
hezi jinying qiye 中外合資經營企業)”, “Sino-foreign cooperative enterprise (zhongwai hezuo jinying 
qiye 中外合作經營企業)” and “foreign funded enterprise (waizi qiye 外資企業)”.  
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stock limited company” (gufen youxian gongsi 股份有限公司).31 This legislation 
also made provision for the sub-category of “share-holding economy” (gufenzi jinji 
股份制經濟) in the statistics during 1994-1999, when the growing importance of 
“foreign funded enterprises” (waishang qiye 外商企業) was also recognised through 
their inclusion. 
The next dramatic change came with the statistical reforms of 1998. The total 
number of sub-categories increased from 6 to 16 in 2000, and from 16 to 30 in 2004. 
Distinctions were made between even more types of ownership, particularly in regard 
to various joint ownerships.32 The most momentous innovation was the explicit 
listing of “private enterprise” (siying qiye 私營企業), with added distinctions in later 
years. The inclusion of four major agents of ownership (state, collective, private and 
foreign sectors) alongside the six major ownership structures (solely funded, 
cooperative, joint venture, limited liability, partnership and limited share-holding) 
highlights the reality that Chinese ownership forms had finally diversified into a 
modern and complicated system.33  
 
Shrinkage of the state sector 
 
In terms of the ownership composition in China, following the rapid 
nationalisation in the late 1950s, public ownership (including state and collective 
ownership) dominated the industrial production for the next four decades. Yet each 
                                                 
31
 This first Company Law was momentous because it unprecedentedly established a modern corporate 
structure, including the shareholders’ meetings, boards of directors, and supervisory committees. It also 
sought strictly to regulate the company finance, accounting, mergers, separations, bankruptcies, 
dissolutions and liquidations.  
32
 Thus, “state joint ownership enterprise (guoyou lienying qiye 國有聯營企業)”, “collective joint 
ownership enterprise (jiti lienying qiye 集體聯營企業)” and “joint state-collective enterprise (guoyou 
yu jiti lienying qiye 國有與集體聯營企業)” were solely listed.  
33
 For further consideration of the impact of China’s statistical reforms, see HOLZ, C. A. & LIN, Y. M. 
(2001) The 1997-1998 break in industrial statistics - facts and appraisal. China Economic Review, 12, 
303-316.  
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decade witnessed its own distinctive changes. As Figure 2.5 shows, the 1970s saw a 
steady increase in the output of TVEs (collective ownership) under the impact of early 
rural reform. Driven by the Open Door Policy, non-public ownership, including the 
individual and foreign ownerships, began to emerge in the first half of the 1980s and 
subsequently expanded further in the latter half. The dramatic transition took place in 
the late 1990s, when rapid privatisation enabled non-public ownership to replace 
public ownership as the dominant ownership form. Indeed, according to the latest data 
in the figure, the public share has fallen to its lowest level – 11 per cent. In terms of 
the gross industrial output by ownership, Figure 2.6 tells a different story: the 
declining trend in state ownership during the 1980s and 1990s was not caused by 
falling output in the state-owned sector, but by the relatively faster increases in the 
output of the collective and non-public sectors. Figure 2.6 also highlights the 
accelerated pace of private ownership expansion in recent years.  
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 Figure 2.5: Composition of the industrial output by ownership 
types (1949-2008).  
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (various years)  
Note: Non-public ownership includes individual (private) and 
other forms of ownership.  
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 Figure 2.6: Total industrial output by ownership types 
(1949-2008).  
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (various years).  
Note: Non-public ownership includes individual (private) 
and other ownerships.  
 
 
Since the shrinkage of the state sector is the principal theme of this section, in 
what follows we concentrate on the distribution of privatisation initiatives among 
provinces and industries.  
In terms of units, the national number of SOEs (with independent accounting 
system) peaked at 87,905 in 1995, subsequently declining to 20,680 in 2007 whilst 
76.5 per cent SOEs had disappeared from the statistics during that period (Appendix 
Table 2A.1).34 In terms of employment, the national number of SOE employees also 
peaked in 1995 at 43.97 million, falling to 17.43 million in 2007 (implying that 60.4 
per cent SOE employees had lost their jobs during this period) (Appendix Table 
2A.2).  
This dramatic transition was not, however, equally distributed among regions and 
industries. In regional terms, there was a heavy concentration of SOE restructuring in 
east China, particularly in coastal provinces (see Figure 2.7). Five coastal provinces – 
                                                 
34
 There are four kinds of definition of SOEs in Chinese statistics. The one defined in terms of 
possession of an independent accounting system is the most rigorous. For further discussions, see 
Section 4.4.  
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Liaoning, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu and Guangdong – each privatised over 3,500 
SOEs during 1994-2008. The two inland provinces, with the highest concentration of 
SOE losses were Jiangxi and Sichuan (including Chongqing).35 The second intensive 
privatisation was mainly concentrated in central provinces – including Henan, Hubei 
and Hunan – although there was also one province in the northeast – Heilongjiang. In 
most provinces in west China, the number of privatisation cases was less than 2,000 – 
a reflection of the relatively small size of their state sectors. The distribution in terms 
of employee reveals a slightly different pattern, biased particularly towards northeast 
China (see Figure 2.8). The combined total of laid-off state workers in Liaoning, Jilin 
and Heilongjiang was 5.44 million, accounting for one fifth of the national total 
during 1994-2008. Meanwhile, Shandong, Jiangsu and Sichuan still retained a large 
share of privatised state workers.  
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2.7: Decreases of SOEs by provinces (1994-2008).  
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (various years).  
Unit: An enterprise. 
Note: Decrease is defined as the difference of the maximum and 
the minimum number during 1994 and 2008. Data of 
Chongqing and Sichuan are not distinguished.  
 
                                                 
35
 Chongqing is included in Sichuan’s because its separation from Sichuan only took place in 1998, 
when it was granted provincial-level status. Combining their data avoids under-estimating this area’s 
importance as well as facilitating the econometric analysis in later chapters.  
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 Figure 2.8: Decreases of SOE employees by provinces 
(1994-2008).  
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (various years).  
Unit: 1 thousand people. 
Note: Decrease is defined as the difference of the maximum and 
the minimum number during 1994 and 2008. Data of 
Chongqing and Sichuan are not distinguished.  
 
 
From an industrial (functional) perspective, privatisation was concentrated in ten 
industries: food processing, non-metallic minerals, food manufacture, chemical, 
textile, special and general machinery, beverages, printing and transport equipment 
(see Figure 2.9). During 1994-2008 66.23 per cent of all SOE closures occurred in 
these ten industries. It is striking that most of these were light manufacturing 
enterprises – and just two food industries accounted for the largest stake (20.76 per 
cent).36  Fewer cases were found in petroleum extraction, petroleum processing, 
ferrous metal ores mining, tobacco, chemical fibbers, non-ferrous metals, and gas – 
i.e., in mining and heavy manufacturing (the single exception being the monopolistic 
tobacco industry). As for employment, nine industries – textiles, non-metallic 
minerals, chemicals, general and special machinery, coal, food processing, ferrous 
metals smelting and transport equipment – accounted for 64.62 per cent of the total 
                                                 
36
 All 37 major industries are divided into four categories of sectors in this research – light 
manufacture, heavy manufacture, mining and energy. More discussion are seen in Chapter Six.  
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number of laid-off SOE employees (see Figure 2.10). Very few state workers were 
dismissed in the ferrous metal ores mining, tobacco, furniture, culture articles, gas and 
water.  
It is worth noting that the energy sector (including electricity, gas and water) 
occupied a special role in China’s privatisation strategy. During 1994-2008, the 
state-owned electricity industry contracted by 27.19 per cent in terms of number of 
enterprises, but expanded by 28.28 per cent in terms of number of employees. The 
water industry closed 48.29 per cent of its SOEs, but dismissed only 18.38 per cent of 
its state employees. Yet while the gas industry shut down 23.32 per cent of its SOEs, it 
laid off 45.67 per cent of its state employees. The conclusion we draw from these 
statistics is that the energy sector underwent internal structural adjustment rather than 
an ownership reform. In short, the state-owned industry of electricity was still in a 
growing phase, while both the state-owned gas and water industries were adjusting 
each to their own problems, such as efficiency or redundancy.  
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    Figure 2.9: Deceases of SOEs by industries (1994-2008).  
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    Source: China Statistical Yearbook (various years).  
    Note: Decrease is defined as the difference of the maximum and the minimum  
number during 1994 and 2008. 
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    Figure 2.10: Decreases of SOE employees by industries (1994-2008).  
    Sources: China Statistical Yearbook (various years).  
Note: Decrease is defined as the difference of the maximum and the minimum 
number during 1994 and 2008.  
 
We have identified, so far, some specific regions and industries in which 
privatisation was more common than in others. However, it would be wrong to 
conclude from this that privatisation was a partial policy that was promoted in rather 
piecemeal fashion. On the contrary, it is clear that privatisation was a nationwide 
policy, pursued across all regions and most industries.  
In some cases, for example, even the number of privatisation cases is small, but 
the percentage is high. The percentage comparison appears to show that Jiangxi, 
Heilongjiang, Jilin, Jiangsu, Hubei, Liaoning and Hunan have been among the most 
privatised provinces in China (see Table 2.5).37 But it also tells us something different. 
                                                 
37
 This comparison is done by ranking the arithmetic mean of the overall privatisation degree in terms 
of enterprise and employee in a specific region or industry.  
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Hainan, Zhejiang, Neimenggu (Inner Mongolia), Guangxi and Fujian – where SOE 
concentration was relatively limited – nevertheless experienced privatisation on a 
considerable scale. By contrast, Shandong, Henan, Guangdong – provinces with 
major SOE contractions – experienced privatisation on a smaller scale than might 
have been expected. Counter-intuitively, Tianjin – an important coastal city – 
underwent the lowest level of privatisation of any province.  
In addition, the comparison by industry first confirms the high degrees of 
privatisation in food processing, textile, foods manufacture, beverages and 
non-metallic mineral manufacture. Some industries – like leather, furniture, culture 
articles, paper, timber and printing – engaged intensive privatisation with less real 
cases due to a smaller scale. These data also demonstrate that privatisation may have 
favoured light industries more than heavy industries. Among the top 10 industries in 
the ranking of Table 2.5, there is only one industry – non-metallic mineral 
manufacture – that falls into the heavy industry category. By contrast, the incidence of 
privatisation in both (general and special) machinery manufacturing was relatively 
moderate, although the absolute level of contraction was much more significant (the 
maximum contraction for the general machinery is 3,267, and 3,511 for special 
machinery during 1994-2008; see Table 2A.1). The findings also suggest that both the 
energy and mining sectors may have been exceptions to privatisation policy trends. 
More specifically, these two sectors may have been pursuing a policy that gave a 
lower priority to privatisation per se.  
In any case, there is no room for doubt that for the last decade and a half (or 
more), privatisation has been pursued as national policy on a widespread basis and 
with profound consequences. The process has taken place in all provinces, (albeit to 
differing degrees with the incidence of SOE privatisation falling within a range of 
between 55 and 80 per cent. From an industrial perspective, is the range of variation 
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was even bigger. The incidence of privatisation in 11 industries exceeded 80 per cent, 
while in 10 other industries it was less than 55 per cent. Such differences imply that 
the functional nature of industries may have been more important than regional 
locational characteristics in shaping the dynamics of privatisation. This point will be 
further elaborated in later chapters.  
 
Table 2.5 
Average decreasing share of state-owned enterprises and employees by provinces and 
industries (1994-2008). 
Rank Region Average Enterprises Employees 
     
1 Jiangxi 78.80% 87.45% 70.15% 
2 Heilongjiang 78.56% 86.94% 70.19% 
3 Jilin 77.90% 85.69% 70.11% 
4 Jiangsu 77.88% 81.92% 73.84% 
5 Hainan 76.51% 81.43% 71.59% 
6 Zhejiang 75.39% 78.78% 72.00% 
7 Neimenggu 73.77% 82.24% 65.31% 
8 Hubei 73.60% 80.28% 66.93% 
9 Liaoning 73.36% 80.82% 65.90% 
10 Hunan 72.72% 77.87% 67.57% 
11 Guangxi 72.31% 77.21% 67.40% 
12 Fujian 71.76% 78.05% 65.46% 
13 Hebei 70.31% 81.84% 58.77% 
14 Shanghai 68.84% 68.89% 68.78% 
15 Anhui 68.41% 80.84% 55.98% 
16 Sichuan 68.16% 75.00% 61.32% 
17 Guangdong 67.75% 74.52% 60.98% 
18 Xizhan 67.53% 84.48% 50.59% 
19 Xinjiang 67.44% 73.82% 61.05% 
20 Yunnan 66.68% 75.43% 57.93% 
21 Henan 66.27% 77.14% 55.40% 
22 Beijing 65.48% 72.57% 58.39% 
23 Qinghai 65.37% 76.30% 54.44% 
24 Ningxia 64.59% 80.23% 48.95% 
25 Gansu 63.96% 73.62% 54.30% 
26 Shandong 62.67% 73.10% 52.24% 
27 Shaanxi 62.52% 76.72% 48.31% 
28 Guizhou 60.63% 72.69% 48.56% 
29 Shanxi 58.09% 76.91% 39.26% 
30 Tianjin 56.55% 54.13% 58.97% 
     
Rank Industry Average Enterprises Employees 
     
1 Leather 95.09% 95.87% 94.31% 
2 Food Processing 90.18% 91.81% 88.55% 
3 Textile 89.89% 88.81% 90.96% 
4 Furniture 89.06% 93.66% 84.45% 
5 Foods Manufacture 88.33% 92.89% 83.77% 
6 Culture Articles 87.50% 89.56% 85.43% 
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7 Paper 87.36% 89.68% 85.04% 
8 Beverages 82.64% 90.96% 74.31% 
9 Non-metallic Mineral Manufacture 82.44% 82.39% 82.49% 
10 Timber 81.86% 86.56% 77.16% 
11 Printing 80.08% 83.87% 76.29% 
12 Other Ores Mining 79.91% 82.35% 77.46% 
13 Metal Manufacture 78.19% 81.60% 74.77% 
14 Plastics 77.24% 81.82% 72.66% 
15 Rubber 76.71% 80.94% 72.48% 
16 Special Machinery 73.31% 78.30% 68.31% 
17 General Machinery 73.08% 74.40% 71.76% 
18 Textile Wearing 72.52% 82.50% 62.55% 
19 Measuring Instruments 72.34% 69.64% 75.05% 
20 Electrical Equipment 72.29% 74.15% 70.43% 
21 Chemical 71.51% 76.40% 66.62% 
22 Non-Ferrous Metal Ores Mining 68.50% 69.76% 67.24% 
23 Medicines 68.42% 74.89% 61.94% 
24 Chemical Fibers 68.29% 76.92% 59.66% 
25 Ferrous Metals Smelting 60.05% 69.48% 50.61% 
26 Transport Equipment 56.89% 68.44% 45.34% 
27 Petroleum Extraction 53.51% 53.57% 53.46% 
28 Communication Equipment 52.02% 54.91% 49.14% 
29 Ferrous Metal Ores Mining 50.96% 59.78% 42.13% 
30 Tobacco 50.02% 61.61% 38.42% 
31 Coal 47.01% 62.05% 31.96% 
32 Petroleum Processing 44.36% 47.15% 41.58% 
33 Non-ferrous Metals Smelting 38.26% 42.80% 33.71% 
34 Gas 34.49% 23.32% 45.67% 
35 Water 33.34% 48.29% 18.38% 
36 Electricity -0.54% 27.19% -28.28% 
     
Source: Author’s calculation.  
Note: Average is the arithmetic mean of the share of enterprises and the share of employees. 
Chongqing’s data are included in Sichuan’s.  
 
2.4 Privatisation performance 
 
“How does privatisation work in China?” This question has attracted worldwide 
attention and already generated a significant literature. It has also shifted the focus of 
research from a previous emphasis on comparing and contrasting performance 
indicators among publicly-owned and privately-owned enterprises to a more recent 
emphasis on comparing the performance record before and after the ownership 
transformation. The consensus view that has emerged from such research is that the 
net impact of privatisation has been a positive one, although there remain a few areas 
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in which findings are more ambiguous (see Table 2.5 for a summary of literature).  
 
Table 2.6 
Measuring the privatisation performance in privatisation literature.  
Authors Data Findings about privatisation performance 
   
Xu and Wang (1999) Utilises SHSE and SZSE data during 
1993-1995 with 673 firm-year 
observations.  
Finds that firm’s profitability is 
negatively correlated with state’s 
shares, but positively correlated with 
legal person’s (private) shares.a  
Li and Rozelle (2000) Utilises a self-survey database 
collected in random counties in 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang in 1998 with 
168 enterprises during 1994-1997.  
Finds a significant increase in revenue 
within and after the year of 
privatisation.  
Li and Rozelle (2003) Utilises a self-survey database 
collected in random counties in 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang, covering 670 
township enterprises during 
1993-1999.  
Among public firms, finds no 
significant difference in the 
performance between privatised and 
non-privatised SOEs. But, comparing to 
public firms, private firms are 
significantly correlated with better 
performance.  
Sun and Tong (2003) Utilises the China Stock Market and 
Accounting Research Database 
(CSMARD) and Taiwan Economic 
Journal Database to evaluate the 
performance changes of 634 SOEs 
issuing privatisation during 
1994-1998. 
The cross-section analysis documents 
that the majority share of government is 
only significantly correlated with sales, 
not with other performance indicators. 
The pooled analysis finds that the 
government ownership has negative 
impact only on to the market-to-book 
ratio, but not on the ROS and the 
earning before interest and tax 
payments.  
Wei, Varela, D’Souza 
and Hassan (2003)  
Utilises an investment bank database, 
covering 208 firms privatised in 
SHSE or SZSE during the period 
1990-97.  
Finds that the share of state ownership 
after privatisation has a significantly 
negative correlation with the changes in 
real sales, sales efficiency, and the 
employment, but has no significant 
correlation with the ROS and leverage.  
Li and Rozelle (2004) Utilises a self-survey database 
collected in Jiangsu and Zhejiang in 
1998, covering 168 township or 
private enterprises on the period from 
1994 to 1997. 
Finds a significant increase in the 
value-added per worker in the 
post-privatisation period.  
Chi and Padgett (2005) Utilises a private Chinese stock 
market database, covering all 409 
companies listed in SHSE or SZSE in 
1996-97 to examine the short-run and 
long-run performance of IPOs. 
Finds a significant return three years 
after the IPOs, but no significant 
response is found when more 
government ownership was engaged at 
the time of issuing.  
Jia, Sun and Tong 
(2005) 
Utilises the Hong Kong Exchange 
data, over the period 1993 to 2002 
and examines the market-adjusted 
buy-and-hold changes five years after 
privatisation among 53 Chinese 
SOEs listed in Hong Kong 
Finds a significant decrease in the 
return of market-adjusted buy-and-hold 
changes by increasing state ownership.  
Lu and Liu (2005) Utilises a Chinese Academy of Social Finds a correlated 2.5 per cent increase 
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Science survey in five cities across 
four provinces, covering data of 451 
enterprises from 1994 to 1995. 
in return on asset after ownership 
transformation.  
Wang (2005) Utilises the CSMARD, covering all 
747 firms in Shanghai or Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange during 1994-1999, 
and examines the changes in 
operating performance after initial 
public offerings.  
Finds no significant correlation 
between the change of three-year return 
on assets and the percentage of 
government ownership at issuing.  
Wei, Xie and Zhang 
(2005) 
Utilises the CSMARD with 5,284 
firm-year observations during 
1991-2001 and examine the 
relationship between firm value and 
state ownership.  
Finds the Tobin’s Q to be negatively 
correlated with the state or institutional 
shares, but positively correlated with 
foreign shares.b  
Dong, Putterman and 
Unel (2006)  
Utilises a self-survey cooperated with 
the NBS over 168 manufacturing 
enterprises in summer 2002 in 
Nanjing during 1994-2001.  
Finds significant and positive 
correlations between the reformed (i.e., 
privatised) share of SOE and the firm’s 
value-added, revenues, total factor 
productivity and profits.  
Hallward-Drimeier, 
Wallsten and Xu (2006) 
Utilises an official survey, 
collaborated by the NBS and the 
World Bank, covering 1,500 firms in 
five major cities during 1994-2001.  
Finds significant and positive 
correlations between the share of 
domestic private ownership and the 
sales growth and investment rate, but 
none with total factor productivity and 
employment growth.  
Hu, Song and Zhang 
(2006)  
Utilises a World Bank survey on 299 
manufacturing SOEs in five major 
cities during 1996-2000.  
Finds significant improvement in sales 
and revenue after increasing private 
ownership, but no improvement in 
value-added and employment.  
Ito (2006) Utilises a self-survey under 
government permission and estimates 
the privatisation effects on 
production function in over 100 
TVEs in rural Jiangsu during 
1995-2000. 
Finds no correlation between 
privatisation and production function 
with time trend, but some significance 
without time trend.  
Jefferson and Su (2006) Utilises an official survey of the NBS 
over 22 thousand large and 
medium-size SOEs during 
1996-2001.  
Finds significant improvements in the 
capital ratio to labour and the profit 
ratio to capital after privatisation.  
Fan, Wong and Zhang 
(2007b) 
Utilises a self database, covering 617 
firms, collected from IPO 
prospectuses published in SHSE and 
SZSE during 1993-2000.  
Finds that firms with 
politically-connected CEO had poor 
performance in the three-year post-IPO 
stock return.  
Park, Li and Tse (2006) Utilises a dataset, collected from the 
Database of Industrial Firms in China 
and NBS statistics, covering 23,577 
firms during 1992-1996.  
Finds that private and collective 
enterprises outperformed state 
enterprises in terms of return on assets 
and earnings before interest and tax.  
Chen, Firth, Xin and Xu 
(2008)  
Utilises a self database collected 
from public information over 156 
privatisation cases in SHSE and 
SZSE during 1995-2000 and 
examines the impact of control 
transfer toward the performance.  
Finds that the control transfer to private 
entity has positive impact to 
performance, but the control transfer to 
other state institutions causes no 
meaningful change.  
Rousseau and Xiao 
(2008) 
Utilises a dataset, collected from the 
CSMARD and the Private Listed 
Companies Database (from SinoFin 
Information Service), covering 116 
exchange-listed firms during 
Finds that the change of control from 
the state to private owners has caused 
higher profitability and productivity.  
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1994-2002.  
Bai, Lu and Tao (2009) Utilises annual surveys of the NBS 
with over 160 thousand firm-year 
data covering all SOEs during 
1998-2005.  
Finds that, in terms of performance, 
privatised SOEs experienced 
improvement in sales, higher profit 
margins and lower liability to asset 
ratio; but, in terms of social welfare, 
they paid lower wages, charged higher 
prices – though also made contributed 
more tax revenue.  
Chen, Firth and Xu 
(2009) 
Utilises the CSMARD with 6,113 
firm-year data during 1999-2004.  
Finds that private ownership is not 
necessarily superior to state ownership 
in performance. SOEs with the central 
government as the largest ownership 
performed best.  
Jiang, Yue and Zhao 
(2009) 
Utilises a dataset of the NBS with 
149 manufacturing firms’ data during 
1998-2003.  
Finds that share issue privatisation has 
improved firm’s profitability by 2.5 per 
cent.  
Li, Sun and Zou (2009) Utilises a dataset, collected from the 
CSAMRD, CCER Corporate 
governance Database and a private 
source, covering 643 firms during 
1994-2000.  
Finds strong negative correlation 
between the state shareholding and the 
firms’ performance among more 
profitable firms.  
Ng, Yuce and Chen 
(2009) 
Utilises a private database (from 
Guoyuan Securities Company) with 
743 companies listed in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange during 
1996-2003.  
Finds a negative correlation between 
the state share ownership and the 
performance (Tobin’s Q).b Also 
documents a convex relation between 
the state ownership and the market 
value.  
   
Source: Author’s summaries.  
Note: All papers listed in this table are once published in academic journals included in the Social 
Science Citation Index (wokinfo.com), except two Chinese papers published in China’s core journals. 
Only findings measuring the performance of different ownerships and the comparison between pre- and 
post-privatisation periods are listed in this table, while other findings of each author’s interests are not 
included.  
a
 Legal personality is the characteristic of a non-living entity regarded by law to have the status of 
personhood.  
b
 The Tobin’s Q, an indicator for measuring performance, is the ratio between the market value and 
replacement value of the same physical asset.  
 
Some papers examine directly the influence of state ownership on SOE 
performance. Xu and Wang (1999) are among the earliest to measure the 
post-privatisation performance of state-owned firms using stock market data. They 
report a negative correlation between a firm’s profitability and its state-owned status. 
Wei, Varela, D’souza and Hassan (2003) document a similar finding to the effect that 
holding a larger stake of state ownership in a firm had reduced both sales and sale 
efficiency and led to a smaller size of employment (i.e., an unsatisfactory result of job 
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creation). Jia, Sun and Tong’s (2005) findings also attribute the decrease in 
market-adjusted buy-and-hold return to the shares held by the state, as do two recent 
papers (Ng et al., 2009, Li et al., 2009).  
Some papers, examining the influence of private ownership, obtain similar 
results. Li and Rozelle’s (2003) survey finds that private ownership is positively 
correlated with firm performance. Dong, Putterman and Unel’s (2006) survey, 
undertaken in cooperation with the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), 
identifies the positive influence of privatisation (represented by the proportion of 
shares privatised) in firm’s value-added, revenues, profits and total factor productivity 
(TFP). From around the same time, two other reports, generated from the World Bank 
database, document a concrete improvement in sales, revenues and investment rates 
associated with increased participation in private ownership (Hu et al., 2006, 
Hallward-Driemeier et al., 2006).  
Meanwhile, other papers have focused on a comparison of firm performance 
before and after privatisation. Li and Rozelle (2000, 2004) indicate that firms’ revenue 
and value-added per worker increased significantly in the wake of privatisation. Lu 
and Liu’s (2005) survey finds a 2.5 per cent increase in the return on assets (ROA) 
following privatisation. Similarly, another survey also finds a 2.5 per cent increase in 
post-privatisation productivity (see Jiang, Yue and Zhao (2009)). Again, Chi and 
Padgett (2005) find a positive (market-adjusted buy and hold) return three years after 
the initial public offering. Two large datasets also endorse the positive impact of 
ownership transformation. Jefferson and Su’s (2006) data, covering over 22,000 SOEs 
during 1996-2001, regress out significant improvements in the capital-labour ratio as 
well as the profit-capital ratio following privatisation. Bai, Lu and Tao’s (2009) mega 
dataset, which included 160,000 firm-year observations for 1998-2005, further 
confirms that privatised SOEs enjoyed more business sales, higher profit margins and 
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lower liability-asset ratio.  
Some more recent papers have shifted the spotlight from ownership comparison 
to other relevant issues. Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007) focus on the relationship 
between political influence and privatisation, and find that privatised SOEs with 
politically-connected Chief Executive Officer (CEO) have had a poorer performance 
in terms of their three-year post-IPO return than SOEs whose CEOs had no political 
connection. This finding implies a negative impact arising out of the legacy of state 
ownership. Chen, Firth, Xin and Xu (2008) investigate the consequence of control 
transfer (i.e., the transfer of controlling share, usually the majority share) to different 
entities. Their evidence shows that the control transfer is beneficial only if the 
controlling share is transferred to private entities; in cases in which the controlling 
share is transferred to another state institution, no meaningful change in performance 
is likely. In another paper working on the control transfer, Rousseau and Xiao (2008) 
reach the same broad conclusion: in their case, that the change of controlling share 
from state to private owners is likely to generate higher profitability and productivity.  
Nevertheless, a number of empirical investigations fail to find a positive impact 
of privatisation on specific performance indicators. Li and Rozelle (2003) find no 
significant difference between privatised and non-privatised SOEs in terms of profit 
rates and value-added per worker. Sun and Tong (2003) do not see positive influence 
of moving from state to private ownership on the firm’s three-year return on sales 
(ROS) and the earnings before interest and tax (EBIT). Wang, Varela, D’Souza and 
Hassan (2003) do not obtain meaningful results in terms of ROS and leverage. One 
study finds no significant correlation between the production function and the 
privatisation proxy (Ito, 2006): another finds no correlation between the three-year 
post-IPO return and the extent of state ownership at the issuing (Chi and Padgett, 
2005; Wang, 2005). Moreover, Chen, Firth and Xu (2009) argue that private 
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ownership is not necessarily superior to state ownership in performance, and they 
even find that SOEs with the greatest ownership involvement by the central 
performed best of all.  
Even so, this review indicates that privatisation in China has been successful. 
Most researchers have concluded that private ownership participation has, to a greater 
or lesser degree, had an enhancing effect of performance within a short period of time. 
Only six out of 25 papers listed in Table 2.6 – fail to reject the superiority of state 
ownership, the findings of the remaining 19 lending support to the beneficial impact 
of private ownership. In the entire literature, there is only one paper that advocates 
SOEs’ performance as being superior to others – and this inference holds only when 
the SOEs in question are under the direct control of the central government (Chen et 
al., 2009). In other words, except for a few large SOEs under the special protection of 
central government, evidence is lacking to support the argument that in the past 
decade or so medium and small SOEs have outperformed non-public enterprises. In 
short, a straight answer to the starting question “how has the privatisation worked in 
China?” is very simple: “well”.  
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Chapter Three 
 
Literature Review: Why privatise? 
 
3.1 Studies of the determinants of privatisation  
 
This section briefly introduces theoretical and empirical studies of the 
determinants of privatisation in the existing literature. More detailed discussion is 
provided in the next section.  
 
Theoretical studies in the literature on privatisation 
 
How to model privatisation? Theorists first seek to find the answer through an 
examination of bureaucratic behaviour (see Table 3.1). Leyden and Link (1993) draw 
attention to the responsibility of production that rests on bureaucrats’ shoulders. They 
argue that there are “political risks” that may reduce production if the production 
process is wholly controlled by bureaucrats (i.e., under government ownership). If the 
bureaucrat in charge of production is risk-averse and budget-maximising, he may try 
to use privatisation (i.e., sanctioning production by private enterprises) as a way to 
mitigate political risks and better fulfil his responsibility. Li, Ouyang and Zhou (2005) 
examine this risk factor, too. Their optimal timing model of privatisation demonstrates 
that a higher gain-to-risk ratio (for bureaucrats) will raise the likelihood of SOE 
privatisation.  
Budget is another natural bureaucratic concern. A bureaucrat will be happy to 
maximise his budget and try to get rid of the heavy burden of running an inefficient 
state enterprise. Those enterprises with the least market power and/or in receipt of the 
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largest subsidies from government should privatise first (Chen, 1996). Yarrow (1999) 
sheds more light on the cost of government finance – a more serious source of 
budgetary concern. He argues that the privatisation of a country’s state sector may be 
preceded by a period of increased financial stringency. By the same token, the change 
in budget constraint will yield a similar impact. Regarding privatisation in China, Cao, 
Qian and Weingast (1999) indicate that the hardening process of soft budget constraint 
brought by the 1994 fiscal reform was crucial. In their Chinese-style federalism 
argument, it is decentralisation that removed soft budgets and further induced the 
privatisation of the late 1990s. 
Likewise, a politician has his motives to privatise, too. A populist politician may 
advocate privatisation in an attempt to win votes by maximising social welfare (Chen, 
1996). Bennett and Maw’s (2003) model also theorises this welfare impact. Biais and 
Perotti (2002) further combine this welfare concern with the ‘ideology factor’ and put 
forward their famous “Machiavellian argument” that strategic privatisation may be 
pursued by a right-wing government seeking to win votes from middle-class citizens 
by issuing state shares to please (or influence) them. Ramamurti’s theory (2000) also 
confirms this right-wing ideology by suggesting that SOEs in countries where the 
political leadership is ideologically committed to market forces are more likely to be 
privatised.  
Macroeconomic pressure is the next concern in the theoretical literature on 
privatisation. Here, crisis is a major driver. According to the “Washington 
Consensus”,38 privatisation is usually included in the bailout conditions imposed on a 
                                                 
38
 Details about the Washington Consensus are discussed in WILLIAMSON, J. (1993) Democracy and 
the Washington consensus. World Development, 21, 1329-1336. WILLIAMSON, J. (2004) The strange 
history of the Washington Consensus. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 27, 195-206. RODRIK, D. 
(2006) Goodbye Washington consensus? Hello Washington confusion? A review of the World Bank's 
economic growth in the 1990s: learning from a decade of reform. Journal of Economic Literature, 44, 
973-987. ROLAND, G. (2001) Ten years after ... transition and economics. IMF Staff Papers, 48, 
29-52.  
78 
country seeking financial support from the World Bank or the IMF (Ramamurti, 2000). 
Competition is another major trigger in privatisation models: rising competition will 
squeeze profit margins and, in turn, drive less efficient public enterprises out of the 
market (Bennett and Maw, 2003, Cao et al., 1999, Ramamurti, 2000). Monopoly is the 
other side of the same coin. Matsumura’s (1998) duopoly model suggests that if a 
public firm is not monopolist, it should at least be partially privatised. In other words, 
the only justification for public ownership is the advantage of being a monopoly; 
otherwise, public ownership should be replaced by private ownership.39 Then, there is 
the issue of transaction cost. Few would deny that competition will be enhanced by 
market development. But it is likely that the same process will also generate lower 
transaction costs, which will then hasten the speed of privatisation sales (Li et al., 
2005). Market development may also reduce the cost of capital and thereby facilitate 
privatisation markets (Li et al., 2005). Finally, the institutional effect should be 
considered. Markets develop through the improvement of market-supporting 
institutions. Indeed, weak institutions – such as weak financial intermediaries, shallow 
stock markets, limited private savings, ambiguous property rights, and 
underdeveloped legal systems – may seriously undermine market development and, in 
turn, competition and privatisation (Ramamurti, 2000). Alexeev and Kaganovich 
(2001) generate the same conclusion that privatisation can be counterproductive 
unless market institutions actively work to favour private enterprises.  
In privatisation theories, microeconomic conditions have attracted limited 
attention. The first factor discussed in the literature is firm size. Small SOEs are more 
easily privatised than large enterprises. This is not only because small size means 
                                                 
39
 There is only one source that argues in favour of privatisation of a monopoly: Ramamurti suggests 
that a monopolistic SOE may also opt for privatisation if it can benefit from the regulatory benefits 
privatisation reform; see RAMAMURTI, R. (2000) A multilevel model of privatization in emerging 
economies. Academy of Management Review, 25, 525-550. 
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fewer redundancies, and a less onerous managerial challenge, but, more importantly, 
also reflects the cheaper cost of purchasing the enterprise (Ramamurti, 2000). Alexeev 
and Kaganovich (2001) put forward the proposition that the productivity gains from 
privatisation are likely to differ dramatically among firms of different size. Li, 
Ouyang and Zhou’s model (2005) also reveals a positive relationship between a firm’s 
capability to adjust and the optimal timing of privatisation. In short, smallness of size 
offers greater flexibility, which facilitates the kind of adjustments entailed in 
privatisation. Next, efficiency. This factor embraces productivity and profitability, 
including future expectations (i.e., post-privatisation). Since efficiency improvements 
may be represented by the difference in income before and after privatisation, future 
income gains can be theorised in a model (Li et al., 2005). Expectations of future 
income gains is thus a strong incentive, since it promises to stimulate greater 
managerial effort and so lead to a better performance following privatisation 
(Debande and Friebel, 2004).  
A unique model sheds light on the information factor in privatisation. At the 
heart of Glaeser and Sheinkman’s (1996) theory is the impact of uncertainty on 
consumer demand and input cost in production. Central planers, they argue, are 
unable to acquire and use new information and hence are less responsive to market 
needs. This gives the “information advantage” to privately owned enterprises, and 
further encourages the “middlemen” (i.e., those whose upstream and/or downstream 
activities are already privatised) to adopt privatisation. Their theory explains how 
privatisation diffuses in the product chain. It also suggests that privatisation should 
begin with industries characterised by high uncertainties of demand and costs. These 
industries, with relatively higher elasticity in demands, are usually more competitive. 
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This theory, therefore, justifies competition as a driver of privatisation.40 However, 
there exists a constraining factor according to the rent-seeking theory. Friebel (2000) 
argues that if the bureaucrat wants to maintain his current level of rents, he may try to 
avoid privatisation – even in the knowledge that doing so will reduce the risk of 
uncertainty he faces.  
The following section offers a more detailed and systematic approach for further 
discussion of many of the issues discussed above.  
                                                 
40
 Li, Ouyang and Zhou (2005) follow this information argument and predict that the negative 
expectation of uncertainty after privatisation may delay its occurrence.  
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Table 3.1 
Theoretical studies of privatisation dynamics in literature.  
Authors Arguments or propositions 
  
Leyden and Link (1993) Examine the effect of bureaucratic risk aversion on the decision to privatise production.  
 If a bureaucrat is risk averse and budget-maximising, he will have an interest in mitigating the effects of risk through privatisation, 
because in which the production risks are reduced.  
  
Chen (1996) Studies the choices of two types of maximising public servants over how far to implement industrial privatisation and in what order to 
privatise.  
 For budget maximising, bureaucrats will gain most by privatising from where the least market power and the largest subsidy are.  
 For maximising social welfare, populists will begin the privatisation process by first focusing on firms with the least market power 
and the largest subsidies.  
  
Glaeser and Scheinkman (1996) Model the sequencing of privatisation within an industry and across industries.  
 Privatisation should be started from where the demand and cost are most uncertain in order to reap information advantages.   
 Privatising middleman has particular value when neighbouring sectors are also private.  
 Downstream privatisation should come first so that information about consumer demand can be generated. If the retail sector is 
private, then privatisation downstream usually dominates privatisation upstream.  
 Sectors that benefit most from flexibility and sectors that will create the greatest benefits for other industries by providing 
improved information should be privatised first. In addition, industries with more inelastic demand should be privatised first.  
  
Matsumura (1998) Considers how many shares the government should hold in the privatised firm in a quantity-setting duopoly involving a private firm and 
a privatised firm.  
 If a public firm is not a monopolist, the government should (at least partially) privatise the public firm.  
  
Yarrow (1999) Argues that privatisation is a dynamic phenomenon and that the cost of government finance has played a role in triggering privatisation 
and related reforms.  
 Comprehensive ownership reform is preceded by a period of increased financial stringency for SOEs.  
 Privatisation will tend to occur earlier, the less efficient is the SOE.  
  
Cao, Qian and Weingast (1999) Investigate the profound reform of Chinese SOEs in the mid 1990s.  
 The decentralisation of governments (i.e. Chinese-style federalism), together with the harder budget constraints and increased 
competition form the non-state sector, created incentives for local government to undertake privatisation.   
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Friebel (2000) Models the relationship among privatisation volume, degree of uncertainty and the information of local conditions.  
 The government may not use additional local information in favour of more privatization, and it may even slow down reforms in 
order to save on bureaucrats’ rents. Concludes that the speed of reform implementation does not necessarily increase when a 
central reform-minded government receives additional information about the conditions facing its agents. The trade-off between 
rent extraction and efficiency may actually involve slower reforms at lower costs rather than an increase in speed.  
  
Ramamurti (2000) Proposes a dynamic multi-level model to answer “why are so many emerging economies privatizing SOEs?” and “how does that affect 
their performance?”  
 Small SOEs are more likely to be privatised than large SOEs.  
 SOEs resulted from nationalisation or still partially privately owned are more likely to be privatised.  
 SOEs in competitive markets are more likely to be privatised than monopolies.  
 SOEs in countries facing a macro-economic crisis are more likely to be privatised.  
 SOEs in countries with weak market-supporting institutions are less likely to be privatised.  
 Monopolistic SOEs that can benefit from regulatory innovations are more likely to be privatised than those that cannot.  
 SOEs in countries where the political leadership is ideologically committed to private ownership and market forces are more likely 
to be privatised.  
  
Alexeev and Kaganovich (2001) Present a dynamic model of the transition and argues:  
 The minimum wage constraint combined with low overall labour productivity impose an upper bound on the feasible speed of 
privatisation. Comprehensive privatisation occurs when the economy has accumulated a sufficient stock of capital so that the 
marginal product of labour rises above the subsistence constraint.  
 Early privatisation in an economy in which private enterprises are not likely to operate much more efficiently than SOEs may be 
counterproductive if it results in suboptimal investment and postpones complete privatisation.  
 Privatising small SOEs at an early stage is generally advisable, while privatising large SOEs should often be postponed, because 
productivity gains due to privatisation may differ dramatically for enterprises of different size.  
  
Biais and Perotti (2002) Offer a political economy theory of the design of privatisation sales to shift the political preferences of the middle class to ensure 
re-election.  
 If inequality is low, the strategic privatisation may be the equilibrium where the right-wing government optimally sets the offer 
price, the middle-class citizens buy shares in the privatisation and then vote for the right-wing party, and the right-wing party wins 
the election.  
  
Bennett and Maw (2003) Determine whether or not the government should retain partial ownership after privatisation.  
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 The optimal amount of partial state ownership depends on both the degree of competition in the product market and the weights in 
the welfare function.  
  
Debande and Friebel (2004) Model a positive theory of privatisation.  
 A government may want to privatise because privatisation can provide managers with stronger incentives to exert effort, and 
greater managerial effort may help to maintain jobs that otherwise would be destroyed.  
 Further predict that potentially profitable firms are more likely to be privatised.  
  
Li, Ouyang and Zhou (2005) Determine the optimal timing of micro-level privatisation. 
 The greater the speed of adjustment or the ability to adjust, the quicker the privatisation should occur.  
 The greater the income gains after privatisation, the more quickly privatisation occurs.  
 The higher the gain-risk ratio, the sooner privatisation occurs.  
 The greater the uncertainty after privatisation, the more it will be delayed.  
 The lower the cost of capital, the sooner the privatisation will take place.  
 The higher the transaction costs, the longer it takes for privatisation.  
 The faster the macro privatisation, the greater the pressure on an SOE, and the sooner it will privatise. 
  
Note: Each arrow mark denotes an argument or proposition. For quality reason, researches are only selected from Social Science Citation Index (SSCI).  
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Empirical studies in the world 
 
Empirical studies of the determinants of privatisation began to emerge in the 
early 1990s (see Table 3.2). Ramamurti (1992) was a pioneer in this field through his 
international comparative attempt to investigate the relationship between financial 
conditions and privatisation initiatives in 83 developing countries during 1965-1985. 
He assumes that privatisation is a policy tool available to governments seeking to 
address macroeconomic difficulty, and further establishes four hypotheses: countries 
that embark on privatisation, comparing to those who do not, are supposed to have (1) 
worse financial performance in their SOE sector, (2) higher budget deficits, domestic 
and/or external debts, (3) a bigger size of public sector, or (4) deeper reliance on the 
bailout programme of the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Plane’s (1997) work, embracing 35 developing countries during 1988-1992, continues 
this topic. 41  Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) expand this 
macroeconomic concern to a broader field of political economy. Their research 
hypotheses, based on American data relating to the private provision of public 
services during 1987-1992, focus on the soft budget constraint of local finance and the 
political inclination among voters in democratic elections. They believe that the 
hardening process in budget system will encourage local governments to privatise 
public services to seek the improvement in efficiency. In addition, for ideological 
reasons, voting behaviour that supports parties that are committed to free-market 
doctrines (for instance, the Republican Party in the U.S.) will generate increased 
privatisation. Li and Xu (2002) too examine the telecommunication sector across 45 
countries in the 1990s from the perspectives of the influences of ideology and fiscal 
                                                 
41
 In this paper, Plane extends the analysis to show how a properly functioning capital market can 
facilitate the process of privatisation.  
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policy. They share Lopez-de-Silanes’s ideological argument and indicate that a 
right-of-centre government (that embraces free-market economics) or one in receipt of 
World Bank loans is more likely to embark on privatisation. However, they take a 
different view of the fiscal impact, and argue that the deficit burden may reduce the 
likelihood of privatisation.42  
In addition to these macroeconomic and political-economic effects, Bortolotti, 
Fantini and Siniscalco (2003) shed light on the institutional impact from the 
perspectives of legal tradition and environment.43 They point out that countries with a 
French/German system of civil law may offer less legal protection to private investors 
than the countries with a (English) common law system. Hence, privatisation is less 
likely to occur in French/German civil law countries. They also highlight the 
lubrication effect of a liquid stock market on the process of initial public offerings 
(IPOs). Clarke and Cull (2002) also focus on factors in addition to deficits and ruling 
ideology. They are more concerned about the microeconomic conditions of an SOE. 
By examining the privatisation plans of Argentinian provincial banks in the late 1990s, 
they argue that poor performance is the major cause of privatisation, while 
overstaffing is a constraining factor that tends to reduce its probability. Gupta, Ham 
and Svejnar (2008) focus particularly this indicator in Czech’s privatisation in early 
1990s.44 They argue that the least profitable firms should be privatised first in order 
to secure higher Pareto efficiency. More importantly, Gupta and his colleagues draw 
special attention to the information factor. They argue that privatisation is a tool for 
reaping information gains: accordingly, privatisation should take priority in 
circumstances where demand uncertainty is greatest. This ‘information argument’ 
                                                 
42
 They also shed light on other factors, such as the size of financial sector, the level of urbanization, 
and the degree of income inequality.  
43
 They also assume that financial distress (or difficulty) and the existence of a right-wing (or 
conservative) government would account for the occurrence of privatisation.   
44
 The Czech hereby and hereafter denotes the Czech Republic, dissolved from Czechoslovakia in 
1993.  
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gives industrial character (i.e., the character of an industry’s demand market) a role in 
privatisation dynamics. It also justifies a previous hypothesis, presented in Aussenegg 
and Jelic (2007), which argues that government’s decision to privatise should be 
related to the characteristic of industry.  
 
Empirical studies of China 
 
It would seem that in the wider literature the focus of privatisation studies has 
gradually shifted from macroeconomic pressures, political economy considerations 
and institutional effects toward microeconomic conditions and information issues. The 
focus of privatisation studies of China, however, does not follow this route. Rather, it 
has concentrated more on microeconomic conditions. Li and Rozelle (2000) are 
among the earliest researchers to try to explain the massive privatisation in China in 
the late 1990s. They survey 168 TVEs in rural Jiangsu and Zhejiang during 
1994-1997 and hypothesise three main determinants – manager traits (i.e., manager’s 
personal characteristics), the choice of firms’ inputs and the production environment. 
In addition to the factors of budget hardness and market competitiveness, they 
emphasize the impact of managers’ personal characteristics (such as education, 
skilfulness, experience etc) and firms’ factor endowments. Li’s next two papers 
elaborate this idea and formalise it as a human capital argument, according to which 
the probability of privatisation increases with the manager’s human capital but 
decrease with the official’s (Li, 2003, Brandt et al., 2005). The firm’s efficiency is 
another concern of microeconomic factor. Wang, Li and Lei (2001) argue that the 
expected improvement in efficiency after privatisation is the reason why a 
government seeks to abandon state ownership. A similar idea is implicit in Guo and 
Yao’s (2005) suggestion that more profitable SOEs should be the first to be privatised. 
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A slightly different argument is that of Fang and Smith (2008), who interpret the 
decline of TVEs in terms of the negative effect on efficiency resulting from the 1994 
banking reform. Huyghebaert and Quan (2009) also assume a positive correlation 
between profitability and privatisation.  
In terms of political economy, as in other economies in transition, soft budget 
constraint is a constant concern. Most papers about China address this topic (e.g., see 
Guo and Yao, 2005, Li and Rozelle, 2000, Li, 2003, Brandt et al., 2005, Lin and Su, 
2008). They all believe that the removal of soft budget constraint among SOEs is a 
necessary condition of privatisation. However, in contrast to the mainstream literature, 
in studies of China political ideology does not loom large as a major focus of concern. 
Instead, a greater preoccupation is the issue of job security. This is reflected in the 
China literature in one of two ways: On the one hand, as Wang, Li and Lei (2001) 
argue, privatisation will be pursued when it is expected to serve important political 
interests by facilitating expanded employment. On the other hand, as Guo and Yao 
(2005) argue, privatisation will be constrained if it is expected to damage the 
legitimacy of governments by leading to large-scale job losses among previous state 
employees. These approaches indicate the existence of a trade-off between public 
(government) ownership and the total level of employment. Kung and Lin (2007) 
incorporate this trade-off into their hypothesis and attribute the decline of public 
enterprises (TVEs in their article) to the job creation impact of the expansion of 
private enterprises. Another concern for government is the fiscal burden. China’s 
fiscal challenge, unlike that facing many transitional economies, tends to have a local, 
or even individual, focus. In China, privatisation is regarded more as a policy tool to 
rebalance local finance than part of crisis therapy designed to rescue central finance. 
In other words, the essence of problem lies more in the performance of individual 
SOEs. The implication is that SOEs with heavier fiscal burdens should be privatised 
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earlier (Guo and Yao, 2005, Kung and Lin, 2007). Similarly, indebted SOEs are also 
thought to be willing to give more new shares to private investors in stock markets 
(Huyghebaert and Quan, 2009).  
As for the macroeconomic environment, competition is also a major part of 
argument in the literature about China. Intense competition in product markets will 
squeeze profit margins and punish less efficient firms. That is why increased 
competition will drive inefficient public enterprises out of market (Li and Rozelle, 
2000, Li, 2003). The same mechanism may also be hypothesised through analysis of 
the degree of market liberalisation, since a liberalising market in which entry barriers 
are being lowered will tend to encourage more providers (i.e., competitors) to 
participate in a given product market (Guo and Yao, 2005). Li, Vertinsky and Zhou 
(2004) extend the focus of analysis from product competition to regional competition 
among Chinese provinces. They examine a mega dataset, with data for 13,520 SOEs 
during 1993-1995, and argue that higher exposure to inter-provincial competition will 
result in more private firms emerging in any given province. Furthermore, this paper 
offers a number of new macroeconomic insights. It is also the first to argue that the 
development of legal and physical infrastructure (for example, telephone density, 
power supply, transportation, legal expenditures or patent transaction) will facilitate 
privatisation. It is also the first to highlight the information factor and illustrate the 
diffusion of privatisation across regions and industries.  
 
Empirical strategy  
 
The following discussion, based on the final column in Table 3.2, focuses on the 
basic empirical strategy in aforementioned papers, particularly in dealing with the 
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potential issue of endogeneity.45  
Most authors adopt probit (Aussenegg and Jelic, 2007; Bortolotti et al., 2003; 
Guo and Yao, 2005; Gupta et al., 2008; Li, 2003; Li et al., 2004; Liu et al., 2006; 
Lopez-de-Silanes et al., 1997; Plane, 1997; Wang et al., 2001) or logit (Brandt et al., 
2005; Ramamurti, 1992) models for their use of qualitative and binary dependent 
variables to proxy for the choice of privatisation. Tobit models are sometimes used for 
better comparison with results from probit models (Guo and Yao, 2005; Plane, 1997).  
Yet, the decision of privatisation is treated as being able to make every year in 
the assumption of a probit model, which fails to account for the irreversibility of 
privatisation (Guo and Yao, 2005). Some authors thus prefer time hazard or duration 
models, setting the timing of privatisation as a (Cox proportional) function of 
variables (Clarke and Cull, 2002; Guo and Yao, 2005; Li, 2003), which allow the 
probability of privatisation to change over time. Though discrete and continuous time 
hazard models will reach similar results, discrete models may be more preferable for 
better efficacy in controlling endogeneity (Clarke and Cull, 2002).  
Fixed effects model is particularly used in panel data to control historical and 
regional fixed effects (Kung and Lin, 2007).  However, when the panel is less 
time-variant – such as of short time period or of time-invariant nature – a fixed effects 
model may throw out a certain number of observations and exacerbate measurement 
error problems. Some authors, instead, choose random effects models in this regard 
(Li and Xu, 2002; Lin and Su, 2008).46 In addition, only one paper in the relevant 
literature adopts a statistical comparison over efficiency performance between public 
and private enterprises as the justification for privatisation (Fang and Smith, 2008).  
                                                 
45
 Please see Section 4.3 for more mathematical discussion about endogeneity and the bias it may 
introduce to regression.  
46
 Lopez-de-Silnes et al. (1997) use random effects models controlling two levels of regional effects 
(state and county) in order to make comparison with results derived from probit models.  
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Most papers devote, to a greater or lesser extent, efforts addressing the potential 
problem of endogeneity, except Kung and Lin (2007), who acknowledge the difficulty 
in tackling this issue for limited range of information in their aggregate data, and 
Ramamurti (1992), who addresses nothing about empirical problems.  
The most popular method of dealing with endogeneity in literature is 
re-estimation by instrument models (Brandt et al., 2005; Clarke and Cull, 2002; Gupta 
et al., 2008; Li, 2003), which can correct potential biases of simultaneity and omitted 
variables. Privatisation, as discussed earlier, can be driven by increasing hardness of 
government budget, but there is also the possibility that a local government may 
privatise as a way of removing soft budgets. This reverse causality will introduce 
endogeneity leading to biased coefficients in regressions. Li (2003) and Brandt et al. 
(2005), accordingly, choose the tightness of budget variable in neighbouring 
townships as an instrument – a variable supposed to be exogenous to the privatisation 
in a specific township – and conduct a Hausman test to examine the validity of 
instrument. Another similar causal relationship is between fiscal pressure and 
privatisation, while, in conventional arguments, fiscal pressure will encourage 
privatisation. However, based on cases of the banking sector in Argentina, provinces 
that spend more and thus have larger deficits in order to provide more bank services 
may be less likely to privatise, argued Clarke and Cull (2002). They find variables 
from the Argentine Constitution – the number of deputies and senators per capita and 
the deputies from the province as a percentage of total deputies – as instruments to 
capture the relative power of smaller provinces. Since these variables are 
predetermined in time, they should be regarded as exogenous to the privatisation 
reform. Gupta et al. (2008) also use predetermined variables as instruments to purge 
potential endogeneity among explanatory variables, by replacing each of the annual 
1992 firm-specific variables by all of the 1992 first quarter values of that endogenous 
91 
variable as instruments.   
The problem of simultaneity can also be mitigated by using lagged variables. 
Bortolotti et al. (2003) use lagged debt-to-GDP ratio, the stock market capitalisation 
to GDP, and the turnover ratio as explanatory variables to tackle potential simultaneity 
between privatisation with public finances and with financial market development. By 
the same token, Guo and Yao (2005) take the values of lagged three-year moving 
averages for all explanatory variables in order to avoid potential endogeneity.  
To avoid a specific variable that could be endogenous is feasible, too. Regarding 
the proxy of hard budget constraint, the conventional wisdom may prefer the 
measurement of government cash-flow; however, Lopez-de-Silanes and his 
colleagues (1997) believe that the ability to run a deficit may have deterred the reform 
of privatisation in American counties. Instead of finding a proper instrument, they use 
a qualitative variable – based on the state laws limiting a county’s ability to tax and to 
spend – that is surely predetermined, and hence exogenous, to privatisation. 
Setting a simultaneous equations model can also identify the simultaneity 
between potential endogenous variables. Huyghebaert and Quan (2009) assume a 
simultaneous nature between public share allocation and the under-pricing in the 
reform of share issue privatisation, although the result of this model disproves their 
assumption of endogeneity.  
It is noteworthy that some papers try to address the potential bias in the sample 
selection (Aussenegg and Jelic, 2007; Li and Rozelle, 2000; Lin and Su, 2008; Plane, 
1997), an econometric problem of inconsistent results caused by dependent variables 
collected in a non-random sample. However, this issue of selectivity is only dealt with 
when the paper tries to find out determinants of firm performance (in which 
privatisation variable is one of the explanatory variables in the right-hand side of 
equation).  Apparently, this is not an issue for papers identifying determinants for 
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privatisation, because these papers do not tend to make a fair comparison in terms of 
performance between privatised and non-privatised firms – a comparison meaningful 
only if the sample selection is unbiased.   
In addition to finding determinants for privatisation programme, Plane (1997) 
sheds light on the privatisation effect to the GDP growth among developing countries. 
Yet he argues that privatisation may not be a random choice because the opportunity 
for privatisation may be enhanced by the expectation of improving economic growth. 
That is, privatisation could be an endogenous explanatory variable to the annual rate 
of GDP growth. To tackle the endogeneity of privatisation, Plane uses Hausman test 
(1978) to decide whether to use the actual privatisation variable or, instead, its 
instrument – estimated from the maximum likelihood probit and tobit equations – in 
the specification.  
The Heckman two-step estimation (1979) is preferable in later years in tackling 
selectivity and, furthermore, controlling missing and unobservable variables 
(Aussenegg and Jelic, 2007; Li and Rozelle, 2000; Lin and Su, 2008). Privatisation 
variable is assumed to be endogenous to various dependent variables of firm 
performance, such as the revenue in Li and Rozelle (2000), the firm value in Lin and 
Su (2008), and the real sales, capital expenditure, net income, debt-asset ratio and 
dividends in Aussenegg and Jelic (2007).  
 
Causality versus correlation  
 
Another topic in privatisation literature that deserves attention relates to the 
relationship between causality and correlation.  
As the conventional wisdom states that “correlation does not imply causation”, 
most of the above papers focus on the discussion of correlation and simply mention 
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nothing about causality (Clarke and Cull, 2002; Gupta et al., 2008; Huyghebaert and 
Quan, 2009; Li, 2003; Li et al., 2004; Li and Xu, 2002; Lopez-de-Silanes, 1997; Plane, 
1997; Ramamurti, 1992). Some papers take a clearer stance against causality. 
Examining the privatisation reform in Russia, Debande and Friebel (2004) warn 
readers to be careful in assuming causality, because many of other things also changed 
in Russia simultaneously. Similarly, Bortolotti et al. (2003) cannot rule out effects 
from unobserved variables. They encourage readers to be cautious in the causal 
interpretation of their results, which they admit to be only “conditional expectations”.  
By contrast, a handful of papers are more open to the issue of causality. The title 
of Guo and Yao’s paper (2005) is “Causes of the privatisation in China”, suggesting 
that they are testing hypotheses based on an assumption of causality. Liu et al. (2006) 
admit that they try to identify motives that make local governments privatise, 
implying causality between privatisation and external factors. Kung and Lin (2007) 
state that their model is intended to capture the causal relationship “implied” in the 
hypotheses. In short, these papers are happy to embrace causality in an implicit way; 
however, there are no doubts that their empirical findings are all interpreted on a 
correlation basis.   
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Table 3.2 
Empirical studies of determinants of privatisation.  
Authors Data Hypothesis Variable Empirical strategy Dependent Independent 
      
Ramamurti 
(1992) 
83 developing 
countries for 
1965-1985 
 The financial performance of the SOE 
sector in privatising countries is likely 
to be worse than that in 
nonprivatising countries  
Probability that a 
country is an active 
privatiser (23 countries 
out of 83, according to 
author’s definition) 
Overall surplus/deficit of SOE 
divided by value added in 
1970s 
Logit models 
   Privatising countries will have higher 
budget deficits, public debt, or 
external debt as a share of GDP than 
nonprivatising countries  
(1) Budget deficit to GNP in 
1983/84, (2) domestic debt to 
GDP for 1981-84, and (3) 
public debt to GNP in 1984 
 
   The share of SOEs in gross 
investment (public sector) will be 
higher in privatising countries than in 
nonprivatising countries  
 SOE share in gross fixed capital 
formation in the late 1970s 
 
   Privatising countries will have higher 
levels of financial dependence on the 
World Bank (W.B.) or IMF as a share 
of GDP  
 (1) Outstanding W.B. loans to 
GDP in 1985 and (2) IMF fund 
resources to GDP in 1984 
 
      
Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) 
3,042 counties in 
U.S. in 1987 and 
1992 
 The harder the budget constraints, the 
more likely that privatisation will 
occur  
Share of services 
provision by private 
contractor in 1987 
(1) Dummy if the state does not 
allow to engage in short-term 
borrowing, (2) dummy if to 
impose debt limits on counties, 
(3) dummy if to mandate a 
balanced budget, (4)dummy if 
not to allow state takeover of 
county finances, and (5) ratio of 
rainy-day funds to state total 
expenditure 
Probit and 
random-effects 
models; avoiding 
cash-flow variable 
for endogeneity  
   The ambiguous effects of 
labour-market conditions on 
 (1) Dummy if state law allows 
employees to strike, (2) civilian 
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Authors Data Hypothesis Variable Empirical strategy Dependent Independent 
privatisation  unemployment rate in 1986, (3) 
public-employee wage 
premium, and (4) union 
participation 
   When more people vote for the US 
Republican Party, the more likely is it 
that local government will privatise  
 Share of county votes for 
Republican governor 
 
   The more difficult it is to pursue 
in-house provision of public services, 
the more likely to privatise  
 (1) Dummy if state law requires 
to use a merit system in hiring, 
(2) dummy if it sets local 
purchasing standards, and (3) 
dummy if it forbids political 
activity by government 
employees 
 
      
Plane (1997) 35 developing 
countries during 
1988-1992 
 The larger the public sector, the 
higher the probability of 
implementing a privatisation 
programme 
Dummy if implemented 
any privatisation during 
1988-1992 
GNP per capita Probit-ML and 
tobit-ML models as 
privatisation itself 
as endogenous 
variable (Ps. 
Hausman test for 
selectivity bias as 
finding 
determinants for 
GDP growth) 
   Privatisation may be a specific 
response to over-indebtedness 
External public debt stock to 
GDP 
   Openness will promote private 
entrepreneurship and show a greater 
the willingness to trust foreign 
investors 
 FDI inflows to income ratio 
   Privatisation will be facilitated by the 
presence of properly functioning 
capital markets 
 Ratio of market capitalization 
to GDP 
 
      
Clarke and Cull 
(2002) 
23 provincial banks 
in Argentina in the 
late 1990s 
 Over-staffing tends to reduce the 
probability of privatisation  
Whether the bank was 
privatised in a certain 
year 
(1) Bank assets per employee 
and (2) government employees 
to population 
Discrete time 
hazard models with 
IVs for potential 
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Authors Data Hypothesis Variable Empirical strategy Dependent Independent 
  Banks that perform poorly are more 
likely to be privatised  
(1) Share of normal loans and 
(2) net worse to total liabilities 
endogenous 
variables  fiscal 
pressure and public 
employment   
   Provincial governments with large 
fiscal deficits may be more willing to 
privatise  
 (1) Government deficit to local 
GDP and (2) federal transfers to 
province to local GDP 
   Provinces controlled by the ruling 
party (Partido Justicialista) may be 
more likely to privatise than those in 
which the opposition (Union Civica 
Radical) has the power to block 
legislation  
 Dummy if the UCR could block 
privatisation by controlling 
either the executive or the 
legislature 
 
      
Li and Xu (2002) Telecommunications 
in 45 countries for 
1990-1998 
 A higher government budget deficit 
makes privatization less likely 
Non-state ownership 
share 
Ration of budget deficit to 
GDP, lagged one year 
Random-effects 
models 
  Countries with a larger financial 
sector, a higher urban population, and 
a lower income inequality are more 
likely to privatize  
 (1) A component index of 
financial depth, (2) urban share 
of population, and (3) Gini 
coefficient 
 
   Countries with a right-of-center 
government and countries that receive 
World Bank assistance in the 
telecommunications sector are more 
likely to privatize 
 (1) A component index of the 
ideological inclination of 
legislature, lagged one year and 
(2) dummy if the World Bank 
has a telecommunications 
project with the country 
 
      
Bortolotti, Fantini 
and Siniscalco 
(2003) 
49 countries for 
1977-1999 
 Ceteris paribus, a financially 
distressed government is more likely 
to privatise  
Scale of the total gross 
revenue from 
privatisation sales to its 
GDP 
Total debt as percentage of 
GDP 
Probit models using 
lagged variables to 
address 
endogeneity  
   Ceteris paribus,  as opposed to 
common law countries, 
French/German civil law countries 
(1) Dummy for German civil 
law countries (2) that for 
French and (3) that for 
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Authors Data Hypothesis Variable Empirical strategy Dependent Independent 
are less likely to privatise  Scandinavian 
   Ceteris paribus, the higher the 
liquidity of stock markets in a given 
country, the more likely it is that such 
countries will privatise  
 Weighted average percentage of 
capital privatised by public 
offer and private sale 
 
   Ceteris paribus, a right-wing 
government is more likely to privatise  
 Dummy if the incumbent 
executive was supported by 
democratic-conservative parties 
 
      
Aussenegg and 
Jelic (2007) 
327 privatised firms 
in Czech, Hungary 
and Poland during 
1990-1998 
 Hypothesise that the governments’ 
choice of timing and order of 
privatisation sales are associated with 
(1) the industry classification, (2) the 
choice between private and public 
sales, (3) foreign participation, (4) 
percentage of shares sold, and (5) 
firm size.  
Early dummy, if 
privatised during 
1990-1994 
(1) Industry dummy, for easy 
privatisation, (2) private 
dummy, if private sale, (3) 
foreign dummy, if foreign 
investors were participating (4) 
share sold, and (5) size, natural 
logarithm of firms’ market 
value.  
Probit MLE models 
(Ps. Heckman 
two-step 
estimations to 
correct selection 
bias as finding 
determinants for 
performance) 
      
Gupta, Ham and 
Svejnar (2008) 
1121 firms in 1992 
Czech privatisation 
 The least profitable firms should be 
privatised first in the interests of 
higher Pareto efficiency  
Dummy if the firm was 
privatised in the first 
wave 
(1) Difference between the total 
output and wage, (2) accounting 
profits, and (3) market share in 
the industry 
Probit models with 
IVs for 
endogeneous 
variables  
   The more profitable firms should be 
privatised first for maximising the 
public goodwill, political cost and 
revenue 
 (1) Difference between the total 
output and wage, (2) accounting 
profits, (3) market share in the 
industry 
 
   The greater the uncertainty that 
surrounds demand, the more likely it 
is that early privatisation will take 
place in order to reap the 
informational gains  
 (1) Dummy of demand shock 
from the breaking-up of Soviet 
trading in 1990 and (2) dummy 
if in downstream industries 
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Authors Data Hypothesis Variable Empirical strategy Dependent Independent 
About China      
      
Li and Rozelle 
(2000) 
168 TVEs in 
Chinese Jiangsu and 
Zhejiang for 
1994-1997 
 The firm’s manger traits have effects 
on ownership decisions.   
Dummy if any share 
shifted to private 
individuals in 1994 
Manager’s (1) firm experience, 
(2) age, (3) hometown, (4) 
education, (5) management 
experience, and (6) government 
experience 
N/A (Ps. 
Heckman’s 
two-step method to 
address selection 
problem as finding 
determinants for 
performance) 
  The firm’s financial inputs have 
effects on ownership decisions.   
 Firm’s (1) fixed capital, (2) 
working capital, (3) 
high-skilled labour, (4) 
low-skilled labour, and (5) loan 
asset ratio 
   The improvements in the product 
market environment and capital 
markets affect firm ownership 
decisions.  
 (1) Bank budget hardness and 
(2) Product market 
competitiveness 
 
      
Wang, Li and Lei 
(2001) 
657 Chinese SOEs 
over 1980-97 
 The greater the improvement in 
efficiency following privatisation, the 
more likely it is that state ownership 
will be abandoned  
Dummy if the SOE is 
privatised or liquidated 
(1) Difference of ROA between 
privatised and non-privatised 
SOEs and (2) Improvement of 
labour-productivity after 
entrenchment 
Probit models 
   The more political interests (in job 
creation, revenue, capital), the sooner 
the government to abandon state 
ownership  
 (1) total employment, (2) 
output, and (3) fixed assets 
before the privatisation 
 
      
Li (2003) 134 Chinese rural 
firms for 1994-97 
 The probability of privatisation 
increases with the manager’s human 
capital, but decrease with the 
official’s  
Dummy if the firm is 
controlling-interest 
shifted 
Official’s (1) education, and (2) 
age; manager’s (3) education, 
and (4) age 
Probit and hazard 
models with IV to 
control over 
potential 
endogeneity of    The quality and size of a firm could  (1) employment, (2) export, and 
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Authors Data Hypothesis Variable Empirical strategy Dependent Independent 
affect the probability of privatisation  (3) profit hardness of budget 
   When the product market is more 
competitive, privatisation is more 
likely to occur 
 Competitive index of product 
market in 40 industries in China 
for 1988-93 
   The probability of privatisation 
increases with the hardness of the 
government’s budget constraint 
 A binary qualitative variable by 
asking township officials “how 
difficult is it to ask for an 
extension when a loan is 
overdue?” 
 
   The probability of privatisation 
increases with the existence of 
upper-government (i.e., higher level 
government) policy and its intensity  
 (1) Dummy if the presence of 
an upper-government policy 
and (2) the number of months 
the township is given to finish 
privatisation 
 
      
Li, Vertinsky and 
Zhou (2004) 
13,520 Chinese 
SOEs during 
1993-1995 
 The higher level of exposure to 
inter-regional competition, the higher 
the frequency of privatisation  
Dummy of the 
ownership choice of new 
firms in 1995 
Number of industries in a 
province 
Probit models with 
a theoretical 
assumption of 
endogenous change  
   The higher the degree of government 
intervention and rent-seeking, the 
lower the frequency of privatisation  
 (1) Ratio of government 
subsidies to retail sales in a 
province, (2) share of controlled 
revenue in a county, and (3) tax 
rate variation in a county 
 
   The higher development of legal and 
physical infrastructure, the higher the 
frequency of privatisation  
 Infrastructure factor (including 
telephone density, power 
supply, transportation, legal 
expenditures and patent 
transaction) 
 
   The more privatisation in the 
neighbouring regions or industrial 
sector, the higher the frequency of 
 (1) Privatisation factor and (2) 
industry privatisation level (i.e. 
The private share of output in a 
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Authors Data Hypothesis Variable Empirical strategy Dependent Independent 
privatisation  region/ neighbouring region/ 
industry) 
   The lower level of government 
supervision for the approval of new 
establishment, the higher frequency 
of privatisation  
 The level of government to 
which the firm reports 
 
      
Brandt, Li and 
Roberts (2005) 
338 TVEs in 
Chinese Jiangsu or 
Zhejiang for 
1993-99 
 The likelihood of privatisation 
increases with both the firm and bank 
manager’s human capital, but 
decreases with that of the leader  
Dummy if 100% of the 
firm was sold  
Manager’s (1) age, (2) years of 
education, and (3) origin 
dummy if from the same 
township; and leader’s (1) age, 
(2) years of education, and (3) 
origin dummy 
Logit models with 
IV models to check 
potential 
endogeneity from 
hardness of budget 
variable  
   Privatisation is more likely when the 
firm is more profitable  
 Profits divided by firm sales in 
1994 
 
   Privatisation is more likely when a 
TE faces tighter budget constraints or 
when the leader derives smaller perks 
(rent) from a TE 
 Budget tightness: by the 
relationships between local 
governments and banks by 
asking the difficulty to extend 
an overdue loan in 1994 
Firm attribute (rent): the size of 
(1) employment and (2) profit 
rate 
 
   Privatisation is more likely to occur 
when banks have incentives to do so 
and without a constraint of too many 
bad loans  
 (1) The profitability relative to 
nonprofit duties by upper-level 
banks, (2) manager’s bonus 
ratio to the base wage, (3) 
percentage of nonperforming 
loans 
 
      
Guo and Yao 
(2005) 
683 Chinese SOEs 
for 1995-2001 
 When an SOE becomes a financial 
burden to the city budget, the more 
(1) Dummy if any 
private shares and (2) 
(1) Tax arrears to the total 
assets and (2) social security 
Comparison among 
OLS, tobit, probit 
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Authors Data Hypothesis Variable Empirical strategy Dependent Independent 
likely it is that privatisation will take 
place  
dummy if more than 
50% of private shares 
arrears to the total assets and duration 
models with all 
explanatory 
variables taking 
values of their 
lagged three-year 
moving averages to 
avoid endogeneity 
   The greater the profit potential, the 
more likely it is that the SOE will be 
privatised  
(1) Return to assets and (2) gap 
of profitability between an SOE 
and the average of the private 
firms in its industry 
   Public ownership will diminish as the 
market becomes more liberalized  
 Private share of employment to 
the total in that province 
   The existence of a soft budget 
constraint will make privatisation less 
possible  
 Dummy if the SOE is losing 
money and getting bank loans 
   Excessive SOE debt and redundant 
workers are serious constraints for 
local government to privatise  
 (1) Debt-asset ratio, (2) ratio 
between redundant and on-duty 
workers, and (3) city budget 
 
      
Liu, Sun and Woo 
(2006) 
847 Chinese SOEs 
for 1997-2003 
 The success of privatisation depends 
on the meeting of the managerial 
cooperation, workers compensation, 
and the bank-debt-serving constraints  
Dummy if the largest 
shareholder has been 
changed to private 
investors 
(1) Lagged compensation cost 
per worker and (2) lagged 
debt-asset ratio for each firm 
Probit model with 
sub-sample 
comparison  
   Local governments will be motivated 
to privatise if higher sales, faster 
growth and sustained official benefits 
are expected to be forthcoming  
 (1) Lagged sale revenues in 
logarithm, and (2) lagged profit 
margin 
 
      
Kung and Lin 
(2007) 
27 provincial TVE 
sectors during 
1987-1998 
 Fiscal pressure: the weaker TVEs’ 
fiscal and financial performance, the 
stronger will be the pressure on them 
to privatise 
(1) sales share: share of 
TVEs in total sales 
revenue of rural 
enterprises, and (2) 
workforce share: share 
of TVEs in total 
workforce of rural 
enterprises 
Sum of taxes and net profits 
divided by fixed assets of TVEs 
Fixed effects 
models  
   Job creation pressure: the faster the 
growth rate of new entrants to the 
rural workforce the stronger the 
pressure to rely on private enterprises 
Growth rate of non-continuing 
junior and senior high school 
graduates in rural areas divided 
by growth rate of newly added 
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Authors Data Hypothesis Variable Empirical strategy Dependent Independent 
for job creation rural workforce 
      
Lin and Su 
(2008) 
816 firms listed 
during 2000-2002 
 State ownership is negatively related 
to firm value due to agency problem 
and soft budget constraint 
Dummy if a firm 
engages in 
diversification 
Government share Random effects 
models. (Ps. IV and 
Heckman models as 
finding 
determinants for 
firm value)  
   Legal ownership status is tied to 
better firm performance for more 
expert knowledge and better monitor 
management 
 Legal share 
   Firms in growth industries are more 
likely to engage in value-enhancing 
diversification 
 (1) Dummy in growth, (2) 
consolidating, (3) technical 
change and (4) declining 
industry among all industries 
      
Fang and Smith 
(2008) 
57 Chinese TVEs 
and PEs for 1988-99 
 After 1994 bank reform, TVEs should 
have encountered institutional 
disadvantage that is worse than PEs in 
terms of efficiency  
Comparison of revenue 
between TVEs and PEs 
(1) Revenue, (2) net income, (3) 
total payments for intermediate 
inputs, (4) total payments to 
labour, and (5) value of 
physical capital 
Conduct statistical 
comparison by 
average data  
      
Huyghebaert and 
Quan (2009) 
521 SOEs listed in 
SHSE during 
1994-2005, in 
Shenyin & Wanguo 
Securities Company 
Ltd. Database 
 More highly indebted SOEs will issue 
a higher portion of new shares at 
share-issued privatisation (SIP)  
Public allocation, the 
fraction of A shares sold 
at SIP relative to the 
total number of shares 
outstanding 
Debt ratio, the ratio of 
short-term and long-term (1) (1) 
bank loans to total debt, (2) 
subsidies, and (3) ratio of 
subsidies to sales 
Establish a 
simultaneous 
equations model to 
account for the 
potential 
endogenous nature 
of public share 
allocation and 
underpricing.  
  Profitability will negatively influence 
public share allocation (i.e. leverage 
has a positive impact on public share 
allocation) 
Leverage, the book value of 
debt and current liabilities 
divided by total assets 
   Poor financial performance will lead 
to larger public share allocation 
 Ratio of administrative 
expenses to sales 
Asset turnover, ratio of sales to 
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Authors Data Hypothesis Variable Empirical strategy Dependent Independent 
total assets 
   Historical stock market returns and 
the clustering of prior listings will 
still not be significantly related to 
public share allocation  
 (1) Market return on the 
Shanghai stock exchange in the 
year before SIP, (2) number of 
new firm, listed in the year 
preceding the SIP scaled by the 
raw data, and (3) sample size 
   Under-pricing costs are negatively 
associated with public share 
allocation  
 Underpricing, first-day stock 
return minus the market return 
between share offering and 
listing 
 
      
Note: Each arrow mark denotes a hypothesis. For quality reason, researches are only selected from the papers published on journals listed on Social 
Science Citation Index. 
Source: Author’s summaries.  
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3.2 Theoretical discussion and establishing hypotheses  
 
The above arguments and statements about the determinants of privatisation can 
be generalised into the following hypotheses.  
 
Soft budget constraint hypothesis 
 
The soft budget constraint is among the earliest factors discussed in the 
privatisation literature. In Kornai’s (1979) classic argument that the socialist 
mechanism reproduces economic shortage, he builds a bridge between public 
ownership and the soft budget constraint. He shows how production is constrained by 
limited resources, limited demand and limited budgets. He argues that the budget 
constraint is hard when the firm’s spending is effectively delimited by its financial 
ability.47 By contrast, the budget constraint is soft when the firm’s losses are almost 
automatically compensated for by the state – a situation that tended to make the firm’s 
demand almost insatiable. Under the soft budget constraint, the state will protect the 
firm from bankruptcy, so that the growth of its demand does not depend on its own 
financial position. Qian’s (1994) incentive model supplements Kornai’s shortage 
theory by demonstrating that soft budget constraint generates shortage because 
household consumption is crowded out by too many bad (inefficient) projects.  
The existence of a soft budget constraint is correlated with the occurrence of 
privatisation because, as Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue, a 
hardening budget constraint will make it more difficult for politicians to spend public 
                                                 
47
 In Kornai’s own words: “A budget constraint is hard if it is asserted with iron discipline: the firm 
can spend only as much money as it has. It has to cover its expenses from its incomes from sales. It is 
entitled to take out credit, but the bank is prepared to grant credit only under ‘conservative’ and 
‘orthodox’ conditions. This can be, therefore, only an advance for subsequent proceeds from sales. The 
budget constraint is soft, if the above-mentioned principles do not get asserted consistently.”  
105 
money for political gain. Chen’s (1996) game model seeking to investigate the 
optimal privatisation explores this dynamics. He distinguishes two kinds of public 
servants – bureaucrat and populist – and assumes that, first, the goal of the bureaucrat 
is to maximise the surplus budget, summed up as revenue, subsidies and sales from 
the public sector plus taxes from the private sector. What the bureaucrat must decide 
is how to choose a sector to privatise and how to determine the level of consumer 
compensation (subject to the constraint imposed by voters’ wishes) so as to maximise 
his utility (that is the surplus budget). Second, the goal of the populist is to maximise 
popularity or consumer welfare (subject to a balanced budget) in making his 
privatisation decision. Chen’s model illustrates that the optimal behaviour for the 
bureaucrat, or the optimal policy for the populist, will be to begin the privatisation 
process in the sector which has the largest subsidies or faces the most intense 
competition. This game model of privatisation therefore explains how, by reducing 
state subsidies, the hardening budget constraint will encourage the bureaucrat or the 
politician to embark on privatisation. This theory is applied to China for the first time 
by Cao, Qian and Weingast (1999), who argue that the Chinese privatisation of the 
late 1990s was induced by a series of reforms that removed soft budget constraint. Tax 
reform made it more difficult for local governments to evade national taxes. Fiscal 
reform meanwhile required that as government borrowing became more restricted 
local finances should be balanced. Local governments could no longer expect to be 
bailed out as easy as thy had been in the past. Hence, their political influence to local 
banks over loan decisions was diminished.48  
Empirical studies offer unqualifiedly positive evidence in support of this 
hypothesis. There are two kinds of variable definition for soft budget constraint – 
objective and subjective. In terms of the objective variable, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer 
                                                 
48
 Details of these reforms are discussed in Chapter Two.  
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and Vishny (1997) find that the service provision by private contractors (the 
privatisation proxy) among 3,042 American counties during 1987-1992 increased in 
countries where state regulation did not allow county government to engage in 
short-term borrowing. They also find that the scale of private provision was smaller in 
counties whose ratio of the state’s “rainy-day funds” (which are reserves that can be 
made available for unforeseen circumstances) to total expenditure was larger.49 Guo 
and Yao’s (2005) regression on 683 Chinese SOEs during 1995-2001 presents a 
similar result – viz., that if an SOE was losing money and meanwhile getting bank 
loans (meaning that this SOE faced a soft budget constraint), its likelihood to be 
privatised was reduced. By examining 521 listed SOEs in the Chinese stock market 
during 1994-2005, Huyghebaert and Quan (2009) also confirm that Chinese 
government was determined to replace subsidies with public allocation (by issuing 
more A shares to the private market). 50  In terms of the subjective variable, 
questionnaires have been designed to measure the real softness of the budget 
constraint. In Li and Rozelle’s (2000) survey of more than 168 TVEs in rural Jiangsu 
and Zhejiang during 1994-1997, they measure the hardness of bank budget constraint 
by asking whether bank managers “are allowed to make their own decisions”. The 
authors assume that banks managers will act more commercially and grant less money 
to inefficient projects if they are given more freedom in making loan decision. Their 
finding is as expected. Based on the same survey, Li (2003) subsequently designs 
another question for township officials: “How difficult is it to ask for an extension 
when a loan is overdue?” He finds that the firm’s controlling-interest was more likely 
to have been shifted to private hands, the more difficult it was for township officials 
                                                 
49
 They find no significance in the following kinds of soft budget dummies: (1) if the state imposes 
debt limits on counties; (2) if the state mandates a balanced budget on counties; and (3) if the state is 
allowed to take over a country’s finance.  
50
 “A share” is traded in Renminbi and cannot be invested directly by foreign individuals, according to 
Chinese law.  
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to seek a loan extension. Brandt, Li and Roberts (2005) continue this work, retaining 
the same measurement. Their result is the same.  
 
Political ideology hypothesis  
 
The influence of political ideology toward privatisation has been extensively 
examined in literature, just next to the factor of soft budget constraint. In reality, 
privatisation is better viewed as a political decision than an economic calculation, and 
it will not occur in the absence of political will and support. Ramamurti (2000) argues 
that, in some transitional countries such as the Czech, Hungary and Russia, many new 
political leaders privatised as fast as they could in an attempt to ensure that the 
political and economic changes following the collapse of Berlin Wall (i.e., the symbol 
of the democratisation movement in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Bloc) would 
be irreversible.51 Li and Xu (2002) attribute the origin of ideological dimension to the 
Washington Consensus, which made privatisation one of its most important 
prescriptions. They argue that the involvement of international organisations – for 
example, the World Bank or the IMF – often entails the advocacy of privatisation for 
which financial incentives are provided.  
What bridges the political strategy with the economic policy? Chen’s (1996) 
optimal model of privatisation, as discussed, is among the earliest to describe how a 
populist politician will use privatisation as a tool to increase social welfare and 
thereby win votes in elections. Biais and Perotti’s (2002) Machiavellian model 
successfully lends political economy theory to privatisation. Their model illustrates 
the dynamic of a situation in which, without privatisation, the middle-class citizens 
                                                 
51
 Ramamurti also argues thereby that the reason why privatisation has not been pursued in Cuba and 
North Korea where macroeconomic performance has also been poor, lies in the lack of the same 
ideological commitment.  
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will always vote for a left-wing opposition party, but in which a right-wing ruling 
party can utilise privatisation to shift political allegiances to its own benefit and so 
win a majority of the electorate’s votes (subject to the condition that the citizens’ 
stakes in privatised firms are large enough and the problem of social inequality is not 
too serious).52 Since the larger the size of the privatisation programme the easier it is 
to shift the political preferences of the middle-class citizens, the prevalence of free 
share distribution and voucher privatisation in some transitional economies is 
therefore justified.  
This hypothesis is well supported by empirical evidences. By comparing the 
telecommunication sectors of 45 countries during 1990-1998, Li and Xu (2002) report 
a significant and positive correlation between the market-oriented ideological 
inclination of legislatures (by a component index) and the share of non-state 
ownership in a country.53 They also document that those countries engaging with the 
World Bank’s telecommunication project were more likely to have a larger non-state 
sector. In American localities, it is also found that the higher the share of votes of the 
Republican Party (which is traditionally perceived as being more committed to the 
free-market doctrine than the Democrat Party) during 1987-1992, the greater the 
                                                 
52
 The two-period dynamics is as follows: In the first period, the citizens receive their first-period 
income; the party in power chooses an economic policy, which involves determining the tax rate for the 
period and possibly setting up a privatisation scheme; the market consumption takes place; elections 
take place. In the second period, citizens receive their second-period income; the party in power 
chooses the second-period economic policy, which involves setting the tax rate and deciding whether to 
expropriate shareholders through re-nationalisation; the manager of the privatised firm decides whether 
to exert effort under given conditions; the profit of the firm is realised while the politicians in power 
can target transfers to their preferred constituency if the firm is under state ownership; consumption 
takes place.  
53
 This component index is a formula constructed by three variables indicating the ideological 
inclination of the legislature: i.e., the right, the centrist and the left inclination of government. Li and 
Xu borrow the definition, developed by Beck et al., in which the ideological inclination is defined by 
party names. A party is defined as ‘Right’ if it is defined as conservative, Christian democratic, or 
right-wing; ‘Left’ if it is defined as communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing; and ‘Centre’ if 
it is defined as centrist or can best be described as centrist, such as a party advocating strengthening 
private enterprise in a social-liberal context. See BECK, T., CLARK, G., GROFF, A., KEEFE, P., and 
WALSH, P. (2001) New tools in comparative political economy: the database of political institutions. 
World Bank Economy Review, 15, 165-176.  
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number of social services contracted by private providers (LopezdeSilanes et al., 
1997). Argentina in the late 1990s (under the rule of then President Menem’s party, 
the Partido Justicialista (PJ)), was seen as fiscally conservative and PJ politicians 
were widely believed to be strongly committed strengthening the banking system by 
privatisation in order to prevent this system collapsed and to secure the party’s 
credibility. By contrast, the left-wing opposition party, Union Civica Radical (UCR), 
was opposed to this policy logic. The finding of Clarke and Cull (2002) confirm that 
the UCR tended to block bank privatisation in areas where this party controlled the 
executive or legislature in a locality. Similarly, as Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco 
(2003) argue, credibility is another ideologically-related concern of right-wing 
governments, since in impinges on private investors’ willingness to pay.54 Their 
research, across 49 countries from 1977 to 1999, indicates that in countries in which 
the incumbent executive was supported by democratic-conservative parties 
privatisation sales continued a larger share of their national gross revenues.  
 
Decentralisation hypothesis  
 
According to the literature, decentralisation may trigger privatisation for three 
reasons: information, budget constraint and market competition.  
Hayek advocates decentralisation because this policy can solve central 
government’s problem of lacking knowledge of local circumstances of time and space. 
This ‘information issue’ makes privatisation crucial to decentralisation because 
privatisation allows a better platform in terms of price mechanism for local economic 
sectors to communicate information of production with each other (See Glaeser and 
                                                 
54
 Also, enhanced credibility will improve the credit rating for government bonds and then generate 
lower interest payments; see BORTOLOTTI, B., FANTINI, M. & SINISCALCO, D. (2003) 
Privatisation around the world: evidence from panel data. Journal of Public Economics, 88, 305-332.  
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Scheinkman, 1996). This ‘information argument’ is further developed by Dewatripont 
and Maskin (1995) in a game model that focuses on the transferability of information 
which, they argue, is an important criterion on the basis of which to distinguish 
between centralisation and decentralisation. They model the funding decision of good 
(profitable) and bad (unprofitable) projects under a centralised or decentralised credit 
market. The result (i.e., this model’s equilibrium solution) shows that, under 
centralisation, bad projects will continue to be funded. By contrast, only good projects 
will be funded under decentralisation thanks to greater financial discipline being 
brought to bear to reduce soft budgets. 
Then, Qian and Weingast (1997) establish a federalism hypothesis that argues 
that – through decentralised information and the state power – federalism will provide 
positive incentives to limit state predation problems, as well as to minimise soft 
budget problems. Meanwhile, the competition intensified by the federalisation among 
localities will also endogenously harden the budget constraint and change the 
incentives of local politicians. Qian and Roland (1998) make this argument clearer by 
generalising two effects – the competition effect, and the check and balance effect. 
The first effect suggests that fiscal competition among local governments under the 
limitation of factor mobility will increase the opportunity costs of bailout. The second 
effect suggests that the policy of fiscal decentralisation, together with the policy of 
monetary centralisation, will induce a conflict of interests between central and local 
governments, and reduce inflation and harden budget constraints. Based on same 
theories, Cao, Qian and Weingast (1999) generate a Chinese-style federalism 
argument to suggest that the massive privatisation in late 1990s was attributable to 
previous decentralisation reforms. They argue that the newly established federal 
structure – formed by decentralised fiscal power – in China provided local 
governments with strong incentives to privatise. Intensified competition generated by 
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an expanding and booming of private sector made it more difficult for local 
governments to maintain inefficient SOEs. Further, the hardening budget constraint 
changed the calculation of costs and benefits among local governments. All these 
factors helped trigger privatisation. Its prevalence also benefited from the information 
advantage that local governments acquired from localised privatisation programmes.  
In the end, however, a fair assessment is that the decentralisation hypothesis is 
relatively ignored by the literature. Empirical evidence is largely lacking; nor has 
anyone designed a subjective or objective variable of decentralisation. In most cases, 
the influence of this factor is embodied within the competition factor and the soft 
budget constraint. In short, finding a variable that can effectively represent this 
hypothesis remains a challenge.  
 
Market competition hypothesis  
 
Market competition, also referred to as market development or market 
liberalisation, is a major hypothesis in privatisation literature. As Ramamurti (2000) 
says, “Nowhere in the literature is there any theoretical argument in favor of state 
ownership of firms in competitive markets.” Under conditions of increased market 
competition, the problem of agency failure will be magnified and the organisational 
weakness of SOEs will be even more clearly exposed. Privatisation is thus seen as a 
means of improving the competitiveness of inefficient SOEs. In David Li’s (1996) 
theory of ambiguous property rights, the justification of government ownership lies in 
market imperfections. His argument is that since government can help overcome 
transaction obstacles caused by market imperfections, in situations in which property 
rights are poorly defined government-owned enterprises are able to achieve greater 
efficiency than their private counterparts. This theory further suggests that as markets 
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become more efficient and/or more market imperfections are corrected, the necessity 
of government ownership is reduced. In this way, privatisation is justified and 
encouraged.  
Some papers explore the interaction between competition and privatisation 
through an investigation of the optimal scale of state ownership (“optimal” in terms of 
maximising the social welfare). Matsumura (1998) seeks to show how much state 
ownership should be retained after privatisation by modelling a quantity-setting 
duopoly involving a private firm and a privatised firm with a mixture of public and 
private ownership. His model demonstrates that in the absence of private participation 
(equivalent to privatisation), social welfare will be optimal only if the firm is a 
monopolist; if the firm is not a monopolist (implying the existence of a competitive 
market), social welfare will not be optimal without private participation 
(privatisation).55 Bennett and Maw (2003) explore the same question and reach a 
clearer conclusion. They demonstrate that in a two-firm differentiated-product 
oligopoly, the optimal amount of retained state ownership will depend on the 
competitiveness of the product market. As discussed above, Chen’s (1996) model 
reaches the same conclusion: that for the bureaucrat, defined here as someone who 
seeks to maximise incremental budget, his maximal budget will only increase with the 
decrease in the market power of a specific sector. That is to say, the bureaucrat will 
gain most by privatising the most competitive public sector. By the same token, for a 
populist politician, defined as someone who seeks to maximise welfare and popularity, 
the optimal strategy is exactly the same as that of the bureaucrat.  
Among empirically-driven studies, Plane (1997) focuses on the openness and the 
                                                 
55
 In Matsumura’s two-firm optimal model, he derives the following proposition: If firm 1 is fully 
privatised, then full privatisation is optimal if the market share of firm 1 is smaller than 1/3. If firm 1 is 
a public firm, then full privatisation is optimal if the market share of firm 1 is smaller than 3/4. In other 
words, if market is highly competitive (meaning firm 1’s market share is always small), no matter firm 
1 is a public or fully privatised firm, full privatisation will be optimal for maximising social welfare.  
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capital function of the market. He argues that the degree of market openness will 
reveal the authority’s willingness to trust foreign investors, as well as its 
determination to promote private entrepreneurship. In addition, the development of 
the capital market will enhance the transparency of the production system and 
engender more political support to the commitment of developing a market economy. 
His measures of the ratio of FDI inflows to total income and of market capitalisation 
to national GDP are all positively correlated with the number of privatisation sales 
among 35 countries during 1988-1992. Li and Xu’s findings (2002) from their 
international comparison of the telecommunications sector are similar. They show that 
the share of non-state ownership in a country’s telecommunications sector increases 
along with the progress of financial deepening, defined in terms of a component index 
of financial depth. 56  Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco (2003) hold the same 
assumptions and argue that the liquidity of stock market will facilitate ownership 
diversification, information aggregation, monitoring of managers and the regulation 
of firms. Their large-scale dataset, covering 49 countries over two decades, confirms 
the positive correlation between government’s privatisation revenue and market’s 
privatised capital. Guo and Yao’s (2005) liberalisation argument also suggests that the 
removal of entry barriers (equivalent to raising market competition) together with 
price liberalisation will correct market imperfections and encourage SOEs to embrace 
more private shares, or even full-scale privatisation. They document a strong positive 
correlation between the private share of employment in a province (the proxy of 
market liberalisation) and the likelihood of provincial SOE privatisation. Li, Vertinsky 
and Zhou (2004) measure the degree of competition directly by the number of 
industries in a province and conclude that it will increase (with significance level at 
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 This composition includes three factors – the M2/GDP, stock market capitalisation/GDP and bank 
assets/GDP.  
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15 per cent) the probability that a new enterprise will register as being privately 
owned. Li and Rozelle’s (2000) survey of the rural Jiangsu and Zhejiang of the 
mid-1990s also demonstrates this competition effect. They borrow Yang’s (1998) 
competitive index of the product market in 40 industries as the proxy for competition 
and regress out a strong correlation between competition and privatisation.57 Li’s 
subsequent work (2003) confirms this result. Without empirical testing, Cao, Qian and 
Weingast’s (1999) observation concludes that intensified competition resulted from 
the rapid increase of foreign direct investment and the boom in non-state enterprises 
was the major trigger of the massive privatisation that took place in China in the late 
1990s.  
 
Financial pressure hypothesis 
 
The financial pressure, or fiscal stringency, hypothesis is described as the most 
common trigger in Yarrow’s (1999) privatisation theory. He argues that demands for 
increased public expenditure across a wide variety of activities and across a wide rage 
of countries have raised the opportunity costs of public finance. This results in 
tightened SOE budgets, curtailed investment programmes, and the eventual 
divestiture of SOEs. Due to the soaring costs of financial stringency, privatisation can 
be expected to occur where the marginal costs of government revenue are high and 
rising. However, privatisation is a painful therapy as many governments recognise. 
Hence, most governments’ preference to solve macroeconomic crises by raising taxes, 
or borrowing from home or abroad, rather than pursuing painful privatisation reforms 
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 Yang’s competitive index estimates the barriers to entry of 40 major industries in China by 
modelling entry as a function of various incentives to enter. These incentives include the degree of firm 
concentration, capital requirement for the establish a new firm, scale of economies, possible 
intervention of local government, regulation of central government and risks in market. He identifies 
16 industries as “lowest barriers to entry” and 9 industries as “highest barriers to entry”. 
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(Ramamurti, 2000). Yet the reality may not always allow them to follow these less 
painful paths. When the limits of taxing and borrowing are reached, privatisation may 
become inevitable. This perhaps explains the privatisation wave following the oil 
crises of the 1970s and the debt crises of the 1980s. Many governments by then found 
it difficult to squeeze more money out of taxpayers and savers at home or from 
lenders abroad, and instead they resorted to privatisation to increase short-term cash 
flows (Ramamurti, 1992). This crisis argument places considerable emphasis on 
pressures of structural adjustment required the international institutions, such as the 
World Bank or the IMF, as sources of last-resort loans. “Stabilise, privatise and 
liberalise” became the mantra of many advocates of the so-called Washington 
Consensus. In addition, the design of “debt-equity swap” has also facilitated the use 
of privatisation as a tool for solving debt problems. In this initiative, loans are allowed 
to be paid by issuing new shares to private investors. It therefore makes privatisation 
therapy particularly attractive in heavily indebted countries (Bortolotti et al., 2003).  
All these arguments suggest a positive correlation between increasing financial 
pressures and the occurrence of privatisation, although there are some who have 
argued in favour of a reverse causation. Even if privatisation solves the fiscal problem, 
it may not benefit the politician, if privatisation reform weakens his political and 
regulatory control capacity – and hence damages his ability to extract rents. Profitable 
sectors or SOEs may be seen as a politician’s “cash cow”, leading him to weigh the 
benefit of a one-time receipt from the privatisation against the loss of control over 
future cash flows. This ‘cash cow argument’, also known as the patronage argument 
(put forward in Li and Xu (2002)), predicts that, in the absence of severe 
macroeconomic crisis, financial stringency may not stimulate privatisation but, 
instead, constrain it. This negative correlation is also implicit in Guo and Yao’s (2005) 
debt evasion argument. They agree that fiscal liability should be a strong driver of 
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privatisation, but they argue that this driver is subject to the constraint of debt evasion. 
If considering the role of bank, a privatisation sale may be vetoed or taken to court by 
the bank if it fears repayment of any loans may be evaded following the takeover.  
Ramamurti’s (1992) examination indicates that in the early 1980s, countries with 
higher budget deficits, domestic or public debts were more likely to have experienced 
five or more privatisation transactions before 1988 (such countries being defined in 
the study as active privatisers). 58  The same phenomenon is found to have 
characterised countries with larger ratio of loans to national GDP from the World 
Bank in 1985.59 In two large-scale and long-term cross-country surveys, Plane (1997) 
and Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco (2003) report the same result – namely, that 
during the period between the 1970s and 1990s, countries with higher debt/GDP ratios 
had completed more privatisation transactions. Clarke and Cull’s (2002) finding in 
regard to the local deficit/GDP ratio in Argentina during the 1990s is also close to 
above results (with significance at 15 per cent level). Local governments in receipt of 
more federal transfers (to enable them to write off deficits) were more likely to 
engage in state bank privatisation. Evidence from China is also consistent. The loan 
share and debt-asset ratio are repeatedly reported to be positively correlated with the 
incidence of local privatisation in Li and Rozelle (2000), Brandt, Li and Roberts 
(2005), Liu, Sun and Woo (2006), and Huyghebaert and Quan (2009) (these studies 
being based on individual surveys across rural TVEs, traditional SOEs and some 
SOEs listed in stock markets). Kung and Lin’s (2007) provincial survey reports a 
similar result to the effect that rising fiscal pressure (as shown by the sum of taxes and 
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 Ramamurti divides 83 countries into three groups – 28 countries designated as active privatisers, 21 
countries as cautious privatisers, and 35 as nonprivatisers – the categorisation being based on whether, 
as of December 1987, countries had completed five or more transactions, between one and four 
transactions, or zero transactions, respectively.  
59
 A finding against hypothesis is noted in the ratio of IMF fund resources divided by national GDP in 
1984. The author attributes this exception to the possible econometric problem of multicollinearity and 
regards it not a piece of counterevidence.  
117 
net profits divided by the fixed assets of TVEs) may have accounted for the shrinkage 
in the number of local TVEs. There is one exception, however: Guo and Yao (2005) 
use the tax arrears to total assets and the social security arrears to total assets as the 
proxy of fiscal liability, but their results show no findings at any level of significance.  
As to counter-arguments, there is also some evidence that supports a negative 
correlation between financial pressure and privatisation. Li and Xu (2002) test the 
‘cash cow argument’ by measuring the deficit/GDP ratio in the telecommunications 
sector in 45 countries. They do find that, in less democratic countries, the 
telecommunications sector had been frequently treated as the politician’s cash cow, 
and that financial pressures had constrained rather than not stimulated privatisation. 
The strength of this argument is enhanced by the finding that this constraint was not 
observable in democratic countries during the 1990s. Moreover, Guo and Yao’s (2005) 
debt evasion argument is also supported as correlating the debt-asset ratio with the 
emergence of private share among 683 SOEs in the late 1990s.  
 
Institutional infrastructure hypothesis  
 
Inherent in transaction cost theory is the assumption that institutional 
infrastructure will facilitate privatisation.60 The quality or degree of sophistication of 
market-supporting institutions determines privatisation because deficient institutional 
environment will raise transaction costs and deter potential private sector investors. 
Reducing transaction costs will require institutional changes in areas such as property 
right protection, business laws, competent regulatory agencies (to ensure fair 
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 Coase and Williamson define the firm as a non-market institution evolving to economise on 
transaction costs; however, the objective function of an SOE is much more complex and does not 
necessarily reflect prioritisation of this goal (see Plane, 1997). This implies that various policy burdens 
placed upon public enterprises would increase rather than decrease transaction costs in the market. Yet 
this explanation is closer to the cash cow argument. The transaction cost argument discussed here 
focuses on the costs raised in privatisation transactions.  
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competition or to protect minority shareholder rights), independent courts (to enforce 
laws), financial institutions (that can mobilise and loan out private savings), and so on 
(Ramamurti, 2000). Improvement in the legal system is a crucial element, particularly 
for former communist countries during the market-oriented transition. This is because 
in these transitional economies, the legal system that protects private property had 
long disappeared in the wake of rapid nationalisation. Needless to say, without a 
sound legal system that favours private ownership, privatisation may involve 
substantial political and economic risk, and hence suffer from high transaction costs 
(Li et al., 2004).  
Li, Ouyang and Zhou (2005) include the factor of transaction cost and set up an 
optimal timing model of privatisation strategy. They define the total costs of 
privatisation in this model as consisting of a function of time, the speed of adjustment, 
and the level of transaction costs; whereas transaction costs often reflect, inter alia, 
non-monetary costs, such as the time spent on cultivating connections or combating 
political resistance to privatisation. The optimal timing of firm privatisation will 
depend on a number of factors including transaction costs, capital costs, speed of 
adjustment, risk aversion, current income, performance and the level of uncertainty. 
They further argue that the higher are transaction costs, the longer it will take for the 
privatisation to take place. A similar argument is provided in Alexeev and Kaganovich 
(2001), whose game model shows that under an adverse institutional environment, 
early privatisation will result in sub-optimal (rather than optimal) investment – which 
will in turn postpone the completion of privatisation. Therefore, early privatisation is 
advisable only in the economies capable of providing a favourable environment that 
can enhance the efficiency of private enterprises; otherwise, if economies fail to 
provide sufficient protection to the private sector, early privatisation may be 
counter-productive and even make things worse. The implication cannot be clearer: 
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institutional improvement in the macro context should precede ownership reform. 
More importantly, the postponement of individual privatisation may not justify the 
delay of more comprehensive liberalisation in macroeconomic environment.  
It is unfortunate that there is scarce empirical evidence to lend support to this 
hypothesis. The reason may be simple: the change in institutional environment is not 
easily quantified and measured before being correlated with any privatisation proxy. 
That is why Bortolotti, Fantini and Siniscalco’s (2003) effort to link a country’s legal 
origin with its current privatisation policy is unique. They argue a country’s choice of 
legal system – i.e., whether it follows French/German-style civil law or English 
common law – will affect its government’s willingness to adopt privatisation. This 
reflects the likelihood that a government of civil law countries is typically an 
influential stakeholder, as well as an active interventionist, and therefore tends to keep 
a larger SOE sector (even if it performs poorly). Just as predicted in the cash cow 
argument, a politician may prefer to enjoy the ‘control rents’ (i.e. the rents duo to 
holding control rights) over SOEs and be unwilling to let the powerful instrument of 
redistribution fall into private hands. Therefore, the transaction costs – such as 
combating for political resistance – in the civil law countries are likely to be high. By 
contrast, common law countries often have a smaller SOE sector, being less likely to 
encounter political resistance. Legal protection of property rights is usually extended 
to private shareholders and creditors, which in turn leads to a better result in terms of 
corporate governance and a higher market value for enterprises. Accordingly, 
institutional advantages should make more popular in common law countries. The 
empirical evidence supports this. By categorising countries into (on the one hand) 
French-, German-, or Scandinavian-like civil laws countries and (on the other) 
English-type common law countries, Bortolotti and his colleagues report a negatively 
significant result in “Germanic law” countries, including Austria, Germany, Japan, 
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South Korea, Switzerland and Taiwan. They explain that it is these countries’ 
relatively strong banking sector that has reduced the feasibility of privatisation. As for 
China, Li, Vertinsky and Zhou’s (2004) research is the only study that focuses on its 
legal system. Their research points to the uneven development across provinces in 
terms of legal protection of intellectual property markets, including patent 
applications, registrations, and technology transactions. Their remit also includes 
physical infrastructure, and they argue that a more developed physical infrastructure – 
roads, transportation, power supply and communication networks – will facilitate 
business operation, enhance businesses’ ability to compete, expand profit-making 
opportunities – and so lead to more privatisation. Their infrastructure factor – 
composed of telephone density, power supply, transportation, legal expenditure and 
patent transaction – is found to be highly correlated with the prosperity of private 
enterprises.  
 
Economic efficiency hypothesis  
 
The economic efficiency hypothesis is another major element in the privatisation 
literature. How to improve the Pareto efficiency among loss-making SOEs is the most 
common question facing a government considering whether or not to embark on 
privatisation reform.61 This Pareto argument predicts that a government should start 
the privatisation at the point of minimum efficiency in order to maximise the 
efficiency improvement (see Gupta et al., 2008). Thus, less efficient SOEs should be 
the first to be targeted for reform because their privatisation is likely to maximise 
potential interests. This privatisation strategy is demonstrated in Li, Ouyang and 
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 “Pareto efficiency” is a basic economic concept that captures the optimal allocation of economic 
resource. In this allocation, no one can be better off without making someone else worse off (otherwise, 
there is still space for “Pareto improvement”). 
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Zhou’s (2005) model, which shows that only if expected post-privatisation gains are 
sufficiently large will privatisation take place. Some models explore the inner 
mechanism of this hypothesis.  
Leyden and Link (1993) shed light on political and production risks that may 
reduce an SOE’s (the “bureaucrat’s” in their model) ability to produce goods or 
provide services. They first distinguish two different time-lines of the 
decision-making process in production: one with the bureaucrat in charge of 
production, and the other with the private firm replacing the bureaucrat and assuming 
the responsibility of production.62 They argue that the constraint of budget and 
self-selection effect (which captures the likelihood that the more-risk-averse 
bureaucrat will be offered a government job) will make a bureaucrat try his best to 
avoid risks. This risk-averse bureaucrat, hence, will tend to mitigate the uncertainties 
in production by contracting with private firms in order to deliver a guaranteed, 
specified level of goods or services that he is asked for. Through this “risk-shifting” 
argument, Leyden and Link (1993) justify the bureaucrat’s motivation to opt for 
privatisation. Their argument also implies that less efficient SOEs should be privatised 
first since they should bear higher uncertain political or production risks.  
Debande and Friebel (2004), however, suggest that the result may be otherwise, 
using a model that focuses on managerial incentives. Two cases are initially 
distinguished: Case A – in which the government seeks to maximise employment, 
while the manager seeks to maximise profit. In these circumstances, the government 
will find that privatisation is the cheapest way to encourage a private manager to exert 
efforts; and, as a result, more jobs will be preserved and/or created. Thus, efficiency 
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 The former time line without privatisation includes four periods: (1) Legislature provides budget 
contingent on output; (2) bureaucrat chooses level of effort; (3) political or production risk is realised; 
(4) output is produced. The latter time-line associated with privatisation includes five periods: (1) 
Legislature provides budget contingent on output; (2) bureaucrat contracts with firm; (3) firm begins 
production; (4) political or production risk is realised; (5) firm finishes production.  
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has nothing to do with privatisation. However, in Case B – where the government 
tries to stabilise current budget level, while the manager tries to seek rents – 
privatisation will favour more profitable firms, which will provide more incentives for 
the manager (who is the residual claimancy) to exert more efforts.63 By contrast, 
privatisation of unprofitable firms will de-incentivise the manager, since his expected 
interests after privatisation is reduced. This model, therefore, suggests a positive 
correlation between efficiency and privatisation, meaning that privatisation will begin 
with relatively more profitable/efficient firms.  
Following the same rent-seeking argument, Brandt, Li and Robert (2005) 
establish a game model bringing in the crucial role of bank. This model assumes that 
the bureaucrat (i.e., the leader in this paper) may prefer not to privatise a firm in order 
to retain his large perks. However, this attempt may be frustrated by the bank. This is 
because as it contemplates the future return, the bank will prefer to lend to a more 
profitable private firm, instead of a less profitable government-owned firm. 
Privatisation, therefore, will be triggered by bank’s loan decision, and will favour 
more profitable/efficient firms.  
Profitability may also encourage privatisation through the “ice-pop effect”, 
firstly coined by Garnaut, Song, Tenev and Yao in their 2003 paper (quoted from Guo 
and Yao, 2005). This effect gives an explanation of goodwill to privatisation – to 
protect valuable/productive state assets from melting down (like popping ice) by 
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 It is worth noting that, for simplicity, Debande and Friebel do not model the case where the transfer 
is characterised by separate control rights and cash flow rights. They are, however, aware of this 
difference, which is the subject of a brief discussion in their paper. There are two types of separated 
transfer – regulation and corporatisation. Under regulation, the government retains the control rights 
and the manager receives cash flow rights; while in corporatisation, the manager receives control rights 
and the government retains cash flow rights. They argue that the ownership form of corporatisation 
combines the worst elements of privatisation and state ownership because the manager will never 
internalise the consequences of his actions and can even divert controlled restructuring funds to 
unproductive uses. But regulation yields a different result. It may incite the manager to exert the same 
level efforts as in privatisation, while the government can also set a higher level of employment target 
to induce the manager to work harder.  
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frequently seen mismanagement and corruption. So, privatisation will be with the 
most valuable asset (i.e., the most efficient SOE) suggesting a positive correlation 
between efficiency and privatisation. Guo and Yao (2005) describe this effect through 
the use of an old Cantonese idiom “prettier-daughter-marries-first” (靚女先嫁). In 
other words, relatively better-performing SOEs have a better chance to raise 
efficiency after privatisation, so they should be privatised first.  
Gupta, Ham and Svejnar (2008) reach the same conclusion. Their model shows 
that in a normal case in which the government is Pareto-efficiency-maximising 
privatisation will begin with loss-making or less profitable firms. By contrast, 
however, if the government is public-will-maximising or political-cost-minimising, 
privatisation will then begin with most profitable firms in order to maximise voters’ 
goodwill and/or to minimise the scale of layoffs.  
Empirical evidence reflects a variety of efficiency variables. In terms of overall 
financial performance, Ramamurti (1992) finds that a country with a higher operating 
deficit as a share of value added is more likely to become an proponent of 
privatisation (“active” here defined in terms of five or more privatisation transactions 
having taken place in a country before 1988). Clarke and Cull (2002) find that 
Argentinian banks with more overdue loans or less net worth to liabilities were more 
likely to have been privatised earlier. Lin and Su’s (2008) examination of 816 listed 
SOEs in China also argues that SOEs with better growth opportunities (in growing or 
consolidating industries or those undergoing technical change) were more likely to 
diversify their ownership (i.e., privatisation) than SOEs lacking such opportunities 
(because of their status as part of a declining industrial sector).64  In terms of 
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 Authors follow the industry classification, given by Maksimovic and Phillips in 2008, where 
industries are divided into four groups based on the change in industries sales and the change in the 
number of firms to show the attractiveness of the industry: (1) Growth industries – both the change in 
industry sales and the change in the number of firms during the sample period are above the median for 
all industries; (2) consolidating industries – the change in industry sales is above the median for all 
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profitability, Wang, Li and Lei’s long-run survey (2001) of 657 Chinese SOEs offers 
evidence of the existence of a positive correlation between the improvement of output 
and fixed assets. Brandt, Li and Roberts (2005) use data for 1994 and predictably find 
a negative correlation between SOE profits/sales and the incidence of privatisation in 
rural Jiangsu and Zhejiang. Guo and Yao (2005) find supportive evidence from the 
variable – return to assets (ROA), as well as the variable – gap of profitability 
between an SOE and the average of private firms of an industry. Liu, Sun and Woo 
(2006) document an expected result in the correlation between the control-shifting 
privatisation (i.e., privatisation is defined as the control/majority share is shifted to 
private investors) and the lagged sale revenues, as well as the profit margin. Kung and 
Lin (2007) get the same evidence from the scale of local TVE sector and the sum of 
taxes and net profits divided by fixed assets. Further, one of Li and Rozelle’s (2000) 
regressions shows that the amount of low-skilled labour will positively affect the 
increase of private share in SOEs. Wang, Li and Lei’s (2001) data also show a positive 
link between the employment gap and the privatisation chance: A bigger improvement 
in total employment is expected, the greater the incidence of privatisation.  
Nevertheless, there is also evidence that supports a different argument: 
Privatisation may start with more efficient or profitable SOEs. Gupta, Ham and 
Svejnar (2008) test their “least-profitable argument” (i.e., the least-profitable SOEs 
should privatise first) and “most-profitable argument” at the same time. They find that 
profitability variables – including the difference between total output and wage, 
accounting profits and industrial market share – were all positively, not negatively, 
correlated with the likelihood of privatisation in the first wave of Czech privatisation 
                                                                                                                                            
industries and the change in the number of firms is below the median for all industries; (3) 
technological change industries – the change in industry sales is below the median for all industries and 
the change in the number of firms is above the median for all industries; (4) declining industries – both 
the change in industry sales and the change in the number of firms are below the median for all 
industries.  
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programme in 1992. That is to say, early privatisation may favour profitable SOEs – 
and the “ice-pop argument” thereby holds true.  
 
Firm size hypothesis  
 
For various reasons, it is commonly argue that firm size is a constraint on 
privatisation. Ramamurti (2000) was an early advocate of this view, using agency 
theory to argue in favour of the advantage of small firm size. Any kind of ownership 
reform, including the comprehensive privatisation, is likely to be accompanied by the 
separation of ownership and management. As this takes place, a large SOE will 
inevitably suffer more pain and encounter greater difficulties because of the higher 
agency costs it bears. Similarly, institutional theory is used by Ramamurti (2000) to 
reach the same conclusion in a context in which the lack of market-supporting 
institutions generates a weak institutional environment, where small SOEs should be 
more flexible to avoid various institutional obstacles. In addition, a small privatisation 
project may reduce the negative consequences of an underdeveloped capital market, 
since private buyers will face a less severe cash constraint. A smaller-scale transaction 
is also more easily financed by internal members (of a privatising SOE), which makes 
the management buy-out an easy way for privatisation (Li, 2003).  
Alexeev and Kaganovich’s (2001) dynamic model finds that the productivity 
gains of privatisation will be distributed unevenly among enterprises of different size. 
They therefore suggest that in the early stages of ownership reform in any transitional 
economy, “small privatisation” (i.e., the privatisation of small-scale SOEs) is 
generally more advisable. Arguing from the perspective of the bureaucrat’s interests, 
Li (2003) justifies the size advantage in terms of the patronage (cash cow) argument. 
Since large SOEs may provide more political capital and economic rents for the 
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bureaucrat in charge, he will prefer to let go of small SOEs, whilst retaining the large 
ones. In their optimal strategy model, Li, Ouyang and Zhou (2005) examine the size 
factor in terms of total privatisation costs, which they define as a function of time and 
speed of adjustment. Given that smaller size usually facilitates adjustment within a 
shorter time period and at a faster pace, it will generate fewer privatisation costs and 
hence reduce the transaction time. Political attitude is another privatisation cost that 
may differ according to firm size. A large SOE may spawn a rigid and complex 
bureaucracy, which generates strong political resistance to privatisation among 
insiders. Finally, small SOEs may have their own preference in favour of privatisation 
(Li et al., 2005): for example, their small size may have limited their development, 
through their disadvantageous market position, poor resource endowments or inability 
to access support from government and banks. Privatisation may therefore offer 
significant support to them in their efforts to expand current size, attract extra 
investment and thereby enhance their market position.  
Empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports this size hypothesis. In their 
examination of 327 privatised firms in Czech, Hungary and Poland in the early 1990s, 
Aussenegg and Jelic (2007) find that firms with a smaller market value were very 
likely to be privatised in the early wave of privatisation programme (1990-1994). 
Argentinian banks with higher bank assets per employee (meaning smaller banks), as 
reported by Clarke and Cull (2002), were more likely to be privatised in the late 
1990s.65 Similarly, in China, Li (2003) measures the employment scale in rural SOEs 
and reaches the same conclusion. Huyghebaert and Quan (2009) obtain the same 
result by measuring the total assets in listed SOEs.  
 
                                                 
65
 In this calculation, banks with fewer employees (equivalent to small banks) are more likely to have a 
higher asset-employee ratio.  
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Human capital hypothesis 
 
In the existing literature, there are only three papers, based on the same survey, 
that examine the influence of human capital changes in economic efficiency and the 
incidence of privatisation. Human capital hardly features as a hypothesis to explain 
privatisation in the paper by Li and Rozelle (2000), where the human capital 
characteristics of the manager – such as the manager’s age, education, place of birth, 
former managerial experience, status as a government cadre, and the length of time 
over which the manager has held a managerial position in the sample firm – are tested 
only in attempts to see if they have raised the efficiency of rural firms. The human 
impact on privatisation is for the first time hypothesised in Li (2003), who consider 
both the manager’s and the bureaucrat’s human capital conditions. Li assumes that 
firms will be more profitable when the manager acquires better human capital 
(enabling the manager to execute better internal and/or external management 
functions, such as education and experience) and become more specialised in doing 
business than the bureaucrat. The probability of an SOE being privatised will increase 
as a manager’s human capital endowment improves, because expected 
post-privatisation profits will also be enhanced. In other words, if the bureaucrat 
acquires better human capital, the probability of privatisation of the SOE over which 
he has charged will decrease as a result of the expected reduction in post-privatisation 
profits. In short, this human capital theory points to a positive correlation between 
privatisation and managerial human capital, but a negative relationship in the case of 
“bureaucratic” human capital. Brandt, Li and Roberts (2005) take this argument a step 
further by placing a human capital factor in a game model with three players – 
government leader, firm manager and bank manager – where privatisation determined 
by the comparison of the total value between public and private enterprises. It is 
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assumed that, like the firm manager, a skilled bank manager (i.e., one with better 
human capital) should be more capable of delivering profitable projects for the bank. 
Also, a government leader may reduce monitoring costs if his human capital 
endowment is enhanced. Then the model shows that the likelihood of privatisation 
will increase as the human capital of both the firm and the bank manager is enhanced 
because their costs of efforts are both reduced and the value of relevant private 
enterprise is raised. The reverse is also shown to hold true.  
Although Li and Rozelle (2000) do not seek to correlate human capital 
characteristics with the privatisation proxy, one of their selected probit models does, 
as it happens, reveal this correlation – the manager’s government experience is found 
to be a negative factor. This means that if the firm’s manager once served as a 
government cadre (which, in turn, implies possession of stronger social network links, 
or the so-called guanxi (relationship) in mobilising economic resources), the firm will 
be less susceptible to privatisation. No significant results are found in other human 
capital characteristics, including age, education, hometown living experience or 
similar previous management experience. This finding is derived from a broad 
definition of privatisation dummy coded by whether or not “any” state share is shifted 
to private investors. This definition is later limited to the control-interest shifting 
(equivalent to a shifting share over 50 per cent) in Li (2003), who compares the 
bureaucrat’s human capital characteristics with those of manager in terms of their 
respective impact on privatisation. Li’s finding gives the first piece of supportive 
evidence that the manager’s age and education level have encouraged the occurrence 
of privatisation as might be expected. However, against the assumption, the 
bureaucrat’s age and education level have not significantly reduced the occurrence of 
privatisation. With the most strict definition in the privatisation dummy (i.e., one that 
regards a privatisation case only if 100 per cent state shares are sold to private 
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investors), Brandt, Li and Roberts (2005) test this hypothesis, again, on the same 
survey. This is the first time they are able to identify the expected constraint impact of 
human capital: privatisation is less likely when the firm’s leader is more educated 
(denoted by education level) or more experienced (denoted by age). This therefore 
confirms the monitoring cost argument. Likewise, their findings over the manager’s 
education level and age also, as expected, suggest a positive influence on the 
incidence of privatisation.  
All theories, arguments, models and evidence discussed above are re-categorised 
by hypothesis in Table 3.3. It should be noted that most arguments in papers and 
propositions derived in models are, more or less, related to several sub-fields of 
economics. The category of theories in this table should not be regarded as a category 
under strict definition. It is mainly based on the author’s personal interpretation and it 
only serves the purpose no more than giving a broad feeling about the possible 
sub-field accommodating relevant arguments and propositions. After all, except a few 
cases, most researchers appear to have prevented from categorising themselves into a 
specific group of discipline. Readers are reminded to be as cautious as they are.  
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Table 3.3 
Theories, arguments, models and evidence for hypotheses 
Hypothesis Theories Arguments Models Evidence 
     
Soft budget 
constraint 
hypothesis 
Economics of 
shortage (Qian, 
1994, Kornai, 
1979) 
 The hardening budget constraint will make it 
more difficult for politicians to spend public 
money to procure political benefits 
(Lopez-de-Silanes et al., 1997).  
 The harder budget constraints will create a part of 
incentives for local governments to undertake 
privatisation.(Cao et al., 1999).  
 Supportive (Li, 2003, Guo and 
Yao, 2005, Huyghebaert and 
Quan, 2009, Li and Rozelle, 
2000, Brandt et al., 2005, 
Lopez-de-Silanes et al., 1997). 
 Behaviour 
theory 
 For a budget-maximising bureaucrat or 
popularity-maximising populist, the optimal 
behaviour is to privatise from where the largest 
subsidy exist (Chen, 1996). 
 
     
Political ideology 
hypothesis 
Economics of 
Washington 
Consensus  
 SOEs in countries where the political leadership 
is ideologically committed to private ownership 
and market forces are more likely to be privatised 
(Ramamurti, 2000).  
 A right-of-centre government or a receiver of the 
World Bank’s loans is more likely to privatise (Li 
and Xu, 2002).  
 Supportive (Li and Xu, 2002, 
Lopez-de-Silanes et al., 1997). 
 Governance or 
election theory 
A right-wing government is more likely to privatise in 
order to maintain the credibility of government to 
private investors (Bortolotti et al., 2003).  
 A populist politician will use privatisation 
as a tool to increase social welfare so as to 
win votes in elections (Chen, 1996).  
 A right-wing government can utilise 
privatisation to shift political allegiance, 
reverse inferior position, and win the 
election at the end (Biais and Perotti, 
2002). 
Supportive (Bortolotti et al., 
2003).  
     
Decentralisation 
hypothesis 
Information 
economics  
Hayek’s information argument that only privatisation 
will allow a better way for the price mechanism to 
Dewatripont and Maskin’s (1995) game model 
proves that under the circumstance of 
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Hypothesis Theories Arguments Models Evidence 
communicate information among local economic 
sectors (See Glaeser and Scheinkman, 1996).  
centralisation, bad (unprofitable) projects will 
continue to be funded because of adverse 
selection; however, only good (profitable) 
projects will be funded under the circumstance 
of decentralisation because by which financial 
discipline will be implemented to harden the 
budget constraint.  
 Federalism 
theory (Qian and 
Weingast, 1997, 
Qian and 
Roland, 1998)  
The Chinese federalism argument that the newly 
established federal structure in China in the mid-1990s 
provided local governments with strong incentives to 
privatise (Cao et al., 1999). 
  
     
Market 
competition 
hypothesis 
Agency theory Under intensified market competition, the problem of 
agency failure will be magnified and more 
organisational weakness of SOEs will be exposed 
(Ramamurti, 2000).  
  
 Property right 
theory 
Since government can effectively help overcome 
transaction obstacles caused by various market 
imperfections, government-owned enterprises are able 
to gain more efficiency than private enterprises under 
the environment with poorly-defined property rights 
(Li, 1996).  
  
 Competition 
theory 
Cao, Qian and Weingast (1999) argue that the 
intensified competition resulted from the rapid increase 
of foreign direct investment and the boom of non-state 
enterprises was the driver of the privatisation in China 
in the late 1990s.  
 Matsumura’s (1998) optimal model 
demonstrates that social welfare will be 
optimal without private participation 
(equivalent to privatisation) only if the 
firm is a monopolist; otherwise, if the 
firm is not a monopolist (meaning a 
competitive market) the social welfare 
will not be optimal without private 
participation (privatisation).  
 In a two-firm differentiated-product 
Supportive (Li et al., 2004, Li 
and Rozelle, 2000, Li, 2003).  
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oligopoly, the optimal amount of retained 
state ownership will depend on the 
competitiveness of product market 
(Bennett and Maw, 2003). 
 Behaviour 
theory 
 For a budget-maximising bureaucrat or 
popularity-maximising populist, the optimal 
behaviour is to privatise from most competitive 
public sector (Chen, 1996).  
 
 Market 
development 
theory 
 Plane (1997) argues that the market openness 
will reveal the authority’s willingness in trusting 
foreign investors as well as its determination in 
promoting private entrepreneurship. Also, the 
development of capital market will contribute 
more transparency to the production system and 
offer more political supports to the commitment 
of market economy.  
 The non-state ownership in a country’s 
telecommunication sector will increase along 
with the progress of financial deepening (Li and 
Xu, 2002).  
 The liquidity of stock market will facilitate 
ownership diversification, information 
aggregation, monitoring of managers and the 
regulation of firms (Bortolotti et al., 2003).  
 Guo and Yao’s (2005) liberalisation argument 
suggests that the removal of entry barriers 
(equivalent to raise market competition) together 
with the price liberalisation will correct market 
failures and then encourage SOEs to embrace 
more private shares or even full privatisation.  
 Supportive (Plane, 1997, Li 
and Xu, 2002, Bortolotti et al., 
2003, Guo and Yao, 2005) 
     
Financial 
pressure 
Fiscal stringency 
theory  
 The rising opportunity costs of public finance 
will result in tightened budgets, curtailed 
 Supportive (Ramamurti, 1992, 
Plane, 1997, Bortolotti et al., 
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hypothesis investment programmes, and the eventual 
privatisation of SOEs (Yarrow, 1999).  
 Privatisation is sought to increase short-term cash 
flow during financial stringency (Ramamurti, 
1992).  
 The new design of “debt-equity swap” will 
facilitate privatisation to be a tool to solve debt 
problem in heavily indebted countries (Bortolotti 
et al., 2003).  
2003, Clarke and Cull, 2002, 
Li and Rozelle, 2000, Brandt 
et al., 2005, Liu et al., 2006, 
Huyghebaert and Quan, 2009, 
Kung and Lin, 2007). 
 Rent-seeking 
theory (cash cow 
argument) 
Li and Xu’s (2002) cash cow argument suggests that 
fiscal stringency may constrain privatisation for the 
politician fears to damage his ability to extract personal 
interests.  
 Supportive (Li and Xu, 2002). 
 Debt evasion 
argument 
Guo and Yao (2005) argue that a privatisation sale may 
be vetoed or taken to court by the bank if it fears the 
loans to be evaded after privatisation.  
 Supportive (Guo and Yao, 
2005). 
     
Institutional 
infrastructure 
hypothesis 
Transaction cost 
theory 
 The quality of market-supporting institutions 
determines privatisation because poor 
institutional environment will raise transaction 
costs and deter the potential investors in private 
sector (Ramamurti, 2000).  
 Without a sound legal system in favour of private 
ownership, privatisation may involve substantial 
political and economic risks and hence suffer 
from high transaction costs (Li et al., 2004).  
 Li, Ouyang and Zhou’s (2005) optimal 
timing model of privatisation proves that 
higher transition costs will deter the 
occurrence of privatisation.  
 Alexeev and Kaganovich’s (2001) game 
model says that, under an unfriendly 
institutional environment, early 
privatisation will result in suboptimal 
investment and in turn postpone the 
complete privatisation.  
Supportive (Li et al., 2004). 
 Legal origin 
argument 
Whether a country has a French/German-style civil law 
or an English common law tradition will affect its 
government’s willingness to adopt privatisation 
(Bortolotti et al., 2003). 
 Supportive (Bortolotti et al., 
2003).  
     
Economic Efficiency The Pareto argument suggests that less efficient SOEs  Li, Ouyang and Zhou’s (2005) strategy Supportive (Ramamurti, 1992, 
134 
Hypothesis Theories Arguments Models Evidence 
efficiency 
hypothesis 
theory should be first targeted for reform because their 
privatisation may realise the maximum of potential 
interests (Gupta et al., 2008).  
model demonstrates that privatisation will 
take place only if the gain in the 
profitability after privatisation is expected 
to be large enough.  
 Less efficient SOEs should be privatised 
first because they should bear higher 
uncertain political or production risks 
(Leyden and Link, 1993). 
Clarke and Cull, 2002, Lin 
and Su, 2008, Wang et al., 
2001, Brandt et al., 2005, Guo 
and Yao, 2005, Liu et al., 
2006, Kung and Lin, 2007, Li 
and Rozelle, 2000).  
 Incentive theory 
(ice-pop 
argument) 
Guo and Yao’s (2005) “prettier-daughter-marries-first” 
argument states that if a local government cares about 
raising efficiency it will privatise better performing 
SOEs as fast as it can in order to protect productive 
assets from melting down.  
When the government is budget-stabilising and 
the manager is rent-seeking, privatisation will 
be more desirable for profitable SOEs because 
the positive incentives associated with residual 
claimancy will be enhanced and managers will 
be more incited to exert efforts (Debande and 
Friebel, 2004). 
Supportive (Guo and Yao, 
2005).  
 Governance 
argument 
For a public-will-maximising or a 
political-cost-minimising government, privatisation 
should begin with the most profitable firms in order to 
maximise the goodwill for voters or to minimise the 
scale of layoff employment (Gupta et al., 2008).  
 Supportive (Gupta et al., 
2008).  
 Bank argument Privatisation will occur when the bank is willing to 
lend to a more profitable private firm in expectation of 
a better future return (Brandt et al., 2005).  
  
     
Firm size 
hypothesis 
Agency theory During the separation of ownership, a large SOE will 
suffer more difficulties because of the higher agency 
costs it bears (Ramamurti, 2000).  
  
 Transaction cost 
theory 
 In a weak institutional environment without 
enough market-supporting institutions, small 
SOEs should be more flexible to avoid various 
institutional obstacles (Ramamurti, 2000). 
 Small transaction is easier to be financed by 
internal members, which makes the management 
 Alexeev and Kaganovich’s (2001) 
dynamic model derives that the 
productivity gains of privatisation will 
distribute unevenly among enterprises of 
different size and hence small 
privatisation is more advisable.  
Supportive (Aussenegg and 
Jelic, 2007, Clarke and Cull, 
2002, Li, 2003, Huyghebaert 
and Quan, 2009). 
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buyout as a way of privatisation mush easier (Li, 
2003).  
 Given that smaller size usually means 
shorter time and quicker speed for 
adjustment, it will generate fewer 
privatisation costs and hence reduce the 
transaction time (Li et al., 2005).  
 A large SOE may have grown into a rigid 
and complex bureaucracy, in which the 
political resistance against privatisation 
among insiders could be too strong to 
overcome (Li et al., 2005). 
 Patronage 
argument 
Since large SOEs may provide more political capital 
and economic rents for the bureaucrat in charge, he will 
prefer to let go of small SOEs and keep large ones (Li, 
2003).  
  
 Strategy 
argument 
 Small SOEs are more willingly to utilise 
privatisation as a way to overcome problems 
like disadvantageous market position, poor 
resource endowments or less supports from the 
government and banks (Li et al., 2005). 
 
     
Human capital 
hypothesis 
Agency theory When the human capital of the manager improves, the 
probability of privatisation will be raised for expecting 
profits increased after privatisation (Li, 2003).  
Brandt, Li and Roberts’s (2005) model derives 
that the probability of privatisation will increase 
with the manager’s human capital because the 
costs of efforts are reduced and hence the value 
of private enterprises after privatisation will be 
raised.  
Supportive (Li, 2003, Li and 
Rozelle, 2000, Brandt et al., 
2005).  
     
Source: Author’s summaries 
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Chapter Four 
 
Research Hypotheses and Methodology 
 
4.1 Research hypotheses 
 
After discussing various arguments and propositions in literature, this research 
sets out nine hypotheses, based on Chinese realities, in order to explain the 
privatisation dynamics in that country.  
The soft budget system is one of the most significant economic features in 
socialist China. Subsidising loss-making SOEs were a heavy burden to the Chinese 
government from the mid-1980s, when, according to official statistics, a quarter of 
annual revenue was directly consumed by SOE subsidies (see Table 2.3). A series of 
reforms in early 1990s (see Chapter Two) saw the beginning of the hardening process 
in the budget and credit systems (especially those of local state sectors). From 1990, 
central government began to reduce annual SOE subsidies. In the 1994 fiscal reform, 
it further transferred a significant part of subsidy responsibilities to local governments, 
whilst also requiring local finance to be rebalanced in accordance with the new 
Budget Law. Meanwhile, the banking reform played a significant role in helping 
diminish the political influence that local bureaucrats had long enjoyed over loan 
decisions of local financial bodies. It also ended the long period of financial 
repression and deprived the state industrial sector of preferential rents which it had 
previously enjoyed.  
In effect and taken together, these reforms reduced soft budget constraint and 
brought strong fiscal pressure to bear on local governments. The new regime of hard 
budget constraint was likely to encourage privatisation for the following reasons:  
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(1) The bureaucrat will adopt privatisation in order to achieve his goal to 
maximise the surplus budget (subject to the constraint of staying in office) (Chen, 
1996).  
(2) The populist politician will adopt privatisation in order to maximise 
popularity/consumer welfare (subject to the constraint of a balanced budget) (Chen, 
1996); or in expectation to generate more political benefits from a larger private sector 
(Lopez De Silanes et al., 1997).  
For these factors derives the first hypothesis, as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 1. The hardening process of SOE’s budget system will encourage 
local state enterprises to embark on privatisation.  
 
Privatisation in transitional economies reflects not only economic calculation but 
also political considerations. The ideology of reform leaders is particularly crucial to 
initiating a nationwide structural adjustment. China is no exception to this. Under the 
impact of privatisation, China’s transformation from a socialist to capitalist ideology 
was characterised by two distinctive features. The first is that the ideological change 
towards market economy in China was endogenously induced by a series of gradual 
reforms rather than being exogenously stimulated by a foreign economic doctrine, 
such as the “Washington Consensus”. From this perspective, it may be said that China 
underwent a transition with Chinese characteristics. The second feature is that this 
Chinese-style transition avoided simultaneously embracing democratisation. As a 
result, the Machiavellian assumption was inapplicable to China.66 The lack of civil 
democracy leaves China with no median-class voters to please, and Chinese leaders 
                                                 
66
 This argument suggests that privatisation will be utilised as a campaign tool for a ruling government 
to please voters during the simultaneous democratisation; see BIAIS, B. & PEROTTI, E. (2002) 
Machiavellian privatization. American Economic Review, 92, 240-258.  
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therefore have no need to pursue popularity through a voucher privatisation 
programme, as happened in Czech, Hungary and Poland in the early 1990s. Moreover, 
the party’s specific preference over ideology (Lopez De Silanes et al., 1997) may also 
not explain Chinese privatisation, for there exists not a substantial opposition party 
confronting the ruling communists. In circumstances, the ideological change in China 
often relied on the power transfer among leader generations within the Communist 
Party per se.  
Nevertheless, political ideology has undoubtedly contributed to the trend towards 
the prevalence of privatisation in China, especially since the historical turning point in 
1992, when during his southern tour Deng Xiaoping referred to the “ideological 
innovation” of socialism.67 However, looked at from a more bottom-up perspective, 
the ideological change at the local level had its origins in enhanced local autonomy 
and decentralised enterprise control rights. Once they were endorsed, both increased 
inter-regional competition to achieve the fastest economic growth. To uphold the 
protection of foreign and private ownership became a priority task. In short, 
privatisation was used by local leaders as a symbolic way of demonstrating their 
determination to promote the development of the private economy.  
Meanwhile, a local leader’s personal career expectation may bridge 
inter-regional competition and privatisation ideology for seeking a better evaluation 
on his performance. Since the performance of local economic growth is included as a 
chief indicator in cadre evaluation system, the decision whether or not to privatise 
                                                 
67
 By then, Deng went to Shenzhen, the pioneering special economic zone to experimentally practice 
market economy, to comfort the hot debates between the socialism and capitalism in society. He 
justified the market-oriented reform by redefining the market role in the socialism; the most famous 
quote he said is “Planning and market forces are not the essential difference between socialism and 
capitalism. A planned economy is not the definition of socialism, because there is planning under 
capitalism; the market economy happens under socialism, too. Planning and market forces are both 
ways of controlling economic activity (quoted form the News of the Communist Party of China, 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/BIG5/64162/82819/143371/8818527.html, downloaded on 28th September 
2010).” In this way, disputes were calmed and the direction toward the so-called socialist market 
economy was therefore determined.  
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became an important political choice that was likely significantly to shape local 
leaders’ future careers (Liu et al., 2007). Accordingly, the confidence to government 
also became a growing concern. Confidence in a local government’s 
pro-private-ownership ideology will largely affect private investors’ willingness to 
invest (Bortolotti et al., 2003). From an examination of the interactions between 
inter-regional competition, local economic growth, the cadre evaluation system and 
confidence in local governments’ commitment to market-oriented development, is 
derived the political ideology hypothesis, as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 2. The greater the commitment by a local government to the ideology 
of private ownership, the more extensive will be the privatisation of its state sector.  
 
Decentralisation is another significant feature of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics. After the end of the Cultural Revolution, the 1980s and 1990s saw the 
implementation by the central government of policies designed to decentralise fiscal 
autonomy, budgetary discretion and enterprise control. As discussed earlier, conflicts 
of interest between the central government, local governments and SOEs became a 
major problem in the early years of the reform, not least because of the core issue of 
asymmetric information. According to Hayek’s theory, lack of local information was 
likely to be a significant challenge for a centralised government, implying that 
decentralisation would overcome such informational deficiencies. China is probably 
the best exemplar of the practice of this information theory. As a result of the 
decentralisation reforms, interests among governments and enterprises were realigned 
in a new distribution system. Meanwhile, the information gaps between them were 
bridged through the introduction of a new decentralised taxation system. Through 
such decentralisation initiatives, by the mid-1990s China had finally achieved more 
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effective control over its state industrial sector.  
Information theory further suggests that decentralisation will stimulate a 
hardening process in the soft budget system. Since the adverse selection effect under 
centralisation is what makes it possible to secure funding for bad (i.e., inefficient, 
unprofitable) projects, decentralisation with more information transferable between 
central and local levels is able to negate this effect and prevent the funding of “bad” 
projects through the introduction of stronger financial discipline (Dewatripont and 
Maskin, 1995). That explains why, after decentralisation, Chinese local governments 
obtained stronger incentives to identify good (efficient or profitable) projects. In other 
words, the opportunity costs of bailing out bad projects were hugely increased. The 
year-on-year reduction in subsidies to loss-making SOEs is strong evidence of this 
process (see Figure 2.2 and Table 2.3). In addition, intensified regional competition 
was another major propelling factor. The pressure of competition consolidated the 
growth-oriented ethos of the cadre evaluation system and made the maximisation of 
investment in their areas a major policy goal of local cadres.  
For all these reasons, the author follows Hayek’s information theory and the 
Chinese-style federalism argument (Qian and Roland, 1998, Cao et al., 1999, Qian 
and Weingast, 1997) in formulating the decentralisation hypothesis as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 3. The decentralisation process will lead to a greater incidence of 
privatisation in China’s state sector.  
 
In the past three decades, a highly competitive product market has been one of 
the most successful outcomes of China’s Open Door Policy. Over 70 per cent of its 
industrial output was produced by SOEs in the late 1970s, but thereafter the industrial 
share of SOEs declined rapidly (see Figure 2.5 and 2.6). Today, over 90 per cent of 
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products are generated by private and foreign companies. Increasing output 
competition accords well with mainstream economic theory. This may be illustrated 
through reference to arguments about liberalisation, agency and property rights.  
The liberalisation argument (Guo and Yao, 2005). Entry barriers in China’s 
major industries were gradually lowered. The change started from the light 
manufacture sector in early 1990s and later expanded to the heavy manufacture, and 
the mining and energy sector. Since market imperfections are supposedly corrected by 
liberalisation, more private providers should be encouraged to join the competition.  
The agency argument (Ramamurti, 2000). Since the SOE manager is not the 
residual claimant and therefore has no incentives to maximise performance, he may 
seek instead to maximise self-interest at the expense of the interests of the enterprise. 
In the Chinese state sector, these agency costs often include opportunistic behaviours 
in the process of decision-making, short-termism in production investment decisions, 
and the misuse of wage and bonus systems (Hassard et al., 2007:91, 94, Holz, 
2003:78-82). By minimising these agency problems, competition will drive out SOEs 
with higher agency costs.  
The argument over ambiguous property rights (Li, 1996). In China, there was no 
separation of government and enterprise responsibilities before the early 1990s, whilst 
enterprise ownership was not legally separated from government property. After 
corporatisation reform, state assets – as the institutional form of state ownership – 
were for the first time legally defined, officially registered, and statistically counted. 
However, a management system in charge of state assets was absent before the late 
1990s. The term “private ownership” was not written into China’s constitution until 
1999. According to some theories, poor definition of property rights will give a 
comparative advantage to government ownership in allocating economic resources. 
However, as markets develop and property rights ambiguities are clarified by new 
142 
institutions, government ownership will lose its comparative advantage to private 
ownership. As a result, government ownership will be replaced by private ownership; 
in other words, privatisation will occur. These theoretical dynamics seem generally 
applicable to the current thrust of developments in China’s legal system.  
Hence, my approach bases the market competition hypothesis on a number of 
economic theories (Matsumura, 1998, Bennett and Maw, 2003, Chen, 1996) and 
privatisation arguments (Ramamurti, 2000, Li, 1996, Li and Xu, 2002, Bortolotti et al., 
2003, Guo and Yao, 2005, Li and Rozelle, 2000, Cao et al., 1999, Li, 2003) and it 
goes as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 4. Intensified competition in Chinese product markets will encourage 
more SOEs to implement privatisation reform.  
 
Fiscal stringency, as Yarrow (1999) argues, is the factor that has most commonly 
triggered structural adjustment in most countries. However, this may not apply to the 
same extent in China. Before the massive privatisation of the late 1990s, unlike some 
countries in Latin America, Eastern Europe or the former Soviet bloc, China did not 
confront hyperinflation, internal deficit or external debt crisis.68 At that time, most of 
China’s neighbours were suffering harshly from the Asian financial/monetary crisis, 
whereas China had emerged largely unscathed thanks to its huge trade surpluses, 
strong economic growth and sizable domestic savings and foreign reserves (Bergsten, 
1997). Indeed, China has never been on the waiting list of countries seeking last-resort 
loans from the World Bank or IMF. In short, the “crisis argument” (Ramamurti, 2000) 
seems not to be applicable to China.  
                                                 
68
 This is not to say that China faced no problems of price inflation or government deficits. It is to 
suggest that the scale of such problems in China was much less than that in countries facing severe 
macroeconomic crises.  
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However, this does not mean that privatisation in China has been immune from 
rising financial pressure. Rather, China faced its own severe financial problem, 
highlighted in the existence of numerous loss-making SOEs. This problem had 
become increasingly serious, thanks to the huge losses accumulated from late 1980s, 
when the incentive deficiencies of the Contract Responsibility System (CRS) enabled 
SOE managers to manipulate profits (Holz, 2003:78-82). In 1993, about 36 per cent 
SOEs were loss-making, and by 1998 this figure had nearly doubled to reach 69 per 
cent. Meanwhile, the non-performing loans (NPLs) of state banks soared. For instance, 
data for 1993 show that NPLs accounted for 20-30 per cent of the total outstanding 
debts of state banks, or the equivalent of 17-25 per cent of national GDP (Li and Li, 
1997). Four state asset management banks were set up in 1999 in order to absorb 
these huge NPLs. Had they not been established, the whole banking sector might have 
collapsed, preventing the creation of China’s first modern banking system. 
Subsequently, the special design of debt-equity swap in this recapitalisation reform 
played a key role in promoting ownership diversification and thereby led to a partial 
or complete ownership transformation plan. Through the support of banking reform, it 
was possible to use the burden of huge SOE losses as a positive force whereby more 
large or medium SOEs were encouraged or forced to adopt privatisation. More local 
bureaucrats could take this therapy to overcome financial problems. In short, the 
financial pressure facing SOEs should display a positive correlation with Chinese 
privatisation.69  
By contrast, the cash cow argument (Li and Xu, 2002), or the patronage 
argument, assumes a negative correlation between financial pressure and 
privatisation.70 The selfish bureaucrat who prioritises short-term cash flows, or perks, 
                                                 
69
 In operational definition, it is equivalent to a negative correlation between the shrinkage of state 
sector and the growth of financial pressure.  
70
 For the same reason, the negative correlation here will assume a positive correlation in operations.  
144 
ahead of long-term returns after privatisation will seek to maintain the existing scale 
of state ownership as long as any financial pressures can be accommodated. This 
argument once more addresses the serious agency problem associated with Chinese 
SOE management, in which a rent-seeking bureaucrat is the root of problem. This 
correlation may also be assumed under a committed bank manager (i.e., one who is 
risk-averse and acting commercially as granting loans), unlike a typical state agent 
(i.e., one who is usually risk-ignorant and follows orders from above in making loan 
decisions). This committed bank manager would probably veto a privatisation plan for 
a highly indebted SOE out of concern that debt repayment would be avoided in the 
aftermath of privatisation. In China, this debt evasion argument (Guo and Yao, 2005) 
seems highly plausible. In the banking reform in mid-1990s, the primary goal was to 
establish a modern commercial banking system, and bank managers were therefore 
given increased authority and encouraged to act independently in their efforts to 
control risk while reducing soft credits. They were also expected to guarantee the 
return of loan funds in a more efficient way. In principle, these managers would prefer 
privatisation because private ownership is supposed to yield better chance than public 
ownership in future success. At the same time, however, they would not hesitate to 
stop a privatisation sale if it threatened to damage a creditor’s rights by (for example) 
under-pricing state assets before the sale. In fact, devaluation of state assets has been a 
prevalent phenomenon in China: sometimes arising through collusion among the 
seller, buyer and inter-mediator; at other times, arising out of the simple fact that the 
real values of many tangible or intangible state assets (for example, land use rights 
and business reputation) were simply unknown.71 
Hence, there are two directions of hypothesis – financial pressure can be 
                                                 
71
 More discussion about the losses of state assets and the causes is seen in TUNG, R. (1996a) The 
depletion of state assets in mainland China. Issues & Studies, 32, 1-17.  
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positively or negatively associated with privatisation. My approach has been to follow 
mainstream arguments and formulate a positive hypothesis, while keeping an open 
mind to the alternative choice:  
 
Hypothesis 5. Severe financial pressure facing SOEs will encourage 
privatisation in China’s state sector.  
 
In terms of reforming its institutional infrastructure, no doubt China has still a 
long way to go. But its achievements in the past three decades haves also been 
impressive. Market-supporting institutions were seriously lacking in the 1980s and the 
1990s, but in the 2000s the situation improved greatly. Among the most important 
institutional changes were the following:  
The revival of private ownership was perhaps the most striking legislative 
institutional initiative. Nationalisation and collectivisation during the 1950s led to the 
elimination of private ownership, except for the retention by farmers of tiny private 
plots. In the first half of the 1980s it was reintroduced in the form of small individual 
business (getihu 個體戶), which were initially officially tolerated, but in the late 
1990s formally legalised (after which they were vigorously promoted). New 
regulations for civil businesses were also announced, and the legal statuses of 
state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises were also defined and clarified for the 
first time. A modern judicial system for the arbitration of business disputes was 
eventually founded. In terms of developing a market system, the institution of a price 
mechanism was the first priority, albeit one fraught with danger. Thanks to the 
adoption of a dual price system within which market prices were extended at a steady 
and safe pace, the former centrally-planned price system was gradually transformed 
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into a market-dominated system without from the attendant danger of hyperinflation.72 
More capital markets were established to issue and manage the shares of enterprises, 
while other institutional initiatives were implemented to create and protect intellectual 
property rights, as well as its transactions. A newly-reformed commercially-based 
banking system also started to provide a better market function in allocating limited 
economic resources in such a way as to enhance efficiency. There were improvements 
too in the physical infrastructure. Factor mobility was considerably enhanced, thanks 
to on-going investment in large infrastructure projects (e.g., highways, railways, 
airports, sea ports, power supply, telecommunications, internet systems, etc.).  
In effect, all these reforms and construction initiatives served to reduce 
institutional barriers and cut transaction costs in all markets. More importantly, these 
changes largely reshaped the market environment to which all enterprises were 
increasingly exposed. The institutional advantage from which public enterprises had 
formerly benefited was reduced, enabling private to enjoy an increasing comparative 
advantage. Such evidence attests to the positive impact of institutional enhancement 
on the occurrence of privatisation. Accordingly, I follow the transaction cost argument 
(Ramamurti, 2000, Li et al., 2005, Alexeev and Kaganovich, 2001) in formulating the 
institutional infrastructure hypothesis as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 6. The more the institutional infrastructure is strengthened and 
improved, the more likely it will be that privatisation will take place.  
 
Much scepticism surrounded claims of enhanced efficiency in China’s state 
industrial sector during the first decade of reform. Doubts were fuelled by the 
                                                 
72
 A certain degree of economic heating was inevitable during the price transition. Price reform 
triggered two significant waves of inflation in 1988 and 1992. See pp.357-361 in WU, J. (2003) China 
Economic Reform (Dandai Zhongguo Jingji Gaige), Shanghai, China, Shanghai Far East Publishers.  
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apparent inconsistency between claims of significant improvements in productivity 
and evidence that pointed to a continuing decline in profitability. This paradox 
generated fierce debate among researchers (Huang et al., 1999, Jefferson and Rawski, 
1994, Cheng and Lo, 2002, Fan and Woo, 1996, Holz, 2003:289, Zhang, 1998, Ash 
and He, 1998, Naughton, 1992). How to improve SOE profitability became a pressing 
question. Reform leaders initially sought to address the issue in a variety of ways, 
such as allowing enterprises to retain a greater share of profits or decentralising more 
enterprise control rights and management autonomy to local governments. The 
outcome of these efforts less than favourable, however, proved unable to halt the 
declining trend in profitability. It was against this background that in the mid-1990s 
ownership reform – an early stage of privatisation – began to be considered.  
Economic theories link efficiency improvements with private ownership through 
consideration of production risks. A risk-averse bureaucrat may prefer private 
provision (through privatising SOEs or contracting with private providers) because of 
a belief that he will thereby avoid the various production and political risks attached 
to public provision (Leyden and Link, 1993). The bureaucrat seeks to guarantee that 
his obligated amount of products or services will be provided under the lowest level 
of uncertainty. This traditional argument fits the motive of Chinese central 
government. It implies the best strategy that privatisation should be started from 
wherever the production or political risk is high – i.e., where the inefficiency is high.  
Nevertheless, there are players other than the central government. There are also 
situations in which privatisation may focus on efficiency, rather than inefficiency. 
First, as some theory suggests, if the local bureaucrat is a benevolent value protector 
(i.e., one who privatises for it as the best way to prevent valuable state assets from 
being melt-down under frequent mismanagement or corruption by SOE managers) he 
will start by seeking to protect the most valuable state assets and therefore seek to 
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privatise the most profitable SOEs as quickly as possible (Guo and Yao, 2005). Or, 
second, if the local bureaucrat is someone who endeavours to minimise political costs, 
then he will also start privatisation with the most profitable SOEs, since these can 
most readily be sold at a favourable price in the face of minimal political resistance 
from employees (Gupta et al., 2008). Thirdly, if the SOE manager is rent-seeking, he 
will also have a stronger incentive to focus his efforts on the privatisation of the more 
profitable SOEs (Debande and Friebel, 2004). Finally, if the bank manager, too, is 
risk-averse and acts commercially, he will wish to fund efficient, not inefficient 
private enterprises in the expectation of higher future returns (Brandt et al., 2005).  
Thus, hypotheses pointing in different directions are suggested by this analysis. 
While keeping open-minded to the alternative, my approach is to base the hypothesis 
on the original motive of the central government and assume that the privatisation will 
start from the point of greatest inefficiency:  
 
Hypothesis 7. Less efficient SOEs are more likely to be privatised than more 
efficient SOEs in China’s state sector.  
 
‘Firm size’ is a variable that can represent and generalise many of the 
privatisation arguments discussed above. The large size of a firm may result in 
exacerbating agency problems that arise during the separation of ownership and 
management (Ramamurti, 2000). It also reduces the flexibility with which a firm can 
operate in a weak institutional environment full of market imperfections. A 
small-scale privatisation sale will be less affected by the underdeveloped state of the 
capital market and will encounter fewer cash constraints by private buyers (Li, 2003). 
In addition, we may assume that a rent-seeking local bureaucrat will be able to retain 
a bigger stake of political patronage by holding large SOEs and only to privatise small 
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ones as a response to the order of central government (Li, 2003). That is why 
privatisation proceeds may differ by firm size (Li et al., 2005). Privatisation will 
almost certainly disadvantage a large firm because of the high transaction costs 
entailed by ownership reform.  
Such size considerations are a justification of China’s privatisation policy of 
“grasping the large and letting go of the small”, launched in the late 1990s. As 
discussed earlier, this policy comprised two elements. The idea of “grasping the large” 
was aimed at about 1,000 large SOEs, which were regarded as strategically important 
and which the central government had already targeted with a moderate programme of 
ownership diversification (albeit on a scale much less than privatisation) in order to 
improve their poor performance (Yeh, 1998, Zhang and Zhang, 2007:235-239). 
“Letting go of the small” focused on the remaining medium and small SOEs, the 
privatisation of which was to be encouraged by local governments through such 
mechanisms as bankruptcy, ownership diversification, shareholding cooperation, 
auctions, leases and mergers (Ma, 2010:22, Garnaut et al., 2005:48-50, Smyth, 1998). 
It would appear that this policy was an attempt to accommodate ownership reform 
whilst avoiding the orthodoxy of the ‘Big Bang’ approach espoused by mainstream 
transitional economics. For Chinese reform leaders, privatisation has never been 
regarded as taking precedence over fundamental policy goals such as the preservation 
of economic stability, high employment and social harmony. Accordingly, my next 
hypothesis is as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 8. In the early stage of privatisation reform in China, small-scale 
SOEs are more likely to be privatised.  
 
Only a handful of studies in the privatisation literature have addressed issues 
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relating to human capital (Li and Rozelle, 2000, Li, 2003, Brandt et al., 2005). One 
reason for this is the lack of human capital data available to SOE staffs and 
government bureaucrats. Yet this research field is full of potential. In some theoretical 
writing, it is argued that human capital characteristics are correlated with privatisation 
for several reasons.  
First, if the SOE manager acquires better human capital, compared with the 
quality of the bureaucrat in charge of this firm, the likelihood of privatisation will 
increase, because the manager’s greater specialisation will give the enterprise a better 
chance of future success (Li, 2003). Second, if the bank manager’s human capital 
endowment is strengthened, he will be better qualified to identify good projects and 
fund them (Brandt et al., 2005). More privatisation programmes will be granted loans 
because they are regarded as “good projects”. Thirdly, if the bureaucrat’s human 
capital endowment is strengthened, his monitoring costs will decrease, so do the 
expected proceeds after privatisation. Hence, the likelihood of privatisation will also 
be reduced (Li, 2003).  
In general, managers are assumed to possess better endowments of human capital 
(such as greater specialisation, higher education, longer experience in relevant works, 
better relationship in social network, etc.) than bureaucrats. However, a 
large-sampling survey in 1994 comparing the human capital characteristics between 
local bureaucrats and SOE managers suggests that this does not hold true in China. To 
date the only instance in which data relating to the basic conditions in human capital 
of civil servants in local governments and administrative personnel in local enterprises 
have been recorded is in the publication of just two tables in China Statistical 
Yearbook 1996 (see Table 4.1). Although the information provided here is of quite a 
general nature, it is sufficient to show that local bureaucrats in chief levels are 
generally speaking more educated, older and having more senior positions. SOE 
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managers possessed less endowments of human capital than local bureaucrats, whilst 
the former only out-perform in one item – staying longer in current positions. That is 
to say, statistically, Chinese SOE managers do not enjoy comparative advantage in 
running enterprises, compared with their upper bureaucrats (from whom the managers 
take their instructions). Local bureaucrats actually possess better endowments in 
human capital than SOE managers. Unfortunately, these data cannot afford any further 
analysis because they have not been updated in a consistent manner. Moreover, during 
a series of far-reaching reforms in the mid-1990s, most SOE personnel structures were 
restructured. Many SOE managers were re-appointed through a competitive process, 
or newly-recruited from domestic or foreign labour markets. The expectation would 
have been that their style of doing business would become more commercial, 
aggressive and market-oriented, and in addition that their endowments of human 
capital would be strengthened. However, the same problem remains – data are not 
available and may not even exist.  
For these reasons, I will simply assume a positive correlation between human 
capital characteristics and privatisation. The improvement in the average level of 
human capital should reduce production risks, enhance opportunities of future success, 
and facilitate the eventual privatisation.73  Accordingly, the hypothesis is set as 
follows:  
 
Hypothesis 9. The improvement of human capital among SOEs will lead to more 
privatisation in China’s state sector.  
 
Table 4.1 
Basic conditions of Chinese civil servants and administrative personnel in enterprises (1994). 
   Average 
  Interviewees Educated Age Seniority Postholding 
                                                 
73
 The justifications and details of the design of human capital variables are discussed in Section 4.4.  
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  (person) (year) 
       
Civil servants National 55,509 11.8 42.0 19.7 4.9 
 Division Chief 3,374 12.7 50.8 32.0 4.9 
 Section Chief 15,239 11.8 48.5 26.8 4.8 
 Office Staff 36,895 11.8 35.0 14.3 5.9 
       
Administrative 
personnel in 
enterprises 
National 65,912 11.2 44.2 21.7 7.0 
Division Chief 4,676 12.1 49.2 29.1 5.5 
Section Chief 18,105 11.2 48.2 26.4 5.7 
Office Staff 43,131 11.0 42.2 19.4 7.8 
       
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1996, pp.127-128.  
Note: Samples are collected from 14 provinces including Beijing, Tianjin, Shanxi, Liaoning, 
Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Shandong, Hubei, Guangdong, Sichuan and Shaanxi.  
 
4.2 Multi-level framework 
 
In this section, the author establishes a multi-level analytical framework, 
modified from the pioneering work in Ramamurti (2000), to accommodate the above 
nine hypotheses and further illustrate the privatisation dynamics in China under 
transition.  
The prevalence of privatisation among emerging economies in the 1980s and 
1990s attracted academic attention in many disciplines. Political scientists, according 
to Ramamurti, mainly emphasise the country-specific factors that interact with 
privatisation. Economists tend to extend their analysis to include the industry-specific 
factors, while management theorists usually focus on the firm-specific factors. 
Ramamurti argues that privatisation is not a “one-shot event”, but is a dynamic 
process in which all these factors should be examined all together ex ante and ex post 
in privatisation. Reforms should be implemented bit by bit in every aspect and should 
not be implemented wholesale in a short time. Furthermore, there is a feedback loop: 
one round of privatisation is likely to generate changes in the firm-, industrial- and 
country-level factors, which in turn affect the dynamics in subsequent rounds of 
reform (see Figure 4.1).  
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In terms of firm-level factors, Ramamurti first points to the agency argument, 
which refers to the failures of agency and property rights.74 SOE property rights are 
usually poorly defined in socialist economies, often leading to the agency problem of 
“an agent without a principal” in which the principal (namely, the whole of society) 
cannot make the agent (the SOE manager) accountable. This gives rise to inevitable 
abuse of government budgets, a problem which Kornai (2003) called the “soft budget” 
problem. The second firm-level factor is firm size. Small SOEs should supposedly be 
privatised earlier than large ones. The price of transacting small-scale SOEs should be 
easier for private buyers. Managerial challenges should be less demanding for the new 
private owners. The potential for political resistance by laid-off state workers should 
be much smaller for local governments. Besides, the origin of the firm is also relevant. 
Wholesale privatisation is more likely to take place in the case of an SOE that had in 
the past been privately (or co-privately) owned. For instance, the reform of so-called 
“restitution” took place in the Czech and Estonia in the early 1990s, when some SOEs 
were returned to the people who had owned these enterprises prior to nationalisation. 
If an SOE is already partly shared by private ownership, its inner legal structure 
should have been left with the space (for diversified ownerships) that can facilitate the 
future privatisation in a full scale.  
Two factors in framework are relevant at an industrial-level – viz., competition 
and regulatory innovation (i.e., the change of regulation). The competition facing 
SOEs in all countries mainly derives from three sources: the global scale of economic 
liberation in most industries, the nature of technological change in some industries 
(especially in telecommunications), and the international trend towards deregulation 
in industries such as airlines, transport, etc. More organisational weaknesses of SOEs 
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 Please note that most arguments Ramamurti makes have been systemically discussed in Chapter 
Three. The introduction here will be kept brief and it serves the only purpose that to draw an overall 
picture of his privatisation framework.  
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are exposed under intensified competition, so that privatisation is seen as a popular 
means of improving the competitiveness of such enterprises.  
Regulatory innovation expands the potential role of private firms in the provision 
of public goods and services. Traditional theory sees the establishment of natural 
monopolies in some industries as lying within the purview of the state; however, 
recent theories suggest that a certain part of this “natural monopoly” is artificial, and 
can be broken up. For example, if production is vertically or horizontally separated, 
collaboration can be achieved among providers characterised by different kinds of 
ownership status. This offers private firms the opportunities to participate in the 
establishment of such natural monopolies. New regulations in respect to natural 
monopolies may also be encouraging for private providers; for example, the 
introduction of a price-cap, which only allows price increases to take place if they are 
lower than actual inflation. This means that higher production costs cannot be 
automatically transferred to consumers. Accordingly, all providers will have stronger 
incentives to reduce cost-raising inefficiencies and thus to increase consumer welfare. 
In consequence, this regulatory change will not only facilitate the competitive 
involvement of private providers, but will also encourage more SOEs to enhance their 
efficiency through privatisation.  
Last but not least important are country-specific factors. Ideology change is the 
first such factor. Ramamurti argues that many new leaders in former communist 
countries tended to privatise as early as possible simply in order to guarantee the 
irreversibility of the economic and political changes that occurred after the collapse of 
Berlin Wall. This ideological fervour for free market doctrines led to a rapid and 
massive privatisation movement throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
bloc in the early 1990s. The second country-specific factor relates to the onset of 
macroeconomic crises, such as hyperinflation or balance-and-payment problems. 
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States confronting such crises may first seek to solve their problems by raising 
domestic taxes or borrowing from overseas; however, there are limits to the extent to 
which domestic savers and foreign lenders can undertake such actions. If these limits 
are reached, the state may have no choice but to take the painful alternative of selling 
off state assets – de facto privatisation – to secure hard currency it needs to write off 
huge deficits or debts. As discussed, this is the remedy advocated by the Washington 
Consensus, and also required by the World Bank and IMF when they grant last-resort 
loans. The final country-specific factor cited by Ramamurti is the degree of 
sophistication of institutions underpinning a market economy. The quality of 
market-supporting institutions will affect the private investor’s willingness to make 
funds available so that a weak institutional environment will slow down the speed of 
any ownership transaction (and so also privatisation). Figure 4.1 offers a 
diagrammatical representation of Ramamurti’s framework of privatisation dynamics.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Ramamurti’s multi-level model for privatisation studies. 
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Source: Ramamurti (2000) 
 
This framework has two shortcomings. First, its classification wholly relies on 
the difference in organisation levels, which are classified by firm-, industry- or 
country-specific factors. However, the scale of influence is actually not a concept 
based on economic theories. That makes this framework impossible to explore the 
economic nature of privatisation dynamics. Second, this framework makes no 
distinction between relevant actors. Different actors are involved in any privatisation. 
They include government bureaucrats, enterprise managers, private investors and 
bank lenders, each of whom will respond to a privatisation programme on the basis of 
his self-interest-maximising calculation of costs and benefits. Such considerations 
help explain why Ramamurti’s framework is too simplified to address the 
complexities of privatisation, as well as to identify the economic nature of 
privatisation dynamics.  
Therefore, in what follows, I propose a modified framework that can be more 
effectively address this nature. All privatisation-related factors can be fitted into three 
categories – those that operate at the microeconomic, macroeconomic and political 
economy levels. Microeconomic determinants place the micro conditions of an SOE 
at the centre of the analysis. They include (see literature review) factors such as 
economic efficiency, firm size and human capital characteristics of SOEs. These 
micro conditions determine the starting point of each privatisation sale. Secondly, 
macroeconomic level determinants relate to macroeconomic changes in the market 
environment and their subsequent impact on privatisation. They include 
considerations of market competition, financial pressure and institutional 
infrastructure. Under my categorisation, this group is larger than Ramamurti’s 
industry-level group because of its inclusion of two extra country-level factors. 
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Thirdly, the group of political economy determinants focuses on the strategic 
behaviours of individual actors during privatisation. Relevant factors include the soft 
budget constraint, political ideology and decentralisation. Through consideration of 
these it is possible to address various interactions between government and enterprise, 
bureaucrat and manager, and/or enterprise and bank in the privatisation process. Thus, 
my revised group here differs greatly from Ramamurti’s country-level group, in which 
there is only one factor – ideological commitment – which overlaps with my modified 
version.  
In nature, there are three economic dimensions of privatisation:  
 
(1) Microeconomic dimension: that concerns SOEs’ conditions of 
individual/micro endowments at the beginning stage of privatisation.  
(2) Macroeconomic dimension: that concerns SOEs’ conditions of 
surrounding/macro environment during privatisation.  
(3) Political economy dimension: that concerns strategic interactions between 
SOEs and other actors in privatisation.  
 
Figure 4.2 shows the author’s modified framework of privatisation dynamics.  
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Figure 4.2: Multi-level framework in this research. 
Source: Author’s summary 
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 The first is between central and local governments. Through a series of 
budgetary, banking and monetary reforms in the mid-1990s, the Chinese 
central government successfully shifted the major part of the SOE subsidy 
burden downwards to local governments. Soft budgets which local 
governments had long enjoyed were significantly reduced. In effect, local 
governments became more vulnerable than the central government in 
bearing this heavy burden because of the absence of fiscal and monetary 
tools at their disposal.  
 At the second level, local governments also reduced the subsidies to local 
SOEs in attempts to transfer the hardening pressure.  
 At the third level, banking reforms began to require state banks to reduce 
soft credits for SOEs because these loans carried higher risks.  
 
As a result, SOEs suffered most from the hardening process because they were 
hit three times over.  
For these reasons, the soft budget constraint should not be seen as solely a 
firm-level determinant. This is particularly the case in China, where the soft budget 
issue is best understood as a set of strategic interactions between central and local 
governments, as well as between SOE managers and bank lenders.  
Secondly, the past experience of an SOE. This factor is regarded by Ramamurti 
as a firm-level determinant for future privatisation because the SOE’s past 
(pre-nationalisation) experience as a private firm act as a facilitator of its re-embrace 
of private ownership. However, this variable is not applicable to China, since this 
assumption does not wholly accord with the historical development of China’s state 
industrial sector. In 1995, the total number of Chinese SOEs peaked over 120,000: 
two thirds of these had been established during the pre-1979 socialist industrialisation 
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period, while one third had been newly created under the impact of reform. In short, 
the vast majority had no origin as a private enterprise. Thus, restitution has not been a 
characteristic feature of Chinese privatisation. In addition, China’s transitional model 
is not based on the Big-Bang approach where voucher privatisation is widely taken to 
achieve a rapid reform of ownership transformation. Its gradualist model of transition 
has also avoided the necessity of making a sudden and immediate privatisation 
decision.  
Thirdly, the benefits of regulatory innovation. By assumption here, under the 
impact of the development of regulatory innovation, more private providers will start 
to be permitted to participate in some traditional monopolistic industries. This 
assumption, however, may not accord with the reality of Chinese conditions. Chinese 
privatisation mainly took place in the second half of the 1990s, a period when the 
institutional environment was still poorly developed and inimical to private property 
rights. Most privatisation transactions took place without supporting regulations. 
Indeed, many entry barriers of industries were lowered whilst more private providers 
were allowed to enter a number of traditional monopolies, such as electricity, water, 
gas, coal or petroleum (see Table 2.6). However, it would be difficult to conclude that 
the evolving process of privatisation in these Chinese industries was the result of 
sophisticated regulation innovation (meaning that private competitors were 
encouraged to participate by the regulatory rents relieved by the state). Most merits 
should be claimed by the success of liberalisation towards China’s markets. 
Fourthly, competition. The two frameworks offer two distinctive hypotheses in 
relation to competition. In Ramamurti’s framework, rising competition in each 
country’s state sector is assumed to have derived from three sources – global 
economic liberalisation, overall technological improvement and the international trend 
towards deregulation. These sources are all external. However, the increase in 
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competition facing Chinese SOEs has mainly come from internal sources, including 
more intensified regional/provincial competition following decentralisation, increases 
in private competitors resulting from a booming local private sector, and the 
increasing accessibility of local markets to products made available through 
international and inter-regional trade. Hence the difference in the competition 
hypothesis in my modified framework.  
Fifthly, there are two necessary shifts between categories. The macroeconomic 
crisis and institution hypotheses are both moved from the country-level group of 
determinants. This does not suggest that these influences on privatisation do not 
operate at the country-level; indeed, they do. But it is to argue that these factors 
mainly relate to the response by an SOE to changes in external conditions in the 
market and institutional environment. They are much less related to the strategic 
interaction between the bureaucrat and manager in the process of privatisation; unlike 
the ideology factor – which captures the manager’s strategic response to the 
bureaucrat’s ideological commitment. It also explains why these two factors do not 
belong among political economy determinants.  
Finally, there are some important factors neglected in Ramamurti’s framework.75 
The first is that of decentralisation. This factor has many distinctive Chinese 
characteristics, and it lies at the heart of differences between privatisation in China 
and in other transitional economies. Chinese privatisation occurred after the 
implementation of major, far-reaching and comprehensive reforms; by contrast, 
privatisation in other transitional economies often took place in advance of 
market-oriented reform (or sometimes within it, or sometimes to be used as a tool to 
achieve it). Chinese practice provided an exception to this mainstream assumption – 
something of which Ramamurti was not aware.  
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Nor, in terms of firm-level determinants, is the factor of economic efficiency 
included. This is generally understood as part of agency/property rights problem in 
Ramamurti’s framework. However, economic efficiency is not a problem that solely 
exists between principal and agent, or merely relates to unclear definition of property 
rights. Efficiency is a more general factor reflecting and affecting many aspects of a 
firm’s business capability. A more economically efficient SOE is likely to be 
privatised sooner or later depending on circumstances. The outcome will depend on 
the assumptions of personal motivation and future expectation of the bureaucrat and 
manager. This is another crucial point, but one that is often ignored.  
Lastly, the human capital characteristics of an SOE are not considered. Although 
this factor has attracted little attention in the existing literature, human capital capacity 
is undoubtedly one of the most important facets of any enterprise’s factor endowment. 
Possession of strong human capital may make an SOE more attractive to potential 
private buyers and thereby increase the likelihood that privatisation will take place. 
Strong human capital may also help an SOE reduce monitoring costs and production 
risks. It may further decrease the willingness of the bureaucrat to privatise it. One way 
or the other, it is a variable not be underestimated in the privatisation process.  
 
Connection between hypotheses  
 
There is potential connection between hypotheses – an issue that should be 
considered before discussing econometrics that can deal with this endogenous 
problem. From a broad perspective, all external factors could be to some extent 
connected to each other, particularly in this multilevel framework of privatisation in 
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which nine hypotheses are placed into three major groups.76 Every hypothesis of each 
group is assumed to be sharing the remaining two hypotheses with similar economic 
essence, either of microeconomics, macroeconomics, or political economy. By nature, 
accordingly, there should be potential connection among hypotheses in the same 
group, and the question is how to deal with this in a more efficient way (see the 
discussion in Section 4.3). However, from another angle, this problem can be 
mitigated by concentrating on the influence of hypotheses as a group. That is, the 
potential connection among three groups should be much smaller than that among 
hypotheses within a group. By doing so in interpretation, we can highlight the driving 
force in a higher level (which is one of main purposes of this thesis) while also not 
downplaying any single factor, whose influence could be affected by other factors 
having potential connection.  
Before the discussion proceeds, it is useful for readers to know that this issue has 
so far drawn little attention in the literature of privatisation studies. The handful of 
papers addressing the potential connection between privatisation and output variables 
attempt to rule out the sample selection bias as comparing performance between 
privatised and non-privatised (including public or private) firms or in ex ante and ex 
post period of privatisation (Aussenegg and Jelic, 2007; Li and Rozelle, 2000; Lin and 
Su, 2008; Plane, 1997). What worries these authors is the potential reverse causality 
in which the privatisation decision is made on the basis of external factors, 
particularly of the variety of firm performances. However, interestingly, this “reverse 
causality” is exactly the causality I intend to examine, and, hence, this concern should 
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 For this reason, it is impossible to single out an independent factor entirely free from influence of 
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The problem in operation is therefore how to better control other effects in terms of ‘feasible’ 
econometrics. All findings should be interpreted in a conservative manner, while a careful researcher 
will have to admit that the limitation of, even the most advanced, econometric technique may neglect 
potential causal relationship not being hypothesised. This is also the stance taken in my following 
interpretation.  
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not be a worry to this thesis.  
Even without any reference in literature, some concerns over the potential 
connection among hypotheses, based on my own conjectures, are still plausible.  
For instance, firstly, the potential relationship between soft budgets (H1) and 
financial pressure (H5). The decrease of soft budgets is supposed to increase the 
financial pressure facing SOEs; however, this causality is not so direct. Since soft 
budgets are mainly granted for loss-making SOEs, the reduction of soft budgets may 
also represent the decrease in the number of SOEs that make losses. This means, on 
the contrary, less financial pressure has fallen on SOEs, against the causality 
imagined.  
Next, in former Soviet and Eastern European countries, rising market 
competition (H4) can be seen to be a result of the ideological shift from a 
central-command to a market-oriented economy (H2) in a rather short period of time 
in the early 1990s. Yet, this ideological change in China has been much slower than 
the “big bang” approach in the West. Private ownership was not even ‘legally’ 
protected in China until the late 1990s – a time when the degree of market 
competition was already very high, thanks to the boom of township and village (also 
public) enterprises, as well as the participation of FDI pouring into China from 
overseas. So the potential causal relationship between ideology and competition in 
China is actually rather weak.  
Thirdly, decentralisation (H3) is once defined in literature as the combination of 
the hardness of budget (H1) and market development (similar to H5) (Guo and Yao, 
2005). This potential connection comes only from the special definition; however, 
decentralisation is not necessarily to be defined as being connected with soft budgets, 
market competition, or even other factors. In my definition, detailed in Section 4.4, 
decentralisation is better represented by the increasing autonomy in local fiscal 
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capability – a factor that could matter nothing about budget constraint or market 
situation.  
Furthermore, as one can imagine, competition (H5) is a strong factor that could 
affect everything. Competition may encourage politicians to undertake political 
changes (relevant to H1, H2 and H3) or push managers to adjust enterprise conditions 
(relevant to H7, H8 and H9). However, this wide range of potential influence of 
competition also reveals that the causality between competition and other factors is 
not sufficient. More importantly, it will take ‘time’ to diffuse competition effect, 
which therefore may not be simultaneous with the effects from other factors.  
The final concern is with the potential link between efficiency (H7) and human 
capital (H9).77 There is no doubt that the endowment of human capital may relate, 
more or less, to the degree of efficiency of a firm. But these two factors may differ 
from each other by placing emphasis on different part of efficiency. The quality of 
labour is at the centre of the human capital factor, while it also can be totally ignored 
in a normal efficiency factor. This strategy may help avoid direct causality between 
them, and will be taken in the variable design in Section 4.4.  
In short, although it is theoretically impossible to reject potential causality 
among hypotheses, there is no substantial causality that can be recognised among the 
hypotheses set out in this thesis. There is no literature to suggest, or even to provide 
evidence of, any potential connection among privatisation determinants. Hence, the 
concern of results being biased by potential problem of endogeneity should be small. 
In addition, by contrast, if there is still concern that this analysis remains 
unconvincing, the issue of endogeneity among hypotheses/variables can also be better 
controlled by using system-GMM estimation technique. The mathematical 
justification is followed in the next section.   
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4.3 Econometrics 
 
Econometric specification and strategies 
 
The shrinkage of Chinese state sector, representing the dependent variable, is 
specified in a dynamic model as  
 
 
* * *
, 1 1 2 k( , , ,..., ),  for 1,..., , 1,..., ,it i t it it ity f y x x x i N t T−= = =   (1) 
 
where the degree of contraction, in the i-th province at the t-th period, ity  is assumed 
to be determined by its lagged term for one period 
, 1i ty − , also known as the dynamic 
variable, with other explanatory variables * * *1 2 k, ,...,it it itx x x  in the same period. This 
dynamic autoregressive-distributed linear model is expressed as  
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where the disturbance itu  is decomposed by unobservable individual-specific effects 
2IID(0, )i ηη σ: ,  year-specific effects tλ , and the remainder stochastic disturbances 
2IID(0, )it vv σ: .  
The reason for setting up a dynamic model is twofold. Firstly, a dynamic process 
of privatisation induced by multilevel factors is the chief argument of this thesis, 
while a traditional static setting in specification is completely contrary to my 
theoretical assumption. My aim is to show that privatisation should not be regarded as 
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a “one-shot event” (Ramamurti, 2000), especially in China where privatisation reform 
took place over a period much longer than that during which the “big bang” approach 
took place in the former Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. Only by a 
dynamic setting in specification can one examine external effects to privatisation as 
well as the feedback/internal effect from privatisation itself. In other words, a static 
model will inevitably omit the lagged adjustment phenomenon in which privatisation 
as a policy may adjust itself according to previous policy outcome, especially in the 
short-run, such as of the last period. Secondly, a multilevel model of privatisation will 
surely raise the worry of engaging with the issue of endogeneity among explanatory 
variables, a kind of econometric bias that can be largely controlled by a newly 
developed estimator that also requires a dynamic specification as necessity. There is 
more discussion about endogeneity and estimator below.  
There are econometric reasons to apply the estimator of system general method 
of moments (system-GMM) (Blundell and Bond, 1998, Blundell et al., 2000, Arellano 
and Bover, 1995) in the following analysis.78 First, the dynamic nature is only 
captured by the GMM estimator without bias and inconsistency – problems that are 
inevitable in traditional pooled or fixed effects, also known as the within group (WG), 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations (Nickell, 1981, Baltagi, 2009, Blundell et al., 
2000).79 80 Second, with the help of GMM estimator, researchers may consider more 
explanatory variables in a regression without worries of the problem of endogeneity.81 
Thirdly, the bias caused by the decrease of data variation in the first differences in the 
                                                 
78
 These reasons are discussed mathematically in the next section.  
79
 The correlations between explanatory variables and errors brought by the dynamic specification 
would prevent the probability limits of pooled-OLS and WG estimators from approaching to the true 
value. So this problem of endogeneity would make results inconsistent when the sample size increases.  
80
 This dynamic nature would also lead to an asymptotic upward bias in the pooled-OLS estimator as 
well as downward bias in the WG estimator.  
81
 The problem of endogeneity refers to problem of inconsistency caused by the correlation between 
regressors and errors. The mathematical discussion of this problem is listed after the Equation (4) in 
Section 4.3.  
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difference-GMM (a problem to which particularly for highly persistent series are 
especially susceptible) is corrected by getting the level values of variables back to the 
regressions in the system-GMM.82  Hence, the precision of coefficients will be 
improved through the removal of the bias caused by weakened instruments.  
Robustness checks are conducted by using a smaller dataset excluding data that 
may contain relatively extreme values in the first or last few periods of time, in order 
to see if results can resist changes. Finite sample bias in the difference-GMM should 
be corrected by the system-GMM estimator through its re-introduction of the level 
equations into estimations (Blundell and Bond, 1998). All results are derived by 
two-step estimation with Windmeijer corrections. Validity of instruments is detected 
by Hansen test.83 Hansen test can also check the fitness of structural specification 
(Roodman, 2009b).84 Difference-in-Hansen test detects the validity of the subsets of 
instruments using in level equations (Roodman, 2009a).85 The potential problem of 
the instrument proliferation, also known as too-many-instruments bias, is considered. 
Some Monte Carlo simulation tests showed that the over-identification caused by too 
many instruments in GMM estimators would lead to the failure of expunging 
endogenous components (Roodman, 2009b). Two theoretical solutions are 
accordingly adopted: first, the instrument count will be severely reduced by the matrix 
technique of collapsing the instruments using in the first differenced equations, and, 
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 This problem will supposedly lead to a downward bias among coefficients – an effect clearly seen in 
following results.  
83
 The validity of instruments can be detected by Sargan or Hansen test. Theoretically speaking, the 
Sargan test is not robust because of its assumption of homogeneity, but this test will not be affected by 
too-many-instrument problem. On the contrary, the Hansen test is robust for assuming heterogeneity, 
but its effectiveness may be weakened by instrument proliferation.  
84
 As Roodman (2009) states “omitting important explanatory variables, for instance, could move 
components of variation into the error term and make them correlated with the instruments”, a large 
p-value in Hansen test also means that there is little evidence of omitted variables. See also in He and 
Sun (2013).   
85
 If the subset instruments introducing by the system-GMM is valid, this statistic should be 
asymptotical to Chi-squared, with degree of freedom equal to the number of suspect instruments.  
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second, the time depth of instrument lags will be severely limited.86 In short, a 
conservative strategy of econometrics will be strictly committed in what follows.  
 
More about endogeneity  
 
Since endogeneity is one of the most common problems that worry researchers in 
empirical studies, I would like to address this topic in more detail and provide the 
rationale of my strategy.  
First of all, it should be noted that most discussions of endogeneity in 
privatisation literature are concerned with the endogenous effect of privatisation 
variable (in the right-hand side of equation) to firm performance as dependent 
variable – a case completely different from this thesis in which privatisation is treated 
as dependent variable (in the left-hand side of equation).   
In fact, there are only two variables discussed in current literature that could be 
endogenous to privatisation. A potential reverse causality may happen to the variable 
hardness of budget (Brandt et al., 2005; Li, 2003; Lopez-de-Silanes et al., 1997). 
Though most privatisation should be driven by hardening budgets, it cannot be 
rejected that a local government may choose privatisation as a means to harden the 
budget. A similar case also happens to the variable fiscal pressure. A local government 
keen to provide more services by spending more budgetary funds may be happy with 
larger deficits and thus less likely to privatise (Clarke and Cull, 2002).  
Nevertheless, as Plane (1997) states, privatisation is not a policy of random 
choice, but endogenous to economic policy targets. That is to say, more, or even all, 
explanatory variables could be endogenous to privatisation. Or, in other words, 
                                                 
86
 Yet, it is well accepted in relevant discussion that there is no clear guidance from the literature on a 
proper number of instruments.  
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privatisation is also inevitably an endogenous result of all economic policy variables. 
This assumption will make it almost impossible to solve endogeneity by traditional 
econometric techniques, such as replacing endogenous variables by valid (or, more 
precisely, orthogonal) instruments, or setting up a simultaneous equations model to 
examine the real degree of endogeneity. Yet the current development in econometrics 
helps greatly in tackling this problem.  
With the help of system-GMM estimator, whose merits in dealing with 
endogeneity have just been discussed, more empirical researchers are encouraged to 
extend their researches to the field that most explanatory variables could be 
endogenous (Colombo et al., 2013; He, 2012; He and Sun, 2013; Pathan and Faff, 
2013). For instance, Colombo et al. (2013) focus on the treatment effect of public 
subsidies on a firm’s investment rate and investment–cash flow sensitivity, but all 
public support variables could be endogenous for a reverse causation in which firms 
having more investment opportunities may be more likely to seek public support in 
finance. He and Sun (2013) identify the determinants of China’s economic growth in 
the reform period and assume that all explanatory variables of output growth may be 
endogenous to the growth process due to the feedback effect. Pathan and Faff (2013) 
examine the causal effect of board structure on firm performance while regarding 
major explanatory variables such as board size, independent directors and gender 
diversity endogenous. He (2012) establishes a causal relationship between financial 
deregulation and export expansion in China while controlling the potential 
endogeneity of financial deregulation to other explanatory variables such as real GDP, 
human capital investment, labour force growth, fiscal expenditure and FDI. Although 
endogeneity may come from different sources, all these papers fully rely on the 
system-GMM estimator to tackle this econometric problem.  
Following this academic trend, the strategy of this thesis is also to take a 
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conservative stance in econometrics, regarding all explanatory variables as potentially 
endogenous, and use system-GMM estimator to deal with this issue. The 
mathematical process of how system-GMM estimator can purge endogeneity via 
lagged terms of predetermined variables as instruments is detailed in the following 
section.  Since these variables are internal instruments, there is no need any longer to 
find external instruments – a job not only time consuming but sometimes unfeasible 
because of limited information for constructing new variables. This estimator is thus 
preferred over reduced-form and instrument models. Another major advantage is that 
it can address endogeneity from different sources including unobserved heterogeneity, 
simultaneity and reverse causality (Pathan and Faff, 2013).  
Additionally, it is noteworthy that the special data form of this research also 
helps to reduce the chance of engaging with endogeneity among variables. Since all 
my data are of aggregate form, either of a province or of an industry of a province, the 
nature of potential reverse causality among variables of a specific firm will inevitably 
be blurred. My assumption corresponds to that of Li (2003), who argues that his 
industrial-level measure is able to avoid the endogeneity issue of a firm-level 
measure.  
 
Causality in hypotheses 
 
In terms of the potential issue of causality versus correlation, the conclusion 
drawn from the literature discussion in Section 3.1 may suggest a conservative 
approach avoiding the use of causality in order to accommodate potential problems 
caused by simultaneity, reverse causality, or unobserved factors.  
However, the current trend in empirical studies seems to be generating greater 
confidence, by which researchers are more encouraged to declare causal relationship 
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among variables examined. Using system-GMM technique, Pathan and Faff (2013) 
examine the causal effect of board structure of firm performance. Vandenberghe et al. 
(2013) use firm-level panel data with system-GMM estimation to produce robust 
evidence (in their words) on the causal effect of ageing on productivity and labour 
costs. He (2012) declares that the dynamic panel data specification allows him to use 
system-GMM to establish a causal relationship between financial development and 
firm exports. Regarding to the production function, He and Sun (2013) use 
system-GMM to isolate the contributions of human capital and technological change 
to output growth, so that they are allowed to establish a causal relationship between 
growth and its determinants. Since the specific (unobserved) characteristics can be 
controlled in system-GMM, Krieger and Ruhose (2013) state that they are “able to 
draw conclusions on a causality basis, rather than just interpreting correlations.”  
Returning to this thesis, which aims to explore the determinants of the 
privatisation reform in China, it is impossible to reject causality. To the contrary, the 
multilevel framework, established in the last section, modelling the dynamic process 
by examining both simultaneous and feedback effects, is by nature assuming causality 
between privatisation and external factors. This theoretical assumption will inevitably 
raise concerns of engaging with endogeneity, introducing biases into regression results. 
However, with the help of system-GMM estimation, these endogenous problems can 
be largely, if not entirely, reduced.  It is beneficial to recall that, in literature, only 
two variables – hardness of budget (Brandt et al., 2005; Li, 2003; Lopez-de-Silanes et 
al., 1997) and fiscal pressure (Clarke and Cull, 2002) – are once discussed for having 
potential reverse causality to privatisation. It means that endogeneity is not a serious 
concern in privatisation studies when privatisation is treated as a development 
variable, rather than one of the explanatory variables that, in most cases, explain firm 
performance. In addition, the great merit of the system-GMM in controlling 
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unobserved effects by introducing differenced equations into models also allows us to 
interpret findings in a more causal sense.87  
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that all empirical findings, not only in this thesis 
but in all empirical papers, are derived from a correlation basis. Causality is only 
assumed behind hypotheses, while any declaration of it should be rigorously subject 
to specific conditions in econometrics. Therefore, I feel obliged to admit that all my 
findings are based on correlations with statistical significance, while the causality can 
only be interpreted in a rather conservative manner.  
 
Econometric justification 
 
This section justifies the application of system-GMM by demonstrating 
mathematically how the potential econometric problems – including bias, 
inconsistency and endogeneity – will be solved by the system-GMM estimator. It 
starts with the basic regression model, the pooled OLS estimation.  
Pooled OLS estimation. This estimation begins with the basic form of Eq.(2):  
 ,poolβi i iy = X + u  (3) 
where 1( ,..., )i ity y ′=iy , * *, 1 1 k( , ,..., )i t it ity x x−=iX , 1 k( , ,... )poolβ α β β′ ′ ′= , and 
1( ,..., )i itu u ′=iu . The coefficient vector poolβ  can be obtained by assuming 
orthogonality conditions ( ) 0E ′ =i iX u , which yield the following calculation  
 
                                                 
87
 It is for this reason that the term “ceteris paribus” will not be used in wording my hypotheses. This 
conditional assumption will help improve the accuracy in interpreting findings when unobserved or 
simultaneous factors cannot be ruled out. However, since the system-GMM is supposed to be able to 
efficiently control both effects, I feel no needs to make this statement. In addition, this term is rarely 
seen in the privatisation literature. There is only one paper using this term in hypotheses, while 
Bortolotti et al. (2003) downplay their findings as conditional expectations for the possibility to contain 
effects unobserved.  
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So, the pooled OLS estimator is obtained as 
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However, there are two problems. First, applying the pooled OLS estimator in a 
dynamic model will cause a problem of inconsistency because of the existence of a 
correlation between regressors and errors:  
 
 pool
ˆplim cov( ) / var( ),poolβ β= + i i iX u X  
 
if cov( ) 0,≠i iX u  then the probability limits will not approach to the true value, that 
is poolˆplim 0poolβ β− →/ . This is called the problem of endogeneity and these 
explanatory variables are called endogenous variables. Second, this estimator also 
leads to the problem of asymptotic bias (Blundell et al., 2000, Baltagi, 2009):  
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this estimator is biased upwards, with ˆplim( ) 1poolβ β< < .  
Fixed effects estimation. The fixed effects (FE) estimator highlights the 
unobserved heterogeneity among individual-specific and time-specific impacts, so the 
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Eq.(2) is re-written as  
 
 ,FE i t FE i tα β η λ δ η λ= + + + + = + + +i nt i η λ i η λ iy ι X Z Z v Z Z Z v  (5) 
 
where ntι  is a n t×  matrix of ones, 1( ,... )FE kβ β β′ ′ ′= , ηZ  and λZ  are 
respectively the matrix of individual and time dummies, = nt iZ (ι , X ) , 
( , )FE FEδ α β ′= , and the stochastic disturbance vector 1( ,..., )i iTv v ′=iv . The 
individual-specific heterogeneity iη  and time-specific heterogeneity tλ  can be 
captured by including dummies in regressions, and the fixed effects estimator ˆFEδ  
can be obtained by performing the method of least squares dummy variables (LSDV) 
on Eq.(5) with a transformation matrix, given by Wallace and Hussain (1969), that 
sweeps away iη  and tλ  effects.88 So, the estimator is as 
 
 ( ) ( )1ˆ .FE Q Qδ −′ ′= i i i iX X X y  (6) 
 
However, this encounters the same problem as the pooled OLS estimator. The lagged 
term of dependent variable in the dynamic model will cause inconsistency due to the 
endogeneity problem (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Additionally, this estimator is also 
asymptotic biased (Nickell, 1981, Blundell et al., 2000), which is given by  
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 This transformation matrix is ,N T N T N T N T N TQ E E I I I J J I J J= ⊗ = ⊗ − ⊗ − ⊗ + ⊗  
where xI  denotes identity matrix of dimension x , yJ  denotes a matrix of ones of dimension y , 
/y yJ J y= , and ⊗  denotes Kronecker product, whose application is if, for example, two matrices 
m n
A ×  and p qB ×  then 
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and hence when 0FEδ > , ˆplim( )FE FEδ δ< .  
Difference-GMM estimation. This estimator has lagged terms of predetermined 
variables, which are determined prior to the current period, as the instruments for the 
equations in first differences (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The logic is that all the 
explanatory variables are potentially correlated with individual-specific effects and 
therefore only the estimator based on the deviations of original observations can avoid 
inconsistency (Arellano and Bover, 1995). The general form of GMM estimator for 
Eq.(2) is expressed as 
 
 ,GMM iδ η=i i i iy W + ι + v  (7) 
 
where the variable matrix * *
, 1 1, 1 ,( , ,..., , )i t i l ity x x−=i tW ι , the GMM parameter vector 
1( , ,..., , )GMM l tδ α β β λ′ ′ ′= , and the vector of ones iι  and tι  with dimension of i  and 
t , respectively.89 The method of difference-GMM utilizes the first differences of 
Eq.(7) to eliminate individual-specific effects iη , which may not be simply purged by 
instrumental transformation:  
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 An essential assumption to GMM estimation is that there is no serial correlation in itv , or the 
estimators may not be consistent. This requirement can be detected by the AR(1) and AR(2) tests.  
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where 2( ,..., )i iTy y ′∆ = ∆ ∆iy  for , 1it it i ty y y −∆ = − , * *, 1 1, 1 ,( , ,..., , )i t i l iTy x x−∆ = ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆i tW ι  
for * * *
, 1 , 1 , 2 , 1 1, ,i t i t i t it it i t t t ty y y x x x ι ι ι− − − − −∆ = − ∆ = − ∆ = − , and 2( ,..., )i iTv v ′∆ = ∆ ∆iv  for 
, 1it it i tv v v −∆ = − . Let 
*
iW  and 
*
iy  denote this first-differenced transformation (that is 
∆ iW  and ∆ iy ), and the suitable instruments for each equation are  
 
First differenced equations Instruments available 
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where * *1, ,( ,..., )it it k itx x x= , and ( ) 0it isE x v =  for s t≥ , otherwise ( ) 0it isE x v ≠ , and 
( ) 0it iE x η ≠ . So the optimal instrumental matrix is given by  
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which can be pre-multiplied on Eq.(8) in order to get the orthogonality conditions for 
further calculating the GMM estimator:  
 
 ,DIFδ′ ′ ′= + ∆* *i i i i i iZ y Z W Z v  (9) 
 
which yields following moment restrictions ( ) 0E ′∆ =i iZ v . 90  Then the one-step 
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 The validity of instruments depends on Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions 
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difference-GMM estimator is computed in the general form as (Arellano and Bond, 
1991) 
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If the number of columns of iZ  equals that of 
*
iW , NA  becomes irrelevant and 
ˆ
DIFδ  reduces to  
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There are reasons that difference-GMM may yield large bias and poor precision in 
simulation and empirical experience. The explanation is that those lagged levels of 
variable series have provided weak instruments for those first-differenced variables 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998), particularly under two conditions:  
                                                                                                                                            
* *
ˆ ˆ ,i i
i i
S v v   ′ ′=    
   
∑ ∑i N iZ A Z  
where *ˆiv  are one-step residuals. This Sargan statistic with the null of the validity of instruments is 
asymptotically distributed as a 2χ  with as many degrees of freedom as over-identifying restrictions; 
see SARGAN, J. D. (1958) The estimation of economic relationships using instrumental variables. 
Econometrica, 26, 393-415.  
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(1) as the value of autoregressive parameter α  increases towards one, meaning 
a highly persistent series; and  
(2) as the variances of individual effects iη  increase relative to the variances 
itv  (Blundell et al., 2000, Bond, 2002).91  
But this efficiency loss will be largely compensated for by introducing more 
informative instruments in the following system-GMM estimator.  
System-GMM estimation. The basic logic of difference-GMM is to utilise 
lagged regressors as instruments because they are not correlated with individual 
effects. This logic can be applied again to the levels of same variables as instruments 
to the first differences of individual-specific effects, and it forms the basic logic of the 
system-GMM estimator. The Monte Carlo simulation in Arellano and Bover (1995) 
reveals that the absence of this information about the levels of variables may lead to 
the substantial loss of the total variation in the data. Arellano and Bover further 
introduce a more efficient estimator, the system-GMM, which exploits more moment 
conditions as the orthogonality restrictions in level equations in the combination with 
those moment conditions already in first-differenced equations.  
In case the AR(1) (i.e., the first order serial correlation) model of the level Eq.(7) 
is mean-stationary, the first differences ity∆  will not correlate with 
individual-specific effects iη . This condition is sufficient to justify that , 1i Ty −∆  can 
be used as suitable instruments to level equations (Blundell and Bond, 1998, Bond, 
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 The reason is that when ity  is highly persistent ( i.e. the autoregressive parameter α  is close to 
one) and variances of itv  and iη  are correlated, consider the case with 2T =   
2 1 2 ,  for 1,..., ,i i i iy y v i Npi η∆ = + + =  the probability limitation of pi  is given by  
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2 2/ vησ σ → ∞ , which means the instrument 1iy  is only weakly correlated with 2iy∆ .  
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2002):  
 
Level equations Instruments available 
  
3 ,2 3i i GMM i i iy W vδ ιη= + +  2iy∆  
4 ,3 4i i GMM i i iy W vδ ιη= + +  3iy∆  
M M 
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Then the system of two equations is  
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and the combined instrument matrix is  
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and the one-step weighting matrix becomes  
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Then the system-GMM estimator ˆSYSδ  can be obtained through the same calculation 
in Eq.(10) and Eq.(11). The final estimator becomes 
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4.4 Data and variables 
 
Basic information 
 
Two panel datasets are utilised in this research to address differences between 
provinces and between industries. The basic assumption is that only through 
comparing, contrasting and generalising these differences can the researcher explore 
and assess the varied nature of privatisation in China. The provincial dataset, 
embracing 31 Chinese provinces from 1994 to 2008 by 450 observations, has six data 
sources.92 The majority of data is collected from the China Statistical Yearbook 
(Zhongguo tongji nianjian 中國統計年鑑) from various years, while the remaining 
data are taken from a number of Chinese provincial statistical yearbooks, China 
Industrial Economic Statistical Yearbooks (Zhongguo gongye jingji tongji nianjian 中
國工業經濟統計年鑑 ), The Third National Industrial Census of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1995 (Zhonghua jenmin gonghejuo 1995 nian disanci quanguo 
gongye pucha ziliao huibian 中華人民共和國 1995 年第三次全國工業普查資料滙
編), China Economic Census Yearbook 2004 (Zhongguo jingji pucha nianjian 2004 
中國經濟普查年鑑 2004) and a small part of data are calculated by the author.93  
The industrial dataset covers all 37 major industries across mining, 
manufacturing and energy sectors in six chosen Chinese provinces – namely 
Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong, Jiangxi, Shanxi and Heilongjiang – for the period 
                                                 
92
 Chongqing was not separated from Sichuan until 1998 in official statistics, so its data are included in 
Sichuan’s throughout this analysis and hence the number of cross-sections in estimations is 30.  
93
 The data calculated by the author are all based on the public data from above sources.  
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1994-2008.94 The major source of information is the relevant collection of provincial 
statistics contained in the Guangdong Statistical Yearbook (Guangdong tongji 
nianjian 廣東統計年鑑), Jiangsu Statistical Yearbook (Jiangsu tongji nianjian 江蘇
統計年鑑), Shandong Statistical Yearbook (Shandong tongji nianjian 山東統計年鑑), 
Jiangxi Statistical Yearbook (Jiangxi tongji nianjian 江 西 統 計 年 鑑 ), Shanxi 
Statistical Yearbook (Shanxi tongji nianjian 山西統計年鑑 ), and Heilongjiang 
Statistical Yearbook (Heilongjiang tongji nianjian 黑龍江統計年鑑).  
The provincial selection was made of the basis of the following criteria:  
 
(1) The search for provinces which had experienced a relatively high degree of 
privatisation. 
(2) The need for an appropriate balance between coastal and inland areas, as 
well as between southern, central and northern areas. 
(3) The feasibility of variable data.95  
 
This panel dataset, with 3,300 observations equivalent to 220 cross-sections 
times 15 time periods,96 accounts for a quarter of the total privatisation cases in 
Chinese state sector after 1994.  
The next two subsections provide details of the variable selection in each dataset.  
 
                                                 
94
 This dataset has updated to the latest data from 2009 provincial statistics that were published at that 
yearend. However, a considerable part of the latest data was not accessible in online databases until 
mid-2010.  
95
 Some provinces might have been preferred to the six that have been chosen. But they were omitted 
because of serious lack of necessary data. For example, Sichuan would have been the best 
representative of inland provinces, but there are no sector data of its serial numbers of state-owned 
employees in the available provincial statistics. The same applies to Liaoning. In the case of Henan, 
statistics were lacking for some years, especially, before 2001. These deficiencies also help explain 
why an all-embracing investigation of data for every province has not been possible.  
96
 Two cross-sections are dropped from the data because there are no petroleum extraction industries in 
the state sector of Jiangxi and Shanxi.  
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Selection of variable in the provincial dataset 
 
The selection of variables in this study is justified by the literature. With regard 
to the dependent variable, all privatisation variables in literature fall into four 
categories, according to different levels and types of data (see Table 4.2). In country- 
or regional-level data, most privatisation variables are scale variables, as represented, 
for example, by the private share of total ownership (Li and Xu, 2002), service 
provision (Lopez De Silanes et al., 1997), government revenue (Bortolotti et al., 2003), 
sales or workforce (Kung and Lin, 2007); while two cases in most studies are dummy 
variables – such as “whether a country has taken a certain number of privatisation 
transactions before or in a certain period” (Ramamurti, 1992, Plane, 1997). By 
contrast, in firm-level data, the dummy variable – e.g., whether a firm is privatised 
before or in a certain period – is the majority as the privatisation variable in literature 
(Aussenegg and Jelic, 2007, Clarke and Cull, 2002, Gupta et al., 2008, Wang et al., 
2001, Li and Rozelle, 2000, Guo and Yao, 2005, Lin and Su, 2008, Liu et al., 2006, 
Brandt et al., 2005). The minor distinction among them is over the quantitative 
definition of privatisation: whether it is defined as “any share” to be privatised or as 
“a certain share”, – which can be, for example, the complete share of 100 per cent; or 
the controlling-interest share of usually 50 per cent; or the largest share of any per 
cent. There is only one case which chose a scale variable as the ownership proxy in 
firm-level data (Huyghebaert and Quan, 2009).  
There are two significant generalisations in the table: Either the data are 
country-level while the privatisation is a scale variable, or the data are firm-level 
while the privatisation is a dummy variable. There are two possible reasons. First, a 
cross-country or cross-region dataset is large scale, so using a dummy variable as a 
dependent variable may reduce too many variations and lead to more insignificant 
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results. Second, in a firm level dataset, a researcher usually has to take a dummy 
variable for privatisation because the scale variable is often not feasible. Otherwise, it 
will require the dataset to cover all information about all ownership changes in all 
years for all firms recorded in the data. Only stock market data may fulfil this strict 
requirement. However, if a privatisation study is only based on stock market data, it 
will lead to another fundamental question: namely, do the ownership transactions in a 
relatively poorly-functioning stock market comprehensively represent the reality of 
privatisation in a transitional economy with fewer market-supporting institutions? 
Especially, privatisation viewed through the prism of stock market data would only 
occupy a small part of total privatisation. This potential fundamental flaw has 
applicability to conditions in China and it may largely damage the credibility of 
research carried out in this way.  
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Table 4.2 
Privatisation variable in empirical literature.  
Data level Scale variable Dummy variable 
   
Country-level or 
regional-level 
Data 
 Share of services provision by 
private contractor in 1987 (Lopez 
De Silanes et al., 1997)  
 Non-state ownership share (Li and 
Xu, 2002) 
 Scale of the total gross revenue 
from privatisation sales to its GDP 
(Bortolotti et al., 2003) 
 (1) Sales share: share of TVEs in 
total sales revenue of rural 
enterprises, and (2) workforce 
share: share of TVEs in total 
workforce of rural enterprises 
(Kung and Lin, 2007) 
 Probability that a country is an 
active privatiser (Ramamurti, 1992) 
 Dummy if implemented any 
privatisation during 1988-1992 
(Plane, 1997) 
   
Firm-level data  Public allocation, the fraction of A 
shares sold at SIP relative to the 
total number of shares outstanding 
(Huyghebaert and Quan, 2009) 
 Dummy if the firm is privatized (for 
any share) in a certain year/period 
(Aussenegg and Jelic, 2007, Clarke 
and Cull, 2002, Gupta et al., 2008, 
Wang et al., 2001, Li and Rozelle, 
2000, Guo and Yao, 2005, Lin and 
Su, 2008)  
 Dummy if the largest shareholder 
has been changed to private 
investors (Liu et al., 2006) 
 Dummy if the firm is 
controlling-interest (50%) shifted 
(Li, 2003, Guo and Yao, 2005) 
 Dummy if 100% of the firm was 
sold (Brandt et al., 2005) 
 Dummy of the ownership choice of 
new firms in 1995 (Li et al., 2004) 
   
Source: Author’s summaries.  
 
Accordingly, given that this empirical study is based on a provincial-level and an 
industrial-level dataset, a scale variable is more suitable to be used as the privatisation 
variable. Yet more concerns should be paid as thinking of the speciality of China, or 
the so-called “Chinese characteristics”. All country-level studies have placed the 
change of “private ownership” at the heart of the analysis to represent the process of 
privatisation, but this methodology may not be applied to China for two reasons.  
First, public ownership and private ownership are not the only two sides of the 
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coin in the Chinese ownership system. There is a significant element of “collective 
ownership” that falls between state ownership and various types of private ownership 
(including joint venture, cooperative, or foreign ownership) (see Table 2.4). In the first 
two decades of the reform era, the collective economy remained significant, 
accounting for around 20-40 per cent of the national economy (see Figure 2.5). The 
problem lies in its ownership nature: i.e., is it essentially to be regarded as embodying 
public or private ownership? Of course, literally and legally defined, collective 
ownership in China is undoubtedly a variant of public ownership, because it refers to 
assets that are owned collectively under the name of a group of people, such as a 
township or village. However, in practice, quite a few collective-owned enterprises 
were in fact founded by private investors during the 1980s, when private ownership 
was not yet formally permitted. Many private owners chose to register their 
enterprises under a “collective name” in order to avoid the risk of it being confiscated 
by the state for ideological reasons. This “red hat” phenomenon was widespread and 
led to unreliable statistics about private economy.97 No consensus has been reached 
so far on the precise number of red-hat enterprises that existed before the late 1990s 
when private ownership was finally permitted and protected by new laws. That is why 
the inclusion or exclusion of collective enterprises or from private enterprises is 
bound to damage the basis of any study.  
Second, the red-hat phenomenon generates another problem, which is that the 
true number of private enterprises was severely suppressed in the late 1980s and 
throughout the 1990s. The formal statistics of registered private enterprises were for 
the first time released only in mid-2002, in the China Statistical Yearbook 2001, and 
                                                 
97
 See more discussion in PUTTERMAN, L. (1997) On the past and future of China's township and 
village-owned enterprises. World Development, 25, 1639-1655. DONG, X. Y., BOWLES, P. & HO, S. P. 
S. (2002) The determinants of employee ownership in China's privatized rural industry: evidence from 
Jiangsu and Shandong. Journal of Comparative Economics, 30, 415-437. 
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times series data went back only to 1999. The situation is the same for provincial 
statistics. Due to the lack of publicly accessible data, in the absence of a dataset 
derived from private surveys, it is impossible to undertake research on private 
enterprises earlier than 1999.  
Accordingly, I have used the shrinkage of the state sector, rather than the boom 
of the private sector, as the privatisation variable what follows. This has two merits. 
First, it helps avoid the risk of including unreliable statistics about the private sector in 
the 1990s. Second, it makes it possible truly to focus on China’s core transformation.  
Two dependent variables to represent privatisation are chosen to measure the 
degree of contraction of the state sector. SOEUnit denotes the total number of 
state-owned and state-holding industrial enterprises, while SOEEmployee denotes the 
total number of staff and workers employed in state-owned enterprises. They 
respectively represent state contraction in terms of enterprise and employee. In 
addition, there are several SOE numbers with different definitions listed in statistics; 
they include (1) SOEs without specific limitation; (2) SOEs above a certain scale 
(usually annual sales of over 5 million yuan); (3) SOEs controlled by local 
governments above a certain level (village or township); and (4) SOEs with 
independent accounting systems. It must be acknowledged that any choice of these 
four kinds of SOE definitions may result in different measure of performance, 
particularly from the perspective of “efficiency”. SOEs having larger size, higher 
level of supervisor, or independent accounting systems are probably more efficient (or 
not) than those SOEs that do not have these conditions. However, it is only in the final 
category that SOE numbers are accompanied by other economic and financial data in 
statistics, making this the only definition that it is operationally feasible to use. 
Additionally, SOEs having no independent accounting systems are usually very small 
ones within or even under township and village level, and inevitably of less 
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importance comparing to others. 
In terms of independent variables, most variables utilised in the general literature 
cannot be applied to China. For practical reasons, variable selection must be based on 
the feasibility of data, as well as the reality of Chinese characteristics. I have 
endeavoured to follow this principle and illustrate the selection process for each as 
follows. However, an inevitable problem should be noted here that all variables will 
be, more or less, loosely related to the factors in hypotheses. Although I provide 
justification for the appropriateness of each variable in use, it should still be open to 
academic discussion. All results should hence be interpreted in a cautious manner.  
Soft budget variable. The first soft budget variable utilised in the privatisation 
literature is a set of dummy variables relating to the budgetary regulations among 
county governments in the U.S. (Lopez De Silanes et al., 1997). This variable does 
not fit China’s case because there are actually no provincial variations among its local 
budgetary regulations.98 The subjective dummy variable of asking how difficult it is 
to extend a bank loan in some researches (Li, 2003, Brandt et al., 2005, Li and Rozelle, 
2000) is feasible for a firm-level dataset, but is not applicable to a provincial-level 
dataset and an industrial dataset. Meanwhile, Guo and Yao’s (2005) variable design is 
helpful. Their dummy variable includes two simultaneous conditions that must be 
met – whether an SOE is losing money, as well as whether it has got loans from the 
bank. This definition highlights two important elements of the Chinese soft budget 
system – viz., the SOE losses and subsequent soft bank credits. With this in mind, I 
have formulated the first scale variable of soft budget as the subsidies for loss-making 
SOEs. This variable is able to show the loco parentis attitude of a local government 
towards its loss-making SOEs. When subsidies are reduced, the budget system is 
                                                 
98
 China’s first Budget Law was announced in 1995 and it was applied to the whole country without 
local variations (at least in theory).  
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hardened. The second scale variable is designed as the share of industrial loans in total 
loans in local state banks. The industrial loan is another major source for bailout 
money, and about 90 per cent of such funds are usually granted to SOEs. So the 
decrease in industrial loans will immediately crowd out the soft credits that can fund 
SOEs.  
Political ideology variable. The most popular political ideology variable utilised 
in literature is the “right-wing government” dummy (Clarke and Cull, 2002, Bortolotti 
et al., 2003, Lopez De Silanes et al., 1997), which assumes that a ruling central/local 
government inclined to a right-wing ideology will be keen to privatise. This simply 
has no applicability to Chinese conditions. This is because of the absence of 
democratic governance and of any alternative party representation to that of the CCP 
in China, where the single ruling communist party is, by assumption, ideologically 
left-wing. By inference, this variable yields no variations in Chinese data. Another 
choice is to see if there is a pro-market legal system (Li and Xu, 2002), but this 
dummy variable is more suitable to a cross-country comparison than to within-country 
research. This is because differences between legal systems in different regions within 
a given country are supposedly minor, unless the context is that of a federalist country, 
like the U.S., with a long tradition of diversified legal systems. China is not a 
federalist country in this sense. In terms of legal system, China is a unitary state, in 
which local legislatures cannot demonstrate any ideological difference with national 
laws.  
Nevertheless, we should never underestimate the influence of political ideology 
in China. Even if there is neither a so-called right-wing government at the central or 
local level, nor any significant legal variations to be found in local legislatures, a local 
government’s determination and commitment to market-oriented reform and the 
promotion of private economy can still make huge differences to outcomes. In order 
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to address this local-level ideological dimension, two variables about the development 
of private sector are selected – the ratio of registered private-owned enterprises (POEs) 
to total registered enterprises, and the ratio of POE’s employees to the total. For 
experienced researchers, it may not be a surprise to learn that in most provinces these 
data never exceeded 10 per cent in the late 1990s. This statistical fact, however, is 
hardly consonant with the well-known reality of a booming private sector at this time. 
The true data were suppressed for two political reasons. Thanks to lack of confidence 
in central leaders’ supports for private enterprises, local leaders might automatically 
suppress such data for fear of stepping across the invisible red line of socialist 
ideology. Similarly, the true owners of “private enterprises” also feared their possible 
confiscation due to an unexpected ideological retreat, leading them to falsely but 
purposely register their enterprises as being publicly owned. This so called ‘red-hat’ 
phenomenon blurring the boundary between collective (public) and private ownership 
was prevalent in rural China in the 1990s, making official statistics unreliable (Dong 
et al., 2002). These ideological concerns are likely to have led both local leaders and 
private owners to manipulate statistics purporting to show the real scale of the private 
sector. However, these inauthentic data may just represent the ideological 
commitment that local leaders have demonstrated to their private entrepreneurs – i.e., 
the commitment to privatisation reform is loose when the statistics of private 
enterprises is severely suppressed; by contrast, the commitment is firm when the 
number of POEs is high and supposedly close to the reality. These data may also 
represent the growing confidence among private investors of not being intervened by 
local government. This explains why this variable with inauthentic data turns out to be 
a good candidate to represent the change of ideology in China. However, readers 
should be reminded that this ideological proxy is for the first time used in literature. 
There may be lack of consensus among academics on the validity of the use of this 
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variable, even though it could be even more difficult to find other replacements in 
Chinese statistics.  
Decentralisation variable. Since this hypothesis has never been empirically 
tested, there is no such variable in the literature. Yet, in theoretical discussion, there 
are some clues that help in the design of an appropriate decentralisation variable. In 
terms of the impact of decentralisation, two elements are considered to be crucial to 
ultimate privatisation – viz., local autonomy and fiscal competition. Rising local 
autonomy is a determinant because it helps to better utilise local information to make 
economic decision-making more efficient (e.g., by using funds efficiently by 
screening out poor projects) (Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995, Glaeser and 
Scheinkman, 1996). Fiscal competition among localities will also help increase the 
opportunity costs of bailing out losses and hence drive out relatively inefficient SOEs 
(Qian and Weingast, 1997, Qian and Roland, 1998, Cao et al., 1999). Accordingly, I 
have designed two variables to represent decentralisation – self-funding capacity in 
local capital investment, and fiscal self-sufficiency in local expenditure. In China, a 
local government has five sources from which to raise money needed for capital 
construction – planned budget, domestic loans, foreign investment, self-funding, or 
“other”.99 Since self-funding usually occupies over half of local investment, it can be 
used to represent the ability of a local government to fund itself. It therefore 
represents financial autonomy.100 Then, the ability of self-sufficiency in local finance 
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 These five sources are formal categories in official statistics.  
100
 There is a reasonable doubt that local government may embrace decentralisation by making full use 
of the FDI as a means of funding itself. If this is the case, the variable of “self-funding capability” may 
not well represent the rising autonomy in local finance during decentralisation. However, this 
theoretical assumption does not match the reality. The reason is twofold. (1) There are only four 
provinces (Beijing, Shanghai, Hainan and Tibet) seeing a moderate decline in the data of self-funding 
capability from 1994 to 2008. What most provinces actually experienced was a steady growth (or with 
slight fluctuation), suggesting an overall rising ability among them in funding their own needs in 
finance (see Table 5A.3a). This matches the assumption in hypothesis. (2) If going into statistics to 
examine this assumption, data just show an opposite story. The percentage of FDI used as the source of 
self-funding sees a clearly decline in all provinces. The average share dropped from about 13% to less 
than 3% from 1995 to 2008. This is against the original hypothesis that local provinces have gained 
192 
may represent the fiscal autonomy. A high deficit will undoubtedly make a local 
government more dependent on subsidies or transfers from the central government. 
Conversely, if local revenue is self-sufficient to meet its expenditure, the local 
government will clearly enjoy stronger fiscal autonomy. In short, both variables are 
able to measure the rising local autonomy in China in recent years.  
Market competition variable. Market development is a broad concept that can 
be measured in many ways, such as openness to the outside world (Plane, 1997, Cao 
et al., 1999), intensified competition (Li, 2003, Li and Rozelle, 2000, Li et al., 2004), 
ownership diversification (Guo and Yao, 2005, Cao et al., 1999) and/or financial 
deepening (Li and Xu, 2002, Bortolotti et al., 2003) in emerging economies. The 
appropriate choice of a market variable depends on which aspect of market 
development a researcher is focusing on. Some variables are not suitable for 
provincial-level research in China, such as capital market development, which 
embraces only two stock markets in Shanghai and Shenzhen. Most large and medium 
SOEs, even in remote provinces, will adopt initial public offerings in these two places 
or Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The underdevelopment of local capital markets has 
not unduly constrained large SOEs from undertaking privatisation. Also, the absence 
of relevant data makes it impossible to use the level of entry barrier as the competition 
variable among Chinese provinces. The first overall index of China’s marketisation 
progress was published in 2007, with provincial data dating back only to 2000 (Fan et 
al., 2007a). Subject to these conditions, I will utilise the non-state share of the gross 
value of industrial output as the first competition variable, similar to that used in Guo 
and Yao (2005). This variable may reflect the real degree of competition facing SOE 
                                                                                                                                            
more autonomy in finance during decentralisation. Additionally, if to check data of the four provinces 
with declining self-funding capability, in the last few years before 2008, except a small jump in 
Hainan’s data of 2006, the rest of the data are all very low. Data of Shanghai and Hainan are around 5%, 
Beijing less than 2%, and Tibet nearly 0%. In short, the FDI share may not be a good proxy to measure 
local capability in the matter of self-funding.  
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products in product market. Next, like in Plane (1997) and Cao et al. (1999), the 
second competition variable is set as an “outward openness” variable, represented by 
the ratio of the combined value of exports plus imports to the total GDP of a province. 
This may also reflect rising product competition associated with the greater 
involvement of foreign producers and consumers.  
Financial pressure variable. Two mutually contradictory arguments in financial 
pressure hypothesis. The most common argument considers financial pressure as a 
stimulant to privatisation, whereas the alternative considers it to be more of a 
constraint. No matter whether it is a stimulant or constraint, however, the variable 
selection in the wider literature focuses heavily on the government burden of deficits 
or debts. Research based on cross-regional data may prefer to use the deficit or debt 
ratio to GDP as representative of financial pressure in a region (Ramamurti, 1992, 
Plane, 1997, Bortolotti et al., 2003, Clarke and Cull, 2002, Li and Xu, 2002); while a 
firm-level research may use loan- or debt-asset ratio (Liu et al., 2006, Li and Rozelle, 
2000, Brandt et al., 2005, Huyghebaert and Quan, 2009). Variables other than these, 
such as the taxability (namely the tax bases) (Kung and Lin, 2007) or tax arrears (Guo 
and Yao, 2005) are rarely used. This research establishes two variables to represent 
the financial pressure facing Chinese SOEs – the asset-liability ratio and the share of 
budget deficit in a province. Both variables are sufficient to measure the changing 
pressure in local finances.  
Institutional infrastructure variable. There are only two pieces of research that 
offer insights to the institutional impact towards privatisation in literature. Both of 
them focus on the legal protection to development in a private economy. The dummy 
variable of legal origin assumes that if a country’s legal system is rooted in the 
French/German civil law tradition, the country in question will have less legal 
protection for private ownership than in a country with a common law tradition 
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(Bortolotti et al., 2003). This variable is not suitable for China because, on the one 
hand, there is no difference in terms of legal tradition among provinces; and, on the 
other, no western legal traditions has any applicability to communist China. A scale 
variable is, therefore, designed by Li, Ouyang and Zhou (2004), in which the legal 
protection of intellectual property rights is the major concern. Li et al. also shed light 
on the improvement of physical infrastructure, through which transaction costs for 
private businesses will be considerably reduced and so will privatisation be facilitated. 
Making use of the same assumptions, this research utilises two scale variables to 
represent the change of institutional infrastructure. The first is a legal infrastructure 
index, comprising of the arithmetic mean of a patent index (indexing the number of 
patent granted in a province) and a technical market index (indexing the amount of 
transaction value in a local technical market). This variable promises to reveal the 
improvement that a local government has achieved in the protection of intellectual 
property rights. The second variable, is a physical infrastructure index, comprising the 
arithmetic mean of a highway index (indexing the length of highways per 
kilometre-squared in a province) and a telephone index (indexing the number of 
subscribers of fixed telephone in a certain population). This variable serves to 
represent the efforts made by a local government to reduce transaction costs.101  
Economic efficiency variable. Economic efficiency, like market competition, is 
a variable with various definitions. Profitability is the most common variable, which 
also can be measured, at least, by profits, return on assets, sales revenue or the output 
of production (Brandt et al., 2005, Guo and Yao, 2005, Liu et al., 2006, Kung and Lin, 
2007, Gupta et al., 2008, Wang et al., 2001). Financial performance, such as the 
deficits or loans, is sometimes a choice, too (Ramamurti, 1992, Clarke and Cull, 
2002). Most above variables are applicable, but the best candidate in Chinese data 
                                                 
101
 The method of indexation is considered in the later section about data transformation.  
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should be the “asset contribution”, which is defined as the sum of profits, tax and 
interests divided by the total assets. Given this variable being a listed item in both 
central and local statistics, its credibility is relatively stronger than other potential 
candidates for efficiency. I also utilise the industrial output ratio to the total assets as 
the second efficiency variable. Since this variable differs from the first one by 
covering the production and management costs, it can be more accurate in the way 
considering the possible misuse of wages and bonuses.  
Firm size variable. “People” is the first key element in measuring the size of a 
firm, so that a firm’s total employment should be a good proxy for size, as in Li 
(2003). “Money” is the second key element, so that a firm’s total assets or market 
value should be good candidates, too, as in Huyghebaert and Quan (2009), and 
Aussenegg and Jelic (2007). Two elements may also be combined together, such as 
the average assets per worker (equivalent to the “money” divided by the “people”) in 
Clarke and Cull (2002). However, this combination may overstate the importance of 
money, while neglecting people; for example, a firm with small assets and many 
workers could be regarded as a smaller unit than one that has larger assets but fewer 
workers. For research on the banking or financial sector, this mixed variable is able to 
highlight the effect of money on the basis of people, but, for research in other sectors, 
this variable may blur the distinction of size and, even worse, be sufficiently 
misleading to generate a false interpretation and results. Accordingly, this research 
seeks to avoid mixing up “people” and “money” by establishing the following two 
size variables – first, the average scale of SOE employment (calculated by the 
year-end number of annual average employed persons divided by the number of SOEs 
in a province); and, second, the average scale of SOE assets (calculated by the amount 
of fixed assets divided by the number of SOEs in a province). Both variables may 
represent the change in size of a local state sector.  
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Human capital variable. In the limited amount of research that addresses the 
impact of human capital on privatisation, the manager’s human capital 
characteristics – including age, education, place of birth, former managerial 
experience, experience as a government cadre, and the time for which that the 
manager has held a managerial position in the firm – are the major concerns (Li, 2003, 
Li and Rozelle, 2000). These variables, according to different assumptions, are also 
used to measure the human capital characteristics of a bureaucrat (Li, 2003) and/or a 
banker (Brandt et al., 2005). For a simple reason, however, these variable designs are 
not applicable to my research: because no such comprehensive information on human 
capital information for SOE managers and local bureaucrats is available in any public 
statistics.102 Subject to data limitation, I have therefore had to design new, feasible 
variables. Based on human capital theory, two concepts are highlighted in the variable 
design. The first is the monitoring costs – better human capital means enhanced 
managing skills, which in turn facilitate a reduction in monitoring costs. The second is 
the production risk – better human capital also means improved labour efficiency, 
which should lead to a reduction in production risks. Thus, the first human capital 
variable is set up as the scientific and technical personnel ratio (equivalent to the 
number of scientific and technical personnel in state-owned enterprises or institutions 
divided by the number of total staff and workers in all state-owned units in a 
province), which is a variable that can trace the increase of ‘advanced labour’ in a 
locality’s state sector. It is assumed that if more skilled positions are generated, the 
overall level of human capital level will also be improved. The second human capital 
variable is formulated as labour productivity (equivalent to industrial value-added 
divided by the number of SOE employees in a province). This variable seeks to track 
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 As discussed earlier, there are only two tables, based on a sampling survey in 1994, in national 
statistics that have ever released basic information about civil servants and enterprises’ administrative 
personnel (see Table 4.1).  
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the improvement in production efficiency in each worker, and hence to reflect the 
reduction in production risks.  
Besides, in order to control influence from other factors, this research introduces 
three control variables to absorb variations caused by people’s education (literacy 
rate), degree of industrialisation (industrial output share to regional GDP) and 
development level (income per capita). Variable definitions are listed in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3 
Variable definitions and summary statistics in the provincial dataset.  
Variables  Definition 
 
SOEUnitX  Index of the number of SOE units with independent accounting system in each 
province 
SOEEmploymentX  Index of the number of employees in SOEs with independent accounting system in 
each province 
SubsidyX  Index of the amount of provincial subsidies to loss-making SOEs in fiscal revenue in 
provinces 
IndustrialLoan%  Share of the industrial loans to total loans granted by local financial institutes in 
provinces 
POE%  Share of registered private-owned enterprises to total enterprises with all types of 
ownership in provinces 
POEEmployment%  Share of POE employment to total employment in both urban and rural areas in 
provinces 
SelfFunding%  Share of the self-funding part in total investment of capital construction in provinces 
FiscalAutonomy%  Ratio of local revenue to its expenditure in fiscal balance of payments in provinces 
NonSOEOutput%  The rest share of SOE industrial output in provinces 
Openness%  Rate of the total amount of import and export trade to regional GDP in provinces 
AssetLiability%  Ratio of the total amount of SOE liabilities to total assets in provinces 
DeficitBudget%  Share of the deficit (that is local revenue minus expenditure) in local expenditure in 
provinces 
PhysicalInfrastructureX  Arithmetic mean of road (that is the highway length per square kilometres) and 
telephone (that is the density of fixed line subscribers to the population) indexes in 
all provinces 
LegalInfrastructureX  Arithmetic mean of patent (that is three kinds of patents granted by local 
governments) and technical market (that is the business volume in local technical 
markets) index in all provinces 
AssetContribution%  Rate of the asset contribution (that is the ratio of total amount of profits, tax and 
interests to that of capital) in provinces 
AssetOutput%  Ratio of the gross value of industrial output to the total assets in provinces 
AveEmployeeX  Index of the average number of SOE employees in each province 
AveAssetX  Index of the average amount of total assets (including fixed and mobile assets) in 
SOEs in each province 
ScientificPersonnel%  Share of the number of scientific and technical personnel in SOEs to the number of 
total employees in each province 
LabourProductivityX  Index of the labour productivity (that is SOEs’ value-added per worker) in each 
provinces 
Literacy%  Share of the population of literacy to the total, over 15 years old, in a province 
Industrialisation%  Rate of the output by industrial sector to the total GDP in a province 
IncomePercapitaX  Index of the disposable income per capita among all provinces 
   
 
Variable selection in the industrial dataset 
 
The criteria of variable selection in the industrial dataset remain the same. Two 
dependent variables are selected – IndSOEUnit, denoting the number of SOEs with 
independent accounting system in one of the major industries in a province; and 
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IndSOEEmployee, denoting the average number of year-end SOE employees. 
However, there is a major problem in local industrial data. Very limited information is 
provided so that this dataset can only afford a handful of variable candidates. The 
following adjustments have therefore been necessary.  
In the first place, virtually no industry-specific variables are available for 
political-economic hypotheses. Data needed for the soft budget or decentralisation 
variable – e.g., subsidies, loans, self-funding or government revenue – are only 
available at the provincial level, but not the industrial level. The data needed for the 
ideology variable, the number of enterprises or employees of private ownership, are 
also seriously deficient for some provinces. Although I am reluctant to drop any 
hypothesis simply because of lack of data, this data issue may remind us that the basic 
assumption behind political-economic hypotheses lies in the interaction between local 
bureaucrats and SOE managers. That is to say, there is no reason to assume that their 
interaction pattern may differ across industries. In other words, political impacts are 
assumed to be equally distributed across industries so that any statistical variations if 
any could be regarded as meaningless. Thus, due to lack of data and the absence of 
theoretical justification, this research only uses the political-economic variables of the 
provincial level as the control variables in order to absorb possible variations.  
Second, also subject to data limitation, most independent variables remain the 
same but all alternative variables have to be dropped. The market competition variable 
is still denoted by the non-state share of industrial output. Financial pressure is 
represented by the asset-liability ratio. Economic efficiency is revealed by output 
divided by assets. Size variable is the average number of workers per enterprise, while 
the human capital variable is still labour productivity. Meanwhile, however, a change 
in the institutional infrastructure variable is necessary.  
In terms of legal infrastructure, there are no data showing the change of legal 
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protection in a specific industry. As for physical infrastructure, estimates of 
construction investment may all that can be used here. However, such data are not 
available for local industry, although they are available, in two instances, among 
national level data, covering total investment in each of 31 provinces, or each of 37 
major industries. Accordingly, I have been compelled once again to design a new 
variable that combines information for provinces and industries. Accordingly, this 
variable is established as the product of provincial value and industrial value. Only by 
this means is it possible to formulate a variable that can simultaneously address both 
provincial and industrial features.  
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Table 4.4 
Variable definitions, summary statistics and correlations.  
Variable  Definition / Operational Definition 
 
IndSOEUnitX 
 
Index of the number of SOEs with independent accounting system in 
each major industrial sector in a province 
IndSOEEmployeeX 
 
Index of the number of the year-end average employees in SOEs with 
independent accounting system in each major industrial sector in a 
province 
IndNonSOEOutput% 
 
The rest share of SOE industrial output in each major industrial sector 
in a province 
IndAssetLiability% 
 
Ratio of the total amount of SOE liabilities to total assets in each 
industrial sector in a province 
IndConstructInvestX 
 
Product of two indexes: (1) index of the total amount of construction 
investment in all years in each major industrial sector in national data, 
and (2) index of the same item in each province. 
IndAssetOutpout% 
 
Ratio of the gross value of industrial output to the total assets in each 
major industrial sector in a province 
IndAveSOEEmployX 
 
Index of the average number of the year-end average employees in 
SOEs in each major industrial sector in a province 
IndLabourProductivityX 
 
Index of the labour productivity in each 
major industrial sector in a province 
   
 
Data transformation 
 
It is worth noting that all variables will be transformed in such a way that data 
value are strictly limited and fall in the range between minus and plus one. This data 
transformation will help highlight the relationship among variables by excluding the 
scale dimension of row data. Therefore, there is no need for transformation if the 
variable is already presented in percentage form, (e.g., literacy rate, asset-contribution 
ratio, non-SOE share of industrial output, etc.). Yet, if the variable is of scale data (e.g., 
the SOE number (units), SOE employee number (person), labour productivity 
(yuan/person), etc.) its value will be transformed into indexes before being regressed.  
Two kinds of indexation are used to serve different purposes. Control variables 
with scale data will be indexed by a whole panel comparison, in which each datum 
will be compared with all data in all provinces in all years. Hence, this index will not 
only show the change in each province over time, but also its relative status to the rest 
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of the panel data. Consequently, the information of other regional characters will be 
included in this index. This kind of information, however, should be excluded when 
the variable is not being used for control purposes; otherwise, the impact from other 
provincial data will also be introduced into the hypothesis testing. For this fear, those 
explanatory variables with scale data will be indexed only by their own serial 
comparison.103 Below are shown two ways of transformation in mathematics:  
 
(1) Indexation with the whole panel comparison:  
min
max min
,
ij
ij
V V
I
V V
−
=
−
 
while ijI  denotes the index in the i-th province in the j-th year, ijV  the original 
value of variable, maxV  the maximum value in all provinces in all years, and minV  
the minimum value in the same scale.  
 
(2) Indexation with the individual serial comparison: It is done by the same 
formula but with different definition in maxV  and minV , where they are respectively 
the maximum or minimum value in that specific province in all years.  
 
After transformation, the maximum datum in a panel or series will be transformed 
into 1 or -1, while the minimum datum into 0, and the remaining data between 
maximum and minimum will be proportionally distributed in the interval between 
± 1 and 0. 
 
Reliability of Chinese data 
 
                                                 
103
 Only two explanatory variables of infrastructure are indexed by a national panel comparison due to 
their institutional nature.  
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Readers should always be reminded that there is an issue of data reliability 
among empirical studies based on Chinese statistics. There has been a growing 
concern about potential data exaggeration, particularly over the real GDP growth rate 
since late 1990s. This suspicion has triggered much debate among academics ever 
since. Some authors identify discrepancies in statistics and tend to regard them as 
“biases” caused by the lack of integrity among statistical agents (Rawski, 2001; 
Young, 2003), while others tend to see these discrepancies as “errors” due to 
misunderstanding statistical methods (Chow, 2006; Holz, 2003, 2005; He and Sun, 
2013). Two procedures are usually seen in showing the falsification of output data: (1) 
to compare output growth to the growth in other variables highly correlated, or (2) to 
contrast different approaches from which are derived nationwide GDP data (Holz, 
2003). The motive for state agents to falsify growth data mainly stems from the cadre 
evaluation system. Local officials may intentionally overstate output growth in order 
to get rewards for superior performance or to avoid punishment for failing to meet 
policy targets (He, 2010; Holz, 2003, 2005; Young, 2003).  
Based on his independent nationwide income calculation, Rawski (2001) points 
out major exaggerations of real output growth during 1997/2001, which he argues 
should be no more than one-third of official claims. He lists some quantitative 
inconsistencies in the trends between China’s GDP and other variables, such as energy 
use and retail sales. Young (2003) also argues that the real GDP growth rate during 
1978/1998 should be 2 percentage points too high due to the systematic 
understatement of inflation that would falsely push up the data of physical capital 
investment. Consumption data based on retail sales and reported in the national 
income account also exceeds that obtained from sample surveys of urban and rural 
households (Chow, 2006). He (2010) attributes the data falsification to the issue of 
methodology in which it is the difference in GDP accounting approaches that makes 
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discrepancies in results. In addition, the sum of provincial GDP routinely exceeds 
nationwide GDP, so the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) needs to adjust provincial 
data as summing up the national total (Holz, 2003, 2005).  
These criticisms are, however, also criticised as being unconvincing. From his 
experience of doing econometric researches based on Chinese statistics over two 
decades with dozens of papers widely published, Chow (2006) admits that “errors or 
statistical discrepancies do exist”, but “it is difficult to falsify national output and 
other statistics for a long period”. After examining Young’s evidence (2003), he 
argues that errors are “unavoidable” but “the official data are by and large reliable”. 
Take an example, consumption: relevant data reported in sample surveys include only 
goods and services paid for by the households themselves – figures bound to be 
smaller than the data in national income accounts that also include goods and services 
provided by the units in which the consumers work (like medical expenses and 
schooling for the children), home production by the consumers, implicit rent of their 
housing units, and etc. (Chow, 2006). Holz (2003) also casts no doubt on the integrity 
of Chinese statistical agents, while his research finds the evidence on falsification of 
growth data “invalid, or at least highly problematic”. Most criticisms, he argues, are 
“unfounded” and “based on misunderstandings about the meaning and coverage of 
particular data” (Holz, 2003). The divergent trend between output growth and energy 
use in the late 1990s, for instance, is caused by the inconsistency of data coverage that 
shows a tendency “to cover only a subset of the economy, the directly reporting 
enterprises” (Holz, 2005). Otherwise, if the NBS request provinces to change the data 
they report, more unexplainable inconsistencies are likely to emerge (Holz, 2003).  
Furthermore, some empirical evidence also supports the reliability of Chinese 
data. Klein and Ozmcur (2002/2003) regress 15 related time series in the period 
1980-2000 and identify a close relationship between these series and the trend of GDP 
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growth. He and Sun (2013) test a provincial panel data (1978-2002) against the 
augmented Solow model and a technological diffusion model and reach a conclusion 
that these data are reliable for growth regressions. Mehrotra and Paakkone (2011) 
produce coincident indicators from a factor analysis summarising various 
macroeconomic information and compare the estimated factors with GDP growth 
(1997-2009). They find discrepancies between them very small and their factors 
match the GDP dynamics closely.  
In sum, all these papers discuss the reliability of Chinese statistical data in a 
prudent manner. They all agree on the existence of discrepancies in statistics, but 
differ on how these should be interpreted. Intentional biases or unintended errors? 
Over this question, there has so far been no consensus of an answer among academics 
and, very likely, will never be. However, even if Chinese data are not purposely 
falsified, as Chow (2006) suggests, a serious scholar will still need to exercise caution 
as using them. I will follow his advice and try to control this potential data problem.  
There are, hence, two kinds of data falsification if any – one is ‘data bias’ with 
purposeful exaggeration, while the other is ‘data error’ without systematic 
manipulation. Both data problems will be dealt with by the system GMM estimation 
technique, discussed in Section 4.3. Firstly, in terms of potential data biases in my 
panel, I assume these biases to be part of “unobserved specific effect”, which should 
be invariant over time and can be eliminated by first differencing. This technique has 
been widely applied as a means to control unobserved specific country characteristics, 
particularly in the cross-country comparison of GDP growth (Hoeffler, 2002; Krieger 
and Ruhose, 2013). I wonder if, perhaps, some researchers are happy to see data 
exaggeration as a kind of country characteristic in China. Secondly, in terms of 
inevitable data errors, I assume these to be “measurement errors”, which should be 
randomly distributed (stationary) in the panel and can be largely corrected by 
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introducing instrumental variables with orthogonal conditions in the system GMM 
estimation (Bond et al., 2001). In practice, He and Sun (2013) use this approach and 
treat the understatement of inflation reported in Young (2003) as a problem of 
measurement error in their cross province comparison over GDP growth.  
Other than econometric solution, there are other reasons that also help reduce the 
worry concern about data falsification. The time period of my panel is from 1994 to 
2008, relatively new to those data criticised in the literature mentioned above. Most of 
them were reported after 1998 when a series of statistical reforms was applied. The 
opportunities of falsification should have been largely reduced (Holz, 2003) Last but 
not least, in fact, there are only three variables (two hypothesised variables and one 
control variable) in my panel containing output data that may be criticised. The data 
reliability of the two dependent variables and most explanatory variables should 
therefore be free from above questions. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Provincial Analysis 
 
5.1 Data and summary statistics 
 
Summary statistics of all variables are listed in Table 5.1. This panel of 
provincial data is balanced. In the correlation table, there are only two coefficients 
higher than the standard value (traditionally 0.9), which could point to the existence of 
a statistical problem of multi-collinearity. The first is the correlation between two 
dependent variables (SOEUnitX [pdv1] and SOEEmployeeX [pdv2]) with the 
coefficient value of 0.9215 and the second, between the AveAssetX (ph8b) and the 
LabourProductivityX (ph9b) with the coefficient value of 0.9515. As it happens, 
however, in neither case is there cause for concern. In the first place, the problem does 
not arise because a regression cannot have two dependent variables. In the second 
case, the potential problem can be overcome by ensuring that the two variables are not 
regressed in combination with one another.  
 
Table 5.1 
Summary statistics in the provincial dataset.  
Variable Code Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
SOEUnitX pdv1 450 0.5725  0.2747  0.1255  1.0000  
SOEEmployeeX pdv2 450 0.6631  0.2306  0.2616  1.0000  
SubsidyX ph1a 450 0.5076 0.3561 0.0000  1.0000  
IndustrialLoan% ph1b 450 0.1747  0.0654  0.0000  0.3738  
POE% ph2a 450 0.2112  0.1916  0.0000  0.6855  
POEEmployee% ph2b 450 0.0617  0.0782  0.0009  0.5724  
SelfFunding% ph3a 450 0.4789  0.1235  0.0854  0.8387  
FiscalAutonomy% ph3b 450 0.5513  0.2238  0.0000  1.3912  
NonSOEOutput% ph4a 450 0.4442  0.2022  0.1012  0.8864  
Openness% ph4b 450 0.3204  0.4281  0.0316  2.3275  
AssetLiability% ph5a 450 0.5998  0.0907  0.1909  0.8401  
DeficitBudget% ph5b 450 0.4654  0.1891  -0.0134  0.9530  
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PhysicalInfrastructureX ph6a 450 0.2351  0.1786  0.0030  0.9509  
LegalInfrastructureX ph6b 450 0.0485  0.0863  0.0000  0.6430  
AssetContribution% ph7a 450 0.0975  0.0621  -0.0127  0.6112  
AssetOutput% ph7b 450 0.5477  0.1768  0.1205  1.0150  
AveEmployeeX ph8a 450 0.6781  0.1834  0.2509  1.0000  
AveAssetX ph8b 450 0.3183  0.2930  0.0263  1.0000  
ScientificPersonnel% ph9a 450 0.2425  0.0746  0.1004  0.4108  
LabourProductivityX ph9b 450 0.3498  0.3057  0.0330  1.0000  
Literacy% pcona 450 0.8625  0.0985  0.3131  0.9689  
Industrialisation% pconb 450 0.3673  0.0990  0.0613  0.5649  
IncomePercapitaX pconc 450 0.2203  0.1659  0.0000  1.0000  
 
 pdv1 pdv2 ph1a Ph1b ph2a ph2b ph3a ph3b ph4a 
          
pdv1 1.0000         
pdv2 0.9215 1.0000        
ph1a 0.6359 0.6135 1.0000       
ph1b 0.6202 0.6658 0.5297 1.0000      
ph2a -0.8219 -0.8066 -0.6061 -0.5786 1.0000     
ph2b -0.4048 -0.5188 -0.2619 -0.3865 0.4020 1.0000    
ph3a -0.5110 -0.4817 -0.3223 -0.2196 0.6197 0.1818 1.0000   
ph3b 0.1005 -0.0079 0.0952 0.1240 0.0400 0.4168 0.1853 1.0000  
ph4a -0.2352 -0.2945 -0.1864 -0.2162 0.4742 0.3762 0.4224 0.6043 1.0000 
ph4b -0.0453 -0.1447 0.0348 -0.1080 0.0724 0.6024 0.0679 0.6471 0.4823 
ph5a 0.1629 0.2239 0.1067 0.4555 -0.0656 -0.3533 0.1563 0.0665 -0.0684 
ph5b -0.1159 -0.0619 -0.1639 -0.2059 -0.0200 -0.4127 -0.1984 -0.8702 -0.6443 
ph6a -0.5912 -0.6766 -0.4134 -0.4870 0.6388 0.8153 0.4265 0.4980 0.5920 
ph6b -0.3360 -0.3895 -0.1937 -0.3081 0.4002 0.6591 0.1973 0.4622 0.4860 
ph7a -0.2621 -0.2534 -0.2300 -0.1380 0.2414 0.1044 0.4333 0.0070 0.0426 
ph7b -0.4811 -0.4849 -0.3120 -0.1838 0.6102 0.3504 0.7241 0.3042 0.5222 
ph8a -0.7012 -0.5566 -0.4259 -0.3256 0.6979 0.2303 0.5725 0.1638 0.4634 
ph8b -0.8040 -0.7764 -0.6362 -0.5896 0.8292 0.4995 0.5759 0.0421 0.3603 
ph9a -0.7569 -0.7693 -0.5471 -0.5479 0.8242 0.2958 0.4351 -0.0293 0.4201 
ph9b -0.7826 -0.7798 -0.6471 -0.6668 0.8031 0.4885 0.5177 -0.0348 0.3161 
pcona -0.3544 -0.3947 -0.2089 -0.0744 0.3229 0.3321 0.4549 0.5152 0.3202 
pconb -0.3307 -0.3080 -0.2603 0.0984 0.4241 0.2800 0.5374 0.4632 0.4412 
pconc -0.6568 -0.7325 -0.4927 -0.6148 0.7088 0.7755 0.4214 0.3312 0.5431 
          
 ph4b ph5a ph5b Ph6a ph6b ph7a ph7b ph8a ph8b 
          
ph4b 1.0000         
ph5a -0.2879 1.0000        
ph5b -0.6652 -0.0903 1.0000       
ph6a 0.6385 -0.2872 -0.4910 1.0000      
ph6b 0.6545 -0.3011 -0.5462 0.7258 1.0000     
ph7a 0.0593 -0.0656 -0.0343 0.1864 0.0896 1.0000    
ph7b 0.2589 0.1230 -0.3648 0.5686 0.3871 0.5590 1.0000   
ph8a 0.0778 0.0873 -0.1535 0.4443 0.2818 0.2468 0.5737 1.0000  
ph8b 0.1464 -0.1667 0.0007 0.6774 0.4689 0.3000 0.5901 0.7324 1.0000 
ph9a 0.0112 -0.0611 0.0575 0.5102 0.2868 0.2434 0.4967 0.5901 0.6792 
ph9b 0.1419 -0.2917 0.0829 0.6709 0.4299 0.3324 0.5622 0.6040 0.9515 
pcona 0.2831 0.2551 -0.5117 0.4853 0.3090 0.1448 0.4486 0.3455 0.3316 
pconb 0.1640 0.2316 -0.4505 0.4130 0.2576 0.2778 0.5234 0.3843 0.3488 
pconc 0.5403 -0.3891 -0.3055 0.8915 0.7497 0.2104 0.5245 0.5091 0.8165 
          
 ph9a ph9b pcona pconb pconc     
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ph9a 1.0000         
ph9b 0.6907 1.0000        
pcona 0.1935 0.2222 1.0000       
pconb 0.3431 0.2481 0.5453 1.0000      
pconc 0.6155 0.8243 0.3323 0.3152 1.0000     
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (中國統計年鑑) China Statistics Press (1995-2009). Provincial 
statistical yearbooks 1995-2009. The Data of the Third National Industrial Census of the People’s 
Republic of China in 1995 (中華人民共和國 1995 年第三次全國工業普查資料匯編), China Statistics 
Press (1997). China Economic Census Yearbook 2004 (中國經濟普查年鑑 2004), China Statistics 
Press (2006).  
Note: All data periods are between 1994 and 2008. Data for Chongqing are subsumed in those for 
Sichuan, so that the cross-section number of provincial-level units is 30, rather than 31. Names of 
variables are all followed by -X or -%, where X denotes that it is an index variable and % indicates that 
it is a percentage variable. Code pdv1 denotes the first dependent variable; pcon1 denotes the first 
control variable; ph1a and h1b denote the two variables in hypothesis 1;… etc.  
 
Relevant data for the two dependent variables, SOEUnitX and SOEEmployeeX, 
are listed in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. Full data for the remaining variables can be found in 
Appendix 2A.  
In terms of the first dependent variable (the index of SOE numbers in each 
province), the data show that in most provinces privatisation of SOEs began to get 
under way within a two year period. Thus, the process was under way in nineteen 
provinces in 1996, and in a further eight provinces in 1997. Privatisation accelerated 
significantly during 2000-2003. As of 2000, in only six provinces – Neimenggu (Inner 
Mongolia), Heilongjiang, Zhejiang, Anhui, Sichuan (including Chongqing) and 
Ningxia – had the number of SOEs contracted by more than 50 per cent. Three years 
later, however, there were only five provinces – Tianjin, Henan, Hainan, Guizhou and 
Tibet – in which a 50 per cent reduction in SOE numbers had not taken place. The 
momentum of privatisation is captured in the finding that between 1994 and 2008 
there was an 80 per cent reduction in SOE numbers in twelve provinces, while – with 
a single exception (Tianjin) – the remaining seventeen provinces achieved a 
contraction of 60-70 per cent.  
The data for the second dependent variable, the index of the number of SOE 
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employees in each province, suggest that the impact of privatisation was less 
pronounced. The dismissal of SOE employees got under way in 13 provinces in 1995, 
and in a further 14 in the following year. The employment contraction accelerated 
between 2001 and 2003, during which eighteen provinces each laid off more than 50 
per cent of their SOE work force. During 1994-2008 SOE employment was reduced 
by more than 70 per cent in six provinces, with a particular concentration in coastal 
provinces (Jiangsu and Zhejiang) and the northeast (Heilongjiang and Jilin). In 
fourteen provinces the corresponding figure was less than 60 per cent, and in four 
cases – Ningxia, Shaanxi, Guizhou and Shanxi – it was less than 50 per cent.  
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Table 5.2a 
Privatisation variable 1 – provincial index of state-owned and state holding enterprises.  
 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  
                
Beijing 0.5071 0.5702 1.0000 0.8400 0.5620 0.8221 0.6037 0.5399 0.4636 0.3384 0.3307 0.4335 0.3650 0.2743 0.2773 
Tianjin 0.8072 0.9549 0.9504 0.9480 1.0000 0.9073 0.9133 0.8969 0.8107 0.8053 0.6606 0.7418 0.6070 0.6492 0.4381 
Hebei 0.9632 1.0000 0.9085 0.8027 0.7279 0.6839 0.6068 0.5631 0.4620 0.3755 0.3744 0.2764 0.2511 0.1865 0.1816 
Shanxi 0.9672 1.0000 0.9910 0.8880 0.7396 0.6675 0.6452 0.6106 0.5450 0.4878 0.4103 0.4226 0.3721 0.2309 0.2341 
Neimenggu 0.8154 0.9824 1.0000 0.7236 0.4410 0.3900 0.3091 0.2781 0.2789 0.2413 0.2242 0.1997 0.1997 0.1776 0.1964 
Liaoning 0.9394 0.9813 1.0000 0.9248 0.6978 0.5965 0.5610 0.5002 0.3939 0.3050 0.2643 0.3194 0.2867 0.1918 0.2391 
Jilin 0.9330 1.0000 0.9780 0.8708 0.6769 0.6674 0.6100 0.5093 0.4504 0.3546 0.3450 0.2133 0.1705 0.1431 0.1522 
Heilongjiang 0.9467 1.0000 0.9658 0.8364 0.6403 0.5112 0.4028 0.3369 0.3128 0.2461 0.2471 0.1758 0.1677 0.1306 0.1377 
Shanghai 0.6339 1.0000 0.8648 0.7875 0.6954 0.7290 0.6609 0.5524 0.4925 0.4292 0.4212 0.3904 0.3602 0.3111 0.3177 
Jiangsu 0.8823 1.0000 0.8872 0.7948 0.7649 0.7262 0.5881 0.4778 0.3894 0.2860 0.2627 0.2206 0.2109 0.1808 0.2121 
Zhejiang 0.9541 1.0000 0.9532 0.7631 0.7123 0.5723 0.4335 0.3430 0.2944 0.2632 0.2592 0.2479 0.2372 0.2122 0.2250 
Anhui 0.8870 1.0000 0.8605 0.5743 0.5618 0.4811 0.3838 0.3447 0.3062 0.2542 0.2409 0.2106 0.1916 0.1977 0.2150 
Fujian 0.9077 0.9685 1.0000 0.8012 0.7193 0.6534 0.5660 0.5416 0.4605 0.3677 0.3420 0.3130 0.2787 0.2195 0.2236 
Jiangxi 0.8430 1.0000 0.9891 0.8018 0.6689 0.6379 0.5594 0.4417 0.3387 0.2388 0.2194 0.1793 0.1574 0.1255 0.1287 
Shandong 0.8185 0.9996 1.0000 0.7986 0.6739 0.6280 0.5714 0.4950 0.4288 0.4039 0.3773 0.2871 0.2801 0.2690 0.2797 
Henan 0.9262 0.9774 1.0000 0.7384 0.7841 0.7488 0.7233 0.6731 0.6038 0.5310 0.3929 0.3017 0.2809 0.2392 0.2286 
Hubei 0.9440 1.0000 0.9451 0.8539 0.8269 0.7952 0.7011 0.5907 0.4966 0.3824 0.3462 0.2502 0.2064 0.1972 0.2097 
Hunan 0.9464 1.0000 0.9769 0.7867 0.6657 0.6559 0.6061 0.5486 0.5294 0.4255 0.4141 0.2742 0.2672 0.2223 0.2213 
Guangdong 0.9084 0.9516 1.0000 0.9099 0.8445 0.8296 0.6350 0.5342 0.4841 0.4023 0.3843 0.3454 0.2938 0.2548 0.2844 
Guangxi 0.9479 1.0000 0.9553 0.8920 0.7978 0.7981 0.7549 0.6812 0.5959 0.4663 0.4685 0.3743 0.3374 0.2279 0.2335 
Hainan 0.8041 1.0000 0.9540 0.9199 0.8279 0.7291 0.6831 0.6337 0.6031 0.5894 0.4566 0.4208 0.4072 0.2249 0.1857 
Sichuan 0.9463 1.0000 0.9516 0.7832 0.6372 0.5656 0.4891 0.4112 0.3621 0.3041 0.2899 0.2602 0.2609 0.2500 0.2838 
Guizhou 0.8454 0.9521 1.0000 0.8619 0.8016 0.7821 0.7197 0.6538 0.6136 0.5343 0.5018 0.4776 0.3916 0.2787 0.2731 
Yunnan 0.9534 1.0000 0.9544 0.8237 0.8127 0.6663 0.6597 0.6069 0.5770 0.4482 0.4064 0.3099 0.3037 0.2457 0.2562 
Tibet 0.6121 0.7543 0.7586 0.7802 0.9612 0.9397 1.0000 0.9871 0.8491 0.8578 0.6767 0.7328 0.6940 0.2284 0.1552 
Shaanxi 0.9299 1.0000 0.9678 0.8742 0.6797 0.6283 0.5904 0.5202 0.4881 0.4465 0.4418 0.3416 0.3109 0.2328 0.2477 
Gansu 0.9461 1.0000 0.9560 0.8080 0.7313 0.7307 0.5944 0.4632 0.4632 0.4372 0.4272 0.2824 0.2762 0.2675 0.2638 
Qinghai 0.9343 0.9879 0.9723 1.0000 0.7855 0.8131 0.6263 0.4983 0.4118 0.3564 0.3893 0.2370 0.2561 0.2388 0.2526 
Ningxia 0.9295 1.0000 0.9705 0.8727 0.8023 0.7477 0.4750 0.4614 0.4182 0.3500 0.3136 0.3182 0.2977 0.1977 0.2409 
Xinjiang 0.8973 1.0000 0.9721 0.9333 0.8810 0.7678 0.6367 0.5165 0.4701 0.4039 0.3807 0.3389 0.3349 0.2618 0.2821 
                
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (中國統計年鑑) 1995-2009. 
Note: Definition: (provincial index of SOEs) = (number of SOEs in a certain year) / (the 
maximum number of SOEs during 1994-2008). Data for Chongqing are subsumed under 
those for Sichuan.  
a  In this table, there are in all 23 data instances of increases between years (except the first 
and last few years) which run counter the shrinking trend among 13 provinces. They all 
point to a certain degree of increase of SOE. A possible reason is this: some new SOEs 
were established to promote industries of strategic importance to a local province.  
Ave 0.5725 
S.D. 0.2747 
Max 1.0000 
Min 0.1255 
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Table 5.3a 
Privatisation variable 2 – provincial index of employees in state-owned and state holding enterprises. 
 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  
                
Beijing 1.0000 0.9574 0.9031 0.8361 0.7847 0.8163 0.7009 0.6392 0.5547 0.4697 0.4161 0.4803 0.4281 0.4314 0.4219 
Tianjin 1.0000 0.9688 0.9301 0.9097 0.7966 0.7059 0.6163 0.6014 0.5353 0.4861 0.4522 0.4371 0.4103 0.4200 0.4216 
Hebei 1.0000 0.9996 0.9796 0.9277 0.8775 0.8111 0.7369 0.6719 0.6093 0.5780 0.5623 0.4811 0.4543 0.4211 0.4123 
Shanxi 0.9944 1.0000 0.9888 0.9426 0.8443 0.7760 0.7539 0.7223 0.6744 0.6284 0.6394 0.6740 0.6636 0.6074 0.6443 
Neimenggu 0.9869 1.0000 0.9878 0.9195 0.7409 0.6810 0.5870 0.5416 0.5167 0.3953 0.3858 0.3652 0.3687 0.3469 0.3567 
Liaoning 0.9396 1.0000 0.9372 0.8905 0.7781 0.6601 0.5988 0.5146 0.4491 0.3922 0.3681 0.3569 0.3446 0.3410 0.3540 
Jilin 0.9941 1.0000 0.9947 0.9382 0.7704 0.6987 0.6320 0.5577 0.4942 0.4182 0.3941 0.3575 0.3182 0.2989 0.3098 
Heilongjiang 1.0000 0.9822 0.9745 0.9195 0.7324 0.6346 0.5525 0.4954 0.4564 0.3239 0.3185 0.3061 0.3077 0.3008 0.2981 
Shanghai 1.0000 0.9263 0.8258 0.7022 0.7942 0.7069 0.6361 0.5513 0.5070 0.4424 0.4167 0.3815 0.3585 0.3227 0.3122 
Jiangsu 0.9932 1.0000 0.9537 0.9303 0.9578 0.8711 0.7047 0.5999 0.5282 0.4224 0.3811 0.3100 0.2996 0.2616 0.2844 
Zhejiang 1.0000 0.9536 0.8958 0.8231 0.8113 0.6612 0.5055 0.3962 0.3493 0.3338 0.2912 0.3006 0.2859 0.2800 0.2842 
Anhui 0.9527 1.0000 0.9806 0.8749 0.8069 0.7251 0.6572 0.5695 0.5336 0.4925 0.5047 0.4599 0.4446 0.4402 0.4780 
Fujian 1.0000 0.9642 0.9083 0.8410 0.8285 0.7369 0.6278 0.5668 0.4913 0.4239 0.4087 0.4122 0.3811 0.3550 0.3454 
Jiangxi 0.9775 1.0000 0.9768 0.9437 0.7896 0.7194 0.6271 0.5346 0.4656 0.3980 0.3690 0.3314 0.3246 0.2985 0.3049 
Shandong 0.9231 1.0000 0.9748 0.9595 0.9445 0.8888 0.8117 0.7332 0.6788 0.6676 0.6124 0.4943 0.4929 0.4776 0.5157 
Henan 0.9671 0.9865 1.0000 0.8896 0.8866 0.8308 0.7763 0.7392 0.6829 0.6519 0.5787 0.5464 0.5115 0.4823 0.4460 
Hubei 0.9858 1.0000 0.9698 0.9235 0.9016 0.8211 0.7257 0.6603 0.5525 0.4869 0.4623 0.3629 0.3352 0.3307 0.3421 
Hunan 0.9907 1.0000 0.9820 0.9431 0.7648 0.7122 0.6402 0.5513 0.4956 0.4443 0.4156 0.3360 0.3373 0.3301 0.3243 
Guangdong 1.0000 0.9365 0.9031 0.8499 0.8775 0.8221 0.6696 0.5886 0.5324 0.4824 0.4795 0.4453 0.3902 0.3904 0.4993 
Guangxi 1.0000 0.9893 0.9658 0.9209 0.8540 0.7947 0.6977 0.6188 0.5530 0.4728 0.4516 0.3979 0.3451 0.3260 0.3676 
Hainan 1.0000 0.9773 0.9167 0.8939 0.8262 0.7607 0.7024 0.6530 0.7192 0.5924 0.4053 0.4485 0.4174 0.3409 0.2841 
Sichuan 1.0000 0.9929 0.9788 0.9186 0.8652 0.7527 0.6262 0.5480 0.4822 0.4409 0.4173 0.3868 0.3906 0.3978 0.4116 
Guizhou 1.0000 0.9762 0.9616 0.9405 0.8396 0.7989 0.7524 0.7029 0.6592 0.6220 0.5914 0.5851 0.5396 0.5144 0.5246 
Yunnan 1.0000 0.9872 0.9821 0.9386 0.9080 0.7844 0.7554 0.6832 0.6355 0.5339 0.4789 0.4247 0.4207 0.4779 0.4247 
Tibet 0.6738 0.6738 0.6738 0.6289 0.9341 0.9415 1.0000 0.9433 0.8648 0.8939 0.7547 0.7232 0.6289 0.4941 0.4986 
Shaanxi 0.9817 1.0000 0.9898 0.9668 0.8439 0.7888 0.7111 0.6356 0.6056 0.5684 0.5835 0.5277 0.5248 0.5169 0.5293 
Gansu 0.9858 1.0000 0.9617 0.9441 0.8822 0.7891 0.7225 0.6340 0.6118 0.5859 0.5740 0.4924 0.4966 0.4570 0.4666 
Qinghai 0.9848 1.0000 0.9949 0.9192 0.8476 0.8401 0.7178 0.6045 0.5346 0.5258 0.5232 0.4556 0.4591 0.4742 0.5354 
Ningxia 0.9747 0.9916 1.0000 0.9494 0.9028 0.8390 0.6976 0.6574 0.6396 0.6274 0.6143 0.5869 0.5105 0.5165 0.5456 
Xinjiang 0.9694 1.0000 0.9810 0.9300 0.8936 0.8042 0.5700 0.4885 0.4702 0.4150 0.3895 0.4603 0.4972 0.5483 0.5723 
                
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (中國統計年鑑)1995-2009.   
Note: Definition: (provincial index of employees in SOEs) = (number of SOE employees 
in a certain year) / (the maximum number of SOE employees during 1994-2008). Data for 
Chongqing are subsumed under those for Sichuan.  
a
 In this table, there are also 23 data instances of increases between years (except the first 
and last few years) which run counter to the shrinking trend among 16 provinces. They all 
suggest a certain degree of increase in SOE employment. A possible reason is this: some 
new SOE employees were recruited to promote industries of strategic importance to a local 
province. 
Ave 0.6631 
S.D. 0.2306 
Max 1.0000 
Min 0.2616 
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5.2 Preliminary analysis 
 
In this section, by way of a preliminary analysis, I present a non-parametric 
comparison, as well as a simple regression model for all independent variables as a 
preliminary analysis. The non-parametric comparison makes it possible to explore the 
changes in the macroeconomic environment and microeconomic conditions, and in 
the political context in which these economic changes were taking place. Regional 
and time differences are both reported. In short, this exercise offers a comprehensive 
account of the factors that shaped the dynamics of Chinese privatisation during 
1994-2008. It is hoped that this simple regression analysis will confirm the 
appropriateness of the choice of hypotheses that underlie this research.  
 
Changes in the political economy context 
 
Soft budgets and credits. The subsidy index calculation in Table 5.4 shows 
unambiguously that the level of total subsidies extended to loss-making SOEs 
declined significantly, implying a rapid shrinkage in soft budgets. If to separate the 
whole period into two – i.e., the former period is between 1994 and 2001, and the 
latter period is between 2002 and 2008 – the mean for the coastal data declined from 
0.7080 of the former period to 0.2631 of the latter period. The mean for the inland 
data declined similarly from 0.7136 of the early period to 0.2812 of the latter period. 
According to the provincial data set out in Table 5A.1a (see Appendix 5A), the 
shrinkage of soft budgets was particularly rapid in a number of inland provinces (for 
example, Xinjiang, Ningxia, Qinghai, Yunnan, Guizhou and Heilongjiang). By 
contrast, this hardening process proceeded more slowly in coastal regions. There are, 
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however, exceptions to these general patterns. Thus, coastal Zhejiang benefited from 
increased subsidy payments until 2002, suggesting that this province’s local budget 
became softer, rather than harder. This implies a local policy to consolidate or support 
local state sector. This also happened in Gansu; which enjoyed a steady expansion of 
subsidy payments from 1998 to 2006, after which such payments abruptly ceased.  
Meanwhile, there was also a major contraction in soft credits in the whole China. 
Shares of short-term industrial loans in coastal and inland regions dropped by about 
half in the latter period (in average, from 20.69 to 13.43 per cent in coastal data and 
from 22.01 to 12.49 per cent in inland data). There were severe reductions in some 
provinces, such as Heilongjiang, Beijing, Hubei, Hunan, Shanghai and Tianjin; as 
well as some small and remote provinces, such as Hainan, Qinghai, Tibet, Guizhou 
and Shaanxi (see Table 5A.1b). Two provinces – Jilin and Shandong – experienced 
cuts of a more moderate nature, before some increases in two or three latter years in 
data.  
 
Table 5.4 
Regional and time comparison.  
  Coastal (11 provinces)  Inland (19 provinces) 
  1994-2001 2002-2008   1994-2001 2002-2008  
  Obs=88 Obs=77   Obs=152 Obs=133  
Variable Code Mean Mean Gap  Mean Mean Gap (a) (b) (c)=(b)-(a)  (d) (e) (f)=(e)-(d) 
         
SOEUnitX pdv1 0.7926 0.3586 -0.4339  0.7684 0.3269 -0.4415 
  0.1671 0.1449 -0.0222  0.1933 0.1397 -0.0536 
SOEEmployeeX pdv2 0.8293 0.4252 -0.4041  0.8442 0.4837 -0.3605 
  0.1492 0.1002 -0.0490  0.1481 0.1172 -0.0309 
SubsidyX ph1a 0.7080 0.2631 -0.4449  0.7136 0.2812 -0.4324 
  0.2507 0.2726 0.0219  0.2743 0.3146 0.0403 
IndustrialLoan% ph1b 0.2069 0.1343 -0.0727  0.2201 0.1249 -0.0952 
  0.0499 0.0403 -0.0096  0.0537 0.0462 -0.0075 
POE% ph2a 0.0958 0.4027 0.3069  0.0587 0.3509 0.2922 
  0.0947 0.1478 0.0531  0.0585 0.1604 0.1019 
POEEmployee% ph2b 0.0492 0.1489 0.0997  0.0178 0.0696 0.0519 
  0.0440 0.1262 0.0822  0.0111 0.0584 0.0473 
SelfFunding% ph3a 0.4766 0.5545 0.0779  0.3957 0.5318 0.1362 
  0.0670 0.1058 0.0389  0.0750 0.1479 0.0729 
FiscalAutonomy% ph3b 0.7278 0.7278 0.0001  0.4789 0.4152 -0.0637 
  0.1805 0.2038 0.0232  0.1727 0.1650 -0.0077 
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NonSOEOutput% ph4a 0.5776 0.6798 0.1022  0.2866 0.3998 0.1133 
  0.1542 0.1479 -0.0064  0.1155 0.1438 0.0283 
Openness% ph4b 0.4830 0.6741 0.1912  0.1709 0.1789 0.0080 
  0.3974 0.5045 0.1071  0.3562 0.3019 -0.0543 
AssetLiability% ph5a 0.6208 0.5720 -0.0488  0.6172 0.5821 -0.0352 
  0.0620 0.0671 0.0050  0.0906 0.1098 0.0192 
DeficitBudget% ph5b 0.3036 0.3222 0.0185  0.5153 0.5984 0.0831 
  0.0901 0.1517 0.0616  0.1588 0.1554 -0.0034 
PhysicalInfrastructureX ph6a 0.1912 0.4713 0.2801  0.0997 0.2822 0.1825 
  0.0977 0.1702 0.0726  0.0840 0.1423 0.0582 
LegalInfrastructureX ph6b 0.0357 0.1337 0.0980  0.0152 0.0458 0.0306 
  0.0318 0.1347 0.1029  0.0199 0.0901 0.0701 
AssetContribution% ph7a 0.0809 0.1170 0.0361  0.0822 0.1148 0.0326 
  0.0329 0.0294 -0.0036  0.0762 0.0656 -0.0106 
AssetOutput% ph7b 0.5244 0.7416 0.2172  0.4368 0.5776 0.1408 
  0.1122 0.1451 0.0329  0.1086 0.1871 0.0785 
AveEmployeeX ph8a 0.6625 0.7840 0.1215  0.5524 0.7707 0.2183 
  0.1182 0.1593 0.0411  0.1393 0.1868 0.0475 
AveAssetX ph8b 0.1370 0.5733 0.4363  0.1050 0.5344 0.4294 
  0.0687 0.2705 0.2017  0.0568 0.2895 0.2327 
ScientificPersonnel% ph9a 0.2045 0.3134 0.1088  0.1858 0.2914 0.1056 
  0.0562 0.0573 0.0012  0.0458 0.0507 0.0049 
LabourProductivityX ph9b 0.1278 0.6335 0.5056  0.1251 0.5890 0.4639 
  0.0656 0.2635 0.1979  0.0645 0.2735 0.2090 
GDPX pcon1 0.1106 0.3063 0.1957  0.0491 0.1283 0.0791 
  0.0723 0.2287 0.1564  0.0380 0.1002 0.0622 
PopulationX pcon2 0.3681 0.3987 0.0306  0.3119 0.3221 0.0102 
  0.2274 0.2461 0.0186  0.2477 0.2457 -0.0021 
Literacy% pcon3 0.8779 0.9184 0.0405  0.8192 0.8696 0.0504 
  0.0522 0.0323 -0.0199  0.1244 0.0932 -0.0312 
Industrialisation% pcon4 0.3787 0.4303 0.0516  0.3272 0.3693 0.0421 
  0.1009 0.0956 -0.0053  0.0826 0.0963 0.0137 
IncomePercapitaX pcon5 0.1561 0.4208 0.2647  0.0933 0.2918 0.1985 
  0.0827 0.1822 0.0994  0.0591 0.1268 0.0677 
         
Note: Values in italic are standard errors. Coastal provinces include Liaoning, Hebei, Tianjin, 
Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Hainan. Chongqing is 
included in Sichuan.  
 
Ideology. The prevailing political ideology during these years favoured 
expansion of the private economy. During 1994-2001, the mean share of 
private-owned enterprises (POEs) (i.e., the number of POEs to the number of total 
enterprises) was only 9.58 per cent in coastal region, and a mean 5.87 per cent in the 
interior.104 By 2002-2008 the corresponding values had both increased around 30 per 
cent. That highlights the fundamental change in the structure of local economies that 
                                                 
104
 As already discussed, these very low figures may reflect local statistical distortions dictated by 
ideological factors or deliberate misrepresentation of enterprise status by de facto private owners.  
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was taking place. Thus, the data for 2008, show the POE share in half of all provinces 
to have exceeded 50 per cent (see Table 5A.2a). Private economy booms were 
especially rapid in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Shandong, Henan, Guizhou, Ningxia, 
Hunan and Sichuan, compared with a much slower pace of change in Tibet, Qinghai, 
Shaanxi, Gansu and Shanxi. The growing pace of private economy in inland region 
was faster than general expectation, according to which coastal regions should have 
taken the lead. Interestingly, among coastal provinces the growth of POEs was 
slowest in Beijing, whose latest data for 2008 are superior only to those of Hainan, 
Tibet and Qinghai. However, it would be premature to draw conclusions from this. If 
we take Beijing’s rapid growth of private employment (discussed in the next 
paragraph) into consideration, it becomes clear that private enterprises based in 
Beijing should be relatively larger than those of other provinces.  
The employment impact of privatisation reform was less pronounced. After 1994 
POE employment scale increased in all provinces, but at a quite modest pace. During 
2002-2008, coastal POEs accounted, on average, for only 14.89 per cent of total 
employment in average, whilst the corresponding figure for inland POEs was even 
lower at 6.96 per cent. Not surprisingly, the five fastest-growing coastal provinces – 
Shanghai, Beijing, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Tianjin – were the driving force behind the 
private sector expansion, although in 2005 only in Shanghai did the private sector 
accommodate more than 50 per cent of total employment (see Table 5A.2b). Until 
quite recently, in two-thirds of all provinces less than one in ten workers were 
employed in the private sector. Besides, Beijing’s relatively higher pace of private 
employment does not contradict its relatively slower growth in the number of private 
enterprises. Rather, this contrast indicates that private enterprises newly established in 
Beijing were larger than those of other provinces, embodying more employees per 
enterprise.  
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Decentralisation. Turning to decentralisation, the evidence suggests that after 
the mid-1990s local governments showed themselves much more willing and able to 
raise construction capital from their own resources. Data for coastal provinces point to 
a 7.79 per cent rise to reach 55.45 per cent in the mean of the self-funding share of 
total investment between 2002 and 2008. In inland regions the corresponding figure 
was significantly higher (13.62 per cent). As a result, during 2002-2008, with 53.18 
per cent of total investment coming from self-funding, inland governments had almost 
caught up with their coastal counterparts (55.45 per cent). In some interior provinces – 
for example, Neimenggu, Jilin, Henan, Heilongjiang, Shanxi, Qinghai and Anhui – the 
accelerated pace of self-funding activities was especially noteworthy (see Table 
5A.3a). On the contrary, Beijing, Shanghai, Hainan, Guangdong, Guangxi and Jiangsu 
experienced the most serious fluctuations.  
A different picture emerges when we examine the extent of fiscal autonomy, 
whose mean remain stable throughout both periods in coastal provinces, but fell by 
6.37 per cent in inland regions. The data variation is remarkable (around 18 per cent 
in national average), and shows the huge differences and fluctuations among 
provinces. The reason lies in the rapid increase of local expenditure in recent years. In 
most provinces, the growth of local revenue was slower than that of local expenditure, 
as a result of which local finances became more dependent on fiscal support from 
central government. In effect, about two-thirds of all provinces experienced a 
weakening of their fiscal autonomy, with Hainan, Henan, Hebei, Gansu, Heilongjiang, 
Jilin, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and Jiangxi being most seriously affected (see Table 
5A.3b). With two exceptions (Neimenggu and Shanxi), there was an unambiguous 
weakening of fiscal autonomy in all inland provinces. Significant enhancement of 
fiscal autonomy was achieved in just seven coastal provinces, with Zhejiang, Jiangsu 
and Fujian recording the greatest improvements. This explains the wide regional gaps. 
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Thus, whereas the average extent of fiscal autonomy in coastal regions in all time is 
about 72 per cent, much higher than the corresponding feature 45 per cent in inland 
regions. In short, we may conclude that coastal governments enjoy greater fiscal 
autonomy than their inland counterparts. Moreover, this gap has continued to widen to 
the detriment of interior regions of the country.  
In summary, the political economy context in which privatisation proceeded in 
China is consonant with the hypotheses set out in an earlier chapter. Starting in the 
late 1990s, soft budgets and credits lines were significantly reduced in all provinces, 
and from 2000 ideological support for the private economy strengthened. Local 
self-financing capability also gradually increased in the wake of the series of 
decentralisation reforms that took place in the mid-1990s. By contrast, however, 
thanks to the more rapid expansion in local expenditures compared with local revenue 
growth, the fiscal autonomy of most provincial governments weakened. This was 
reflected in deteriorating local finances which made local governments more 
dependent on central transfers.  
In addition, regional variations are shown to have been significant. Among inland 
provincial governments, the process of hardening soft budgets and credits took place 
more rapidly, although the shift toward an ideology in favour of private ownership 
was slower. Coastal governments embraced a pro-privatisation ideology changes at an 
earlier stage; larger local revenues also gave them greater fiscal autonomy, and they 
experienced a slower rate of contraction of soft budgets and credits.  
Some provinces deserve further notes. For the boom of private economy, in 
terms of employment scale, Shanghai, Jiangsu and Beijing took a clear leading role, 
followed by Tianjin and Zhejiang. Yet the private labour market in Guangdong and 
Shandong was not as much advanced as expected. In Zhejiang and Gansu, unlike rest 
provinces, budget and credit systems became softer, not harder, in the most of time. 
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That means the state sector in these two provinces was not the target to be shrunk but 
to be fostered, instead. More moderate cuts and slight increases of soft credits were 
seen in Jilin and Shandong, suggesting that their state sector (perhaps more orientated 
towards heavy industries) was a particular target for support (through state loans) and 
given a greater development responsibility after 2006.  
 
Changes in macroeconomic environment 
 
Market competition. In the product markets of both coastal and inland areas, 
data show that between 1994-2001 and 2002-08 the non-state share of industrial 
products rose by 10 per cent. A corollary of the increase in non-state activity was an 
intensification of market competition in all provinces after the mid-1990s. However, 
the gap between coastal and inland areas was huge: the average industrial output made 
by non-state sector in coastal data was about 30 per cent higher than that of interior 
regions (see Table 5.4). Competition was particularly severe in southeast coastal 
provinces, including Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Guangdong and Fujian (see Table 5A.4a). The 
most outstanding improvements of non-state activities occurred in inland provinces, 
especially in Neimenggu, Jiangxi, Ningxia, Hebei, Hunan, Henan and Sichuan 
(including Chongqing), accounted for an increasing share of local product markets. 
Yet in some remote provinces, such as Xinjiang, Gansu, Qinghai, Shaanxi and 
Heilongjiang, the increase in competition was much more limited, and markets were 
still mainly the output of SOEs.  
In terms of the openness to foreign trade, regional gaps were even wider. The 
average ratio of foreign trade to provincial GDP in coastal regions during 1994-2001 
was 48.30 per cent, or 30 per cent higher than the average in inland regions. By 
2002-2008, the coastal average had increased by almost 20 per cent (67.41 per cent), 
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whereas the inland average remained virtually unchanged (rising by less than a 
percentage point from 17.09 to 17.89 per cent) (see Table 5.4). Four coastal 
provinces – Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Tianjin – achieved outstanding growth in 
foreign trade (see Table 5A.4b). By contrast, most inland provinces experienced 
stagnation. In 2008, the foreign trade share of GDP in eighteen out of nineteen inland 
provinces was still less than 20 per cent. In addition, data in most provinces show a 
U-style curve, indicating that the degree of openness declined slightly before rising 
sharply after 2000. This is because the growth of foreign trade in most provinces was 
slower than the growth of GDP during the 1990s, and foreign trade was significantly 
stimulated as a result of the increasing foreign direct investment. Interestingly, Beijing 
and Guangdong in 2008 were less open than they were in 1994.  
Financial pressure. In terms of financial pressure, all provinces faced a 
long-term debt problem in their state sector. The national average asset-liability ratio 
consistently remained at a 60 per cent high after 1994. This burden, however, seems to 
have been kept under control, since the situation did not subsequently deteriorate. 
Indeed, in recent years it has slightly improved. The detailed local statistics show 
major fluctuations in all provinces (see Table 5A.5a). Three provinces – Beijing, 
Shanghai and Guangdong – achieved significant improvement in the later period. No 
clear distinction is found between coastal and inland areas, and it means that remote 
and rural provinces did not necessarily face a debt problem more serious than their 
coastal and relatively richer counterparts.  
The deficit problem, nevertheless, facing inland governments has been far more 
severe than that facing coastal governments. During 2002-2008, the average 
deficit-budget ratio of inland data was close to 60 per cent, a rate almost double the 
average of coastal regions (see Table 5.4). In some inland provinces the ratio was even 
higher: for example, deficits in Tibet, Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, Jilin, Xinjiang and 
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Guizhou exceeded two-thirds of local expenditure. By contrast, in recent years some 
coastal provinces – for example, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Beijing, Guangdong and 
Shanghai – have successfully addressed deficit problems by generating rapid local 
revenue growth.  
Infrastructural institutions. Turning now to the institutional framework, all 
provinces display an improvement in their index of physical infrastructure during 
1994-2008. This reflects the deliberate efforts of local governments to reduce 
transaction costs and to facilitate private business expansion. From a regional 
perspective, it is clear that coastal provinces started with a stronger infrastructural 
base than and that they achieved a further strengthening of that foundation, compared 
with inland provinces. Between 1994-2001 and 2002-08 the mean of physical 
infrastructure data in coastal provinces grew from 0.1912 to 0.4713, while in inland 
provinces, the increase was smaller (rising from 0.0997 to 0.2822) (see Table 5.4). As 
comparing nationally, the regional gap is clear (see Table 5A.6a): over one-third of all 
provinces – most of them inland provinces, except for Guangxi and Hainan – failed to 
raise this figure to more than 0.3 between the two periods. Meanwhile, the increase in 
some coastal provinces was huge. For example, Shanghai’s index rose to more than 
0.7, whilst that of Jiangsu, Beijing, Zhejiang and Shandong reached about 0.5.  
However, the degree of improvement in the legal infrastructure was much more 
limited. For coastal provinces, the figure for 2002-08 averaged 0.1337, while for 
inland regions it was a mere 0.0458 (see Table 5.4). Clearly, the development of a 
legal framework was much slower in interior regions of the country. The gap between 
individual provinces was even wider. Whilst five major coastal provinces achieved 
significant improvement – Beijing (0.6430), Guangdong (0.5981), Zhejiang (0.4555), 
Jiangsu (0.4040) and Shanghai (0.3852) – during 2002-08, eleven inland provinces 
were still characterised by an underdeveloped legal infrastructure, as shown by a 
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figure lower than 0.0500 (see Table 5A.6b).  
Overall, the development of the macroeconomic environment in China after the 
mid-1990s was exemplified by important advances: product competition intensified, 
foreign trade expanded, debt burdens diminished, deficit problems began to be 
brought under control, and both physical and legal infrastructures were enhanced. It is 
true that the record of progress was not uniformly positive (for example, in terms of 
deficit reduction or in the creation of an effective legal infrastructure); however, the 
overall direction of change was undoubtedly encouraging. As a result, China’s 
macroeconomic setting was much better than that of other transitional economies of 
Eastern Europe and former Soviet bloc. The major deficiency in China’s case was the 
huge developmental gap that continued to exist between coastal and inland areas. 
Debt burden apart, this regional gap was reflected in almost all macroeconomic 
variables, including openness to non-state business and the outside world, the scale of 
government deficits, and the development of physical and legal infrastructures. It is 
clear (and not surprising) that five coastal provinces – Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang and Guangdong – showed a higher degree of macroeconomic development 
than any other provinces in China. The potential for catch-up remains great for many 
provinces.  
 
Changes in microeconomic conditions 
 
Economy efficiency. As for economic efficiency, the trend in asset-contribution 
ratio presents a slight improvement among local state sectors (see Table 5.4). For both 
coastal and inland provinces, the average asset-contribution ratios from 1994-2001 to 
2002-08 period grew at around 3-4 per cent. Most provinces showed profitability 
fluctuating around a slightly rising trend (see Table 5A.7a). Growth could be adjudged 
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outstanding in only a few provinces – namely, Heilongjiang, Xinjiang, Shaanxi, 
Qinghai, Tianjin, Hainan and Shandong. Indeed, in some cases (for example, Yunnan, 
Beijing and Tibet) SOE profitability was in decline.105 106  
Nevertheless, the growth of productivity is much significant than that of 
profitability. Looking at the figures of asset-output ratio, both figures of two areas 
grew significantly between 1994-2001 and 2002-08, whilst 21.72 per cent increased in 
the average of coastal data and 14.08 per cent in the average of inland data (see Table 
5.4). In general, coastal provinces showed a greater improvement than inland 
provinces over the entire period between 1994 and 2008. Fourteen provinces 
increased the average ratio during 2002-08 by over 70 per cent, ten of which were 
coastal provinces. The most significant improvements were recorded in Shandong, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Heilongjiang and Jilin (see Table 5A.7b). By contrast, 
the degree of improvement was rather limited in Ningxia, Guizhou and Qinghai, close 
to zero in Hubei and Yunnan, and even negative in Beijing and Tibet. The inefficiency 
of production in these provinces can be justified by their remote location, except 
Beijing. Whose low level of profitability was mainly caused by rapid growth in 
accumulation of state (fixed) assets, which significantly reduced its efficiency 
performance. It is worth pointing out a contradiction inherent in the divergent 
performance of two efficiency variables in coastal provinces. Intriguingly, their 
outstanding productivity enhanced record is hardly consistent with their much more 
modest improvement in profitability. The reason this divergence may lie in the 
definition and coverage of two measures. Industrial output, the productivity variable, 
is a broad concept that embraces profits, taxes and interest. But the profitability 
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 Yunnan, where the values of asset-contribution rate are shown to have been unrealistically high 
throughout the whole years, seems to have been a special case. It remains to resolve this puzzle.  
106
 At first glance, the retrogression in Beijing’s data also seems puzzling. It is repeated in the 
estimates of the asset-output ratio. The reason lies in the rapid growth in the fixed assets after 2004. 
The total scale of fixed assets increased fourfold within four years.  
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variable focuses only on profits and excludes other transaction costs, such as 
management and sales costs. In short, the apparent paradox captured in divergent 
trends in productivity and profitability may conceal the reality that a significant share 
of the increase in profits was absorbed by rising costs of management and sales. Here, 
then, may be further evidence in favour of the widespread assumption that wages and 
bonuses were largely manipulated in China’s state sector. By implication, we may 
suppose that the phenomenon of rent-seeking management should have been more 
prevalent in China's coastal provinces.  
Firm size. Measured by the average number of employees in a local SOE, the 
national average size of firm was increasing. On average, the index of firm size in 
coastal regions increased by 0.1215 in 2002-08, while the corresponding figure for 
inland provinces was 0.2183. This phenomenon occurs when small SOEs (with the 
number of employees below the mean of total data) are more likely to be privatised. 
This corresponds to the central policy of “grasping the large and letting go of the 
small (zhuada fangxiao)”, promoted in the late 1990s, meaning that privatisation 
should start with small SOEs. Since local governments held fast to this principle, the 
average number of employees in SOEs increased significantly in 2002-08. Provincial 
statistics suggest that inland governments were more committed to this policy. In 2008, 
in eight inland provinces the average size of SOE exceeded over 1,000 employees, 
whereas in most coastal provinces the corresponding figure was around 400-700 
employees.107 In three provinces this figure fluctuated and declined. The average size 
of SOE contracted in Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai – seemingly because these more 
advanced local economies did not follow central policy, but went in the opposite 
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 In 2008, there were totally eleven provinces in which the average number of employees was 1,000 
or above; they are Shanxi (1,762), Heilongjiang (1,636), Jilin (1,266), Henan (1,228), Ningxia (1,220), 
Anhui (1,167), Hebei (1,147), Shandong (1,145), Shaanxi (1,141), Liaoning (1,109) and Gansu (1,000). 
By way of comparison, in the mid-1990s the corresponding figure was between 500 and 800.  
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direction (i.e., prioritising privatisation of relatively large SOEs). One may wonder 
how to explain this phenomenon of “grasping the small while letting go of the 
large” – an opposite practice to that of central government policy. The possible reason 
is that local governments in these three major cities faced less risk to raise protests 
among laid-off workers, because these workers would be better accommodated by 
larger and more advanced private sector. This spared more room for privatising larger 
SOEs.  
Next, regarding the second size variable, the index of the average size of total 
assets, the nationwide numerical increases confirm the widespread impact of the 
central policy of privatisation. All provinces acquire a figure increased by over 0.4000 
between 1994-2001 and 2002-08 – this suggesting a more than threefold increase (see 
Table 5.4). Nor in this case do Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai emerge as exceptions. 
Yet this phenomenon of rapid expansion in average assets does not wholly reflect the 
policy of privatising small enterprises first. An examination of provincial statistics 
suggests that asset expansion was in part the result of pouring huge amounts of money 
into remaining SOEs in 2004/05-20008 (see Table 5A.8b). The underlying logic may 
be as follows: Those relatively large SOEs that survived the ‘privatisation tsunami’ 
may be in need of immediate recapitalisation. This may require that they undertake a 
certain degree of ownership reform (albeit of a kind that does not fundamentally 
change their state-owned or state-holding status), such as issuing more shares in 
domestic or foreign stock markets in order to increase cash flows and enhance 
competitiveness. 108  Thus, two explanations for the expansion in firm size in 
provincial state sectors are offered here. During 1994-2004, the increase in average 
firm size reflected the commitment to following the central policy of letting go of the 
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 This also means that, in Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin, small SOEs are more likely to be preserved 
and to be recapitalised, too.  
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small SOEs first. Subsequently, large-scale recapitalisation by the remaining SOEs 
may have led to further expansion in asset size.  
Human capital endowment. Finally, in terms of Chinese SOEs’ human capital 
capacity, there was stable growth of about 10 per cent in the national average for the 
entire period (1994-2008), as captured by changes in managerial positions (measured 
by the share of scientific and technical personnel in the total number of employees). 
All provinces shared in this impressive record. In some less developed provinces – 
such as Anhui, Hunan, Guangxi, Jilin, Jiangxi and Yunnan – the corresponding 
increase was up to 20 per cent (see Table 5A.9a).109 As for labour productivity (the 
alternative human capital variable), all provinces recorded positive growth during 
1994-2008, but with major regional gaps. In 2008, the value-added per worker in nine 
provinces was more than 300,000 yuan per year; but in ten other provinces the 
corresponding figure was less than 200,000 yuan. The highest provincial figure 
(517,846 yuan/year in Guangdong) was 4.7 times higher than the lowest figure 
(110,798 yuan/year in Tibet). Over the entire period, there was a 13-17 fold 
improvement in average labour productivity in most provinces. 110  The most 
outstanding records were achieved in Neimenggu, Shaanxi, Tianjin, Hainan and 
Zhejiang, all of which recorded increase of at least 2,000 per cent. Other provinces 
were, however, left far behind: in Guizhou and Gansu there was a 10-fold 
improvement; in Yunnan, only an eight-fold increase; and in Tibet, a mere six-fold. It 
is noteworthy that a simple coastal-interior dichotomy does not suffice to explain 
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 A noteworthy feature is that the shares in Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin should have been 
surprisingly low, especially in the late 1990s – something that hardly meets the popular preconception 
of a high level of human capital in these three coastal major cities. The explanation may be as follows: 
Unlike other provinces, these three city economies afforded fewer managerial-level positions to be 
filled. In any case, the unique nature of these three provincial-level units does not affect the empirical 
result. Since regressions are conducted province by province, differences over a specific variable 
among provinces – as in this case – will not be carried out into the result.  
110
 This coefficient is calculated by the maximum value divided by the minimum value in a provincial 
series for the period 1994-2008.  
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regional differentials: the record of coastal provinces was not necessarily superior to 
that of inland provinces in terms of enhancing human capacity, especially given that 
the latter usually faced a relatively lower starting point in terms of human capital 
endowment.  
In short, we may summarise changes in microeconomic conditions among 
provincial SOEs as follows: economic efficiency improved; firm size expanded; and 
human capital was enhanced. However, it is clear that concealed in these generalities 
were major regional differences and that these dictated the need for specific local 
strategies. Coastal SOEs are found to have been more susceptible to manipulate 
profitability because more economic rents were apparently lost in the management 
and sales process. They were also less committed to the central policy of prioritising 
the privatisation of small enterprises (the average size of privatised SOEs in most 
coastal provinces was smaller).111 Meanwhile, in terms of the overall improvement of 
human capital, inland governments should be applauded for having achieved a level 
close to that of their coastal counterparts. Even in some remote and less developed 
inland provinces, growth was significant.  
 
Simple regression analysis  
 
This sub-section presents basic results of the simple regression analysis, 
conducted in a single-variate linear OLS model, where the dependent variable is 
regressed by singular independent variable with an intercept. This reveals the basic 
correlation between the dependent variable and each independent variable, and further 
enables us to check the appropriateness of hypothesis establishments in a preliminary 
manner. It is important to note, however, that this kind of analysis can be largely 
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 Except for Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, as discussed earlier.  
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biased because it does not contain any control variable over simultaneous impacts 
from other factors, nor any adjustment over the individual-specific and time-specific 
influences. The result, therefore, can only provide basic correlation and cannot 
underpin any meaningful conclusion according to a conservative manner of 
econometrics.  
Most hypotheses introduced in this research assume a negative correlation 
between the scale of state sector and its determinants. This is necessarily reflected in a 
negative sign of coefficient in a simple regression. There are only two exceptions, 
where the original hypothesis would expect to generate a positive sign in estimated 
coefficients. Given that the removal of a soft budget constraint implies a contraction 
in the total amount, an increase of soft budgets will, conversely, encourage local 
governments to maintain the current scale of state sector. This positive correlation 
would generate an expected positive sign. Secondly, in the factor of economic 
efficiency, since the original assumption is based on the traditional orthodox argument 
which states that less efficient SOEs should be privatised first, the efficiency level of 
the remaining non-privatised SOEs should be raised. Accordingly, it leads to a 
positive sign in estimation. Table 5.5 lists the results of all simple regressions.  
 
Table 5.5 
Simple regression analysis by pooled-OLS.  
  Coef. Std. Err. T P > t R-squared Obs Sign 
assumed 
Corres- 
pondence 
Dependent variable: SOEUnitX         
          
SubsidyX ph1a 0.4905  0.0281  17.44  0.00 0.4043  450 + V 
IndustrialLoan% ph1b 2.6070  0.1558  16.73  0.00 0.3846  450 + V 
POE% ph2a -1.1786 0.0386  -30.54 0.00 0.6755  450 - V 
POEEmployee% ph2b -1.4211 0.1517  -9.37  0.00 0.1638  450 - V 
SelfFunding% ph3a -1.1367 0.0903  -12.58 0.00 0.2611  450 - V 
FiscalAutonomy% ph3b 0.1234  0.0577  2.14  0.03 0.0101  450 - X 
NonSOEOutput% ph4a -0.3196 0.0624  -5.12  0.00 0.0553  450 - V 
Openness% ph4b -0.0291 0.0303  -0.96  0.34 0.0021  450 - V 
AssetLiability% ph5a 0.4935  0.1412  3.50  0.00 0.0265  450 - X 
DeficitBudget% ph5b -0.1684 0.0682  -2.47  0.01 0.0134  450 - V 
PhysicalInfrastructureX ph6a -0.9095 0.0586  -15.51 0.00 0.3495  450 - V 
LegalInfrastructureX ph6b -1.0703 0.1417  -7.55  0.00 0.1129  450 - V 
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AssetContribution% ph7a -1.1591 0.2016  -5.75  0.00 0.0687  450 + X 
AssetOutput% ph7b -0.7477 0.0644  -11.62 0.00 0.2315  450 + X 
AveEmployeeX ph8a -1.0503 0.0504  -20.82 0.00 0.4917  450 - V 
AveAssetX ph8b -0.7538 0.0263  -28.61 0.00 0.6463  450 - V 
ScientificPersonnel% ph9a -2.7864 0.1137  -24.51 0.00 0.5728  450 - V 
LabourProductivityX ph9b -0.7033 0.0264  -26.61 0.00 0.6125  450 - V 
          
  Coef. Std. Err. T P > t R-squared Obs Assumed Consistent 
Dependent variable: SOEEmployeeX        
          
SubsidyX ph1a 0.3973  0.0242  16.44  0.00 0.3764  450 + V 
IndustrialLoan% ph1b 2.3492  0.1244  18.89  0.00 0.4433  450 + V 
POE% ph2a -0.9709 0.0336  -28.88 0.00 0.6506  450 - V 
POEEmployee% ph2b -1.5289 0.1190  -12.84 0.00 0.2691  450 - V 
SelfFunding% ph3a -0.8996 0.0773  -11.63 0.00 0.2321  450 - V 
FiscalAutonomy% ph3b -0.0081 0.0487  -0.17  0.87 0.0001  450 - V 
NonSOEOutput% ph4a -0.3359 0.0515  -6.52  0.00 0.0867  450 - V 
Openness% ph4b -0.0780 0.0252  -3.10  0.00 0.0209  450 - V 
AssetLiability% ph5a 0.5692  0.1171  4.86  0.00 0.0501  450 - X 
DeficitBudget% ph5b -0.0754 0.0575  -1.31  0.19 0.0038  450 - V 
PhysicalInfrastructureX ph6a -0.8738 0.0449  -19.45 0.00 0.4578  450 - V 
LegalInfrastructureX ph6b -1.0412 0.1163  -8.95  0.00 0.1517  450 - V 
AssetContribution% ph7a -0.9405 0.1696  -5.54  0.00 0.0642  450 + X 
AssetOutput% ph7b -0.6326 0.0539  -11.73 0.00 0.2351  450 + X 
AveEmployeeX ph8a -0.6998 0.0493  -14.18 0.00 0.3099  450 - V 
AveAssetX ph8b -0.6111 0.0234  -26.08 0.00 0.6029  450 - V 
ScientificPersonnel% ph9a -2.3773 0.0933  -25.48 0.00 0.5918  450 - V 
LabourProductivityX ph9b -0.5882 0.0223  -26.37 0.00 0.6081  450 - V 
          
Note: Assumed signs accord to hypothesis settings. All regressions include intercepts but values are not reported 
here.  
 
Most estimated coefficients are significant at the 1 per cent level. For the first 
privatisation variable, in the upper part of table, most coefficients obtain signs 
corresponding to the original assumptions.112 The only four exceptions are in respect 
to the variables of fiscal autonomy, asset-liability rate, asset contribution rate and 
asset-output ration. Results obtained by the second privatisation variable, in the lower 
part of table, are similar. Only the coefficient signs of the asset-liability rate, asset 
contribution rate and asset-output ratio are not as would be expected. Nevertheless, 
these unexpected results would not affect each original hypothesis, because which has 
included counter-arguments that could offer explanations. In summary, the simple 
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 There are only three regressions in the table in which the t-value is less than the significant level of 
10 per cent in the table.  
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regression analysis demonstrates that all hypotheses established in this research 
should be deemed appropriate.  
 
5.3 Empirical results 
 
The author’s regression strategy is, first, to estimate hypothesis variables one by 
one in order to identify individual effects and then to estimate some selected variables 
put together for a broader comparison.113 All estimations are run with two respective 
time periods – a longer period (1994-2008 – the maximum time length of available 
data), and a shorter period (1997-2005). There are two reasons for this approach. On 
the one hand, it helps focus more on the peak period of the privatisation movement, 
which clearly experienced a sharp acceleration between the late 1990s and early 
2000s. On the other hand, since some extreme values in data have been excluded, the 
results obtained from the shorter period may serve, to some extent, to check the 
econometric robustness of the results obtained from the longer period.114  Two 
baseline models, without hypothesis variables, are provided in (a0) and (a5) models in 
Table 5.6. All empirical results are obtained from the dynamic two-step system-GMM 
estimator with a balanced panel of data.115 The number of instruments is strictly 
controlled under the number of groups (cross-sections) in order to prevent 
proliferation bias caused by too many instruments.116 Following the suggestion by 
Roodman (2009b), instrument matrices are collapsed in all regressions. For the same 
purpose, the length of the lagged period of instrument variables is mainly limited to 
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 It should be noted that there is econometric reason that does not allow too many variables to be run 
in a regression of system-GMM. Please see the detail in the final part of this section.  
114
 In general, extreme values exist in the data of the first or last few time periods in a panel dataset. By 
excluding data for the first and last three years in this dataset, it is possible to minimise the impact of 
extreme values.  
115
 Please see Chapter Four for more econometric discussion and justification.  
116
 Proliferation bias leads to the problem of over-identification.  
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six periods (from T-2 to T-7). The Hansen test and the Difference-in-Hansen test are 
applied in an attempt to detect this bias. Using the lagged term of dependent variable 
as one of the independent variables inevitably reduces the data of first period, and the 
number of observations therefore falls from 450 to 420, and the length of time period, 
from 15 to 14 (years).  
Variables, serving for control purpose, include the lagged term of dependent 
variable, year dummies, intercept and four other specific control variables to absorb 
impacts relating to region (by sea dummy), education (by literacy rate), industrial 
development (by the degree of industrialisation) and economic growth (by per capita 
income). Strict econometric standards are adhered to in all regressions. In order to 
maintain high econometric quality, estimated results are accepted and reported only 
when all the following requirements are fulfilled:  
 
(1) The coefficient of the lagged term dependent variable is significant and less 
than the unity.  
(2) The first order serial correlation test (AR(1)) rejects the null hypothesis – 
the absence of serial correlation.117  
(3) The second order serial correlation test (AR(2)) accepts the null hypothesis 
at a level higher of 25 per cent, instead of the general level of 10 per cent 
(Roodman, 2009b).  
(4) Hansen test accepts the null hypothesis and confirms the validity of 
instruments.  
 
Results for the political economy hypotheses 
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 The first order serial correlation is inevitably and necessarily introduced by the lagged dependent 
variable as one of the independent variables in regression.  
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For the hypothesis of soft budget constraint, relevant evidence is found in (a1) 
and (a7) models in Table 5.6. The variable of subsidy index enters with positive and 
significant coefficient in both models. This suggests that provinces in receipt of 
above-average subsidies tended to maintain a larger size of state sector. This finding 
corresponds to the original assumption of causality that the existence of soft budgets 
constrained privatisation. The series of fiscal reforms starting in the mid-1990s, which 
sought to reduce soft budgets, proved successful in promoting subsequent 
privatisation. The soft credit variable, unlike the soft budget one, is shown to have 
exerted less influence on the privatisation decision. No evidence is found to support 
the supposition that a contraction in industrial loans would encourage more SOEs to 
undertake ownership reform. This is probably because the scale of soft credit 
reduction was relatively modest. Whilst loss-making subsidies were gradually reduced 
to zero in most provinces, industrial loans were cut by only half. This finding echoes 
empirical results in other part of the literature (e.g., Guo and Yao, 2005, Huyghebaert 
and Quan, 2009, Lopez De Silanes et al., 1997). In short, the expectation is that 
hardening local budget constraints should have encouraged the process of 
privatisation in China.  
Evidence pertaining to the political ideology hypothesis may be found in (b2), 
(b4) and (b6) models. These significant and negative coefficients indicate a reciprocal 
relationship between the boom of the private sector and the shrinkage of the state 
sector in all provinces, particularly in the period 1997-2005.118 The evidence is 
strongly supportive of the original assumption that privatisation would be caused by 
the government’s commitment to support the development of the private economy. It 
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 It is noteworthy that those insignificant results obtained by the full length of time period are not 
against the finding here. It just says that this ideology impact is more concentrated in the peak time of 
privatisation reform.  
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is also apparent that the first ideology variable – the share of private enterprises in 
total enterprises – generates a result that is more significant than that forthcoming 
form the second ideology variable (the share of private employees in total work force). 
The finding suggests that the expansion of the labour market in the private sector had 
little effect on the shrinkage of the state sector, perhaps, because the scale of private 
employment was still quite limited. Although private sector labour expansion in all 
provinces have maintained sustained growth in recent years, in most cases such 
growth was as low as around 10 per cent, especially in inland area. This may explain 
why this ideology variable was less important. In any case, the more important 
implication of this finding is that it confirms the unique path of ideology change in 
China. This change was not brought about by a change in ruling party brought about 
through democratic elections, which has been the norm in other transitional countries. 
Rather, it was achieved by the government’s growing commitment to private 
ownership and its sanctioning of the establishment of more private enterprises. In this 
characteristic Chinese way, privatisation was thereby encouraged.  
The impact of decentralisation is evident in (c1) and (c8) models, although the 
results demonstrate different suggestions between two decentralisation variables. The 
significant and negative coefficient in the (c8) model suggests that provinces with 
greater fiscal autonomy were to accept a reduction in employment in their state 
sectors. More state workers were dismissed by local governments during 1997-2005. 
This is in line with the original assumption that decentralisation would facilitate 
privatisation because of the information advantage local governments gain. It deserves 
stating that this finding is the first piece of evidence of its kind so far to appear in the 
literature (Qian and Roland, 1998, Qian and Weingast, 1997, Dewatripont and Maskin, 
1995, Cao et al., 1999).  
However, the driving force of decentralisation may also have worked in the 
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opposite direction. The positive coefficient with significance at 1 per cent level 
obtained in the (c1) model indicates that provinces closer to attaining capital 
self-sufficiency would be willing to maintain a larger state sector during 1994-2008. 
This contradicts the original assumption and raises the interesting issue of the 
willingness of government to take ownership reform – local bureaucrats may become 
reluctant to privatise if they are more readily able to secure the investment funds they 
need. This reluctant attitude towards privatisation should have been more prevalent 
among coastal governments because the average level of this variable (SelfFunding%) 
in coastal areas was generally higher than in inland regions (see Table 5.4). This 
further points to another important implication, which is that economic 
self-sufficiency is likely to be reflected in local bureaucrats being more politically 
autonomous and therefore less willing to follow the central policy of privatisation. In 
other words, there is an implicit tension between the central and local governments. 
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Table 5.6 
Empirical results for the hypothesis group of political economy.  
 DV: SOEUnitX  DV: SOEEmployeeX 
 (a0)  (a1)  (a2)  (a3)  (a4)   (a5)  (a6)  (a7)  (a8)  (a9)  
Soft budget constraint hypothesis            
                      
Lag.DV 0.712 *** 0.661 *** 0.675 *** 0.703 *** 0.542 ***  0.672 *** 0.841 *** 0.922 *** 0.908 *** 0.760 *** 
 0.180  0.215  0.148  0.213  0.149   0.244  0.326  0.152  0.164  0.160  
SubsidyX   0.237 * -0.009         -0.048  0.084 #     
   0.137  0.151         0.079  0.054      
IndustrialLoan%       0.519  -1.812         0.070  -0.041  
       1.572  1.813         0.272  0.235  
SeaDummy -0.096  0.075  -0.042  -0.087  -0.069   -0.386  -0.286  0.176  -0.097  -0.117  
 0.539  0.396  0.398  0.512  0.481   0.332  0.544  0.204  0.151  0.127  
Literacy% -0.592  -0.387  -0.415  -0.434  -0.562   0.010  0.776  0.163  -0.422  -0.097  
 0.396  0.505  0.787  1.038  0.751   0.697  0.861  0.292  0.409  0.248  
Industrialisation% 0.284  -0.166  -0.370  0.190  -0.498   1.087 # 0.543  -1.189  0.510  -0.440  
 1.274  1.083  0.788  1.665  0.735   0.742  1.575  0.911  0.380  0.635  
IncomePercapitaX 0.321  -0.136  0.302  0.286  0.327   0.470  0.255  -0.113  0.272  0.339 # 
 0.904  0.569  0.674  0.992  0.710   0.527  0.518  0.350  0.272  0.226  
                      
Obs 420  420  270  420  270   420  420  270  420  270  
Groups 30  30  30  30  30   30  30  30  30  30  
Periods 14  14  9  14  9   14  14  9  14  9  
Instruments 29  29  29  29  29   29  29  29  29  29  
AR(1) 0.018  0.030  0.002  0.019  0.003   0.112  0.058  0.010  0.019  0.032  
AR(2) 0.784  0.698  0.741  0.709  0.519   0.823  0.897  0.782  0.934  0.823  
Hansen 0.298  0.514  0.518  0.402  0.411   0.222  0.330  0.352  0.195  0.399  
DIH-1 0.439  0.236  0.294  0.369  0.411   0.073  0.096  0.163  0.078  0.159  
DIH-2 0.203  0.844  0.848  0.408  0.380   0.831  0.922  0.856  0.656  0.967  
                      
   (b1)  (b2)  (b3)  (b4)     (b5)  (b6)  (b7)  (b8)  
Political ideology hypothesis            
                      
Lag.DV   0.847 *** 0.561 *** 0.592 *** 0.594 ***    0.720 ** 0.652 *** 0.744 *** 0.705 *** 
   0.282  0.146  0.179  0.197     0.289  0.176  0.274  0.133  
POE%   -0.080  -0.581 **        -0.153  -0.467 ***     
   0.325  0.265         0.237  0.167      
POEEmployee%       -0.634  -1.017 #        -2.188  -0.070  
       1.039  0.701         2.452  0.405  
SeaDummy   0.442  -0.044  0.092  -0.007     -0.226  -0.204  -0.013  -0.180  
   0.346  0.263  0.204  0.337     0.438  0.248  0.285  0.208  
Literacy%   0.043  -0.610  -0.581 * 0.049     -0.136  -0.370 # -0.706  -0.381  
   0.745  0.449  0.327  0.459     0.769  0.228  0.921  0.494  
Industrialisation%   -0.381  -0.151  -0.155  -0.519     1.059  0.407  0.410  0.286  
   1.099  0.522  0.673  0.630     1.201  0.330  0.568  0.254  
IncomePercapitaX   -0.827 # 0.352  0.530  1.206     0.250  0.351  1.123  0.387  
   0.540  0.475  0.849  0.905     0.563  0.381  1.339  0.765  
                      
Obs   420  270  420  270     420  270  420  270  
Groups   30  30  30  30     30  30  30  30  
Periods   14  9  14  9     14  9  14  9  
Instruments   29  29  29  29     29  29  29  29  
AR(1)   0.046  0.012  0.015  0.020     0.110  0.047  0.052  0.046  
AR(2)   0.549  0.794  0.629  0.950     0.953  0.912  0.622  0.995  
Hansen   0.434  0.328  0.227  0.197     0.405  0.197  0.191  0.314  
DIH-1   0.233  0.170  0.086  0.282     0.135  0.056  0.180  0.132  
DIH-2   0.698  0.764  0.715  0.188     0.917  0.973  0.305  0.884  
                      
   (c1)  (c2)  (c3)  (c4)     (c5)  (c6)  (c7)  (c8)  
Decentralisation hypothesis            
                      
Lag.DV   0.590 *** 0.681 *** 0.662 *** 0.727 ***    0.541 *** 0.742 *** 0.615 * 0.857 *** 
   0.169  0.163  0.237  0.132     0.188  0.150  0.343  0.158  
SelfFunding%   0.425 *** 0.065         0.059  -0.001      
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   0.146  0.127         0.148  0.100      
FiscalAutonomy%       -0.155  -0.190         -0.022  -0.409 * 
       0.619  0.602         0.631  0.230  
SeaDummy   0.178  0.282  0.018  0.130     0.054  -0.201  -0.337  -0.029  
   0.331  0.332  0.975  0.347     0.153  0.271  0.483  0.209  
Literacy%   -0.269  -0.052  -0.441  -0.366     -1.011 ** -0.387 * -0.234  -0.029  
   0.512  0.377  0.562  0.694     0.472  0.212  0.724  0.287  
Industrialisation%   -0.750  -0.691  0.108  -0.472     -0.061  0.370  1.286 # 0.328  
   0.827  0.749  1.999  0.760     0.559  0.412  0.791  0.369  
IncomePercapitaX   -0.066  -0.268  0.366  0.225     -0.160  0.504  0.412  0.674  
   0.529  0.556  0.948  0.820     0.346  0.437  0.690  0.546  
                      
Obs   420  270  420  270     420  270  420  270  
Groups   30  30  30  30     30  30  30  30  
Periods   14  9  14  9     14  9  14  9  
Instruments   29  29  29  29     9  29  29  29  
AR(1)   0.015  0.014  0.032  0.003     0.055  0.033  0.118  0.019  
AR(2)   0.641  0.890  0.954  0.770     0.432  0.987  0.754  0.893  
Hansen   0.547  0.543  0.338  0.368     0.271  0.317  0.216  0.149  
DIH-1   0.520  0.658  0.416  0.140     0.060  0.130  0.079  0.062  
DIH-2   0.453  0.286  0.271  0.967     0.975  0.900  0.718  0.733  
                      
Note: All regressions are dynamic panel-data estimations by two-step system-GMM with Windmeijer’s 
finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix. Intercepts and year dummies are included but 
values are not reported. Standard errors are in italics. ***, **, * and # denote the significance level at 1%, 5%, 
10% and 15%, respectively. The p-values are listed in the first and second order serial correlation tests, Hansen 
test and two Difference-in-Hansen tests.  
 
Results for the hypotheses reflecting macroeconomic environment 
 
In terms of the market competition hypothesis, significant supporting evidence is 
found in (d1) and (d3) models at the levels, respectively, of 15 and 10 per cent (see 
Table 5.7). The negative coefficients of two variables – the non-state share of 
industrial output and the degree of openness to the outside world – suggest that 
provinces with more competitive product markets were more likely to engage in SOE 
privatisation. However, due to the low significance level, the impact of competition is 
rather weak. This impact even disappears altogether in the results in respect to the 
second privatisation variable. That is to say, for local governments, whether or not to 
reduce the number of SOE employees is not a decision dictated by the rising pressure 
of market competition. Market force is not sufficient to justify the sacking of state 
workers. In literature, this finding to a certain degree echoes some cross-country 
studies (Li and Xu, 2002, Plane, 1997, Bortolotti et al., 2003) and some studies about 
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China (Guo and Yao, 2005, Li, 2003, Li and Rozelle, 2000, Li et al., 2004).  
The impact of financial pressure on privatisation is found in (e2), (e3), (e4) and 
(e6) models, although the fins are not wholly consistent with respect to the two 
variables. Using the asset-liability rate as the variable of financial pressure, the results 
in both (e2) and (e6) models generate negative and significant coefficients. This 
suggests that provinces with a heavy SOE liability burden would more readily reduce 
the size of their state sector. This finding is in line with the traditional causal argument 
of fiscal stringency, which states that a government will privatise in order to reduce 
the growing financial costs caused by a sluggishly monolithic state sector.  
Furthermore, using the deficit-budget rate as the second variable, both 
coefficients in (e3) and (e4) models remain significant but positive, indicating the 
opposite direction of driving force. That is, counter intuitively, pressure from the 
existence of a deficit would actually reduce the likelihood of privatisation taking place. 
This finding corresponds to the cash cow (patronage) argument that local bureaucrats 
will be reluctant to abandon SOEs as they attempt to maintain current cash flows as a 
way to tackle deficits or seek economic rents. Observation of the deficit situation in 
Chinese localities, this ‘cash cow phenomenon’ is more prevalent among inland 
provinces. As discussed earlier, the deficit problem for inland governments is more 
severe than that facing their coastal counterparts and, even worse, the scale of the 
problem is increasing. This divergence reveals the reality that the issue of SOE 
liability and that of government deficit are two quite distinct problems, which have 
been addressed differently in the process of privatisation. The reasoning is as follows: 
When the origin of the financial problem lay with the enterprise, local governments 
would try to reduce the liability burden by simply privatising more SOEs. By contrast, 
when the origin lay with the government, they would preserve SOEs as a way of 
increasing their cash flows and write off deficits. Interestingly, however, this deficit 
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impact affected not the employee side, only the enterprise side. In other words, the 
level of state employment was not affected by the deficit problem. It is apparent that 
local governments did not view sacking SOE employees as a means of reducing 
deficits. Awareness of the positive impact of job security on social stability was 
clearly a priority policy consideration. The first finding here, based on the liability 
impact on enterprises, is in line with most results obtained by firm level data in the 
literature (Brandt et al., 2005, Li and Rozelle, 2000, Liu et al., 2006, Huyghebaert and 
Quan, 2009, Kung and Lin, 2007). At the same time, the second finding here, based 
on the deficit impact on government, echoes different findings that are available in the 
literature (Li and Xu, 2002, Guo and Yao, 2005), but contradicts the most (Ramamurti, 
1992, Plane, 1997, Clarke and Cull, 2002, Bortolotti et al., 2003).  
In terms of the impact of institutional infrastructure toward privatisation reform, 
no results of any significance emerge from the data. There is no evidence to support 
the supposition that the shrinkage of China’s state sector was led by 
market-supporting institutional change. Nobody would surely deny that the 
institutional environment was significantly reshaped in the past two decades, but its 
impact on local state sectors is shown to be rather limited here. A possible reason is 
that changes affecting the state sector were more determined by policy decisions in a 
top-down manner rather than by market forces in a bottom-up approach. Institutional 
change did not directly induce privatisation among Chinese provinces. However, it 
should also be noted that this finding does not wholly reject the possibility that 
institutional change might facilitate the development of the private sector. The 
contribution may be meaningful but it is just not testable in this dataset because no 
reliable data can reflect the actual boom of private economy in the 1990s.  
In addition, this result of absence suggests another meaningful implication. The 
assumption of an induced privatisation approach in China is less well supported by 
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data; instead, the assumption of an enforced approach is more consistent with the data. 
This finding provides another piece of evidence that supports the supposition that the 
market-driven force is likely to be a less decisive cause than the policy-oriented force 
in the privatisation decision of local governments.  
 
240 
 
Table 5.7 
Empirical results for the hypothesis group of macroeconomic environment.  
 DV: SOEUnitX  DV: SOEEmployeeX 
 (d1)  (d2)  (d3)  (d4)   (d5)  (d6)  (d7)  (d8)  
Market competition hypothesis          
                  
Lag.DV 0.667 *** 0.678 *** 0.560 * 0.594 ***  0.658 *** 0.794 *** 0.797 *** 0.599 *** 
 0.169  0.175  0.330  0.199   0.214  0.189  0.242  0.122  
NonSOEOutput% -0.708 # 0.020       -0.225  -0.044      
 0.490  0.687       0.260  0.180      
Openness%     -0.321 * 0.221       -0.093  -0.072  
     0.188  0.167       0.118  0.076  
SeaDummy 0.385  0.059  0.913  -0.045   0.092  0.236  0.169  0.082  
 0.661  0.579  0.787  0.374   0.291  0.355  0.205  0.078  
Literacy% -0.648 # -0.511  -1.655  -0.339   0.392  -0.041  -0.257  -0.161  
 0.401  0.649  1.426  0.557   0.543  0.244  0.670  0.250  
Industrialisation% 0.130  -0.478  -0.607  -0.500   -0.327  -0.097  -0.422  -0.562 * 
 1.271  0.965  1.527  0.665   0.428  0.345  0.535  0.306  
IncomePercapitaX 0.046  0.114  -0.296  -0.468   -0.131  0.011  -0.066  0.277  
 1.013  0.540  0.531  0.497   0.258  0.442  0.204  0.259  
                  
Obs 420  270  420  270   420  270  420  270  
Groups 30  30  30  30   30  30  30  30  
Periods 14  9  14  9   14  9  14  9  
Instruments 29  29  29  29   29  29  29  29  
AR(1) 0.061  0.010  0.068  0.007   0.039  0.079  0.016  0.011  
AR(2) 0.658  0.823  0.433  0.370   0.990  0.762  0.609  0.766  
Hansen 0.363  0.293  0.563  0.262   0.371  0.198  0.123  0.260  
DIH-1 0.368  0.153  0.235  0.158   0.105  0.212  0.018  0.102  
DIH-2 0.350  0.733  0.924  0.617   0.959  0.286  0.987  0.879  
                  
 (e1)  (e2)  (e3)  (e4)   (e5)  (e6)  (e7)  (e8)  
Financial pressure hypothesis          
                  
Lag.DV 0.706 *** 0.583 *** 0.891 *** 0.531 ***  0.685 *** 0.750 *** 0.596 *** 0.778 *** 
 0.176  0.130  0.202  0.167   0.250  0.158  0.214  0.124  
AssetLiability% 0.220  -0.685 **      0.217  -0.435 #     
 0.332  0.322       0.522  0.294      
DeficitBudget%     0.951 ** 0.721 *      -0.182  0.281  
     0.387  0.422       0.649  0.342  
SeaDummy -0.067  -0.256 # 0.184 # 0.245 **  -0.351  -0.130  -0.071  -0.008  
 0.533  0.165  0.119  0.134   0.259  0.195  0.288  0.108  
Literacy% -0.606 # -0.294  1.134  -0.107   0.107  -0.025  -0.707 # -0.142  
 0.420  0.612  0.807  0.417   0.810  0.353  0.488  0.292  
Industrialisation% 0.146  -0.012  0.240  -0.147   0.958  0.042  0.122  0.218  
 1.276  0.305  0.663  0.460   0.713  0.409  0.260  0.202  
IncomePercapitaX 0.319  0.382  0.880 ** 0.762 #  0.405  0.046  -0.182  0.324  
 0.903  0.363  0.416  0.469   0.409  0.212  0.534  0.328  
                  
Obs 420  270  420  270   420  270  420  270  
Groups 30  30  30  30   30  30  30  30  
Periods 14  9  14  9   14  9  14  9  
Instruments 29  29  29  29   29  29  29  29  
AR(1) 0.022  0.003  0.007  0.019   0.089  0.010  0.012  0.008  
AR(2) 0.579  0.477  0.632  0.544   0.891  0.756  0.535  0.923  
Hansen 0.243  0.435  0.854  0.507   0.241  0.238  0.094  0.257  
DIH-1 0.368  0.279  0.973  0.805   0.075  0.091  0.021  0.077  
DIH-2 0.193  0.695  0.418  0.139   0.823  0.878  0.817  0.990  
                  
 (f1)  (f2)  (f3)  (f4)   (f5)  (f6)  (f7)  (f8)  
Institutional infrastructure hypothesis           
                  
Lag.DV 0.628 *** 0.686 *** 0.680 *** 0.717 ***  0.755 *** 0.761 *** 0.702 ** 0.834 *** 
 0.176  0.126  0.172  0.129   0.214  0.144  0.279  0.104  
PhysicalInfrastructureX 0.481  0.085       0.211  0.461      
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 0.379  0.880       0.382  0.570      
LegalInfrastructureX     -1.486  0.275       0.414  0.458  
     1.102  0.915       0.664  0.810  
SeaDummy 0.170  0.054  -0.089  0.148   -0.274  0.069  -0.335  -0.052  
 0.251  0.367  0.304  0.402   0.341  0.158  0.338  0.164  
Literacy% -0.661 # -0.449  -0.214  -0.654   -0.112  -0.018  0.342  -0.382 * 
 0.448  0.633  0.624  0.556   0.568  0.235  0.878  0.216  
Industrialisation% -0.464  -0.518  -0.104  -0.403   0.858  -1.232 * 1.254  0.116  
 0.609  0.912  0.567  0.680   0.880  0.686  1.531  0.355  
IncomePercapitaX -0.633 * -0.065  1.502  -0.143   0.086  -0.387  -0.008  -0.089  
 0.371  1.222  1.389  1.058   0.483  0.432  1.044  0.607  
                  
Obs 420  270  420  270   420  270  420  270  
Groups 30  30  30  30   30  30  30  30  
Periods 14  9  14  9   14  9  14  9  
Instruments 29  29  29  29   29  29  29  29  
AR(1) 0.021  0.002  0.010  0.005   0.070  0.009  0.091  0.026  
AR(2) 0.929  0.837  0.626  0.825   0.851  0.976  0.939  0.942  
Hansen 0.671  0.355  0.562  0.400   0.195  0.306  0.360  0.244  
DIH-1 0.521  0.156  0.373  0.246   0.050  0.146  0.131  0.067  
DIH-2 0.649  0.891  0.669  0.701   0.868  0.802  0.844  0.999  
                  
Note: All regressions are dynamic panel-data estimations by two-step system-GMM with Windmeijer’s 
finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix. Intercepts and year dummies are included 
but values are not reported. Standard errors are in the italic. ***, **, * and # denote the significance 
level at 1%, 5%, 10% and 15%, respectively. The p-values are listed in the first and second order serial 
correlation tests, Hansen test and two Difference-in-Hansen tests.  
 
Results for the hypotheses relating to microeconomic conditions 
 
In terms of the economic efficiency hypothesis, relevant evidence appears in (g3), 
(g4), (g6) and (g8) models in Table 5.8. Intriguingly, simultaneously contradictory 
findings emerge from the data. The highly significant and positive coefficient in (g3) 
strongly supports the traditional orthodox argument that privatisation will start where 
the most inefficiency exists.119 Evidently, provinces with more efficient state sectors 
were less likely to embrace privatisation. In other words, as assumed in the original 
hypothesis, the Chinese government did use ownership reform as a tool to improve 
overall SOE efficiency by releasing less efficient enterprises to the privatisation 
market. However, the significant and negative coefficients obtained in (g6) and (g8) 
models contradict this argument. Instead, they indicate that provinces with more 
                                                 
119
 The reason for the contradictory result in (g4) model is not known, but, because of the much lower 
level of significance, it should not be regarded as concrete evidence on the basis of which the result in 
(g3) should be rejected.  
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efficient state sectors – especially coastal provinces – showed a greater tendency to 
dismiss SOE employees during 1997-2005 (see Table 5.4). This finding seems to 
endorse the ice-pop argument, assuming a causality between SOE efficiency and 
privatisation that the former discourages the latter, but actually it does not carry such 
an endorsement. In the ice-pop argument, efficient SOEs are privatised first because 
they are ‘valuable assets’, which the state wants to protect from mismanagement and 
corruption. In addition, the state may also favour ownership reform in the expectation 
of securing a higher tax return after privatisation has taken place. Yet this is not the 
case here. For the state, efficient workers indeed represent a valuable asset, but it only 
happens when they are working within the state sector. Once they have been laid off 
from a SOE or re-recruited by a private enterprise, they no longer generate any benefit 
for the state. The state, in most cases, will also not guarantee their re-recruitment after 
privatisation. Therefore, the evidence found here cannot suitably be used to support 
the ice-pop argument. This raises an interesting question: namely, why did those 
provinces with a better efficiency record abandon more state workers? A possible 
market explanation may be that such workers were more easily and rapidly 
accommodated by a booming private sector. Efficient workers are in high demand in 
the privatisation market. Thus, their absorption in the expanding private sector 
promises to minimise the potential for post-privatisation political protest by laid-off 
workers. Here we once more have confirmation that state enterprises and employees 
were not treated the same during privatisation. Policies as they affected enterprises 
were to a greater extent shaped by economic consideration; as they affected 
employees, they were influenced more by political factors. This finding corresponds 
to those that have emerged from parallel studies in other transitional economies 
(Ramamurti, 1992, Clarke and Cull, 2002) and in China (Wang et al., 2001, Lin and 
Su, 2008, Brandt et al., 2005, Guo and Yao, 2005, Liu et al., 2006, Kung and Lin, 
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2007).  
The firm size hypothesis is strongly supported in (h1), (h2), (h4) and (h8) models. 
Both size variables generate significant and negative coefficients. The coefficient 
estimates indicate that provinces with SOEs whose size was larger than the average 
had privatised more since 1994, implying that privatisation had mainly embraced 
small SOEs (i.e., those whose size was less than the mean of data). This result accords 
well with the original hypothesis. Small-size advantage was significant, given the 
considerable transaction costs that attached to large SOEs. The finding also highlights 
the success of the policy of “grasping the large while letting go of the small”, to which 
local governments were firmly committed. It further reflects a kind of policy-driven 
nature, which points to a top-down approach as a distinct feature to the privatisation in 
China. Finally, it is worth noting that, as discussed earlier, most provinces’ post-2004 
rapid expansion of firm assets (the second size variable) may be attributable to 
recapitalisation needs. This flood of assets may have affected the regressions and led 
to insignificant results in (h3) and (h7) models. Be that as it may, this does not affect 
the results in (h4) and (h8) models, where the time length is limited to the shorter 
period extending from 1997 to 2005. This finding is in line with those obtained in the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Argentine (Aussenegg and Jelic, 2007, Clarke 
and Cull, 2002), and also complements others arising out of China’s experience (Li, 
2003, Huyghebaert and Quan, 2009).  
In terms of the human capital hypothesis, the results are forthcoming from (i2), 
(i6) and (i8) models. The estimated coefficients are all significant and negative, 
suggesting that provinces with a better human capital endowment are likely to 
experience a greater contraction of the local state sector. This endorses the original 
assumption that enhanced human capital will cause privatisation through reduced 
monitoring costs and lower production risks. This stimulatory role of human capital 
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was particularly clear during 1997-2005 since all levels of significance strengthened. 
This underlines the importance of this factor, since these years were the peak period 
of privatisation. This finding offers the first evidence that has yet been forthcoming 
for Li and his colleagues’ human capital argument (Li and Rozelle, 2000, Li, 2003, 
Brandt et al., 2005). Notwithstanding their use of different proxies for human capital, 
their idea is well confirmed in our provincial dataset. In short, this factor emerges as 
one of the most distinctive drivers of privatisation in China.  
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Table 5.8 
Empirical results for the hypothesis group of microeconomic conditions.  
 DV: SOEUnitX  DV: SOEEmployeeX 
 (g1)  (g2)  (g3)  (g4)   (g5)  (g6)  (g7)  (g8)  
Economic efficiency hypothesis          
                  
Lag.DV 0.797 *** 0.697 *** 0.643 *** 0.639 ***  0.577 ** 0.674 *** 0.709 *** 0.718 *** 
 0.133  0.124  0.136  0.120   0.228  0.111  0.215  0.136  
AssetContribution% 2.004  -1.266       -0.447  -0.846 #     
 2.426  1.020       0.425  0.553      
AssetOutput%     0.635 *** -0.259 #      -0.049  -0.178 * 
     0.220  0.179       0.213  0.102  
SeaDummy -0.273  0.080  0.238  0.013   0.012  -0.201 # 0.089  -0.202  
 0.624  0.321  0.280  0.284   0.122  0.127  0.162  0.182  
Literacy% 0.563  -0.829  -0.548  -0.559   -1.462 ** -0.441 *** -0.531  -0.374 * 
 0.943  0.720  0.436  0.746   0.687  0.163  0.550  0.227  
Industrialisation% -0.054  0.142  -1.138  -0.152   0.706 * 0.551 * -0.301  0.437  
 0.942  0.859  0.844  0.651   0.370  0.291  0.516  0.385  
IncomePercapitaX 0.612  0.047  -0.322  0.290   0.147  0.301  -0.167  0.370  
 1.120  0.531  0.512  0.435   0.204  0.274  0.223  0.294  
                  
Obs 420  270  420  270   420  270  420  270  
Groups 30  30  30  30   30  30  30  30  
Periods 14  9  14  9   14  9  14  9  
Instruments 29  29  29  29   29  29  29  29  
AR(1) 0.044  0.012  0.014  0.004   0.005  0.058  0.018  0.018  
AR(2) 0.722  0.775  0.776  0.724   0.715  0.792  0.994  0.894  
Hansen 0.790  0.350  0.672  0.382   0.266  0.315  0.189  0.267  
DIH-1 0.641  0.167  0.401  0.156   0.086  0.139  0.083  0.103  
DIH-2 0.717  0.839  0.819  0.946   0.828  0.860  0.608  0.894  
                  
 (h1)  (h2)  (h3)  (h4)   (h5)  (h6)  (h7)  (h8)  
Firm size hypothesis          
                  
Lag.DV 0.553 *** 0.483 *** 0.608 ** 0.675 ***  0.632 *** 0.827 *** 0.451 ** 0.667 *** 
 0.178  0.164  0.290  0.163   0.198  0.126  0.221  0.162  
AveEmployeeX -0.385 ** -0.441 *      0.106  -0.064      
 0.169  0.246       0.100  0.187      
AveAssetX     -0.297  -0.821 **      -0.056  -0.438 ** 
     0.361  0.404       0.264  0.214  
SeaDummy 0.137 * 0.188  -0.242  -0.143   0.046  0.125  -0.115  -0.215  
 0.081  0.245  0.586  0.116   0.293  0.136  0.137  0.280  
Literacy% -0.513  0.083  -0.546  -0.119   -1.147 * -0.387 * -0.620  -0.229  
 0.553  0.434  0.423  0.322   0.688  0.205  0.868  0.235  
Industrialisation% 0.236  -0.655  0.700  -0.046   0.182  -0.003  0.498  0.311  
 0.597  0.474  1.529  0.461   1.094  0.267  0.560  0.502  
IncomePercapitaX -0.278 * -0.065  0.638  0.668 **  0.040  -0.307  0.158  0.525  
 0.143  0.364  1.040  0.293   0.539  0.327  0.222  0.501  
                  
Obs 420  270  420  270   420  270  420  270  
Groups 30  30  30  30   30  30  30  30  
Periods 14  9  14  9   14  9  14  9  
Instruments 29  29  29  29   29  29  29  29  
AR(1) 0.016  0.020  0.095  0.024   0.037  0.027  0.057  0.032  
AR(2) 0.407  0.975  0.494  0.868   0.376  0.967  0.888  0.942  
Hansen 0.128  0.335  0.194  0.421   0.468  0.305  0.226  0.128  
DIH-1 0.039  0.155  0.321  0.251   0.162  0.200  0.123  0.108  
DIH-2 0.710  0.843  0.165  0.739   0.942  0.593  0.541  0.351  
                  
 (i1)  (i2)  (i3)  (i4)   (i5)  (i6)  (i7)  (i8)  
Human capital hypothesis          
                  
Lag.DV 0.771 *** 0.529 *** 0.592 *** 0.783 ***  0.582 * 0.557 *** 0.605 ** 0.717 *** 
 0.144  0.163  0.206  0.192   0.299  0.188  0.275  0.176  
ScientificPersonnel% -0.700  -3.319 #      -0.886  -2.938 #     
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 0.620  2.242       0.809  1.849      
LabourProductivityX     0.665  -1.160       0.116  -0.567 ** 
     0.522  0.816       0.229  0.286  
SeaDummy 0.151  -0.063  0.401  0.040   0.169  -0.121  -0.031  -0.187  
 0.168  0.188  0.348  0.500   0.307  0.312  0.158  0.231  
Literacy% -0.634  -0.599 # -0.678 # -0.608 #  -1.226 # -0.582 * -0.835  -0.458 * 
 0.592  0.367  0.471  0.403   0.753  0.324  1.032  0.253  
Industrialisation% 0.742  0.071  -0.979  -0.341   0.054  0.279  0.316  0.275  
 0.982  0.475  0.929  0.803   0.566  0.746  0.262  0.401  
IncomePercapitaX -0.351  0.472  -0.514  0.624   -0.217  0.392  0.030  0.539  
 0.246  0.377  0.585  1.071   0.381  0.392  0.097  0.529  
                  
Obs 420  270  420  270   420  270  420  270  
Groups 30  30  30  30   30  30  30  30  
Periods 14  9  14  9   14  9  14  9  
Instruments 29  29  29  29   29  29  29  29  
AR(1) 0.017  0.040  0.017  0.008   0.023  0.050  0.036  0.040  
AR(2) 0.717  0.866  0.594  0.887   0.453  0.868  0.883  0.619  
Hansen 0.516  0.387  0.513  0.338   0.658  0.285  0.183  0.286  
DIH-1 0.387  0.217  0.362  0.129   0.582  0.091  0.128  0.136  
DIH-2 0.568  0.758  0.601  0.955   0.554  0.984  0.406  0.791  
                  
Note: All regressions are dynamic panel-data estimations by two-step system-GMM with Windmeijer’s 
finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix. Intercepts and year dummies are included 
but values are not reported. Standard errors are in the italic. ***, **, * and # denote the significance 
level at 1%, 5%, 10% and 15%, respectively. The p-values are listed in the first and second order serial 
correlation tests, Hansen test and two Difference-in-Hansen tests.  
 
The data lend empirical support to most of the hypotheses. The sole exception is 
the institutional infrastructure hypothesis, for which no supporting evidence is 
forthcoming. For the hypotheses relating to soft budget constraint, political ideology, 
market competition, firm size, and human capital, the consistent results are in line 
with original causal assumptions. However, the results are inconsistent in regard to the 
hypotheses embracing decentralisation, financial pressure and economic efficiency. 
Some of the findings are new and meaningful. There is an indication that local 
governments may have been reluctant to privatise thanks to their ability to raise the 
money they needed. Deficit pressures may have encouraged local bureaucrats to treat 
SOEs like cash cows rather than letting them be privatised. In order to minimise 
potential political resistance, the more efficient state workers may have been targeted 
first for dismissal on the grounds that they could be more readily accommodated by 
the private labour market. This also highlights the importance of job security and 
social stability considerations in helping shape privatisation decision.  
247 
 
Results for all hypotheses by Principal Component Analysis 
 
It is worth noting that the merit of the system-GMM regression methodology lies 
in the unique design of its instrument matrix. This estimator addresses the critical 
econometric problem of endogeneity, but engages with the danger of committing the 
over-identification bias. Therefore, one of the most important requirements is that the 
validity of the instruments should be confirmed, by Hansen test, before any result can 
be considered to be econometrically meaningful. However, to follow this requirement 
will introduce another limitation. Too many variables cannot be regressed together at 
the same time; otherwise the validity of the instruments cannot be confirmed. This 
methodological constraint limits the attempt to compare the nine hypothesis factors all 
together in a regression model. To compromise on this limitation with the attempt to 
make a broader comparison, I have adopted the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
to generate new independent variables for each hypothesis, as well as to combine two 
dependent variables into a new variable. The process and summary statistics are listed 
in Appendix 5B. By doing so, the comparison can be made under a reduced number of 
variables.  
The regression strategy is as follows:  
(1) Factors of each hypothesis group (i.e. political economy, macroeconomic 
environment or microeconomic condition) will be regressed together in order to find 
out the most significant factor (in models (j2)-(j7)).  
(2) These most significant factors found in each hypothesis group will be 
regressed together (in models (j8) and (j9)) in order to confirm their influence under 
simultaneous impacts from other strong factors.  
(3)  Factors found significant in individual tests (in Table 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8) will 
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also be regressed together (in model (j10) and (j11)) in order to confirm their 
influence under other strong impacts.  
Going straight to the results, after comparing the three hypotheses of political 
economy in (j2) and (j3) models in Table 5.9, the most significant impact seems to be 
associated with the soft budget constraint variable. The positive sign endorses the 
original hypothesis. To shorten the time period does not change the result, while the 
robustness is also confirmed. The assumed impact of decentralisation is also 
significant, but only with respect to the shorter period of 1997-2005. The impact of 
political ideology, one of the most marked in the individual tests, is entirely absorbed 
by other simultaneous impacts.  
Next, in the comparison of macroeconomic hypotheses, the only significant 
impact in (j4) and (j5) models is that associated with the financial pressure variable. 
This finding is strongly robust and the magnitude of the estimated coefficient does not 
change to any significant extent if the time period is shortened. Impacts from market 
competition and the institutional infrastructure are absent. However, the positive sign 
associated with the financial pressure variable contradicts the original hypothesis, 
indicating that this factor was a constraining factor that served to consolidate, rather 
than diminish, the state sector in Chinese provinces. This is perhaps the most 
distinctive finding.  
As for the microeconomic hypotheses, only the impact of human capital can be 
identified in the comparison in (j7) models. This confirms again the stimulatory role it 
played in encouraging privatisation. Impacts from other two variables are entirely 
absorbed.  
In effect, three hypotheses – soft budget constraint, financial pressure and human 
capital – are endorsed especially strongly in each comparison of the above three 
groups. The author has compared these in (j8) and (j9) models. The results are highly 
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consistent and robust. The signs of the estimated coefficients remain the same. 
Shortening the time period increases the level of significance in two variables (the soft 
budget variable and the human capital variable). These two models throw into sharp 
relief of the multi-level driven nature of Chinese privatisation.  
Finally, I also have compared the three hypotheses outstanding in individual 
tests – political ideology, financial pressure and firm size. The results once more 
confirm the constraining effect of financial pressure and firm size, as hypothesised 
causality. Yet no significant impact of political ideology is found. The reason why this 
factor is significant in individual test but the result differs here may lie in the 
combination of two ideology variables (i.e., private enterprises versus employees). 
Since the second variable is much less influential than the first variable in stimulating 
privatisation, their combination as a new variable in PCA may therefore have been be 
less influential.
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Table 5.9 
Comparison of all hypotheses by principal component analysis.  
 (j1)  (j2)  (j3)  (j4)  (j5)  (j6)  (j7)   (j8)  (j9)  (j10)  (j11)  
Dependent variable: privatisation                    
                        
Lag.Privatisation 0.565 *** 0.641 *** 0.697 *** 0.863 * 0.782 *** 0.903 *** 0.580 ***  0.430 * 0.560 *** 0.751 *** 0.417 ** 
 0.198  0.231  0.197  0.453  0.134  0.259  0.185   0.220  0.138  0.162  0.184  
SoftBudget   0.755 ** 0.358 #          0.572 # 0.374 *     
   0.431  0.220           0.376  0.205      
PoliticalIdeology   -1.404  -0.347               0.007  0.389  
   0.661  0.553               0.390  0.303  
Decentralisation   0.165  -0.211 *                  
   0.304  0.112                   
MarketCompetition       -0.458  0.079               
       0.592  0.630               
FinancialPressure       0.662 *** 0.443 ***      0.805 ** 0.622 ** 0.186  0.414 *** 
       0.235  0.150       0.318  0.261  0.285  0.160  
InstitutionalInfrastructure       0.432  0.162               
       0.330  0.491               
EconomicEfficiency           0.786  -0.007           
           0.660  0.224           
FirmSize           0.526  0.482       -0.281 # -0.760 *** 
           0.457  0.369       0.180  0.231  
HumanCapital           -0.138  -1.846 ***  -0.479 # -1.358 **     
           2.231  0.470   0.324  0.665      
SeaDummy -3.333  1.126  -0.552  2.137  0.441  -1.783  -0.612   -0.341  -1.398  -0.082  2.010 # 
 2.457  3.072  1.881  3.429  3.215  1.496  1.314   0.904  2.797  0.998  1.347  
Literacy% -0.973  -4.909 # -2.869  2.325  1.893  -2.117  0.513   -2.844  0.200  0.782  0.763  
 2.917  3.271  2.600  3.739  4.073  4.739  2.622   2.594  2.283  3.036  1.533  
Industrialisation% 7.470  1.475  2.383  -0.431  -1.968  -1.658  -6.756 **  5.658 ** 3.896  1.273  -3.064  
 6.051  6.628  4.156  2.520  2.336  4.431  3.161   2.818  4.529  3.845  2.658  
IncomePercapitaX 4.850 # 4.924  2.909  -4.250  -2.257  3.885  5.533 **  1.386  2.071  -0.056  -5.995 # 
 2.980  3.577  4.363  4.990  5.287  2.937  2.527   1.708  3.955  2.720  3.651  
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Obs 420  420  270  420  270  420  270   420  270  420  270  
Groups 30  30  30  30  30  30  30   30  30  30  30  
Periods 14  14  9  14  9  14  9   14  9  14  9  
Instruments 29  29  29  29  29  29  29   29  29  29  29  
AR(1) 0.056  0.084  0.008  0.076  0.006  0.070  0.037   0.028  0.060  0.011  0.072  
AR(2) 0.581  0.532  0.984  0.464  0.414  0.604  0.653   0.674  0.838  0.513  0.652  
Hansen 0.296  0.883  0.362  0.708  0.277  0.503  0.588   0.707  0.788  0.165  0.667  
DIH-1 0.150  0.442  0.234  0.625  0.603  0.194  0.354   0.867  0.921  0.030  0.658  
DIH-2 0.662  0.988  0.601  0.583  0.100  0.807  0.809   0.421  0.336  0.832  0.480  
                        
Note: All regressions are dynamic panel-data estimations by two-step system-GMM with Windmeijer’s finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix. Intercepts 
and year dummies are included but values are not reported. Standard errors are in the italic. ***, **, * and # denote the significance level at 1%, 5%, 10% and 15%, 
respectively. The p-values are listed in the first and second order serial correlation tests, Hansen test and two Difference-in-Hansen tests.  
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Conclusion 
 
On the basis of all the empirical evidences that has been cited here, the story of 
Chinese privatisation may be summarised as follows: The most distinctive finding is 
the multi-level driven nature of the dynamics of privatisation. Four factors are shown 
to have had particular significance. Of these, the continuing contraction of soft 
budgets has been the single most important driving force. Next in importance was the 
central government’s policy of “grasping the large while letting go of the small”, to 
which local governments firmly committed themselves. Meanwhile, the screening 
strategy for privatisation according to specific microeconomic conditions, especially 
in terms of human capital capacity, was clearly followed. At the same time, the 
evident cash cow (patronage) effect captures the basic nature of the relationship 
between governments and enterprises in China. Increasing financial pressure has 
constrained, rather than facilitated, the privatisation of the local state sector – 
something that stands in stark contrast privatisation experiences of other transitional 
economies.  
This story generates some important implications. First, privatisation in China is 
closer to having been a policy-dominated, not a market-driven, process. 
Macroeconomic factors have made little contribution to the shrinkage of local state 
sectors. ‘Enforced change’, dominated by central and local governments, is a better 
phrase than ‘induced change’ to describe the nature of the process. Second, the whole 
process may be seen as having embodied, in combination, both top-down and 
bottom-up elements. It has been is top-down in the sense that privatisation has, to a 
significant extent, been driven by the central government policy and local government 
commitment to this policy. But it has also been bottom-up in the sense that the 
endowment of microeconomic conditions in SOEs has been crucial to screening 
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decisions. Thirdly, the whole process may be viewed as a compromise in the way in 
which it has embodied of central policies and local strategies. Local bureaucrats have 
shown quite a high degree of commitment to the central government’s privatisation 
strategy, but at times some of them (especially those in inland provinces) have placed 
their own interests ahead of those of Beijing. Last but not least, it is apparent that 
social stability has been a core concern for Chinese reformist leaders in their 
implementation of privatisation. Accordingly, the job security of state employees has 
sometimes taken precedence, as a policy goal, over that of the ownership reform of 
state enterprises.  
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Chapter Six 
 
Industrial Analysis 
 
6.1. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
This chapter explores a larger panel dataset, collected by the author, covering 37 
industries in six provinces. It consists of 220 cross-sections with 15 time-periods and 
3,300 observations in sum.120 For purpose of comparison, all data are categorised 
under two regions (coastal and inland areas), and three sectors (light manufacturing, 
heavy manufacturing, and mining and energy). The coastal region is represented by 
three provinces – Guangdong, Jiangsu and Shandong; the inland area is also 
represented by three provinces – Jiangxi, Shanxi and Heilongjiang. Light 
manufacturing includes eighteen industries – food processing, food manufacturing, 
beverages, tobacco, textiles, textile garments, leather, timber, furniture, paper, printing, 
cultural articles, chemical, medicines, chemical fibres, communications equipment, 
measuring instruments, and artwork. The heavy manufacturing sector includes eleven 
industries – petroleum processing, rubber, plastics, non-metallic mineral manufactures, 
ferrous metals smelting, non-ferrous metals smelting, metal manufacturing, general 
machinery, special machinery, transport equipment, and electrical equipment. The 
mining and energy (ME) sector includes nine industries – coal, petroleum extraction, 
ferrous metal ores mining, non-ferrous metal ores mining, other ores mining, 
electricity, gas and water.  
It is noteworthy that this panel is balanced in estimation only if the liability 
                                                 
120
 The number of cross-sections is 220, not 222, because there is no petroleum extraction industry in 
Jiangxi and Shandong.  
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variable is not included in the regressions because some relevant data of this variable 
are absent or not accessible.121 However, this does not damage the analysis for the 
following three reasons. First, many regressions in this research do not include the 
liability variable. Secondly, all regressions, including those including this variable, are 
also estimated for a shorter time period, thereby balancing the panel. Thirdly, there are 
only five years (three years for Guangdong and two years for Jiangsu) for which 
industry data are missing in the panel. These omissions have the effect of reducing the 
number of observations from 3,300 to 3,115, which still represents 94.4 per cent of 
total data. Summary statistics and the correlation table are listed in Table 6.1. The 
result indicates that there are no problems of multi-collinearity.  
 
Table 6.1 
Summary statistics and correlation table.  
Variable Code Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
       
IndSOEUnitX idv1 3300  0.5188  0.3080  0.0000  1.0000  
IndSOEEmployeeX idv2 3300  0.5536  0.3053  0.0000  1.0000  
IndNonSOEOutput% ih4 3300  0.6025  0.3237  0.0000  1.0000  
IndAssetLiability% ih5 3189 0.6570 0.2184 -0.0040 4.2500 
IndConstructInvestX ih6 3300  0.1640  0.2880  0.0000  1.0000  
IndAssetOutput% ih7 3300  0.6655  0.5346  0.0000  8.3834  
IndAveSOEEmployX ih8 3300  0.5891  0.2651  0.0000  1.0000  
IndLabourProductivityX ih9 3300  0.3271  0.2970  -0.9139  1.0000  
SoftBudget ph1ab 3300  0.0841  1.1389  -2.0898  2.4882  
PoliticalIdeology ph2ab 3300  0.1025  1.1483  -1.2766  3.7865  
Decentralisation ph3ab 3300  0.5854  0.8498  -2.1657  2.0289  
Literacy% icona 3300  0.8990  0.0497  0.7554  0.9616  
Industrialisation% iconb 3300  0.4353  0.0746  0.2233  0.5649  
IncomePercapitaX iconc 3300  0.2269  0.1640  0.0028  0.7129  
 
Code idv1 idv2 ih4 ih5 ih6 ih7 ih8 
        
idv1 1.0000       
idv2 0.7024 1.0000      
ih4 -0.4053 -0.4578 1.0000     
ih5 0.0139 -0.0279 0.1517 1.0000    
ih6 -0.4420 -0.3673 0.1721 -0.1812 1.0000   
ih7 -0.1667 -0.1441 0.0588 -0.0466 0.2926 1.0000  
ih8 -0.1469 0.2620 -0.0370 -0.0180 0.1607 0.0058 1.0000 
                                                 
121
 Data of the total amount of SOE liabilities are not published in Guangdong statistics of 1994 and 
Jiangsu statistics of 1994 and 1995. The same data of Guangdong in 2007 and 2008 are not accessible 
to the author so far.  
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ih9 -0.3544 -0.2850 0.0279 -0.1179 0.6222 0.3105 0.1881 
ph1ab 0.6632 0.4749 -0.1772 0.1331 -0.6422 -0.2058 -0.1828 
ph2ab -0.6079 -0.5212 0.3204 -0.1877 0.6803 0.3139 0.1920 
ph3ab -0.3256 -0.2387 0.3566 -0.1658 0.4974 0.2544 0.2095 
icona -0.3891 -0.3876 0.0015 -0.0073 0.3973 0.0343 -0.0396 
iconb -0.3675 -0.2873 0.1889 -0.0413 0.4027 0.0952 0.0934 
iconc -0.5198 -0.4393 0.3285 -0.1999 0.7903 0.3236 0.2166 
        
 ih9 ph1ab ph2ab ph3ab icona iconb iconc 
        
ih9 1.0000       
ph1ab -0.5594 1.0000      
ph2ab 0.5212 -0.6470 1.0000     
ph3ab 0.3555 -0.4406 0.6785 1.0000    
icona 0.3966 -0.6066 0.3295 0.0994 1.0000   
iconb 0.3466 -0.4581 0.4927 0.5592 0.3610 1.0000  
iconc 0.5757 -0.7603 0.8606 0.7212 0.4367 0.5157 1.0000 
        
Note: Observation number is 3,189. The values of three control variables – SoftBudget, 
PoliticalIdeology and Decentralisation – are new variables created by Principal Component Analysis in 
Section 5.3.  
 
6.2. Preliminary analysis 
 
By way of preliminary analysis, I first examine the panel by sectors, regions and 
time-periods as shown in Table 6.2. Regardless of whether the basis of measurement 
is enterprise or employee, it would appear that privatisation disproportionately 
affected the light manufacturing sector. By contrast, the mining and energy sector 
displayed the smallest degree of privatisation. Competition was particularly intense in 
light manufacturing, whilst the product market in mining and energy remained highly 
monopolistic. Light and heavy manufacturing suffered to a greater extent from 
financial liabilities. The development of infrastructure appeared to have been sluggish 
across all sectors. The mining and energy sector was less efficient in production than 
the other two manufacturing. The rate of contraction of state involvement was similar 
in all sectors and yield similar level of the endowment of human capital.  
In regional terms, privatisation was more apparent in inland provinces. In coastal 
areas product markets were more competitive, production process were more efficient, 
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SOE liabilities were lighter, implementation of the central government’s policy of 
“letting go of the small” was more expeditious, and – unexpectedly – the level of 
labour productivity was slightly lower. In other words, inland regions faced a heavier 
SOE liability burden, had less competitive product markets, were less efficient in 
production, but, enjoyed higher labour productivity. However, the development of 
infrastructure was sluggish in both regions.  
Over time, privatisation has had a slightly greater impact on enterprises than on 
employees. Some trends are clearly positive and increasing – for example, a strong 
improvement in production efficiency, steady growth in average firm size, modest 
increase in market competition, and slow but significant enhancement of 
infrastructure. Meanwhile, the liability burden showed a slight reduction over time.  
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Table 6.2 
Summary statistics by sector, region and time.  
 Light manufacture  Heavy manufacture  Mining & Energy 
Variable Obs Mean S. D.  Obs Mean S. D.  Obs Mean S. D. 
            
IndSOEUnitX 1620 0.4691 0.3113  990 0.5120 0.2903  690 0.6452 0.2892 
IndSOEEmployeeX 1620 0.5091 0.3105  990 0.5707 0.2968  690 0.6337 0.2861 
IndNonSOEOutput% 1620 0.6877 0.2977  990 0.6277 0.2918  690 0.3663 0.3122 
IndAssetLiability% 1566 0.6886 0.2461  957 0.6756 0.1370  666 0.5560 0.2149 
IndConstructInvestX 1620 0.1686 0.2921  990 0.1543 0.2822  690 0.1670 0.2866 
IndAssetOutput% 1620 0.7000 0.5512  990 0.7210 0.5323  690 0.5047 0.4632 
IndAveSOEEmployeeX 1620 0.5726 0.2660  990 0.6082 0.2572  690 0.6005 0.2721 
IndLabourProductivityX 1620 0.3316 0.2993  990 0.3149 0.2921  690 0.3341 0.2985 
 
 Coastal area  Inland area 
 Obs Mean S.D.  Obs Mean S. D. 
        
IndSOEUnitX 1665  0.5282  0.3000   1635  0.5092  0.3158  
IndSOEEmployeeX 1665  0.5749  0.3069   1635  0.5320  0.3023  
IndNonSOEOutput% 1665  0.7108  0.2966   1635  0.4922  0.3128  
IndAssetLiability% 1554 0.6270 0.1986  1635  0.6855  0.2322  
IndConstructInvestX 1665  0.1708  0.2928   1635  0.1570  0.2830  
IndAssetOutput% 1665  0.7511  0.5194   1635  0.5782  0.5360  
IndAveSOEEmployeeX 1665  0.6452  0.2409   1635  0.5320  0.2763  
IndLabourProductivityX 1665  0.3138  0.2905   1635  0.3406  0.3029  
 
 1994-2000  2001-2008 
 Obs Mean S. D.  Obs Mean S. D. 
        
IndSOEUnitX 1540 0.7374 0.2252  1760 0.3275 0.2347 
IndSOEEmployeeX 1540 0.7328 0.2374  1760 0.3968 0.2699 
IndNonSOEOutput% 1540 0.5499 0.3094  1760 0.6485 0.3290 
IndAssetLiability% 1429 0.6904 0.1736  1760 0.6299 0.2457 
IndConstructInvestX 1540 0.0027 0.0037  1760 0.3051 0.3359 
IndAssetOutput% 1540 0.5501 0.2696  1760 0.7664 0.6713 
IndAveSOEEmployeeX 1540 0.5533 0.2509  1760 0.6204 0.2732 
IndLabourProductivityX 1540 0.1548 0.1495  1760 0.4779 0.3116 
        
 
 
If we change the basis of comparison by examining the estimates of means for 
each industry, several prominent features emerge. For SOEs, the average incidence of 
privatisation across all the industries was 52 per cent (see the first column of Table 
6.3). The incidence was higher for some industries, such as leather, artwork, furniture, 
culture articles, timber, and food manufacturing (light industrial manufacturing); 
plastics and metal manufacture (heavy industrial manufacturing); and petroleum 
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extraction (mining). These industries share the same feature that the technical entry 
barrier for new comers are relatively low than other industries in the same sector. 
By contrast, three energy industries (gas, electricity and water) continued to be 
characterised by a high degree of state-monopoly. Privatisation was relatively limited 
in three mining industries (ferrous metal ores mining, non-ferrous metal ores mining 
and coal), as well as in two heavy industries (petroleum processing and non-ferrous 
metals smelting). A common feature shared by these industries is their relative high 
entry barrier in terms of techniques and/or fixed capital. Tobacco was the only light 
manufacturing industry that retained a high degree of monopoly due to a government 
policy.  
Across the entire SOE sector, on average, privatisation affected 55 per cent of 
enterprise employees (see the second column). It means that Chinese government has 
taken a slower pace in dismissing state workers. The issue of job security – to reduce 
risks of chaos caused by laid-off state workers – has been an obvious concern. 
Differences in the impact of privatisation on employees among industries are similar 
to the pattern that emerged with respect to enterprise units, with a few exceptions. For 
example, printing and chemical fibres are two light industries in which dismissal of 
state workers was preferred to shutting down or selling state firms outright. The same 
applies to two mining industries – non-ferrous and ferrous metal ores mining – in both 
of which the rate of dismissal of state workers was about 10 per cent higher than the 
rate of privatisation of enterprises themselves.  
A comparison of the two mean values of different privatisation proxies for each 
industry, as shown in the third column of Table 6.3, shows whether enterprises and 
employees within a given industry affected differently by privatisation reform. (For 
example, the third column shows the difference of “transportation equipment” in 
terms of different privatisation proxies is 22 per cent, which is obtained by the figure 
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of this item’s second column (73 per cent) minus that of the first column (51 per cent).) 
The findings suggest that all the industries can be placed into one of three categories. 
In the first category are those industries in which the impact of privatisation was felt 
most forcefully by the enterprise, implying that employees in these industries were 
afforded special protection. This category is found to have included transport 
equipment manufacturing, petroleum extraction, ferrous metals smelting, furniture, 
medicines, textile garments, metal manufacturing and coal.122 Most industries offal 
into the second group, which is characterised by enterprises and enterprise employees 
having been impacted by privatisation to a similar extent (i.e., where there are 
differences in the impact, they are of no significance).123 By final contrast, for 
industries in the final (third) category, privatisation reform primarily manifested itself 
through the sacking of redundant state workers. This policy approach emerges 
especially clearly in the two mining industries (non-ferrous and ferrous metal ores 
mining), as well as in all three energy industries (gas, electricity and water).124  
 
Table 6.3 
Mean comparison of the privatisation degree by industry. 
 Rank by IndSOEUnitX  Rank by IndSOEEmployeeX  Rank by mean gap 
   Mean S.D.    Mean S.D.  
Rank  (a)     (b)    (b)-(a) 
              
1 Leather L 37% 32%  Artwork L 41% 32%  Transport Equipment H 22% 
2 Petroleum Extraction M 38% 30%  Leather L 41% 35%  Petroleum Extraction M 22% 
3 Artwork L 38% 32%  Timber L 41% 32%  Ferrous Metals Smelting H 15% 
4 Furniture L 38% 32%  Foods Manufacture L 45% 30%  Furniture L 12% 
5 Culture Articles L 41% 30%  Plastics H 46% 34%  Medicines L 11% 
6 Timber L 41% 31%  Printing L 46% 27%  Textile Wearing L 10% 
7 Foods Manufacture L 42% 34%  Textile L 46% 32%  Metal Manufacture H 10% 
8 Plastics H 44% 30%  Chemical Fibres L 47% 31%  Coal M 10% 
9 Metal Manufacture H 45% 30%  Non-ferrous Metal Ores Mining M 47% 32%  Culture Articles L 9% 
10 Beverages L 46% 31%  Rubber H 47% 33%  Beverages L 7% 
11 Rubber H 46% 33%  Paper L 47% 34%  Tobacco L 6% 
12 Textile Wearing L 46% 30%  Food Processing L 48% 35%  Chemical L 6% 
13 Paper L 46% 32%  Other Ores Mining M 50% 29%  Measuring Instruments L 5% 
14 Textile L 47% 32%  Culture Articles L 50% 34%  Petroleum Processing H 5% 
15 Food Processing L 48% 33%  Non-metallic Mineral Manufacture H 50% 31%  Non-ferrous Metals Smelting H 4% 
16 Chemical Fibres L 48% 30%  Furniture L 50% 33%  Leather L 4% 
17 Non-metallic Mineral Manufacture H 49% 31%  Special Machinery H 52% 31%  Foods Manufacture L 3% 
18 Ferrous Metals Smelting H 49% 29%  Electrical Equipment H 53% 29%  Special Machinery H 3% 
                                                 
122
 The values for these industries are all beyond the mean plus the value of one standard deviation.  
123
 Values for these industries are all in the range of the mean plus or minus the value of one standard 
deviation.  
124
 Values for these industries are all less than the mean minus the value of one standard deviation.  
261 
19 Measuring Instruments L 49% 29%  Beverages L 53% 29%  Artwork L 2% 
20 Special Machinery H 49% 31%  Measuring Instruments L 54% 29%  Plastics H 2% 
21 Printing L 50% 30%  Communication Equipment L 55% 27%  Rubber H 1% 
22 Transport Equipment H 51% 25%  General Machinery H 55% 28%  Non-metallic Mineral Manufacture H 1% 
23 Other Ores Mining M 51% 29%  Metal Manufacture H 55% 29%  General Machinery H 1% 
24 Chemical L 52% 29%  Ferrous Metal Ores Mining M 56% 28%  Paper L 1% 
25 Electrical Equipment H 52% 28%  Textile Wearing L 56% 26%  Electrical Equipment H 1% 
26 General Machinery H 54% 28%  Chemical L 58% 27%  Communication Equipment L 0% 
27 Medicines L 54% 29%  Petroleum Extraction M 60% 34%  Food Processing L 0% 
28 Communication Equipment L 54% 27%  Ferrous Metals Smelting H 64% 25%  Textile L 0% 
29 Coal M 56% 29%  Medicines L 65% 26%  Timber L 0% 
30 Non-ferrous Metal Ores Mining M 57% 30%  Non-ferrous Metals Smelting H 66% 26%  Other Ores Mining M -2% 
31 Non-ferrous Metals Smelting H 62% 25%  Coal M 66% 31%  Chemical Fibres L -2% 
32 Petroleum Processing H 62% 23%  Petroleum Processing H 67% 26%  Printing L -3% 
33 Ferrous Metal Ores Mining M 65% 28%  Gas E 69% 24%  Water E -4% 
34 Tobacco L 66% 25%  Tobacco L 73% 18%  Electricity E -4% 
35 Gas E 73% 17%  Transport Equipment H 73% 17%  Gas E -5% 
36 Electricity E 80% 18%  Electricity E 76% 13%  Ferrous Metal Ores Mining M -9% 
37 Water E 86% 17%  Water E 83% 13%  Non-ferrous Metal Ores Mining M -10% 
              
 Average  52%     55%     4% 
 Std.Dev.  11%     10%     7% 
              
Note: L: Light manufacturing; H: Heavy manufacturing; M: Mining; E: Energy.  
 
A simple regression analysis is presented in Table 6.4. All the regressions are 
conducted in a single-variate linear model by pooled-OLS estimator. The basic 
correlation between the two privatisation variables and other independent variables 
are revealed by the sign of the estimated coefficient. This helps provide a preliminary 
check of the hypothesis. Note, however, that these results are generated in conditions 
in which no simultaneous impacts are absorbed by control variables. The results may 
therefore contain bias and, econometrically speaking, they are not sufficiently robust 
as a basis on which to draw meaningful conclusions.  
The next stage is to apply necessary modifications to the following six 
hypotheses, developed in Chapter Four, in order to ensure that they accommodate the 
industrial specifics of this dataset.  
 
Hypothesis 4. Intensified market competition within an industry will encourage 
more SOEs in that industry to undertake privatisation reform.  
 
Hypothesis 5. The degree of privatisation within an industry will increase when 
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the financial pressure of its SOEs is mitigated.  
 
Hypothesis 6. The incidence of privatisation will increase in an industry when 
more capital for infrastructural construction is invested there.  
 
Hypothesis 7. The greater the concentration of inefficient SOEs in an industry, 
the more likely it will be for privatisation to take place in that industry.  
 
Hypothesis 8. Since small-size SOEs should be privatised first, the average size 
of SOEs within an industry will increase along with the progress of privatisation.  
 
Hypothesis 9. Improvements in human capital among SOEs in an industry will 
encourage a greater scale of privatisation within that industry.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Five, we expect to find a negative correlation between 
each of most independent variables and any of the two dependent variables. The sole 
exception to this is in respect to the efficiency variable, IndAsstOutput%, because of 
the underlying assumption that less efficient SOEs will be the first to experience 
privatisation. The expectation is that industries whose SOEs are characterised by 
relatively low levels of efficiency will be more susceptible to privatisation and will 
therefore have smaller state sector involvement. With two variables changing in the 
same direction, this points to a positive correlation.  
The results show that ten out of twelve estimated coefficients in simple 
regressions exceed the significant level at 1 per cent. The signs of seven coefficients 
in the ten regressions are as would be expected from the hypotheses, while three fail 
to show the expected signs. In correspondence, consistent and expected results are 
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derived from four hypotheses – market competition, financial pressure, infrastructure 
investment and human capital.125 One consistent but unexpected result is derived 
from the economic efficiency hypothesis. The only inconsistent but significant result 
is in respect to the hypothesis of firm size.  
In short, this preliminary analysis confirms the feasibility of this panel dataset as 
a basis on which to pursue further analysis. It also confirms the suitability of the 
hypotheses which we have established.  
 
Table 6.4 
Simple regression analysis by pooled-OLS.  
 Coef. Std. Err. t P> t R-squared Obs Sign assumed As assumed 
Dependent variable: IndSOEUnitX      
         
IndNonSOEOutput% -0.3643 0.0153  -23.80 0.00 0.1466  3300 - V 
IndAssetLiability% 0.0194 0.0247 0.79 0.43 0.0002 3189 - V 
IndConstructInvestX -0.4814 0.0166  -28.95 0.00 0.2026  3300 - V 
IndAssetOutput% -0.0892 0.0099  -9.00 0.00 0.0240  3300 + X 
IndAveSOEEmployeeX -0.1543 0.0201  -7.70 0.00 0.0177  3300 - V 
IndLabourProductivityX -0.3865 0.0168  -23.06 0.00 0.1389  3300 - V 
         
Dependent variable: IndSOEEmployeeX      
         
IndNonSOEOutput% -0.4111 0.0148  -27.81 0.00 0.1899  3300 - V 
IndAssetLiability% -0.0386 0.0244 -1.58 0.12 0.0008 3189 - X 
IndConstructInvestX -0.4004 0.0171  -23.42 0.00 0.1426  3300 - V 
IndAssetOutput% -0.0757 0.0099  -7.68 0.00 0.0176  3300 + X 
IndAveSOEEmployeeX 0.3102 0.0193  16.06 0.00 0.0725  3300 - X 
IndLabourProductivityX -0.3141 0.0170  -18.42 0.00 0.0933  3300 - V 
         
Note: ‘V’ denotes the consistency with hypothesis, while ‘X’ denotes the inconsistency. Assumed signs 
accord to hypothesis settings. All regressions include intercepts but values are not reported here.  
 
6.3. Empirical results 
 
This section sets out the empirical results. Estimates are, first, presented in three 
categories by sector – light manufacturing, heavy manufacturing and mining and 
energy – in an attempt to explore the differences between and among industries in the 
                                                 
125
 Although the liability variable generates a result not as assumed in the correlation with the first 
privatisation variable, this result is not significant enough to reject the original hypothesis.  
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course of privatisation reform in China. Second, estimates are presented by region – 
i.e., coastal areas (including Guangdong, Jiangsu and Shandong), and inland areas 
(including Heilongjiang, Shanxi and Jiangxi) – in an effort to identify regional 
variations. Thirdly, in order to discern the existence of different trajectories over time, 
the data are divided into two temporal categories: the first includes data from 1994 to 
2001; the second, from 2002 to 2008.  
Additionally, there are two time periods in the regressions. The longest time 
period is fifteen years (1994-2008).126 However, alongside the results based on this 
longer time frame, I also show the results derived from the regression over a shorter 
time period (1997-2005). This serves two purposes. On the one hand, it helps focus 
the analysis on the discrete specific time period during which privatisation was mainly 
taking place. On the other hand, it helps to check the robustness of regressions by 
deleting some extreme values in data. Extreme values usually exist in the data towards 
the beginning or the end of the time period.127  
 
Results for light manufacturing 
 
The empirical results for the privatisation of light manufacturing are listed in 
Table 6.5. For the first privatisation variable – the number of SOEs – three factors are 
shown to be significant – market competition, infrastructural investment and 
economic efficiency.  
The strongest factor is market competition. It shows negative and significant 
                                                 
126
 However, the real length in regression will be reduced to fourteen in a dynamic model.  
127
 One point deserves to be made here. When the length of time period is cut from fifteen to nine years, 
the result can be served as a support/rejection only if it is also significant. If the result of longer time 
period is significant while that of the shorter is not, the insignificant result of the shorter one is not 
sufficient to reject the significant result of the longer one. In this case, it indicates that the impact of this 
specific factor may be evenly distributed over time or be particularly stressed in the first or last few 
years.  
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coefficients in both (k1) and (k2) models. The negative correlation is consistent with 
the original causal assumption that the pace of privatisation will accelerate as 
competition in the product market intensifies.  
Next, in terms of the strength of its impact, was economic efficiency. The sign of 
the coefficient in (k1) model suggests a negative correlation between economic 
efficiency and the incidence of privatisation. As such, it contradicts the original 
assumption of causality. Conventional theory would lead one to expect that 
privatisation would be used as a means of encouraging improvements in productivity 
in the state sector, with privatisation reform being first directed towards the most 
inefficient SOEs. However, the evidence presented here rejects this supposition. 
Rather, it indicates that in light manufacturing privatisation began with the more 
efficient industries, not those that were less efficient. This finding can be regarded as 
evidence that supports the “ice-pop” argument that a benevolent bureaucrat will be 
eager to privatise a valuable/efficient state asset/enterprise in order to prevent its 
meltdown as a result of mismanagement or corrupt activities (Guo and Yao, 2005). 
However, if considering the special industrial characteristics of light manufacturing, 
another market explanation may turn out to be more persuasive than this ‘bureaucratic 
argument’. As discussed in Chapter Two, China opened the markets of many light 
industries only a few years after the reforms started. Newcomers were quickly 
attracted by the absence of entry barriers and low capital requirements, which made 
the product market highly competitive. Almost certainly this also reduced the 
incentive for private investors to participate in SOEs’ privatisation programmes. After 
all, why should they feel compelled to purchase an inefficient SOE when they could 
just as easily – and perhaps more profitably – establish a new private firm? In other 
words, inefficient SOEs in light manufacturing proved to be insufficiently competitive 
for purposes of privatisation. In effect, the local bureaucrats had no choice but to 
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release the efficient SOEs to the market. This line of causal reasoning may lie at the 
heart of the negative correlation found here.  
The third strongest impact is infrastructural investment, which shows negative 
and significant coefficients in (k2) models. The causality implied by the negative 
correlation is what was expected, suggesting that privatisation in light manufacturing 
has been investment-driven. The flow of money into the construction of infrastructure 
has encouraged privatisation and the expansion of the private economy. In short, the 
spillover effect of enhancement of infrastructure is confirmed.  
In the case of the second privatisation variable – the number of SOE employees – 
three factors are significant – viz., market competition, infrastructural investment and 
human capital. Among these, the strongest factors were market competition and 
infrastructural investment. Evidence of the strength of the former is found in both (m1) 
and (m2) models. Negative and significant coefficients attach to both factors, 
confirming the causality derived from theoretical assumptions.  
The third significant factor is that of human capital, which displays positive 
coefficients in (m2) model. This finding runs against the theoretical expectations. The 
positive correlation that emerges counter-factually suggests that light industries with a 
stronger human capital endowment will tend to retain more state employees and be 
less willing to dismiss them. This is a unique finding, albeit one that accord with 
reasoning set out in the previous paragraph. No matter whether it derives from ice-pop 
or market demand considerations, the highly competitive nature of this sector seems 
to have compelled local bureaucrats to allow superior and efficient SOEs to succumb 
to forces of privatisation. Meanwhile, the evidence presented here reveals that those 
same bureaucrats sought to better labour force in order to maintain the 
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competitiveness of the rest of the SOEs.128  
Two conclusions can be generalised.  
The first and the most significant is the revelation of a baseline pattern of 
privatisation in light manufacturing. This baseline pattern comprised twin forces, 
made up of pressures associated with the emergence of an increasingly competitive 
environment and the spillover effect brought about by changes in infrastructure. These 
forces may be reduced to a single factor, which may be or ‘thought of as’ the impetus 
generated by market expansion. This market impetus played the crucial part in driving 
the privatisation of light manufacturing industries.  
Second, a happy asymmetry emerges from two further findings. The evidence 
shows that, on the one hand, local governments were compelled to permit 
privatisation of SOEs in more efficient light industries, but, on the other hand, they 
also sought to maintain more SOEs in light industries with a higher average level of 
human capital. These two findings seem to contradict each other, but, in fact, they do 
not. Indeed, what is interesting is that they both highlight the adoption of local 
strategies by local governments that sought first, to meet market demand by giving up 
efficient SOEs whilst, second, seeking to serve their own interests by retaining SOEs 
with a stronger human capital base for themselves. In short, it seems clear that local 
bureaucrats were sufficiently skilful to take full advantage of this information 
asymmetry.129  
 
                                                 
128
 Since the significance of financial pressure only reaches the level at 15 per cent in (m1) model 
without a confirmative result in (m2) model, it is not seen as a significant factor.  
129
 In making this statement, I assume that the efficiency of production of an SOE is more easily 
detected by private buyers than an SOE’s real endowment of human capital. Thus, the local bureaucrat 
secures an advantage from this asymmetry of information.  
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Table 6.5 
Empirical results from light manufacturing industries. 
 IndSOEUnitX  IndSOEEmployeeX 
 (k1)  (k2)   (m1)  (m2)  
          
Lag.IndSOEUnitX 0.464 *** 0.642 ***      
 0.119  0.123       
Lag.IndSOEEmployX      0.539 *** 0.533 *** 
      0.074  0.128  
IndNonSOEOutput% -0.348 ** -0.148 #  -0.397 ** -0.191 # 
 0.143  0.101   0.170  0.129  
IndAssetLiability% 0.053  0.090   -0.106 # 0.025  
 0.085  0.120   0.069  0.155  
IndConstructInvestX -1.046  -0.786 *  -2.259 ** -1.075 * 
 0.848  0.427   1.039  0.635  
IndAssetOutpout% -0.033 ** -0.016   -0.012  -0.076  
 0.015  0.049   0.014  0.069  
IndAveSOEEmployX -0.085  -0.038   0.111  0.150  
 0.091  0.061   0.102  0.128  
IndLabourProductivityX 0.080  0.075   -0.071  0.206 * 
 0.065  0.062   0.062  0.111  
SoftBudget -0.130  0.091 #  -0.056  -0.105 * 
 0.096  0.060   0.054  0.060  
PoliticalIdeology 0.193 ** -0.084   0.070  0.065  
 0.089  0.091   0.052  0.076  
Decentralisation -0.073 # -0.127 **  -0.118 ** -0.014  
 0.046  0.058   0.047  0.047  
CoastalDummy 0.146  0.346 *  0.301 ** -0.152  
 0.126  0.196   0.149  0.224  
Literacy% -1.122  2.264 #  0.079  0.567  
 0.971  1.440   0.570  0.709  
Industrialisation% -0.351  1.102   0.173  -0.208  
 0.497  0.832   0.548  0.468  
IncomePercapitaX -1.098 ** -0.164   -0.969  1.424  
 0.477  0.673   0.685  1.187  
          
Obs 1494  972   1494  972  
Groups 108  108   108  108  
Ave. periods 13.83  9.00   13.83  9.00  
Instruments 37  41   41  41  
AR(1) 0.002  0.000   0.000  0.000  
AR(2) 0.617  0.803   0.383  0.607  
Hansen 0.152  0.345   0.455  0.224  
DIH-1 -  0.253   0.127  0.054  
DIH-2 0.167  0.496   0.706  0.709  
          
Note: All regressions are dynamic panel-data estimations by two-step system-GMM with Windmeijer’s 
finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix. Intercepts and year dummies are included 
but values are not reported. Standard errors are in the italic. ***, **, * and # denote the significance 
level at 1%, 5%, 10% and 15%, respectively. The p-values are listed in the first and second order serial 
correlation tests, Hansen test and two Difference-in-Hansen tests.  
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Results for heavy manufacturing 
 
In terms of the SOEs in the eleven heavy manufacturing industries, the empirical 
results identify three factors that are consistent and significant: viz., market 
competition, financial pressure and firm size (see Table 6.6).  
First, estimated coefficients for market competition are significant in (n1) and 
(n2) models, where their negative sign accords with the underlying theoretical 
assumptions and indicates that privatisation in this sector was caused by intensified 
market competition.  
Second, the coefficients for financial pressure also have a positive sign in both 
models, meaning that financial pressure – denoted by the asset-liability ratio – is a 
constraining force that prevented heavy manufacturing SOEs from going further with 
privatisation. Importantly, this finding is the first ever piece of evidence so far in the 
literature about China that endorses the “cash cow” argument that local bureaucrats 
would prefer to tolerate a debt burden that was manageable and impede privatisation 
in order to keep more cash flows for their own self-interests (Li and Xu, 2002). This 
constraining effect may also have reflected forces at work in the banking sector. For 
fear of debt non-payment, especially in respect to large-scale loans that had been 
granted to heavy industries, a risk-averse bank manager may sometimes have felt 
impelled to veto a privatisation programme (Guo and Yao, 2005). In other words, 
whatever prompted by the interests of the local authorities or of bank managers, the 
liability burden of heavy manufacturing SOEs had caused the slowdown in the pace of 
privatisation. This finding also highlights another significant distinction between light 
and heavy manufacturing: namely, that among local authorities, light manufacturing 
SOEs were not regarded as being as valuable as their heavy manufacturing 
counterparts. It would appear that the liability burden among SOEs in light 
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manufacturing was not something that local governments were willing to tolerate (see 
(k1) and (k2) models).  
Third, the significant and negative coefficient for firm size in (n1) model is 
evidence of a driving force at work. This finding confirms the effectiveness of the 
“letting go of the small” policy in this sector. It also reveals that the privatisation in 
heavy manufacturing is more policy-dominated than that in light manufacturing, 
where the size effect is absent.  
In terms of SOE employees – the second privatisation variable – three factors are 
found to have generated significant results.  
The first is market competition. Supporting evidence appears in (o1) and (o2) 
models, with the expected negative sign. This finding once more confirms the 
stimulative impact of competition, which is a market driver for both enterprises and 
employees. Likewise, competition effect is the most significant factor in both heavy 
and light manufacturing.  
The second factor is that of economic efficiency, which demonstrates positive 
and significant coefficients in both (o1) and (o2) models. Importantly, this piece of 
evidence is unique in all the data; in that it endorses the causal assumption that 
privatisation should start in those areas where inefficiency is greatest. It differs from 
the findings for light manufacturing and for the mining and energy industries. 
Uniquely, in the case of heavy manufacturing industry, the findings suggest that in the 
face of demands for improvements in economic efficiency, privatisation is an 
important vehicle for the fulfilment of this goal. Further, in pursuit of the same goal, 
there is an acceptance that privatisation should seek to reduce the large number 
inefficient workers in state-owned heavy industries.  
The third is firm size. The positive correlation indicates the causality that fewer 
layoffs of state workers occurred in industries whose size was larger. This finding is 
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special and important. It is special because it does not apply to other sectors. It is 
important because it highlights the core element – “grasping the large” – of China’s 
privatisation policy. The way in which the “grasping” of heavy manufacturing SOEs 
took place was such as to minimise the number of layoffs. The reason for this was 
simple – it was pursued in an attempt to preserve job security and social stability. The 
background was that the ‘xiagang’ (laying-off) problem had become a serious 
policy-related concern, emerging out of the privatisation reform process since the late 
1990s. Too many layoffs in the state sector would, it was feared, backfire, generating 
social unrest and even ‘chaos’ (luan). In truth, there was an inherent tension between 
the two policy goals – namely, trying to reduce the number inefficient state workers in 
heavy industries, whilst simultaneously seeking to maintain social harmony by 
maximising job security. Concealed in the tension associated with potentially 
conflicting goals is the reality that the Chinese government actually did quite well in 
fulfilling both goals. The selection of privatisation targets in heavy manufacturing was 
highly strategic. In inefficient heavy industries, privatisation sought to reduce the 
numbers of state employees; in efficient industries, it sought to protect job security for 
purposes of social stability.  
Furthermore, it is worth noting that the findings obtained by two privatisation 
variables are different from one other. Enterprises were not protected as much as 
employees during the privatisation reform.  
Some general conclusions follow from the preceding analysis, as follows:  
First, the strongest inducement to privatisation in heavy manufacturing industry 
was market competition. Both state firms and workers were privatised in response to 
intensified competition in the product market.  
Second, patterns of privatisation affecting enterprises and employees reflect 
coherent behaviour, but have their own distinctive characteristics. For enterprise, 
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‘environmental’ conditions (for example, changes in financial pressure, etc.) are more 
influential. For employee, however, individual conditions, such as efficiency and size, 
are clearly more decisive factors.  
Third, there is abundant evidence to show that SOEs in this sector received 
special treatment. They were more likely to be treated as “cash cows” for local 
treasuries, or as debtors seized by local banks. In this regard, privatisation did not 
offer a solution (as had originally been intended) to relieve fiscal stringency, but raise 
the risks for local authorities or bank managers to lose current interests.  
Finally, SOE employees in heavy manufacturing also received special treatment 
in order to minimise threats to job security. Whether or not to embark on privatisation 
was a highly strategic decision because of the need to “kill two birds with one stone”. 
In other words, privatisation reform sought to maximise SOE efficiency, whilst 
minimising the number of laid-off workers. In these circumstances, the only feasible 
compromise was to let inefficient industries bear the brunt of the cuts, which is 
exactly what China has done.  
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Table 6.6 
Empirical results from the heavy manufacturing industries.  
 IndSOEUnitX  IndSOEEmployeeX 
 (n1)  (n2)   (o1)  (o2)  
          
Lag.IndSOEUnitX 0.491 *** 0.433 ***      
 0.156  0.161       
Lag.IndSOEEmployX      0.342 *** 0.419 *** 
      0.101  0.090  
IndNonSOEOutput% -0.270 ** -0.715 ***  -0.191 # -0.364 *** 
 0.130  0.236   0.124  0.077  
IndAssetLiability% 0.588 *** 0.433 *  0.048  0.108  
 0.212  0.257   0.285  0.193  
IndConstructInvestX 0.085  1.844   -0.210  -0.230  
 0.510  2.399   0.358  0.283  
IndAssetOutpout% -0.020  0.006   0.203 ** 0.097 * 
 0.027  0.135   0.099  0.051  
IndAveSOEEmployX -0.213 ** 0.076   0.459 *** 0.166 * 
 0.085  0.232   0.142  0.092  
IndLabourProductivityX 0.016  0.104   -0.188  -0.004  
 0.065  0.161   0.134  0.107  
SoftBudget -0.288 *** -0.074   -0.124 ** -0.149 *** 
 0.108  0.105   0.056  0.040  
PoliticalIdeology 0.011  0.086   -0.117  0.079 # 
 0.121  0.144   0.121  0.054  
Decentralisation 0.028  -0.174 **  0.035  0.024  
 0.065  0.076   0.040  0.028  
CoastalDummy -0.043  0.465   0.064  -0.067  
 0.095  0.327   0.110  0.095  
Literacy% -2.342 * 1.849   1.569 * -0.195  
 1.349  1.388   0.803  0.523  
Industrialisation% 0.071  0.084   0.455  0.217  
 0.767  0.765   0.555  0.346  
IncomePercapitaX 1.039 # -0.351   0.147  0.227  
 0.716  1.798   0.892  0.631  
          
Obs 913  594   913  594  
Groups 66  66   66  66  
Ave. periods 13.83  9.00   13.83  9.00  
Instruments 41  31   43  64  
AR(1) 0.017  0.002   0.000  0.004  
AR(2) 0.710  0.723   0.270  0.721  
Hansen 0.884  0.215   0.135  0.254  
DIH-1 0.662  0.011   0.092  0.211  
DIH-2 0.849  0.790   0.388  0.487  
          
Note: All regressions are dynamic panel-data estimations by two-step system-GMM with Windmeijer’s 
finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix. Intercepts and year dummies are included 
but values are not reported. Standard errors are in the italic. ***, **, * and # denote the significance 
level at 1%, 5%, 10% and 15%, respectively. The p-values are listed in the first and second order serial 
correlation tests, Hansen test and two Difference-in-Hansen tests.  
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Mining and energy 
 
In the mining and energy sector, three factors are found to have been significant 
and consistent (see Table 6.7): market competition, economic efficiency and firm size.  
As expected, the competition impact is negative and echoes the findings in other 
sectors (see (p1) and (p2) models). We interpret this as final and definitive 
confirmation that market competition has been the most significant cause of 
privatisation in all sectors. Despite the high degree of state monopolisation of mining 
and energy industries (in general, the state accounted for 70 per cent or more of the 
product market), SOEs in these industries were still vulnerable to competition from 
newly-established private firms. We may infer that competition hurts SOEs, no matter 
where in the economy they may be located.  
Next factor in importance is economic efficiency, evidence of its influence being 
found in (p1) and (p2) models. The negative correlation shown here suggests the 
causal relationship that privatisation in mining and energy actually began with more – 
not less – efficient SOEs. This runs in opposition to our original assumption, and it is 
the first piece of evidence that lends support to the “ice-pop” argument in the 
literature. This argument, it will be recalled, states that valuable state enterprises may 
be the first to undergo privatisation, if appropriate local authorities seeks to prevent 
meltdown of valuable assets as a result of mismanagement or corruption. The 
evidence found here lends strong support to this argument. We may recall that the 
same result emerged from the analysis of light manufacturing. In that case, the market 
forces were the basis of the suggested explanation, the argument being that less 
efficient SOEs in highly competitive light manufacturing industries found it difficult 
to secure private buyers. The same underlying factor is at the heart of the 
‘bureaucratic explanation’ in the mining and energy sector. Here, the highly 
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monopolistic nature of the market constituted a severe barrier for new entrants. For 
potential private investors, the chance of securing government permission to enter 
mining or energy industries was rather limited. Thus, SOEs in this sector were easy to 
sell, even where their production efficiency was low. In other words, in this sector 
there was no compulsion for local bureaucrats to release efficient SOEs to the 
privatisation market. There was every reason why local authorities might wish to 
retain these valuable assets for their own self interest, but the reality is that they did, 
in fact, sell them on a significant scale. This is why the finding here should be 
attributed more to the ‘bureaucratic’ explanation – and be regarded as the first piece of 
evidence that confirms the “ice-pop” effect in China. To be fair, ‘bureaucratic 
benevolence’ seemed a reality.  
Third, firm size is found to be a cause of privatisation. Not only does it highlight 
the susceptibility of small-scale firms to privatisation, but it also demonstrates that the 
central policy of “letting go the small” had special applicability to SOEs in this sector. 
Like the heavy manufacturing, the privatisation in mining and energy is also highly 
policy-oriented.  
In terms of the contraction of employees, it seems clear that the only significant 
factor is economic efficiency. The negative correlation in (q1) and (q2) models 
suggests that the layoffs of state workers in mining and energy were also concentrated 
in relatively more efficient SOEs. We interpret this as further strong in support of the 
“ice-pop” effect, although it is even more significant here because it is the only 
instance in which SOE employees were caught up in this effect. Evidently, social 
stability was not a factor that inhibited privatisation decisions in this sector, or more 
precisely in the energy industries.130 The ice-pop argument implies the causation that 
                                                 
130
 Due to the data limitations, it has not been possible to separate the mining and energy sub-sectors in 
the regression. Had we done so, the number of cross-sections would have been too small to fulfil the 
requirement of instrument use in GMM estimation. That is why it is impossible to differentiate between 
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state workers here were regarded as valuable assets because of the relatively higher 
skill that is required to work in these industries so that they were protected from being 
laid off in privatisation. This explanation is convincing because it fits well the then 
current boom conditions in all energy and some mining industries. Moreover, given 
the difficulty of training employees to the requisite level with in a short time in the 
private sector, highly skilled mining and energy workers were indeed a scarce 
commodity in the labour market. As a result, as privatisation proceeded, there was 
high demand for skilled workers from the state sector.  
By way of conclusion, we would make three points:  
First, this section confirms that market competition was the single most 
important driver of privatisation in China’s industrial state sector. Across all industries 
and activities, SOEs were exposed to the rising pressures of market competition.  
Second, the “ice-pop” effect was a major determinant of the privatisation pattern 
of this sector. Contrary to what the original hypothesis would suggest, in this sector, 
contraction of state-owned enterprises and employees began with the more efficient 
units. Privatisation was not, it seems, used as a means of improving efficiency, but as 
a vehicle for transferring valuable state assets out of public into private hands.  
Third, it is also apparent that the “letting go of the small” element in China’s 
privatisation policy was most apparent in this sector. Reforms clearly focused on 
SOEs of below-average size. In contrast to conditions in heavy manufacturing, where 
the “grasping the large” element of policy protected employee, job security seems to 
have been a less important issue for mining and energy SOEs. The reason for this is 
perhaps that workers in this sector could be accommodated more readily and easily by 
the private sector than those engaged in heavy manufacturing activities. It may also 
                                                                                                                                            
these two sectors. However, there is reason to believe that the labour force in the energy sector should 
have been more economically valuable (for higher requirement of skills) than that of the mining sector.  
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correspond to the then current boom of private energy market.  
 
Table 6.7 
Empirical results from mining, electricity, gas and water industries.  
 IndSOEUnitX  IndSOEEmployeeX 
 (p1)  (p2)   (q1)  (q2)  
          
Lag.IndSOEUnitX 0.764 *** 0.721 ***      
 0.135  0.125       
Lag.IndSOEEmployX      0.867 *** 0.518 *** 
      0.149  0.188  
IndNonSOEOutput% -0.145 * -0.214 *  -0.018  -0.294  
 0.088  0.129   0.081  0.266  
IndAssetLiability% -0.135  -0.007   0.115  0.498  
 0.277  0.109   0.192  0.418  
IndConstructInvestX -0.637  -0.469   0.439  -1.126  
 0.901  0.517   0.914  1.142  
IndAssetOutpout% -0.094 ** -0.277 *  -0.078 # -0.340 * 
 0.046  0.142   0.050  0.200  
IndAveSOEEmployX -0.230 ** -0.265 **  -0.025  0.043  
 0.116  0.135   0.083  0.308  
IndLabourProductivityX 0.086  0.213   0.001  -0.170  
 0.181  0.165   0.136  0.396  
SoftBudget -0.101  -0.050   0.019  0.031  
 0.115  0.070   0.119  0.270  
PoliticalIdeology -0.230 ** -0.132   0.018  -0.335 * 
 0.116  0.102   0.087  0.204  
Decentralisation 0.067  0.039   -0.015  -0.113  
 0.087  0.061   0.091  0.197  
CoastalDummy 0.223  0.077   -0.076  0.879 # 
 0.276  0.300   0.176  0.579  
Literacy% -0.704  -0.643   0.719  3.286  
 1.006  1.167   1.550  2.847  
Industrialisation% -1.505  0.029   0.255  2.080  
 1.600  0.760   1.316  1.817  
IncomePercapitaX 0.754  0.353   0.098  -2.755  
 0.721  1.768   0.478  2.653  
          
Obs 636  414   636  414  
Groups 46  46   46  46  
Ave. periods 13.83  9.00   13.83  9.00  
Instruments 46  43   46  37  
AR(1) 0.001  0.019   0.009  0.028  
AR(2) 0.661  0.923   0.888  0.889  
Hansen 0.584  0.458   0.534  0.287  
DIH-1 0.638  0.727   0.158  0.047  
DIH-2 0.424  0.174   0.928  0.769  
          
Note: All regressions are dynamic panel-data estimations by two-step system-GMM with Windmeijer’s 
finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix. Intercepts and year dummies are included 
but values are not reported. Standard errors are in the italic. ***, **, * and # denote the significance 
level at 1%, 5%, 10% and 15%, respectively. The p-values are listed in the first and second order serial 
correlation tests, Hansen test and two Difference-in-Hansen tests.  
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Results – regional perspective  
 
Does the pattern of privatisation in China reveal any distinctive regional 
differences? In order to answer this question, we have divided the panel into two 
datasets. The ‘coastal dataset’ includes data from three coastal provinces – Guangdong, 
Jiangsu and Shandong; the ‘inland dataset’ includes data from the three inland 
provinces – Jiangxi, Shanxi and Heilongjiang. Two new control variables, light and 
heavy dummies, are introduced to absorb industrial variations.131  
Estimates obtained by regressing the first privatisation variable, the number of 
SOEs, are reported in (r1)-(r4) models in Table 6.8. The two regions show similar 
results in terms of the shaping influences of three factors – market competition, 
financial pressure and firm size.  
The stimulative impacts of competition and firm size cause no surprise. Market 
competition is once again confirmed as the chief cause of privatisation in both coastal 
and inland provinces. The central policy of “letting go of the small” was also firmly 
adhered to by all local authorities, with a slight stress on coastal region. The “cash 
cow” effect, whereby fiscal difficulties take second place to other interest concerns, is 
also shown to have been widespread in both coastal and inland areas.  
However, the two regions differ in the respect of human capital. The fact shows 
that coastal authorities placed a much higher premium on SOEs’ human resource 
endowments. They were more selective in deciding whether or not to privatise, their 
decision being shaped by their desire to preserve those SOEs whose human capital 
was more advanced (for example, in terms of skill endowments). Such considerations 
were minimally important to local authorities in inland regions in making their 
                                                 
131
 The dummy of the mining and energy sector should not be set for econometrical reason. The 
estimated coefficients obtained for the light and heavy dummies are based on the comparison with the 
‘invisible dummy’ of the mining and energy sector.  
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privatisation decisions.  
Estimates obtained by regressing the second privatisation variable, the number of 
SOE employees, in (r5)-(r8) models are striking for the absence of similarities 
between regions.  
In coastal provinces, the workforce contraction was more competition-driven and 
highly dependent on the level and standard of human capital resources. In inland 
provinces, these factors were absent, the more important factors being infrastructural 
change and the size factor. There is some evidence that this pattern was 
investment-driven, although the nature of driving force is uncertain due to the 
inconsistent signs obtained in (r7) and (r8) models.132 But it could also be argued that 
the pattern reflects the “grasping the large” element of privatisation policy. It is 
suggested that job security was a major concern for inland governments, and this 
policy goal was a crucial determinant of privatisation in these regions. By contrast, it 
would seem that unemployment pressures facing coastal governments were much less 
pressing.  
In short then, in answer to the original question, we find that regional differences 
are distinctive. In terms of enterprises, it is true that their trajectories were similar in 
both regions. Nor do these appear to have been any regional difference in terms of the 
impact of competition, size and financial pressures. However, coastal authorities were 
also more selective than their inland counterparts in determining the effect of human 
capital resource endowments on decisions whether or not to privatise an SOE. The 
clear implication is that a kind of regional strategy had emerged.  
From the perspective of the workforce, patterns were more distinctive. 
Downsizing of coastal SOEs was driven by the pressure from intensified competition 
                                                 
132
 Readers are reminded that the author may not provide a convincing explanation over this 
inconsistency.  
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under the screening strategy based on the consideration of human capital endowments. 
In inland regions, labour force contraction was most strikingly shaped by policy of 
“grasping the large”. The implication here is that inland governments tried hard to 
minimise the scale of social instability caused by large-scale dismissal of state 
workers.  
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Table 6.8 
Empirical results by regions.  
 IndSOEUnitX  IndSOEEmployeeX 
 Coastal  Inland  Coastal  Inland 
 (r1)  (r2)   (r3)  (r4)   (r5)  (r6)   (r7)  (r8)  
                    
Lag.IndSOEUnitX 0.383 ** 0.496 ***  0.241 ** 0.981 ***           
 0.157  0.137   0.114  0.109            
Lag.IndSOEEmployX           0.441 *** 0.489 ***  0.571 *** 0.304 ** 
           0.151  0.150   0.083  0.155  
IndNonSOEOutput% -0.314 ** -0.833 ***  -0.406 *** -0.021   -0.383 *** -0.453 **  -0.012  -0.028  
 0.128  0.182   0.126  0.084   0.123  0.199   0.101  0.126  
IndAssetLiability% -0.012  0.292 #  0.108 # 0.149 *  -0.086  0.247   0.014  -0.203  
 0.192  0.185   0.069  0.091   0.148  0.278   0.055  0.184  
IndConstructInvestX 1.862 # -0.971   0.199  0.230   1.688 # 0.786   -1.282 *** 1.452 *** 
 1.210  0.786   0.523  0.468   1.082  0.967   0.501  0.598  
IndAssetOutpout% -0.043  -0.010   -0.031  0.028   -0.022  0.100   0.006  -0.092  
 0.090  0.047   0.041  0.063   0.088  0.081   0.026  0.155  
IndAveSOEEmployX -0.298 ** -0.290 ***  -0.147 * 0.158   -0.072  0.087   0.137 * 0.718 *** 
 0.139  0.090   0.076  0.112   0.147  0.133   0.074  0.321  
IndLabourProductivityX 0.613 ** 0.050   0.047  -0.001   0.717 *** 0.214 *  0.020  0.161  
 0.281  0.107   0.065  0.100   0.211  0.119   0.066  0.147  
SoftBudget 0.071  0.006   -0.053  0.072   0.122 * 0.055   -0.296 *** -0.178 * 
 0.064  0.042   0.068  0.073   0.066  0.063   0.062  0.092  
PoliticalIdeology 0.045  0.081   0.045  -0.108 #  0.063  0.011   -0.268 *** 0.070  
 0.097  0.077   0.118  0.073   0.103  0.118   0.064  0.154  
Decentralisation 0.047  -0.158 ***  -0.104 # -0.112 *  -0.022  -0.209 ***  -0.198 *** 0.022  
 0.111  0.039   0.069  0.059   0.111  0.063   0.057  0.079  
Literacy% -0.908  -1.005 **  2.506  -3.748 **  -1.745 *** -0.863   0.393  2.021  
 0.756  0.435   2.411  1.549   0.597  0.701   0.893  1.644  
Industrialisation% 0.504  -0.095   1.123  0.945 **  0.448  6.869 ***  0.722 ** 0.425  
 3.333  1.467   0.799  0.460   3.468  1.356   0.295  0.757  
IncomePercapitaX 0.963  0.715   -5.399 ** -6.713 #  1.006  1.210 *  -0.661  -0.963  
 1.267  1.008   2.243  4.183   1.328  0.689   0.964  7.044  
LightDummy -0.324 ** 0.252 *  -0.516 * 0.072   0.091  -0.005   -0.093  -0.538  
 0.156  0.134   0.302  0.148   0.173  0.183   0.084  0.790  
HeavyDummy -0.251  0.199   -0.414  -0.042   -0.063  -0.383   0.295 # -0.403  
 0.388  0.383   0.336  0.358   0.426  0.362   0.189  1.115  
                    
Obs 1517  999   1526  981   1517  999   1526  981  
Groups 111  111   109  109   111  111   109  109  
Ave. periods 13.67  9.00   14.00  9.00   13.67  9.00   14.00  9.00  
Instruments 43  49   43  37   43  43   51  43  
AR(1) 0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000  
AR(2) 0.236  0.867   0.626  0.941   0.908  0.807   0.973  0.184  
Hansen 0.154  0.151   0.555  0.800   0.396  0.459   0.559  0.422  
DIH-1 0.113  0.119   0.243  0.188   0.766  0.858   0.284  0.269  
DIH-2 0.364  0.441   0.888  0.963   0.156  0.110   0.804  0.677  
                    
Note: All regressions are dynamic panel-data estimations by two-step system-GMM with Windmeijer’s 
finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix. Intercepts and year dummies are included 
but values are not reported. Standard errors are in the italic. ***, **, * and # denote the significance 
level at 1%, 5%, 10% and 15%, respectively. The p-values are listed in the first and second order serial 
correlation tests, Hansen test and two Difference-in-Hansen tests.  
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Results – temporal perspective  
 
Next, differences between different time periods. Was the pattern of privatisation 
unchanged, or did it evolve over time? In order to investigate this, we have again 
divided the panel into two datasets. The dataset for the early period includes data for 
the years between 1994 and 2001 inclusive, while its later counterpart focuses more 
narrowly on the period from 2001 until 2008.133 Regressions run over a shorter time 
period, which reduces both the first and last time periods, are also provided in order to 
verify the results. Industrial dummies are introduced as control variables.  
In the privatisation of SOEs, first of all, two factors are found to have been 
constant over time in (s1)-(s4) models (see Table 6.9).  
As expected, market competition remains the most significant stimulative factor 
in this time-based analysis. The importance of this factor as a driving force of 
privatisation is common to all sectors, all regions and all time periods. Market 
competition full deserves to be regarded as the prime cause of this process in China.  
As expected, the policy of “letting go the small”, was faithfully adhered to 
throughout the era of privatisation. The policy-dominated character of privatisation is 
also clear. Thus, an important inference of these two findings is that privatisation in 
China is unique in reflecting the simultaneous competition-driven nature and the 
policy-dominated character of the process. This is a phenomenon that is absent in the 
privatisation reforms of other transitional economies.  
Second, however, two effects are found to have weakened over time.  
The first is the “cash cow” effect reflected in the factor of financial pressure. 
                                                 
133
 That time periods in (s1) and (s5) models sun only to seven, rather than eight reflects the use of the 
lagged term of dependent variable as one explanatory variable in dynamic GMM estimation. This 
necessarily causes a reduction of one period in the panel. However, there is no need to reduce one 
period in the calculation of sub-panels where the first time period is not included. This explains why 
the time periods sum to eight in (s3) and (s7) models.  
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This effect is very significant in the results of the early period (see (s1) and (s2) 
models), but in the later results it becomes more vague and there are even suggestions 
that its direction was reversed (i.e., the value of the coefficient changed from being 
positive to becoming negative). It would seem that local authorities became more 
responsive to the liability burden of SOEs in more recent years, and were more likely 
to use privatisation as a means of relieving this heavy financial burden, particularly by 
laying off more state workers. Taking other previous findings into the consideration, 
we would expect this phenomenon to have been particularly prevalent in heavy 
manufacturing SOEs (see (n1) and (n2) models in Table 6.5).  
The next force which weakened over time was the “ice-pop” effect reflected in 
the factor of economic efficiency. The ice-pop effect was more significant in the 
results of the early period (see (s1) model). The causal implication is that, generally 
speaking, Chinese privatisation started with relatively more efficient SOEs, 
suggesting that privatisation was not used as a tool to improve SOE efficiency but – 
rather the reverse – mainly to protect efficient SOEs in the early stages of 
privatisation, especially in mining and energy sector.  
Thirdly, it is in the results of latter period that the impact of the factor of human 
capital emerges most strongly (see (s3) model). It reveals that, in the early stages of 
privatisation, local governments’ selection of privatisation targets had no regard for 
human capital resource conditions. However, as time passed, this changed. Thus, in 
latter years SOEs with a stronger human capital endowment were more likely to 
remain state-owned, especially if they were coastal enterprises engaged in light 
manufacturing (see (m2), (r1), (r5) and (r6) models).  
Fourthly, it is intriguing to observe the nature of the impact of the ‘infrastructure 
factor’ changing over time (the estimated coefficients turns from positive into 
negative between two periods in (s1), (s2) and (s4) models). This suggests that in 
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earlier years the infrastructural investment was used to fuel SOE development across 
sectors and regions. However, in later years, such investment facilitated privatisation. 
That is to say, both the state and private sectors were beneficiaries of improvements in 
infrastructure. This was especially the case in light manufacturing SOEs in coastal 
areas (see (k2), (m1), (m2), (r7) and (r8) models).  
The impact on state employment of two factors obtained similar results (see (s6), 
(s7) and (s8) models). First, competition was constantly the major force driving 
downsizing in the state sector throughout the entire period. Since this has been 
thoroughly aired in the previous discussion, there is no need to elaborate the point 
further here. Second, the positive impact of infrastructural investment becomes vague 
in later years, though there is no opposite result found. Previous analysis is 
unaffected. 
Next, there are two factors whose impacts became increasingly apparent in the 
latter period.  
First is the “ice-pop” effect vis-à-vis state workers. This finding echoes the 
earlier finding obtained from the analysis of employees in mining and energy SOEs 
(see (q1) and (q2) models in Table 6.6). More efficient state workers were released to 
the private sector, especially in recent years, when the private energy market 
prospered.  
The second factor relates to the way in which considerations of human capital 
resources impacted on the selection of targets for privatisation. This finding here is the 
same as the finding derived from another privatisation variable (see (s3) model). To be 
specific, this screening strategy over state workers was particularly in evidence among 
coastal light manufacturing SOEs (see (m2), (r5) and (r6) models) – no doubt because 
of highly competitive market conditions.  
There are two factors the direction of whose impacts changed over time.  
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The “cash cow” effect (over the factor of liability) is significant in the results for 
the early period in (s5) model, but is absent in the results of the latter period in (s7) 
and (s8) models. The impact of financial pressure even works in the opposite 
direction – the first-ever finding that supports the traditional assumption that 
privatisation is adopted to tackle liability burden. Consequently, more state workers 
were laid off for reasons connected with financial liability. However, this argument 
has quite limited applicability. Except here, there is only one finding with weak 
significance in light manufacturing (see (m1) model).  
Next, as for firm size, its impact is found to have been positive solely in the 
results of the early period (see (s6) model). Inherent in this is the finding that the 
privatisation policy of “grasping the large” had particular relevance to SOE 
employees in the early years of privatisation reform. It seems clear enough that the 
underlying rationale was one of job protection. Other findings also suggest that this 
protective policy was particularly enforced in heavy manufacturing SOEs in inland 
provinces (see (o1), (o2), (r7) and (r8) models).  
In comparing the time patterns between two privatisation proxies (i.e., dependent 
variables), two similarities that emerge are significant. One, there is no difference in 
terms of the impact of market competition. Two, as for local authorities’ behaviour, 
the targeting of privatisation on the basis on human capital resource endowments only 
occurred in the later stage of reform.  
Meanwhile, there are also some significant differences.  
In the early years, for example, the need to “grasp the large” was clearly a point 
of emphasis in determining the downsizing of state enterprises. Layoffs of SOE 
employees were controlled carefully in order to maintain social stability, especially 
among heavy manufacturing SOEs in inland provinces. It was also to the advantage of 
local bureaucrats, in terms of preserving more perks (patronage), to retain a larger 
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state sector. However, in later years, state workers were obviously less regarded as a 
“cash cow”, their role gradually changing to become a target for cost saving in order 
to relieve liability burdens. It seems to be a general phenomenon, although a weak one 
in light manufacturing.  
Regarding infrastructural development, there is no doubt that the investment 
funds were mainly used for the maintenance of the state sector, but the spillover effect 
to the private sector grew significantly in later years, especially among manufacturing 
SOEs in coastal areas.  
Finally, the “ice-pop” phenomenon mainly initially characterised SOEs, but its 
effect was gradually felt more strongly by SOE employees by the later years. This 
shift illustrates the changing demand for privatisation over time, particularly for SOEs 
in the mining or energy sector, where over time the focus of privatisation shifted form 
being efficient SOEs to efficient SOE employees.  
In summary, we have sought to offer some answers to the time difference issue. 
First, from a policy perspective, the process of privatisation basically followed the 
relatively more efficient state assets, via the “ice-pop” phenomenon, although the 
policy focus gradually shifted from enterprise to the employee over time. Second, the 
benefits of infrastructural improvements were initially concentrated in the state sector, 
but latterly started to spillover into the private sector. Third, job security having 
initially been a major rationale of privatisation, its importance clearly declined in 
more recent years. Fourthly, in terms of the bureaucratic behaviour, as the 
privatisation reform process matured, so local strategies emerged. Local authorities, 
especially in coastal regions, began to screen out privatisation targets, especially in 
light manufacturing, in order – out of self interest – to retain control over SOEs with a 
stronger human capital resource endowment. Meanwhile, fifthly, as it matured, the 
pattern of privatisation returned to a more normal path. The “cash cow” phenomenon, 
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once prevalent among heavy manufacturing SOEs, gradually disappeared, as the need 
to reduce liabilities became one of the major incentives for privatisation. 
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Table 6.9 
Empirical results by time.  
 IndSOEUnitX  IndSOEEmployeeX 
 Early  Later  Early  Later 
 (s1)  (s2)   (s3)  (s4)   (s5)  (s6)   (s7)  (s8)  
                    
Lag.IndSOEUnitX 0.163 * 0.421 **  0.386 *** 0.599 ***           
 0.085  0.212   0.095  0.143            
Lag.IndSOEEmployX           0.396 *** 0.237 *  0.437 *** 0.712 *** 
           0.088  0.127   0.113  0.078  
IndNonSOEOutput% -1.206 *** -0.460 *  -0.090 * -0.100   -0.082  -0.739 **  -0.208 ** -0.191 # 
 0.210  0.271   0.052  0.108   0.194  0.290   0.103  0.133  
IndAssetLiability% 0.438 ** 0.605 *  -0.021  -0.012   0.550 * 0.208   -0.095 # -0.131 ** 
 0.197  0.365   0.048  0.063   0.321  0.542   0.064  0.059  
IndConstructInvestX 22.730 *** 24.000 **  -0.050  -0.763 **  25.805 * 14.051 #  -0.035  0.061  
 7.031  10.167   0.285  0.342   13.664  9.190   0.520  0.202  
IndAssetOutpout% -0.353 *** -0.157   0.000  0.015   0.258  0.021   -0.040 # -0.029 * 
 0.126  0.332   0.017  0.023   0.193  0.216   0.024  0.015  
IndAveSOEEmployX -0.417 *** -0.430 **  -0.104 ** -0.095 #  0.255  0.487 **  0.034  -0.099 * 
 0.155  0.204   0.044  0.059   0.181  0.219   0.076  0.060  
IndLabourProductivityX 0.035  0.211   0.074 ** 0.023   -0.048  -0.148   0.213 * 0.162 *** 
 0.210  0.479   0.029  0.050   0.390  0.177   0.126  0.050  
SoftBudget 0.018  -0.106   0.014  0.006   -0.196 *** -0.225 **  -0.006  -0.044  
 0.061  0.102   0.018  0.016   0.066  0.094   0.039  0.034  
PoliticalIdeology 0.096  0.142 #  -0.002  -0.065   0.166 ** 0.297 **  -0.050  -0.040  
 0.084  0.092   0.048  0.096   0.084  0.118   0.077  0.047  
Decentralisation -0.119 *** -0.145 **  -0.021  0.008   -0.014  0.069 #  -0.019  -0.007  
 0.043  0.059   0.026  0.028   0.044  0.046   0.045  0.017  
Literacy% 2.014 *** 0.447   1.492 ** -0.354   -0.393  1.111   -1.018  -0.505  
 0.756  0.791   0.761  1.082   0.679  0.794   0.991  0.403  
Industrialisation% -1.371 * 1.333   0.052  -0.204   -0.176  0.545   -0.194  -0.099  
 0.795  1.214   0.397  0.321   0.823  0.894   0.592  0.230  
IncomePercapitaX 4.065 *** 1.950 *  0.450 * 0.798   -1.262  -1.406   0.445  -0.087  
 1.330  1.140   0.273  0.642   0.976  2.238   0.420  0.443  
LightDummy 0.637 ** -0.087   -0.506 *** -0.150   -0.077  -0.224   -0.325 * 0.009  
 0.318  0.252   0.147  0.143   0.342  0.537   0.177  0.117  
HeavyDummy 1.060 *** 1.097 **  -0.457 ** -0.174   0.433  0.925 **  -0.207  0.154  
 0.233  0.435   0.226  0.195   0.321  0.452   0.242  0.151  
                    
Obs 1503  1283   1760  1320   1503  1283   1760  1320  
Groups 220  220   220  220   220  220   220  220  
Ave. periods 6.83  5.83   8.00  6.00   6.83  5.83   8.00  6.00  
Instruments 37  33   49  31   37  31   43  55  
AR(1) 0.009  0.002   0.000  0.000   0.000  0.021   0.000  0.000  
AR(2) 0.765  0.313   0.333  0.232   0.559  0.550   0.301  0.306  
Hansen 0.152  0.300   0.213  0.230   0.633  0.674   0.130  0.335  
DIH-1 0.063  0.080   0.143  -   0.822  0.173   0.124  0.266  
DIH-2 0.631  0.682   0.525  -   0.375  0.979   0.307  0.532  
                    
Note: All regressions are dynamic panel-data estimations by two-step system-GMM with Windmeijer’s 
finite-sample correction for the two-step covariance matrix. Intercepts and year dummies are included 
but values are not reported. Standard errors are in the italic. ***, **, * and # denote the significance 
level at 1%, 5%, 10% and 15%, respectively. The p-values are listed in the first and second order serial 
correlation tests, Hansen test and two Difference-in-Hansen tests.  
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Conclusion 
 
The privatisation patterns discussed above are categorised in Table 6.10 below.  
 
Table 6.10 
Privatisation patterns by sector, region and time.  
Light manufacture Heavy manufacture Mining and Energy 
   
1. Competition-driven 
2. Infrastructure-driven 
3. Human capital protected 
4. Efficiency-seeking 
1. Competition-driven 
2. Policy-dominated 
3. Cash cow effect 
4. Efficiency-driven 
1. Ice-pop phenomenon 
2. Policy-dominated by 
letting go of the small 
3. Competition-driven 
   
 Early period (1994-2001) Latter period (2001-2008) 
   
Coastal area 1. Competition-driven 
2. Policy-dominated by 
letting go of the small  
3. Cash cow effect  
4. Infrastructure-constrained 
1. Competition-driven 
2. Policy-dominated by 
letting go of the small  
3. Human-capital-protected 
4. Liability-driven 
   
Inland area 1. Policy-dominated by 
grasping the large 
2. Infrastructure-constrained 
3. Cash cow effect  
4. Competition-driven 
1. Liability-driven 
2. Competition-driven 
3. Infrastructure-driven 
 
   
Note: Dichotomies – liability-driven vs. cash cow effect (by financial pressure variable in H5); 
infrastructure-driven vs. infrastructure-constrained (by institutional infrastructure variable in H6); 
efficiency-driven vs. ice-pop phenomenon (by economic efficiency variable in H7); policy-dominated 
by letting go of the small vs. policy-dominated by grasping the large (by firm-size variable in H8); 
human capital driven vs. human capital protected (by human capital variable in H9). And the 
competition-driven is examined by the market competition variable in H4.  
 
From this table, we may draw the following general inferences:  
First, competition is the chief driver of privatisation in all sectors, regions and 
time periods. The market-driven nature is the most striking featured that emerges from 
all the data. In almost all the results, the impact of competition manifests itself most 
strongly – the only exception being in some of the results from inland regions and 
some of mining and energy industries.  
Second, the data highlight the dominant influence of policy. This makes itself felt 
in two ways. In the interests of job security, the privatisation process was driven by a 
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commitment to the central government’s policy of “grasping the large”. This was 
especially prevalent in heavy manufacturing in inland provinces in the early period. 
By contrast, in booming markets – especially in mining or energy in coastal 
provinces – the same process was shaped by implementation of the policy of “letting 
go of the small”.  
Third, privatisation patterns differ considerably between sectors. Thus, to give 
some of the more striking examples: (1) The “cash cow” effect was only prevalent in 
the privatisation of heavy manufacturing, not of other sectors. (2) As for the 
hypothesis that privatisation would be driven by efficiency considerations, this was 
clearly confirmed only in heavy manufacturing, where privatisation was used in order 
to improve the efficiency of SOEs. This contrasts with the other two sectors, in which 
the “ice-pop” phenomenon was prevalent, with valuable/efficient state assets being 
particularly targeted for release to the private sector.134 (3) Considerations of human 
capital resources shaped privatisation in light manufacturing, in which they were 
targeted for protection. This strategy is absent in other sectors. (4) The influence of 
infrastructure was only significant in light manufacturing. (5) Finally, only in mining 
or energy industries, especially in inland regions, was the competition weaker than 
other factors.  
Fifth, within the framework of centrally determined policies, local authorities 
formulated their own strategies. In some circumstances, local authorities took 
advantage of asymmetrical information to protect their own interests. This was 
especially evident in light manufacturing, where local bureaucrats were under 
pressure to release the more efficient SOEs to be privatised, but where they often 
retained enterprises with more favourable human capital endowments under state 
                                                 
134
 However, the evidence obtained through data for light manufacturing is not regarded as sufficiently 
convincing to confirm the ice-pop phenomenon.  
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ownership – a practice that was increasingly observable in coastal provinces in more 
recent years. This clearly demonstrates that there was a tension between adhering to 
central government policy and protecting local interests. The evidence suggests that 
local authorities did not dare to ignore central policy diktats, but that they used every 
opportunity to protect their own interests.  
Sixth, there are some significant regional differences. The coastal pattern of 
privatisation was not the same as that of inland areas. (1) In both regions, privatisation 
was strongly shaped by policy considerations but with different points of emphasis. In 
inland areas, the pattern was one in which the “grasping the large” part of 
privatisation policy was emphasised in order to minimise the number of layoffs and 
preserve social stability. In coastal areas, however, against the background of a private 
sector that was more advanced and could more readily accommodate workers laid off 
from SOEs, the policy emphasis was on the “letting go of the small” in order to realise 
the full potential of privatisation by putting it to its utmost. (2) In terms of local 
strategies, coastal governments were more inclined to keep SOEs with more 
favourable human capital endowments in their own hands, especially in light 
manufacturing. Moreover, this tendency became more pronounced in recent years.  
Seventh, the pattern of privatisation was not static but evolved over time. (1) In 
the early period, infrastructural investment was distributed in such a way that it 
consolidated the state sector rather than promoting the private sector. But 
subsequently the spillover effect emerged, and in later years, privatisation was 
facilitated by infrastructural investment. (2) The “cash cow” effect gradually 
weakened as the liability burden became a more important inducement to privatisation. 
This rent-seeking phenomenon gradually disappeared, enabling privatisation to follow 
a more ‘normal’ path. (3) In coastal provinces, local bureaucrats became more 
inclined to induce a screening strategy as privatisation took place. Light 
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manufacturing SOEs with more favourable human capital endowments were 
particularly targeted for retention. This strategy was a more recent phenomenon, and it 
may have been forced on coastal authorities, as the light manufacturing product 
market became more competitive.  
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Chapter Seven 
 
Concluding Analysis – Privatisation with Chinese Characteristics? 
 
7.1. General analysis 
 
The first section generalises findings from both provincial and industrial datasets 
and identifies and summarises ten significant features of the privatisation process in 
China. The features are ranked by the strength of which they display.  
 
1. Policy-oriented dominance135 
 
The first significant feature derives from the factor of firm size. My findings 
support the traditional causal argument that large-scale SOEs will generate more 
agency problems, increase transaction costs, and result in a slow pace of privatisation 
(Li, 2003, Ramamurti, 2000, Li et al., 2005). In China, the process of privatisation 
mostly began in the late 1990s with small-scale SOEs. My finding also confirms the 
success of central government policy – captured in the mantra “grasp the large and let 
go of the small” – a top-down privatisation guiding principle, to which local 
governments were strongly committed.  
Yet, the details are more complex. The provincial data show that this 
size-screening strategy was more strongly emphasised in inland provinces. This 
regional bias is echoed in the industrial data, which suggest that the prevailing policy 
thrust helped preserve more jobs among inland large-scale SOEs in heavy 
manufacturing. The reason why the state focused its efforts on large enterprises was 
                                                 
135
 Refer to Hypothesis 8.  
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quite simply, to minimise job losses in order to maintain social stability – or what later 
came to be called to create a “harmonious society” (hexie shehui). By contrast, in 
coastal areas, small-scale SOEs in heavy industries (including heavy manufacturing, 
mining and energy) were more encouraged to pursue privatisation in order to fulfil the 
policy goal of reducing inefficiency. Our first conclusion is therefore that privatisation 
in China was strongly policy-driven, particularly among SOEs in heavy industries, 
which Chinese leaders regarded as “strategically important” (Hassard et al., 2007:96).  
 
2. Cash cow effect136 
 
The next highly significant and consistent finding that emerges from both 
datasets is the cash cow (patronage) effect, which reveals the existence of a 
fundamental relationship between local bureaucrat and state enterprise. From a 
theoretical economic perspective, privatisation should be pursued for the good of the 
enterprise, but, in reality, in China it was more likely to be advocated in the interests 
of local people. Two incentives are likely to have explain this phenomenon: first, the 
patronage of local bureaucrats (Li and Xu, 2002); second, local bank managers’ fear 
of debt avoidance (Guo and Yao, 2005).  
Provincial data indicate that this rent-seeking phenomenon was more likely to 
characterise local governments facing deficit problems (see (e3) and (e4) models in 
Table 5.7, (j4), (j5), (j8), (j9) and (j11) models in Table 5.9). Industrial data further 
show that it was particularly prevalent among SOEs in heavy manufacturing (see (n1) 
and (n2) models in Table 6.5).137 The regional analysis finds no difference among 
                                                 
136
 Refer to Hypothesis 5.  
137
 It is noteworthy that in the provincial data, this effect is absent in respect to the liability problem for 
SOEs; instead, the effect turned out to be liability-driven (see (e2) and (e6) models in Table 5.7). This 
phenomenon corresponds to the absence in the industrial data of the cash cow effect among SOEs 
engaged in light manufacturing (see Table 6.4).  
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localities, while the temporal analysis shows a declining trend. The message is crystal 
clear: the once-prevalent rent-seeking behaviour became more effectively controlled 
over time, whilst the liability effect grew steadily more pronounced. In other words, 
more privatisation programmes were caused in the face of the orthodox business 
concerns of tackling soaring liabilities among SOEs. In short, it is the weakening of 
the cash cow effect that makes Chinese privatisation so different from that of other 
transitional economies.  
 
3. Distinctive regional characteristics 
  
Marked regional gaps appear in a number of variables in the preliminary analysis 
of provincial data (see Table 5.4). Inland governments suffered more from deficit 
burdens, as well as a more severe and quicker process of shrinkage in soft budgets and 
credits. By contrast, coastal governments experienced an earlier shift of attitude in 
favour of market-oriented reforms; enjoyed stronger autonomy in terms of local 
finance; and, in consequence, acquired a more competitive and outwardly-open 
product market and were more effective in upgrading their institutional infrastructure. 
However, the absence of relevant provincial data makes it econometrically impossible 
to explore this regional gap in greater detail.  
Fortunately, the larger industrial dataset permits a more in-depth investigation. It 
finds that privatisation in coastal China focused especially on the “letting go of the 
small” aspect of policy in order to maximise the impact of reforms. In contrast, in 
inland China the main focus of policy was on “grasping the large” in order to preserve 
as many state jobs as possible and maintain a harmonious society. Our analysis further 
indicates that coastal governments tended to apply a screening strategy that was more 
protective of local than of central interests in the selection of privatisation targets. In 
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addition, the overall process of privatisation in coastal regions appears to have 
corresponded more closely with the pace of market development.  
 
4. Screening strategy of human capital138 
 
In screening the human capital endowments of SOEs, a strategically strong 
behavioural thrust is widely identified at the local level.  
In general, based on provincial data, our findings show that a strong human 
capital tended to facilitate privatisation (see (i2), (i6), and (i8) models in Table 5.8 and 
(j7), (j8), and (j9) models in Table 5.9), as other studies have suggested (Li and 
Rozelle, 2000, Li, 2003, Brandt et al., 2005).139 Meanwhile, the findings generated by 
the industrial data point to the practice whereby that local bureaucrats sometimes used 
the selection to keep those SOEs with better human capital endowment under their 
control. Evidence of this is particularly clear from recent cases involving light 
manufacturing SOEs in coastal provinces. This finding corresponds to Table 5.4, 
which implies that the misappropriation of profits is a problem that has been more 
prevalent in coastal provinces.140 Both facts suggest that, compared with their inland 
counterparts, coastal bureaucrats were more likely to take advantage of privatisation 
to defend local interests.  
This finding also importantly illuminates the issue of information asymmetry. 
Since the quality of the endowment of a firm’s human capital can not be fully known 
to by outsiders or potential investors, local bureaucrats have an information advantage 
in terms of their superior knowledge of a firm’s real condition. They thereby occupy a 
                                                 
138
 Refer to Hypothesis 9.  
139
 In the analysis of the industrial data, this finding holds for SOEs engaged in heavy manufacturing 
(see Table 6.5).  
140
 This phenomenon is implied by the divergent performances of two efficiency measurements in the 
coastal data, where outstanding productivity is not consistent with moderate profitability. Please see the 
more detailed discussion in Section 2.2, 4.1 and 5.2.  
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position that allows them to gain an advantage by manipulating asymmetric 
information. Local interests, after all, frequently conflict with central interests – a 
problem that characterises China, where such friction is especially intense.  
In short, the overall view at the provincial level supports the theory of human 
capital whereby the improvement of which will facilitate privatisation. Further 
examination, however, suggests a screening strategy that has favoured local interests. 
This pattern of behaviour is found to have been highly selective and prevalent only in 
specific industries, regions and periods. This may explain why such behaviour is 
concealed in the provincial data.  
 
5. Clear soft budget constraint among regions141 
 
Kornai’s (1979) classic argument about the constraining effect of soft budget on 
public-ownership/privatisation is supported by evidence by China. All results derived 
from the provincial data are highly significant and consistent (see (a1) and (a7) 
models in Table 5.6 and (j2), (j3), (j8) and (j9) models in Table 5.9), indicating that 
this factor was far more decisive than the other two factors political economy 
factors – ideology and decentralisation – in explaining provincial-level privatisation in 
China.142  
In China, the nationwide shrinkage of soft (government) budgets and (bank) 
credits got under way in the late 1990s. Inland governments were hit harder than 
coastal governments, as their subsidies and loans shrank more rapidly. This reduction 
                                                 
141
 Refer to Hypothesis 1.  
142
 It should be noted here that, because of the lack of relevant information, the author was unable to 
use the industrial data to test this variable. Instead, the variable has been used as a control variable in 
all regressions based on the industrial data, as analysed in Chapter Six. However, the estimated 
coefficients derived from industrial data should not be compared with those generated by the provincial 
data in Chapter Five, because the former results are simply not sufficiently robust to challenge the 
latter.  
298 
of soft budgets helped considerably in removing the constraints on SOEs, and, as 
expected, it was a major cause of privatisation of the state sector. Yet, this effect is 
found to have been lessening during the reduction of soft credits. This is probably 
because the reform to tighten soft credits was pursued on a more moderate scale and 
at a slower pace, compared with the cutting of soft budgets. Thus, this finding offers 
further evidence that is strongly echoed in some of the existing literature on China 
(Guo and Yao, 2005, Li and Rozelle, 2000, Li, 2003, Brandt et al., 2005, Lin and Su, 
2008, Cao et al., 1999, Huyghebaert and Quan, 2009).  
 
6. Strong competition effect on industries143 
 
In terms of the competition effect, the strength of the results differs according to 
which of the two datasets is used. The findings derived from the provincial data are 
much weaker than those generated by the industrial data. Only two provincial-level 
regressions are identified with low significance, while none is found in the PCA test 
(see (d1) and (d3) models in Table 5.7 and (j4) and (j5) models in Table 5.9). Yet, the 
industrial-level regressions suggest that the competition factor was the most 
significant driver, including (more importantly) across all four sectors.  
This comparison suggests that the intensification of competition had a more 
marked impact on specific industries, rather than on specific regions, in driving 
privatisation in China. It further suggests that factors embedded in arguments about 
competition – such as agency costs, market failures and the comparative advantage of 
government ownership (Ramamurti, 2000, Li, 1996, Guo and Yao, 2005) – are likely 
to have been more pronounced among industries than regions.  
An even more important message is that the channel by which increasing 
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 Refer to Hypothesis 4.  
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competition encourages an enterprise to pursue privatisation is mainly industrial, not 
regional. This industrial channel further explains the nature of the expansion of 
privatisation, which spread as a response to changes taking place among upstream and 
downstream enterprises or industries, rather than events unfolding in adjacent regions 
undergoing market reform.  
This finding challenges the view of some current literature that attributes the 
diffusion of privatisation to the increasing inter-regional competition (Li et al., 2004). 
It further lends strong credence to the ‘uncertainty argument’, which states that the 
information advantage (obtained through reduced uncertainty) will help the 
middleman (i.e., someone whose upstream and/or downstream sector has already been 
privatised) to privatise more SOEs in neighbouring industries (Glaeser and 
Scheinkman, 1996). In short, it is no exaggeration to suggest that privatisation in 
China has been strongly driven by rising competition, but only (according to current 
evidence) among industries.144  
 
7. Ice-pop effect on specific industries145 
 
The ice-pop effect points to the existence of a negative correlation between the 
growth of enterprise efficiency and the incidence of privatisation designed to protect 
state assets (Guo and Yao, 2005). Results in support of this assumed causality are 
found several times in the two datasets, although not all of them are equally 
convincing and supportive.  
Results derived from provincial data show a negative correlation between the 
                                                 
144
 This also echoes Aussenegg and Jelic’s argument that the industrial classification should be 
associated with government’s choice of privatisation; see AUSSENEGG, W. G. & JELIC, R. (2007) The 
operating performance of newly privatised firms in central European transition economies. European 
Financial Management, 5, 853-879.  
145
 Refer to Hypothesis 7.  
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reduction of SOE employees and improved efficiency among SOEs (see (g6) and (g8) 
models in Table 5.8). Yet, these cases are not sufficient to uphold the ice-pop 
argument. A simple reason is that the state derives no benefit from state employees 
laid-off during privatisation, who on the contrary become a heavy burden in terms of 
their claims on social welfare.146 Nor are results derived from industrial data showing 
the same correlation among light manufacturing SOEs convincing (see (m1) and (m2) 
models in Table 6.4). This is because, thanks to intense competition in this sector, 
buying out an inefficient SOE in need of restructuring will be less attractive than 
creating a new efficient private company – assuming that getting an entrance ticket to 
light manufacturing markets is the main goal for a private investor, especially while 
the ticket is cheap (i.e. the entrance cost in light manufacturing is low). The 
phenomenon found here may embody a market explanation: namely that in a highly 
competitive market such as light manufacturing, local bureaucrats may be compelled 
to release efficient/valuable SOEs to the privatisation market in order thereby to 
attract more potential private buyers.  
By contrast, results derived from highly monopolistic markets such as mining 
and energy industries, convincingly endorse the existence of the ice-pop phenomenon 
(see (p1) and (p2) models in Table 6.6). The underlying reasoning is that because of 
the high entry barrier for newcomers, buying out a monopolistic share in the market is 
a sufficient motivation unto itself. There is no need for local bureaucrats to forfeit 
strongly performing and/or efficient monopolistic SOEs, because private buyers eager 
to join this monopolistic market will be happy to buy less efficient targets. The 
contradictory behaviour among local bureaucrats allows therefore for the possibility 
that they may do, as the ice-pop argument suggests, to prevent the melt-down of 
                                                 
146
 The basic assumption behind the ice-pop argument is that privatisation of efficient/profitable SOEs 
will generate higher tax remittances for the state.  
301 
valuable state assets during privatisation reform, especially in Chinese mining and 
energy industries. Though not prevalent, this effect gains concrete evidence from data 
of this sector.147  
 
8. Evolutionary process 
 
This research has identified another important feature of Chinese privatisation: 
namely, that its dynamics are not static, but evolutionary. Time itself is a significant 
factor introducing fundamental changes to other factors.  
First, time has witnessed a change in the dynamics of privatisation from an 
infrastructure-constrained pattern to an infrastructure-driven one (see Table 6.8). In 
the early years, the distribution of infrastructure investment was used as a tool to 
consolidate the local state sector. But, in later years, such funds were used for the 
establishment of infrastructure in whose benefits the local private sector was able to 
share. More impartial public spending created a relatively more friendly environment 
for private investors and thus facilitated privatisation.  
Secondly, the liability impact of privatisation was transformed from a constraint 
into a stimulant. This change indicates that the cash cow effect disappeared or became 
insignificant in later years. Rent-seeking behaviour among local bureaucrats seems to 
have been considerably reduced after the implementation of banking reform, which 
encouraged and enabled the banking system to perform in a more 
commercially-oriented manner that led to a significant diminution in soft credits. 
Initially, privatisation was a policy by central government on local authorities 
(however selfish and recalcitrant they may have been towards the policy initiative). 
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 It is noteworthy that the low incidence of this effect in the industrial data may help explain the 
absence of significant results in the provincial data.  
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Yet, as they became increasing responsible for their balance sheets, in later years local 
governments began to use this policy as a tool to tackle the liability problems of 
SOEs.  
Third, a screening strategy over human capital emerged. Local bureaucrats, on 
occasions, became much keener to pursue self-interests when selecting privatisation 
targets. There was a growing tendency, when privatisation reform reached a more 
mature stage, for local bureaucrats to take advantages of the information asymmetry. 
This selective behaviour helped them to keep those SOEs with better endowments of 
human capital in their own hands.  
In short, all these findings reject any suggestion that privatisation in China was 
an unchanging policy. The reality is that over time it changed markedly.  
 
9. Multi-level induced dynamics 
 
The final feature points to the process of privatisation as a process of multi-level 
induced dynamics, which is one of the most important characteristics of Chinese 
privatisation. If there is a single message delivered by this research, it is that there is 
no master theory, unique hypothesis or single factor that can fully account for the 
entire process. Each factor may have been significantly influential, but only within 
specific industries, in a specific region, and/or during a specific period of time. It is in 
this sense that privatisation in China may be regarded as a dynamic process induced 
by various factors over time.  
 
Through different lenses different pictures emerge. Through the lens of the 
provincial-level analysis, political factors are particularly to the fore. Softness of the 
budget system, commitment to the central policy, and fiscal burden are major factors. 
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Market-related factors are clearly less influential in this regional comparison. 
However, after political factors controlled (in the industrial-level data), market impact 
becomes particularly outstanding in investigation. The competition factor turns out to 
be the strongest driver among all industries.  
Above all, there is no fixed ranking in terms of the influence for the various 
factors. The influence of each factor differs by industry, region and time period. 
China’s privatisation path reflects in varying degree of the impact of policy, markets 
and competition, enterprise conditions and bureaucratic interests. The incidence of 
privatisation is, therefore, an outcome that is multi-level induced, evolutionary over 
time, and embedded to a specific context.  
 
7.2. The story of Chinese privatisation 
 
From the perspective of this research, this section gives a brief overview of the 
origin and development of the privatisation process in China during the past two 
decades.  
 
Before privatisation 
 
Privatisation in China may be seen as the climax of a series of efforts, beginning 
in the early 1980s, to enhance the security of government revenues through the 
reforms of state enterprises.  
The first round of such reforms sought to increase the autonomy of enterprises. 
Reformist leaders’ intention in setting up a new profit distribution system was to make 
enterprises accountable for their performance, in order thereby to relieve the heavy 
financial burden on government shoulders. In pursuit of this goal, the role of 
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‘enterprise manager’ was divorced from the role of ‘government official’ and the 
manager’s pre-eminent role became that of maximising enterprise performance. 
Centrally planned prices were also loosened through the introduction of a dual-track 
system, which allowed the emergence of a profit margin. This policy was soon found 
to be misplaced, as undesirable outcomes emerged. Since the level of profit-delivery 
was negotiated on a firm-by-firm basis, updated on the basis of fixed short period, this 
profit-sharing system actually created negative incentives that punished the growth of 
efficiency and encouraged a race to the bottom. The central government’s response 
was to try to replace it with a new tax-for-profit system. In the event, the first two 
waves of tax reforms quickly failed. Meanwhile, the effort to replace free government 
appropriations by repayable bank loans – an initiative designed to relieve the fiscal 
burden of the central government, as well as to reduce opportunist behaviour by local 
governments – also proved to be a failure. Due to the lack of an effective mechanism 
to force enterprises to repay loans, the accumulation of non-performing loans grew 
rapidly and left a serious problem of ‘triangular debts’ among enterprises and banks.  
It seems clearly that the failure of the first round of reforms intended to secure 
for the government a share in profits was rooted in the problem of information 
asymmetry in the profit-sharing system. Accordingly, the second round of reforms 
was designed to overcome the problem of information disadvantage for the 
government. The new Contract Responsibility System, in fact, cared nothing about 
how much profit was retained by enterprises, but merely required enterprise managers 
to guarantee a fixed amount of profit-delivery and taxes on the basis of a negotiated 
contract. A further requirement was that wages and bonuses were linked to the profits 
in order to stop prevalent misuses and abuse. This system was expected to turn around 
the declining trend of government revenue. Yet, the reality was that it led to another 
serious problem – namely, the emergence of a debt crisis. The origin of this lay in an 
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institutional failure generated by the new system, which encouraged state enterprises 
to over-report profits and hide losses. This problem was amplified by the behaviour of 
state banks, which acted like state agents granting loans through fiat. The outcome 
was to turn bank credits into cheap commodities, as a result of which these soft credits 
encouraged state enterprises to shower bad/inefficient projects or fund opportunist 
activities with cheap money. Furthermore, state banks were trapped by a kind of 
‘hostage effect’ in that they could not stop funding loss-making state enterprises 
without risking losing all their money (capital and interest). As a result, the 
government revenue was – ironically – secured at the expense of the banking sector 
being pushed to the edge of bankruptcy.  
It was inevitable and unavoidable that the third round of enterprise reform sought 
to cope with this debt crisis through efforts to adjust the management structure within 
enterprises. The management of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was separated from 
government ownership through a new reform initiative – that of corporatisation. More 
new types of non-state ownership were created. The responsibilities of social 
provision previously carried on SOEs’ shoulders were largely removed. A new 
auditing and monitoring system was established in an attempt to reduce opportunist 
behaviour by managers. SOE ‘managers’ were no longer government ‘officials’, 
whilst state workers were also transformed into ‘state employees’ by a labour contract 
no longer based on lifelong employment. A modern market-oriented enterprise system 
emerged after these and other efforts to clarify property rights and diversify ownership 
types. Unprecedented autonomy, granted to SOEs, also facilitated a significant 
reduction in monitoring costs. Yet, the desired outcome still proved elusive. The 
looked-for reversal in the previous declining trend in profitability was not 
forthcoming: indeed, the number of loss-making SOEs grew even more rapidly. For 
the third time, enterprise reform had proved a failure.  
306 
From such perspectives, the reform of Chinese enterprises seemed to be trapped 
in a vicious circle: whenever a new policy was introduced, a new and even more 
severe problem had rapidly emerged. When enterprise reforms were first unveiled, the 
Chinese government wanted to stimulate enterprise performance by introducing a 
profit retention system; but the outcome was a contraction in government revenue. 
Thus, the second round of reform changed the strategy of profit distribution in an 
attempt to secure a guaranteed stake for the government. Unfortunately, however, the 
financial burden was merely transferred to state banks, leading to an even more severe 
problem in the form of a debt crisis. In the third round of reforms, therefore, the 
government sought to cut its ties with enterprises so as to make them more financially 
independent and more accountable for their performance. Yet, once again, the 
outcome was a rapid rise of loss-making SOEs in nearly all industries. It seems 
reasonable to conclude that, after all these reform failures, privatisation had become 
inevitable.  
To sum up, several pressure points jointly triggered a nationwide reform of 
industrial ownership in China: rising competition in the product market caused by the 
rapid growth of local non-state economic actors, the deterioration of financial 
conditions facing the central government, the reduction of soft budgets and credits for 
local governments, a new regulatory policy fostering a commercial banking sector, 
and a shrinking space for the rent-seeking behaviour by SOE management.  
 
During privatisation 
 
The general idea that the privatisation in China is more focused on coastal 
provinces and in light industries is contradicted by available empirical evidence. The 
incidence of privatisation was, in fact, more equal than that is widely believed. 
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Privatisation was pursued as a nationwide policy in all but a few provinces and 
industries.  
Concealed in this general finding is the most significant feature of this empirical 
study – the fact that the process of privatisation in China has been dominated by the 
central policy of “grasping the large and letting go of the small”. The “grasping the 
large” element on the strategy has had particular applicability to employees engaged 
in heavy manufacturing industry in inland provinces, while “letting go of the small” 
has impacted especially on heavy manufacturing, mining and energy activities in 
coastal provinces. For the central government, the social issue of job security has 
apparently been weighted against the parallel urgency of SOE privatisation. 
Meanwhile, efforts to reduce soft budgets and credits have also been major 
motivations for reform. The increasing heavy financial onus carried by local 
governments has also encouraged localities to seek more effective ways of reducing 
such burdens.  
More importantly, this top-down driving force has been conjoined with a 
bottom-up stimulus – the impetus of market competition. Rising competition in the 
product market has undoubtedly been a powerful driver of privatisation among SOEs 
in all sectors of the economy. This competitive pressure has been transmitted through 
industrial channels, while the vehicle of the diffusion of privatisation has been related 
industries rather than neighbouring regions. There is an unequivocal underlying 
message: that the fundamental orientation of privatisation in China has also been that 
of the market.  
The pattern of privatisation has differed between inland and coastal regions. 
Inland bureaucrats appear to have been more conservative in the efforts they have 
made to protect state employment. By contrast, perhaps because of the existence of 
more highly developed market conditions, coastal bureaucrats have been keener to 
308 
pursue policies designed to protect local interests.  
A strong cash cow effect appears in the basic relationship between SOEs and 
their local official supervisors. Privatisation, in some industries, is not primarily a tool 
to serve the interests of local finance, but rather a channel for eliciting the interests of 
patronage-seeking bureaucrats or risk-averse bank managers. Some local bureaucrats 
have also benefited from information not available to others and kept for themselves 
more valuable state assets, such as SOEs with better-than-average human capital 
endowments (especially in light industries). However, the ice-pop effect has generated 
contrary evidence in heavy industries, where more valuable/efficient SOEs are more 
likely to have been sold to private buyers.  
Above all, the whole process of Chinese privatisation appears to have been 
evolutionary, with the dynamics jointly induced by multi-level forces. The pattern of 
privatisation demonstrates significant changes over time. The strength of impact of 
various factors – economic and political operating at micro and macro levels – differs 
depending on the region, industry, or time period under consideration.  
In sum, Chinese privatisation has been constrained by the political economy 
context in which it has taken place, propelled by macroeconomic developments, and 
screened by microeconomic conditions. Its origins were policy driven, but its outcome 
was market-oriented. Rent-seeking management is in decline. Public resources are 
spilling over to the private sector. The individual condition of respective SOE 
becomes crucial to the privatisation decision. In short, the overall pattern of Chinese 
privatisation is moving back to the orthodox track advocated by mainstream 
economics.  
 
7.3. Concluding remarks: Privatisation with Chinese characteristics? 
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‘Chinese characteristics’ is not a term that has an unambiguous definition, but it 
has become the almost universal touchstone for capturing China’s developmental 
ethos. It is a truism, but also an important truth that China is too big to accommodate 
any simple theory. It would seem that the most distinctive feature of China is its 
ability to embody a plethora of ‘characteristics’. For example, for decades we have 
been familiar with the term ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’. Sometimes too 
one encounters terms such as ‘capitalism’ or ‘democracy’, which (according to some) 
are also supposed to have their own ‘Chinese characteristics’. Even such 
contemporary phenomena as ‘google’, ‘e-bay’, or ‘facebook’ have their Chinese 
counterparts. As a researcher of Chinese privatisation, therefore, I feel compelled to 
ask the same question: is there a phenomenon that might be referred to as 
‘privatisation with Chinese characteristics’? In these concluding remarks to my 
research analysis, I try to find an answer to this question.  
We might begin by acknowledging that some characteristics of Chinese 
privatisation are similar to those that are highlighted elsewhere in the literature.  
 
 First, the constraining effect of soft budgets on privatisation in China in the 
late 1990s is very similar to that of the United States a decade earlier 
(LopezdeSilanes et al., 1997). This would seem to indicate that decision 
making in the public sector – no matter whether it is in a highly developed 
country like the U.S. or a developing country in transition such as China – is 
highly sensitive to the changes of budgetary changes. China is no exception 
to this principle.  
 Second, China is also no exception to the likely impact of competition. As 
empirical investigations have shown in dozens of countries during the 1980s 
and 1990s (Li and Xu, 2002, Plane, 1997, Bortolotti et al., 2003), in China 
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too rising competition in the product market as a result of a booming private 
sector has accompanied by the contraction of its state sector. This effect is 
further identified in my research as the strongest driving force in diffusing 
privatisation within and among neighbouring industries, although as an 
explanation of regional differences in privatisation behaviour, its impact is 
less clear.  
 Third, the infrastructure driver identified in some manufacturing industries 
in later years lends further strong support to the transaction cost argument in 
privatisation theories (Alexeev and Kaganovich, 2001, Li et al., 2005). It 
also casts new light on the limited literature that sought to highlight the 
stimulus of infrastructure in mid-1990s China (Li et al., 2004).  
 Fourth, the strong tendency towards the dominant role of policy in guiding 
the privatisation process, particularly in regard to firm size, is quite 
consistent with the successful privatisation reforms of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Argentina (Aussenegg and Jelic, 2007, Clarke and 
Cull, 2002).  
 
Some characteristics in China, nevertheless, were extraordinary.  
 
 Surprisingly, privatisation in China has not been noticeably ideology-driven: 
it did not reflect either a sudden change in domestic political alternation or 
an imposed solution by foreign powers. Nor was it a Machiavellian-type 
privatisation (i.e. using privatisation as a strategic policy to retain political 
power) (Biais and Perotti, 2002). Such features have made the pattern of 
privatisation in China quite distinctive, compared with that of the U.S, 
Argentina and many other transitional countries (Li and Xu, 2002, Clarke 
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and Cull, 2002, LopezdeSilanes et al., 1997, Bortolotti et al., 2003).  
 Chinese privatisation has clearly not been driven by a decentralisation 
dynamics, nor by the emergence of so-called “Chinese federalism” (Qian 
and Roland, 1998, Qian and Weingast, 1997, Cao et al., 1999). 148 
Increasing local autonomy (especially its implications for local financial 
self-sufficiency) made only a limited contribution to privatisation.  
 Third, the shrinkage among local state sectors has not been directly 
triggered by rising financial stringency (Yarrow, 1999, Ramamurti, 2000). 
This finding makes China unique compared with other instances of 
privatisation in the world (Clarke and Cull, 2002, Ramamurti, 1992, Plane, 
1997, Bortolotti et al., 2003). On the contrary, the cash cow effect 
throughout Chinese privatisation is a situation very similar to the prevalent 
corruption seen in the privatisation of telecommunication sector in many 
less-democratic countries (Li and Xu, 2002).  
 The ice-pop effect on the efficiency of public firms (Ramamurti, 1992, 
Clarke and Cull, 2002) is a phenomenon that has only rarely been witnessed 
in other countries. Admittedly, it has not been widespread in China, merely 
affecting some mining or energy SOEs. Interestingly, this phenomenon has 
a precedent in the Czech Republic, where the focus of the first wave of 
privatisation in 1992 was the more efficient state enterprises (Gupta et al., 
2008).  
 The Chinese example of the screening of human capital is also unique in the 
literature. This factor has not previously been examined in the context of 
countries in transition. The increasing prevalence of this local strategy is 
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 This effect is significant only if it is separated into two individual factors – market competition and 
soft budget constraint – and being considered respectively; otherwise, this argument is not supported by 
any concrete evidence.  
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one of the most characteristic features of privatisation in China.  
 The final feature relates to regional differences. One might argue that 
privatisation in China was less a national achievement than an 
agglomeration of achievements of many “little China” – i.e., many regional 
components of the whole. Local governments made unique and critically 
important contributions to the overall process of privatisation. In some cases 
and at some times, they lent valuable assistance; at others, they were the 
source of strong resistance. There were regional variations in local 
enforcement, as there were also in local strategies. In short, regional 
variations were remarkable in both their richness and scope.  
 
Overall, privatisation in China appears to have been more multi-dimensional than 
in other transitional economies. It not only reflected a centrally-determined national 
policy, but was played out as a drama in which the principal actors were the central 
reformers, local bureaucrats, enterprise managers, bank lenders and private investors. 
Privatisation was not the optimal choice for all players at all times, but the interests of 
any given group of players (especially those able to take advantage of informational 
asymmetries) meant that it was variously promoted or resisted. The process of 
privatisation was also evolutionary, in accordance changing contextual conditions. Its 
dynamics adjusted gradually, but steadily from that of a top-down policy-enforced 
process towards one that was more bottom-up and market-induced. The basic 
relationship between local bureaucrats and enterprise managers was thereby reshaped, 
and their interests become more closely aligned. In short, the dynamics of the 
privatisation movement reflected a balance between different forces operating at 
different levels. It was not driven by a single factor, nor did it adhere to coherent and 
consistent pattern of evolution. The decision whether or not to privatise was 
313 
determined by the nature of the balance among multi-level forces, given the 
conditions prevailing at a particular point in time.  
Thus, in answer to the question, “Is there such a phenomenon as ‘privatisation 
with Chinese characteristics’?” We would respond both affirmatively and negatively. 
The answer is negative in the sense that the Chinese experience does not wholly 
contradict theoretical orthodoxies as outlined in many current economic textbooks. To 
a significant extent too, the path followed by China is not dramatically different from 
that trodden by other countries (both developed and developing). At the same time, 
the answer is also affirmative because of its embodiment of characteristics that have 
not yet fully conceptualised in the mainstream literature. In terms of its ‘game’ nature, 
its regionally and industrially fragmented trajectory, its evolutionary process and its 
multi-level dynamics, it has followed a uniquely Chinese path of privatisation.  
 
7.4. About this research 
 
Contributions 
 
The final section of this chapter demonstrates possible contributions to the 
privatisation literature. They are categorised in terms of their contributions to 
empirical and evidentially-based analysis, theory and methodology.  
This research adds to the existing literature by making available new empirical 
evidence:  
 
1. It is the first piece of evidence, based on macro-level (provincial) data, which 
supports the classic argument concerning the role of the soft budget constraint. 
The rest existing relevant evidence in the literature is wholly derived from 
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firm-level data. Extending the scope of empirical analysis and evidence serves to 
underline the validity of the results.  
2. It throws new light (through the introduction of a new variable) on how to 
measure the ideological component of China’s marketisation trajectory. Official 
registers of private ownership, especially in the early 1990s, fails to reveal the 
reality of conditions at that time. This deficiency can, however, be turned into an 
advantage by using the relevant data to represent the strength of ideological 
control over the development of the private economy. Although the regression 
results point to this factor having a rather limited impact, it is possible to use the 
statistics as a proxy measure of the strength of ideological change taking place in 
China, even in circumstances, such as other transitional economies have 
encountered, in which no major domestic political realignments have taken place 
nor any pressures been brought to bear from external organisations.  
3. This research is the first of its kind to provide empirical analysis of the 
decentralisation (Chinese-style federalism) argument, thanks to the use of 
another newly-designed variable. It suggests that decentralisation is not only the 
combination, as it is in current literature, of soft budget constraint and 
competition effect. Rather, it proposes that it can and should be measured 
independently, for example, through the prism of increasing local autonomy. The 
results show that the decentralised fiscal power does sometimes encourage the 
spread of privatisation, even if in most cases its impact is less decisive than that 
of other factors.  
4. My research contributes to the literature by setting out strong and concrete 
evidence in favour of the competition impetus toward privatisation. This finding 
also pushes China into the mainstream school of privatisation studies. 
Furthermore, it is the first research of its kind to confirm the validity of the 
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Chinese variant of the federalism argument (in which, as it is in the literature, 
intensifying competition together with the hardening soft budgets represents the 
process of federalisation).  
5. In terms of the widely advanced argument about financial stringency as a driver 
of privatisation, the findings of this research contradict the mainstream literature 
(some of it based on Chinese data). For the first time, evidence is offered in 
favour of the cash cow argument, with the implication that rent-seeking 
behaviour has been prevalent among Chinese SOEs.  
6. The infrastructure-driven impact on privatisation is confirmed, though not 
universally. This result echoes Li, Vertinsky and Zhou’s first finding in 2004, and 
endorses the theory of transaction cost. However, results derived from provincial 
data are less convincing, and to this extent weaken arguments about the impact 
of institutions on privatisation.  
7. The mainstream argument relating to the role of efficiency is echoed in this 
research. That is, in some industries privatisation in China did begin with less 
efficient SOEs. Yet the results also suggest an alternative argument that points to 
the existence of an ice-pop effect in some industries, with privatisation focusing 
on more efficient enterprises. This is the first time that this phenomenon – first 
and uniquely identified by Guo and Yao’s (2005) – has been confirmed.  
8. In terms of the size factor, my research echoes the findings of previous studies 
and/or those that are implicit in current theories. Nevertheless, the results here 
offer the first econometric evidence in favour of the success of Chinese central 
government privatisation policy – namely, to “grasp the large while letting go of 
the small”. Also significant is the finding that the size factor had different effects 
on different industries.  
9. Three new variables have been designed to measure changes in enterprises’ 
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human capital endowments. Through the use of these variables, this research is 
unique in extending the pioneering work of Li et al. (2003).  
 
As for the theoretical literature on privatisation, this research lends unambiguous 
and consistent support to the following theories:  
 
(1) the soft budget constraint argument in the literature on economics of 
shortage;  
(2) the competition argument in agency, property rights and traditional 
competition theories;  
(3) the cash cow argument in rent-seeking theory;  
(4) the firm size argument in agency and transaction cost theories; and  
(5) the human capital argument in the agency theory.  
 
The inference of these theoretical contribution is that privatisation in China has 
been shaped by several drivers operating at the political economy, macroeconomic 
and microeconomic levels.  
Some theories are, however, challenged by my research findings. Thus:  
 
(1) The results provide some evidence in support of the Pareto argument in 
traditional efficiency theory, although this is contradicted by the ice-pop 
phenomenon, which justifies the incentive theory. The inference we draw is 
that, in some circumstances, pursuit of enterprise efficiency may be 
seriously distorted by bureaucratic self-interest.  
(2) There are also two elements to the ‘infrastructure effect’. The reduction of 
transaction costs through as a result of infrastructural improvements has not 
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necessarily benefited the private sector. In some cases, such improvements 
were used to consolidate the state’s control, rather than to promote private 
business.  
(3) This research, meanwhile, lends only weak support to the ‘Chinese 
federalism argument’, which is represented by an independent variable 
focusing on changes in local financial capabilities, rather than a collective 
variable incorporating competition and budgetary factors.  
(4) The popular ‘financial stringency’ argument is seriously challenged by the 
findings of this research in respect to China, according to which 
privatisation did not apparently take place under heavy financial pressure. 
This makes China’s experience very distinctive in the comparative context 
of studies of other transitional economies.  
 
As for methodology, this research offers the first systematic review in the 
literature on privatisation in China. My hope is that through this contribution this 
study will be a foundation stone for future meta-analysis of Chinese privatisation. The 
research embodied in this thesis generates a dynamic framework in which 
privatisation can be studied through multi-level determinants – a framework that can 
be used as a platform to facilitate deeper cross-country analyses. China’s privatisation 
experience can thereby be more readily compared and with that of other countries. 
The newly-developed econometric methodology utilised in this research is one of only 
few in the literature that effectively overcome the problem of endogenous bias – a 
critically important issue in a dynamic regression model. This promises to facilitate 
further quantitative research. In particular, we would draw attention to the higher level 
of data which have been used in this research and which have made it possible to 
extend the analysis into areas (especially those relating to the political and 
318 
macroeconomic factors shaping privatisation) that firm-level data cannot reach. Lastly, 
by introducing some newly designed political and institutional variables to the 
literature, this research will facilitate future research into privatisation.  
To conclude, this empirical research is a critical work, especially in terms of 
structural arrangement. Its starting point is a rejection of mainstream theories of 
economic transition and an attempt to challenge some of the arguments that have 
gained the most currency in existing studies of privatisation in China. From my own 
perspective, the start of the research was a mainstream question (i.e, “What is the 
driving force of privatisation in China?”), but it has ended up with an alternative 
answer (i.e., “There is such a phenomenon as ‘privatisation with Chinese 
characteristics’.”). The methodology is generated from that that available in the 
existing literature, to which, however, new contributions have been made. The results 
of the research in this thesis are all derived from quantitative analysis, but their 
implications throw new light on qualitative aspects of study. In short, this study is 
econometrically conservative, but offer critical new economic insights.  
In sum, this research adds to our understanding of privatisation in China by 
highlighting its enormous complexity, captured in its dynamic, evolutionary, 
multi-level induced, regionally and sectorally diverse nature. It has also shown 
privatisation in China to have been policy-driven as well as market-induced, top-down 
as well as bottom-up in its approach, embodying a combination of centrally planned 
and local strategies, and of liability-driven and patronage-constrained forces. It is 
shown to have been driven by considerations of efficiency (but with protection from 
an ice-pop outcome), of competition, of infrastructure, and human capital. It has been 
shaped by sometimes compliant, sometimes selfish local bureaucrats and by 
profit-making by also rent-seeking behaviour by SOE managers. Contained in this 
enormous complexity is the critically important finding that privatisation in China has 
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not followed a uniformly consistent path, and that the various elements listed above 
serve to characterise different privatisation trajectories, applicable to different 
circumstances in different regions of the country at different times.  
 
Limitations 
 
There are of course some inevitable limitations to this research, mainly caused by 
the limited availability of data.  
The first limitation relates to the lack of sufficient data for variable selection. In 
such large-scale datasets as the two used in this study, a feasible criterion for inclusion 
of a hypothesis variable should be the existence of a balanced panel and full 
comprehensive panel of data. Fulfilling this requirement is a major and sometimes 
critical challenge to the Chinese statistics that are available. Some statistical items 
widely adopted in other countries’ national statistics simply do not exist in China’s 
case. Alternatively, some items are listed, but not reported and defined in a consistent 
manner. This problem considerably reduces the number of potential candidates for 
inclusion as feasible variables, and exacerbates the difficulty of making comparisons 
between China and other countries. However, I have endeavoured to make the best 
selection possible from the data that are available data, and I am confident that, in 
terms of variable design, this research is in no way inferior to other similar 
quantitative studies of Chinese privatisation.  
Second, comprehensive data coverage of the industrial sector in all Chinese 
provinces is lacking. In nearly half of China’s 31 provinces (municipalities and 
autonomous regions), there is a problem of lack of balanced panel data. Some 
provincial statistical yearbooks from the 1990s are, for unknown reasons, simply 
absent in major databases. Some data items have also disappeared in some provincial 
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statistics. These deficiencies have made it impossible to create a comprehensive 
industrial dataset that embraces all variables for 31 provinces over the long period 
from 1994 until 2008. The only realistic response to such problems is to use a 
sampling dataset in order pursue the kind of research attempted here.  
The third data limitation relates to the issue of authenticity. The reason why this 
research cannot explain the boom of private enterprises (i.e., treat this phenomenon as 
one of dependent variables) is that the correct data about the development of private 
sector have been suppressed for ideological reasons, especially in the early years of 
economic reform. The literature has so far not generated a consensus about the actual 
number of private enterprises and employees in the late 1990s. This problem is a 
fundamental constraint on studies of privatisation in China, and it explains why this 
study has chosen to focus on the contraction of the state sector, where data are more 
authentic and reliable.  
Fourth, the nature of the data used may colour any interpretation that is derived 
from the quantitative analysis. Given the nature of provincial and/or industrial level 
data, the impact of political factors or the macroeconomic environment may be 
magnified. Contrariwise, because of the lack of firm level data, the impact of micro 
conditions may be underestimated. Readers are reminded to keep such data limitations 
in mind in drawing further conclusions based on the empirical findings in this 
study.149  
 
Further questions 
 
Some questions remain unanswered and demand further explorations.  
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 It should be lastly noted that these analyses are all based on the author’s personal understanding and 
judgement, yet the empirical evidence found hereby should be open to many other theoretical 
interpretations.  
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One such question is: will the findings of this research prove to be valid if a 
larger scale firm-level dataset becomes available? This question cannot be answered 
until the Chinese statistical authorities are willing to release more of the information 
that is undoubtedly available about the transition of all SOEs in the late 1990s.  
If such a ‘mega database’ becomes available, the next important question will be: 
What was the fate of each privatised SOE? The answer to this key question would 
certainly help us understand the true essence of China’s privatisation.  
A topic of great importance likely to draw increasing academic attention is the 
nature of political control after privatisation and its impact on China’s newly 
emerging ‘market economy’. On the surface, more than 90 per cent of state-owned 
enterprises have now been privatised. But there is considerable uncertainty about the 
extent to which these privatised SOEs and other private enterprises newly funded by 
big SOE groups are genuinely owned by the state? From a more theoretical 
perspective, this research topic refers to the ‘boundary’ of ownership – or, more 
precisely, the line that should be drawn between public and private ownership. 
Basically, there are two kinds of boundary issues that could be encountered during the 
transition of ownership restructure. One is that of a blurred boundary, a problem 
caused by the ambiguity in the definition of property rights. This problem is likely to 
happen particularly in the early stage of economic transition, where private ownership 
is gradually beginning to emerge. In this period, the boundary of private ownership is 
vague, difficult to be differentiated from public ownership.  The other one is the 
boundary to be crossed, a problem caused by intended intrusion from the ‘real’ owner. 
This problem is likely to happen particularly after privatisation, when the state (public 
ownership) remains dominant power (even with minor shares) in privatised 
enterprises. In this situation, the boundary of private ownership is weak, difficult to 
protect against penetration from the state. Unfortunately, both cases happened in 
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China.  
As mentioned earlier in the Section 4.4, the ‘red-hat’ phenomenon engages with 
the problem of ambiguous property rights for the private ownership. Since the 
relevant property rights were not yet clearly and legally separated from the public 
ownership in the late 1980s, a good number (though there is no consensus so far on 
precisely how many) of collective enterprises (in township and village level) were de 
facto “private” enterprises. The reason why those real private owners chose to register 
their enterprises under the type of “collective (public)” ownership was to avoid 
potential confiscation for ideological reasons. In other words, in an environment 
hostile to the private ownership, wearing a red hat became the best strategy to protect 
private properties.  
This red-hat phenomenon gradually disappeared after a series of ownership 
reforms and eventual privatisation in the late 1990s. Since the environment became 
much friendly to private ownership, the risk of ideological confiscation was largely 
reduced. Most red hats were taken off when collective-owned enterprises were 
required to restructure or to re-register their ownership type, as a result of which a 
clearer line of boundary was drawn between public and private ownership. However, 
this boundary seemed not strong enough to full defend against state penetration.  
During privatisation reform, a new kind of boundary issue was raised, in which 
the state (public ownership) still held strong political control over enterprises that had 
been “privatised”. This “red-hand” phenomenon, as I would argue, has considerably 
distorted the traditional definition of privatisation, whose practice in China seemed to 
consolidate state’s power toward the market, rather than the other way round.  
An easy approach to explore this nature of political control after privatisation is 
through the formal institution – the State Asset Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC). This institution embodies the state’s ambition to retain 
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ownership and control of the most important enterprises, through the authority given 
to appoint senior executives of enterprises under its administration (Chan, 2009; 
Green and He (2005); Koppell, 2007). Nevertheless, this approach would fall short in 
explaining daily businesses.  
A more difficult but more accurate approach would shed light on the real party 
influence over enterprises. Nomenklatura – a terminology in comparative politics that 
refers to the Soviet party control over leadership positions of all types in the society 
(Liu et al., 2006) – offers a key clue. According to the party constitution after 2002, 
all enterprises having three or more party members should establish a party unit (Yu, 
2013), from which almost all fundamental decisions related to management, personnel, 
projects and finance would be made (Chan, 2009).  This “party supervises the cadre” 
rule (Qian, 1995) helped greatly to maintain state power in the post-privatisation 
period. It not only enhanced state control over the whole economy, but also 
transformed privatised enterprises into state agents whose priority was to carry out 
state policies rather than to maximise interests of private investors.  
The future study, in accordance, tracing the party control in privatised enterprises 
would be highly meaningful. It would help answer an interesting question: How 
private have Chinese enterprises actually been after privatisation? The answer may 
overthrow the conventional wisdom on the privatisation in China.  
In the end, this author’s conclusion is that privatisation in China has been far 
more complicated than many existing studies have suggested – which is precisely why 
more academic investigations are needed in the future.  
324 
Appendix 2A 
 
Table 2A.1 
Number of state-owned and state holding enterprises with independent accounting system in regions 
and industries (1994-2008). 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
                
National 79731 87905 86982 74388 67845 61301 53489 46767 41125 34280 31750 27477 24961 20680 21313 
                
Beijing 2041 2295 4025 3381 3345 3309 2430 2173 1866 1362 1331 1745 1469 1104 1116 
Tianjin 1629 1927 1918 1913 1872 1831 1843 1810 1636 1625 1333 1497 1225 1310 884 
Hebei 4297 4461 4053 3581 3316 3051 2707 2512 2061 1675 1670 1233 1120 832 810 
Shanxi 2685 2776 2751 2465 2159 1853 1791 1695 1513 1354 1139 1173 1033 641 650 
Neimenggu 1997 2406 2449 1772 1364 955 757 681 683 591 549 489 489 435 481 
Liaoning 4109 4292 4374 4045 3327 2609 2454 2188 1723 1334 1156 1397 1254 839 1046 
Jilin 2550 2733 2673 2380 2102 1824 1667 1392 1231 969 943 583 466 391 416 
Heilongjiang 3732 3942 3807 3297 2656 2015 1588 1328 1233 970 974 693 661 515 543 
Shanghai 2372 3742 3236 2947 2838 2728 2473 2067 1843 1606 1576 1461 1348 1164 1189 
Jiangsu 3832 4343 3853 3452 3303 3154 2554 2075 1691 1242 1141 958 916 785 921 
Zhejiang 3121 3271 3118 2496 2184 1872 1418 1122 963 861 848 811 776 694 736 
Anhui 2607 2939 2529 1688 1551 1414 1128 1013 900 747 708 619 563 581 632 
Fujian 2192 2339 2415 1935 1757 1578 1367 1308 1112 888 826 756 673 530 540 
Jiangxi 3781 4485 4436 3596 3229 2861 2509 1981 1519 1071 984 804 706 563 577 
Shandong 3974 4853 4855 3877 3463 3049 2774 2403 2082 1961 1832 1394 1360 1306 1358 
Henan 3930 4147 4243 3133 3155 3177 3069 2856 2562 2253 1667 1280 1192 1015 970 
Hubei 3992 4229 3997 3611 3487 3363 2965 2498 2100 1617 1464 1058 873 834 887 
Hunan 3652 3859 3770 3036 2784 2531 2339 2117 2043 1642 1598 1058 1031 858 854 
Guangdong 4749 4975 5228 4757 4547 4337 3320 2793 2531 2103 2009 1806 1536 1332 1487 
Guangxi 2545 2685 2565 2395 2269 2143 2027 1829 1600 1252 1258 1005 906 612 627 
Hainan 472 587 560 540 484 428 401 372 354 346 268 247 239 132 109 
Sichuan 5088 5377 5117 4211 3626 3041 2630 2211 1947 1635 1559 1399 1403 1344 1526 
Guizhou 1641 1848 1941 1673 1596 1518 1397 1269 1191 1037 974 927 760 541 530 
Yunnan 2006 2104 2008 1733 1568 1402 1388 1277 1214 943 855 652 639 517 539 
Xizhan 142 175 176 181 200 218 232 229 197 199 157 170 161 53 36 
Shaanxi 2572 2766 2677 2418 2078 1738 1633 1439 1350 1235 1222 945 860 644 685 
Gansu 1528 1615 1544 1305 1243 1180 960 748 748 706 690 456 446 432 426 
Qinghai 540 571 562 578 524 470 362 288 238 206 225 137 148 138 146 
Ningxia 409 440 427 384 357 329 209 203 184 154 138 140 131 87 106 
Xinjiang 1546 1723 1675 1608 1466 1323 1097 890 810 696 656 584 577 451 486 
                
Coal 1975 2095 2011 1810 1622 1434 1321 1204 1135 1008 981 912 884 795 864 
Petroleum 
Extraction 69 54 71 52 59 66 67 70 68 81 81 102 87 91 112 
Ferrous Metal Ores 
Mining 271 265 276 233 210 186 179 163 149 126 125 119 113 111 132 
Non-Ferrous Metal 
Ores Mining 839 949 887 788 733 678 662 517 473 389 353 310 307 298 287 
Other Ores Mining 1157 1190 1147 987 852 716 621 548 471 390 356 297 277 210 226 
Food Processing 9463 9832 9586 8057 7137 6217 5082 4016 3149 2346 2039 1393 1137 857 805 
Foods Manufacture 5154 5306 4934 4089 3349 2608 2071 1624 1298 1012 872 595 513 377 384 
Beverages 3323 3607 3367 2737 2377 2017 1663 1376 1146 841 743 557 456 366 326 
Tobacco 296 302 304 289 300 310 299 276 243 210 180 153 143 120 119 
Textile 4177 4345 4031 3391 3201 3011 2631 2157 1812 1449 1274 905 742 601 486 
Textile Wearing 918 1102 1177 935 864 792 638 546 452 370 332 282 212 221 206 
Leather 738 847 764 595 511 426 331 267 202 138 118 72 54 36 35 
Timber 1013 1265 1254 1045 905 765 638 502 427 358 299 243 222 171 170 
Furniture 479 594 615 482 395 308 239 204 165 149 129 96 78 45 39 
Paper 1644 1899 1795 1536 1373 1209 1028 846 708 571 493 374 283 220 196 
Printing 3027 3552 3596 3155 2800 2445 2148 1890 1666 1448 1332 1149 1001 580 589 
Culture Articles 414 527 487 415 363 310 268 213 186 128 104 92 68 55 61 
Petroleum 
Processing 348 391 403 353 330 307 281 279 260 235 246 241 221 213 231 
Chemical 5151 5834 5723 4855 4561 4267 3692 3261 2810 2271 2084 1696 1551 1377 1407 
Medicines 1861 2099 2044 1775 1724 1673 1496 1341 1180 1001 939 676 590 559 527 
Chemical Fibers 231 248 249 204 232 260 233 203 175 113 106 85 76 60 60 
Rubber 573 640 621 533 492 451 374 341 286 234 222 184 143 122 122 
Plastics 1162 1609 1667 1408 1286 1164 967 821 718 543 508 414 379 303 320 
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Non-metallic 
Mineral 
Manufacture 
7064 7568 7392 6259 5605 4950 4279 3635 3145 2556 2354 1835 1613 1333 1413 
Ferrous Metals 
Smelting 948 1078 1046 914 854 793 702 622 550 485 454 407 367 329 333 
Non-ferrous 
Metals Smelting 613 725 750 662 657 652 608 614 555 481 469 429 436 432 476 
Metal Manufacture 2055 2507 2641 2227 1966 1704 1426 1239 1034 730 676 655 556 486 510 
General Machinery 3785 4346 4391 3787 3495 3202 2761 2475 2180 1921 1786 1573 1392 1124 1202 
Special Machinery 4349 4365 4484 3797 3400 3002 2622 2239 1938 1687 1509 1323 1170 973 1007 
Transport 
Equipment 3330 4083 4303 3644 3353 3061 2747 2478 2299 1977 1875 1732 1598 1358 1428 
Electrical 
Equipment 2299 2685 2659 2268 2108 1948 1684 1474 1285 1062 1005 927 821 694 723 
Communication 
Equipment 1475 1610 1579 1346 1410 1473 1330 1182 1061 932 886 830 762 726 770 
Measuring 
Instruments 1036 1141 1179 1016 910 804 710 675 609 505 497 490 441 369 358 
Electricity 4272 4679 4781 4476 4388 4300 4128 4116 4058 3933 3755 3829 3858 3481 3672 
Gas 262 269 283 258 257 255 252 252 243 231 233 221 227 217 260 
Water 2116 2261 2342 2262 2259 2255 2231 2205 2205 2150 2136 2070 1999 1211 1290 
                
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (various years).  
Note: Chongqing is included in Sichuan.  
Unit: enterprise.  
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Table 2A.2 
Number of employees in state-owned and state holding enterprises with independent accounting 
system in regions and industries (1994-2008). 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
                
National 4371 4397 4277 4041 3741 3395 2995 2675 2424 2163 2048 1875 1804 1743 1794 
                
Beijing 110.4 105.7 99.7 92.3 86.6 90.1 77.4 70.6 61.2 51.9 45.9 53.0 47.3 47.6 46.6 
Tianjin 93.0 90.1 86.5 84.6 74.1 65.6 57.3 55.9 49.8 45.2 42.1 40.7 38.2 39.1 39.2 
Hebei 225.3 225.2 220.7 209.0 197.7 182.8 166.0 151.4 137.3 130.2 126.7 108.4 102.4 94.9 92.9 
Shanxi 176.8 177.8 175.8 167.6 150.1 138.0 134.0 128.4 119.9 111.7 113.7 119.8 118.0 108.0 114.6 
Neimenggu 112.8 114.3 112.9 105.1 84.7 77.8 67.1 61.9 59.1 45.2 44.1 41.7 42.1 39.7 40.8 
Liaoning 308.0 327.8 307.2 291.9 255.1 216.4 196.3 168.7 147.2 128.6 120.7 117.0 113.0 111.8 116.0 
Jilin 169.0 170.0 169.1 159.5 131.0 118.8 107.4 94.8 84.0 71.1 67.0 60.8 54.1 50.8 52.7 
Heilongjiang 298.0 292.7 290.4 274.0 218.3 189.1 164.6 147.6 136.0 96.5 94.9 91.2 91.7 89.7 88.8 
Shanghai 160.2 148.4 132.3 112.5 127.2 113.2 101.9 88.3 81.2 70.9 66.8 61.1 57.4 51.7 50.0 
Jiangsu 246.6 248.3 236.8 231.0 237.8 216.3 175.0 149.0 131.2 104.9 94.6 77.0 74.4 65.0 70.6 
Zhejiang 114.2 108.9 102.3 94.0 92.6 75.5 57.7 45.2 39.9 38.1 33.3 34.3 32.7 32.0 32.5 
Anhui 147.0 154.3 151.3 135.0 124.5 111.9 101.4 87.9 82.3 76.0 77.9 71.0 68.6 67.9 73.8 
Fujian 69.8 67.3 63.4 58.7 57.8 51.4 43.8 39.6 34.3 29.6 28.5 28.8 26.6 24.8 24.1 
Jiangxi 138.8 142.0 138.7 134.0 112.1 102.2 89.0 75.9 66.1 56.5 52.4 47.1 46.1 42.4 43.3 
Shandong 278.3 301.5 293.9 289.3 284.8 268.0 244.7 221.1 204.6 201.3 184.6 149.0 148.6 144.0 155.5 
Henan 258.3 263.5 267.1 237.6 236.8 221.9 207.3 197.4 182.4 174.1 154.6 146.0 136.6 128.8 119.1 
Hubei 208.9 211.9 205.5 195.7 191.0 174.0 153.8 139.9 117.1 103.2 98.0 76.9 71.0 70.1 72.5 
Hunan 181.2 182.9 179.6 172.5 139.9 130.3 117.1 100.8 90.6 81.3 76.0 61.5 61.7 60.4 59.3 
Guangdong 155.9 146.0 140.8 132.5 136.8 128.2 104.4 91.8 83.0 75.2 74.8 69.4 60.8 60.9 77.8 
Guangxi 93.6 92.6 90.4 86.2 79.9 74.4 65.3 57.9 51.8 44.3 42.3 37.2 32.3 30.5 34.4 
Hainan 13.2 12.9 12.1 11.8 10.9 10.0 9.3 8.6 9.5 7.8 5.4 5.9 5.5 4.5 3.8 
Sichuan 311.9 309.7 305.3 286.5 269.9 234.8 195.3 170.9 150.4 137.5 130.2 120.6 121.8 124.1 128.4 
Guizhou 75.6 73.8 72.7 71.1 63.5 60.4 56.9 53.1 49.8 47.0 44.7 44.2 40.8 38.9 39.7 
Yunnan 78.2 77.2 76.8 73.4 71.0 61.3 59.1 53.4 49.7 41.8 37.5 33.2 32.9 37.4 33.2 
Tibet  1.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.1 1.9 2.0 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.1 1.1 
Shaanxi 144.9 147.6 146.1 142.7 124.6 116.4 105.0 93.8 89.4 83.9 86.1 77.9 77.5 76.3 78.1 
Gansu 90.0 91.3 87.8 86.2 80.5 72.0 66.0 57.9 55.9 53.5 52.4 45.0 45.3 41.7 42.6 
Qinghai 19.5 19.8 19.7 18.2 16.8 16.6 14.2 12.0 10.6 10.4 10.4 9.0 9.1 9.4 10.6 
Ningxia 23.1 23.5 23.7 22.5 21.4 19.9 16.5 15.6 15.2 14.9 14.6 13.9 12.1 12.2 12.9 
Xinjiang 66.5 68.6 67.3 63.8 61.3 55.2 39.1 33.5 32.3 28.5 26.7 31.6 34.1 37.6 39.3 
                
Coal 453.4 446.6 439.8 427.5 392.8 358.1 345.4 324.3 320.7 308.5 310.2 322.8 335.3 319.9 333.5 
Petroleum Extraction 114.8 116.9 119.0 119.1 114.8 110.6 57.4 59.3 55.4 72.0 75.3 82.1 91.3 88.6 109.5 
Ferrous Metal Ores 
Mining 18.9 18.0 17.2 15.7 15.1 14.5 14.1 13.1 12.8 12.5 10.9 11.7 11.2 11.0 13.4 
Non-Ferrous Metal 
Ores Mining 51.5 49.8 48.0 44.7 36.8 29.0 33.2 29.5 26.7 23.2 20.5 18.6 18.4 22.3 16.9 
Other Ores Mining 51.9 49.8 47.7 45.1 36.3 27.5 33.5 30.5 27.8 22.0 20.3 13.9 13.4 11.7 11.9 
Food Processing 156.6 154.2 151.8 137.0 104.0 70.9 82.9 65.9 54.1 43.4 36.4 26.8 21.8 20.4 17.9 
Foods Manufacture 83.5 76.9 70.3 62.1 46.6 31.1 37.5 30.5 28.5 24.1 22.5 16.7 16.8 13.6 14.2 
Beverages 89.4 89.1 88.8 81.4 72.7 64.0 61.5 52.6 45.1 38.0 33.8 27.5 23.5 23.1 23.0 
Tobacco 28.7 28.8 28.9 28.9 28.3 27.7 24.4 23.4 21.8 20.0 19.0 18.5 18.0 17.8 18.8 
Textile 445.5 431.2 417.0 356.0 273.4 190.7 230.1 193.2 164.9 131.7 111.2 73.8 64.1 52.9 40.3 
Textile Wearing 24.0 24.1 24.1 20.6 18.4 16.2 20.0 19.8 15.9 14.6 13.7 11.6 9.3 9.8 9.0 
Leather 22.0 21.3 20.5 17.3 12.2 7.1 7.9 8.1 5.8 3.9 3.2 1.9 1.7 1.3 1.5 
Timber 26.7 24.8 22.9 20.6 14.9 9.3 13.6 10.6 8.8 12.7 11.4 10.8 8.7 6.8 6.1 
Furniture 6.4 5.8 5.1 4.8 3.8 2.8 3.1 2.9 2.4 2.4 2.2 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.0 
Paper 73.2 73.4 73.6 61.0 48.7 36.4 43.2 37.2 31.6 25.1 21.9 15.9 14.1 11.0 11.7 
Printing 56.1 55.6 55.0 47.1 38.3 29.5 31.7 28.2 24.3 20.9 19.3 16.6 15.1 13.3 13.4 
Culture Articles 9.5 10.0 10.5 8.7 7.2 5.6 4.7 4.4 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.4 1.9 1.5 1.8 
Petroleum Processing 54.8 55.8 56.7 56.5 59.8 63.1 47.5 43.7 37.0 36.9 37.0 38.1 38.0 40.0 42.9 
Chemical 298.3 299.5 300.7 275.5 234.2 193.0 222.1 190.0 166.4 143.6 132.2 111.9 106.5 100.4 102.0 
Medicines 78.0 75.7 73.4 64.6 59.6 54.5 60.8 55.9 51.0 48.1 43.9 36.3 31.5 32.0 29.7 
Chemical Fibers 27.4 28.4 29.5 25.9 27.1 28.3 26.9 22.1 18.8 13.5 16.0 14.3 15.5 14.0 11.9 
Rubber 38.0 38.3 38.6 34.6 29.9 25.3 27.7 23.2 20.2 15.5 13.9 12.8 10.7 10.6 11.9 
Plastics 23.4 24.9 26.3 24.9 19.0 13.1 16.8 15.4 13.4 10.9 9.8 8.5 8.4 7.2 7.8 
Non-metallic Mineral 
Manufacture 304.0 288.8 273.7 243.3 200.0 156.7 164.5 140.3 119.8 98.9 90.6 68.4 56.9 53.2 54.4 
Ferrous Metals 
Smelting 263.6 262.0 260.4 250.1 234.7 219.3 204.5 187.6 169.8 160.3 147.5 141.0 133.5 132.9 130.2 
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Non-ferrous Metals 
Smelting 76.8 79.1 81.4 78.4 68.7 58.9 70.3 69.5 61.4 58.6 57.1 56.1 53.9 56.1 61.6 
Metal Manufacture 59.6 59.3 59.1 51.2 38.5 25.7 32.7 28.9 23.2 19.7 17.4 16.3 15.4 15.0 16.5 
General Machinery 240.2 238.3 236.4 215.5 174.9 134.3 152.7 132.5 112.5 100.4 94.9 79.1 72.3 67.8 67.9 
Special Machinery 214.6 212.1 209.6 190.8 145.3 99.9 128.8 102.9 91.7 108.5 98.1 78.1 69.9 68.0 72.5 
Transport Equipment 244.1 257.6 271.2 247.7 232.7 217.8 211.8 195.9 180.9 170.2 161.6 152.8 148.2 150.3 153.7 
Electrical Equipment 110.0 107.8 105.5 95.4 76.2 57.0 79.3 64.6 56.8 47.7 42.2 37.3 33.8 32.5 35.4 
Communication 
Equipment 88.2 86.0 83.8 77.5 78.5 79.6 75.0 67.4 63.4 58.9 61.6 55.9 44.9 45.4 55.5 
Measuring 
Instruments 53.2 51.4 49.7 44.6 31.3 17.9 27.4 15.2 17.1 16.8 16.1 15.0 13.8 13.5 13.3 
Electricity 163.0 169.9 176.8 184.1 190.4 196.6 216.0 211.6 212.7 213.9 212.7 220.0 226.9 225.7 227.3 
Gas 13.9 14.5 15.2 19.4 16.4 13.4 15.6 14.1 13.8 13.1 12.9 11.8 10.6 10.5 10.5 
Water 31.8 34.8 37.9 39.9 40.2 40.6 43.1 43.2 43.1 43.6 43.5 42.2 41.1 35.6 36.5 
                
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (various years).  
Note: Chongqing is included in Sichuan.  
Unit: 10k persons.   
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Table 5A.1a 
Soft budget variable 1 – index of subsidies for loss-making SOEs.  
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
                
Beijing 0.9120 0.9120 0.9372 1.0000 0.9976 0.9023 0.8564 0.8413 0.8172 0.8070 0.7999 0.7949 0.7654 0.0000 0.0000 
Tianjin 0.9399 1.0000 0.9523 0.7898 0.7898 0.7042 0.5417 0.4334 0.3250 0.3250 0.2708 0.2708 0.2708 0.0000 0.0000 
Hebei 1.0000 1.0000 0.8618 0.6961 0.7179 0.5992 0.5619 0.5168 0.3008 0.2274 0.1834 0.2032 0.1279 0.0000 0.0000 
Shanxi 0.8515 0.9118 1.0000 0.8951 0.9497 0.8968 0.5171 0.8000 0.3525 0.2972 0.3026 0.3014 0.3970 0.0000 0.0000 
Neimenggu 1.0000 0.8914 0.6980 0.5608 0.5777 0.3453 0.1715 0.3640 0.0873 0.1550 0.1006 0.0625 0.2352 0.0000 0.0000 
Liaoning 0.9599 1.0000 0.9487 0.9226 0.7293 0.6214 0.5358 0.2619 0.1951 0.1848 0.1593 0.1691 0.1666 0.0000 0.0000 
Jilin 0.9507 0.9507 0.9206 0.9003 0.6288 0.8597 1.0000 0.9736 0.9407 0.9857 0.8335 0.8752 0.8464 0.0000 0.0000 
Heilongjiang 1.0000 0.8996 0.5405 0.3989 0.3420 0.2717 0.2287 0.1884 0.1722 0.1666 0.1579 0.1607 0.1296 0.0000 0.0000 
Shanghai 0.9157 0.9783 0.9903 0.9985 1.0000 0.9761 0.8104 0.7886 0.7732 0.7876 0.5988 0.3915 0.1053 0.1807 0.0000 
Jiangsu 0.9058 0.8897 0.7925 0.6675 0.6928 0.6930 0.5708 0.5708 0.5534 0.5533 1.0000 0.7590 0.7561 0.0000 0.0000 
Zhejiang 0.3271 0.3271 0.3929 0.4541 0.4941 0.4639 0.7152 1.0000 0.7707 0.6162 0.6030 0.5542 0.5650 0.6697 0.0000 
Anhui 0.8037 0.5871 1.0000 0.9402 0.7609 0.5083 0.3755 0.9601 0.3021 0.3223 0.2968 0.7301 0.4346 0.0000 0.0000 
Fujian 1.0000 0.6774 0.3755 0.2822 0.2101 0.1409 0.0952 0.1141 0.0827 0.0789 0.0662 0.0663 0.0724 0.0000 0.0000 
Jiangxi 1.0000 1.0000 0.9630 0.7755 0.7430 0.4959 0.3932 0.3398 0.0945 0.3259 0.3010 0.3010 0.2966 0.0000 0.0000 
Shandong 0.9601 0.9601 0.9192 0.7216 0.5575 0.6600 0.7155 1.0000 0.7252 0.5537 0.4968 0.4840 0.5052 0.0000 0.0000 
Henan 0.3731 0.3731 0.3320 0.3195 0.2325 0.1841 0.1797 1.0000 0.1958 0.1489 0.1194 0.0769 0.0908 0.0000 0.0000 
Hubei 0.9380 1.0000 0.9473 0.9410 0.8470 0.6241 0.4311 0.4124 0.3545 0.3654 0.2245 0.1730 0.1870 0.0000 0.0000 
Hunan 0.6836 0.7724 0.8740 0.7161 0.8757 0.9164 0.8314 1.0000 0.9267 0.6733 0.6021 0.6381 0.6458 0.4686 0.0000 
Guangdong 1.0000 1.0000 0.9907 0.8783 0.7763 0.5639 0.3407 0.2971 0.3208 0.1631 0.1290 0.1008 0.0514 0.0000 0.0000 
Guangxi 1.0000 1.0000 0.9058 0.7231 0.6011 0.5818 0.4236 0.8090 0.7220 0.6913 0.4395 0.3115 0.3149 0.2659 0.0000 
Hainan 0.8355 1.0000 0.6108 0.4500 0.8657 0.5864 0.7290 0.4441 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sichuan 0.9751 0.9399 1.0000 0.8155 0.5989 0.8886 0.8906 0.8726 0.8498 0.7959 0.7377 0.6969 0.5534 0.0000 0.0000 
Guizhou 0.8420 0.6595 0.6922 1.0000 0.6479 0.5170 0.2806 0.2334 0.2464 0.2391 0.1703 0.1675 0.1669 0.0000 0.0000 
Yunnan 0.8834 0.9606 1.0000 0.8301 0.4128 0.4002 0.3479 0.3666 0.2535 0.3017 0.2287 0.2353 0.2235 0.0000 0.0000 
Tibet 1.0000 0.6770 0.9062 0.9334 0.9190 0.7851 0.7913 0.7560 0.6640 0.7158 0.7108 0.7129 0.2277 0.0000 0.0000 
Shaanxi 1.0000 1.0000 0.9545 0.9982 0.8762 0.7730 0.5757 0.4532 0.5252 0.2785 0.3111 0.2587 0.3821 0.0000 0.0000 
Gansu 0.3506 0.3506 0.1680 0.1359 0.4173 0.8597 0.9878 0.8897 0.9658 0.9613 0.9083 0.9513 1.0000 0.6658 0.0000 
Qinghai 0.9457 0.9457 1.0000 0.5330 0.4661 0.0817 0.0390 0.0126 0.0042 0.0042 0.0043 0.0042 0.0042 0.0000 0.0000 
Ningxia 0.8439 0.8439 0.7376 0.9080 0.8769 1.0000 0.4491 0.2587 0.1119 0.0051 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Xinjiang 0.9461 0.9461 0.8388 0.6950 0.5884 0.7872 0.8229 1.0000 0.3006 0.0046 0.0144 0.0027 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
                
Source: Various provincial statistical yearbooks 1995-2009. 
Note: Definition: (Index of subsidies for loss-making SOEs) = (subsidies for 
loss-making SOEs in a given certain year) / (the maximum subsidy for loss-making 
SOEs during 1994-2008). Chongqing is included in Sichuan. 
 Ave 0.5076 
 S.D. 0.3561 
 Max 1.0000 
 Min 0.0000 
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Table 5A.1b 
Soft budget variable 2 – industrial loans to total loans in financial institutes.  
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
                
Beijing 0.3632 0.2976 0.2760 0.2725 0.2681 0.2475 0.1747 0.1501 0.1159 0.1088 0.0966 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Tianjin 0.2683 0.2599 0.2512 0.2527 0.2501 0.2352 0.1981 0.2006 0.1788 0.1253 0.1061 0.0964 0.1077 0.1052 0.0877 
Hebei 0.2669 0.2365 0.2404 0.2472 0.2228 0.2027 0.1674 0.1602 0.1532 0.1536 0.1420 0.1263 0.1500 0.1410 0.1199 
Shanxi 0.3004 0.2692 0.2343 0.2538 0.2444 0.2307 0.1759 0.1788 0.1652 0.1554 0.1438 0.1390 0.1471 0.1515 0.1560 
Neimenggu 0.2399 0.2292 0.2209 0.2149 0.2134 0.1942 0.1725 0.1748 0.1695 0.1697 0.1487 0.1242 0.1423 0.1315 0.1203 
Liaoning 0.3109 0.3020 0.2767 0.2903 0.2776 0.2663 0.2151 0.2276 0.2171 0.2016 0.1833 0.1247 0.1352 0.1342 0.1217 
Jilin 0.2497 0.2285 0.2326 0.2676 0.2264 0.2178 0.2394 0.2372 0.2410 0.2299 0.2185 0.2055 0.2094 0.2525 0.2402 
Heilongjiang 0.3143 0.2964 0.2887 0.2639 0.2476 0.2280 0.1870 0.1808 0.1822 0.1721 0.1621 0.1004 0.0919 0.1048 0.0747 
Shanghai 0.3014 0.2899 0.2854 0.2698 0.2499 0.2205 0.1886 0.1572 0.1641 0.1335 0.0995 0.0990 0.0985 0.1035 0.0998 
Jiangsu 0.2679 0.2451 0.2438 0.2417 0.2365 0.2206 0.2198 0.1944 0.1686 0.1530 0.1572 0.1472 0.1803 0.1800 0.1591 
Zhejiang 0.2164 0.2006 0.1979 0.1977 0.1895 0.1656 0.1316 0.1285 0.1336 0.1349 0.1449 0.1688 0.2087 0.2247 0.2190 
Anhui 0.2210 0.2136 0.2073 0.1972 0.1886 0.1921 0.1671 0.1672 0.1575 0.1529 0.1393 0.1138 0.1182 0.1183 0.0988 
Fujian 0.2788 0.2262 0.2218 0.2224 0.2154 0.1916 0.1663 0.1640 0.1454 0.1551 0.1617 0.1549 0.1689 0.1585 0.1399 
Jiangxi 0.2518 0.2452 0.2362 0.2361 0.2370 0.2353 0.2157 0.2146 0.1856 0.1753 0.1481 0.1164 0.1320 0.1298 0.1124 
Shandong 0.2156 0.2073 0.2081 0.2069 0.1918 0.1829 0.1601 0.1635 0.1577 0.1560 0.1634 0.1511 0.1806 0.1881 0.1771 
Henan 0.2060 0.1923 0.1889 0.2024 0.1888 0.1803 0.1674 0.1616 0.1660 0.1699 0.1586 0.1269 0.1435 0.1421 0.1183 
Hubei 0.2977 0.2663 0.2829 0.2463 0.2216 0.2136 0.1947 0.1864 0.1564 0.1380 0.1270 0.0900 0.0907 0.0917 0.0939 
Hunan 0.2619 0.2479 0.2304 0.2104 0.1988 0.1806 0.1601 0.1524 0.1449 0.1391 0.1377 0.1130 0.1142 0.0942 0.0864 
Guangdong 0.2012 0.1904 0.1837 0.1793 0.1671 0.1462 0.1343 0.1308 0.1287 0.1194 0.1107 0.0898 0.0897 0.0896 0.0802 
Guangxi 0.2149 0.1538 0.1638 0.2108 0.2024 0.1873 0.1558 0.1619 0.1524 0.1378 0.1188 0.1077 0.1126 0.1073 0.1056 
Hainan 0.2057 0.1766 0.1823 0.1606 0.1470 0.0962 0.0770 0.0701 0.0919 0.0892 0.0709 0.0482 0.0445 0.0363 0.0592 
Sichuan 0.2195 0.2030 0.2044 0.2045 0.2071 0.1687 0.1425 0.1540 0.1377 0.1341 0.1169 0.0957 0.0972 0.1025 0.0943 
Guizhou 0.2908 0.2712 0.2685 0.2497 0.2307 0.2094 0.1687 0.1539 0.1393 0.1084 0.1108 0.0870 0.0894 0.0725 0.0738 
Yunnan 0.2625 0.2504 0.2680 0.2466 0.2191 0.2071 0.1710 0.1821 0.1525 0.1347 0.1255 0.1123 0.1251 0.1070 0.1079 
Tibet 0.1314 0.0641 0.0728 0.0804 0.0738 0.0813 0.1049 0.0928 0.0764 0.0652 0.0334 0.0430 0.0287 0.0450 0.0431 
Shaanxi 0.2830 0.2819 0.2868 0.2739 0.2467 0.2317 0.2055 0.1751 0.1604 0.1510 0.1443 0.0998 0.0941 0.0991 0.0916 
Gansu 0.2539 0.2510 0.2527 0.2408 0.2352 0.2412 0.2080 0.1931 0.1864 0.1876 0.1888 0.1521 0.1042 0.1136 0.1331 
Qinghai 0.2916 0.2564 0.2625 0.3135 0.3733 0.3738 0.2436 0.2010 0.1847 0.1645 0.1291 0.0755 0.0867 0.0997 0.0817 
Ningxia 0.2651 0.2702 0.2776 0.2672 0.2460 0.2317 0.1890 0.1790 0.1658 0.1455 0.1291 0.1087 0.1073 0.1214 0.1471 
Xinjiang 0.1960 0.1841 0.1948 0.1964 0.1959 0.1948 0.1732 0.1886 0.1727 0.1522 0.1397 0.1094 0.1131 0.1047 0.0955 
                
Source: Various provincial statistical yearbooks 1995-2009. 
Note: Definition: (share of industrial loans to the total) = (amount of industrial loans) / 
(total loans granted by all financial institutes). Beijing’s data after 2005 are absent in 
statistics. Chongqing is included in Sichuan. 
Ave 0.1747 
S.D. 0.0654 
Max 0.3738 
Min 0.0000 
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Table 5A.2a 
Political ideology variable 1 – private-owned enterprises to total enterprises.  
 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  
                
Beijing 0.0097 0.0212 0.0328 0.0178 0.0496 0.0774 0.0782 0.0790 0.1127 0.1383 0.1547 0.2387 0.2603 0.3060 0.3267 
Tianjin 0.0595 0.0633 0.0670 0.0708 0.0746 0.0783 0.0821 0.1032 0.1119 0.1410 0.2780 0.2873 0.3239 0.3298 0.4443 
Hebei 0.0145 0.0336 0.0527 0.0718 0.0910 0.1170 0.1505 0.2131 0.2829 0.3631 0.3682 0.4755 0.5235 0.5581 0.6070 
Shanxi 0.0015 0.0014 0.0012 0.0011 0.0629 0.0834 0.0995 0.1360 0.1957 0.2386 0.2521 0.2626 0.2806 0.3365 0.3608 
Neimenggu 0.0040 0.0166 0.0292 0.0418 0.0544 0.0819 0.1347 0.1777 0.1931 0.2559 0.3855 0.4021 0.4559 0.4643 0.4651 
Liaoning 0.0000 0.0023 0.0301 0.0408 0.0771 0.1186 0.1305 0.1710 0.2162 0.2987 0.3632 0.4447 0.5228 0.5649 0.6234 
Jilin 0.0037 0.0047 0.0058 0.0068 0.0348 0.0569 0.0777 0.1258 0.1598 0.2172 0.1024 0.1355 0.1444 0.1463 0.5570 
Heilongjiang 0.0026 0.0082 0.0138 0.0189 0.0238 0.0526 0.0814 0.1276 0.1793 0.2384 0.2449 0.3408 0.3792 0.4272 0.4854 
Shanghai 0.0026 0.0053 0.0080 0.0105 0.0130 0.0214 0.0214 0.1399 0.1855 0.2414 0.2738 0.3698 0.3873 0.4116 0.4776 
Jiangsu 0.0890 0.0986 0.1081 0.1940 0.2798 0.3070 0.3838 0.4606 0.5203 0.4836 0.5160 0.5509 0.5877 0.6054 0.6692 
Zhejiang 0.0695 0.1022 0.1348 0.1675 0.1671 0.2086 0.2840 0.4021 0.4705 0.5254 0.5812 0.6020 0.6285 0.6566 0.6855 
Anhui 0.0083 0.0151 0.0218 0.0286 0.0504 0.0976 0.1448 0.2082 0.2953 0.3920 0.4756 0.5164 0.5671 0.6051 0.6591 
Fujian 0.0102 0.0339 0.0575 0.0812 0.0775 0.0739 0.1201 0.1682 0.2119 0.2758 0.3587 0.3826 0.4099 0.4418 0.4841 
Jiangxi 0.0028 0.0069 0.0111 0.0152 0.0246 0.0281 0.0505 0.1758 0.2546 0.3786 0.3974 0.4722 0.5250 0.5378 0.5529 
Shandong 0.0000 0.0018 0.0129 0.0132 0.0697 0.0930 0.1502 0.2620 0.2935 0.3789 0.4501 0.5196 0.5714 0.5987 0.6332 
Henan 0.0362 0.0367 0.0550 0.0734 0.1061 0.1165 0.1320 0.1399 0.2166 0.2680 0.3774 0.5435 0.5116 0.5550 0.6216 
Hubei 0.0356 0.0477 0.0463 0.0573 0.1121 0.1668 0.2216 0.2763 0.3311 0.3858 0.4142 0.4427 0.4711 0.5016 0.5330 
Hunan 0.0220 0.0297 0.0373 0.0450 0.0526 0.0603 0.1184 0.1764 0.2396 0.3409 0.3665 0.5459 0.6011 0.6194 0.6510 
Guangdong 0.0044 0.0062 0.0350 0.0781 0.1211 0.1642 0.2072 0.2503 0.2933 0.3364 0.3464 0.3565 0.3665 0.3866 0.4120 
Guangxi 0.0061 0.0027 0.0123 0.0219 0.0315 0.0423 0.0732 0.1078 0.1446 0.2316 0.2625 0.3464 0.3942 0.4803 0.5414 
Hainan 0.0222 0.0242 0.0262 0.0316 0.0625 0.0777 0.1005 0.1002 0.1048 0.1871 0.2405 0.2938 0.2908 0.2152 0.2062 
Sichuan 0.0114 0.0127 0.0205 0.0569 0.0908 0.1297 0.1817 0.2688 0.3105 0.4036 0.4529 0.5010 0.5240 0.5494 0.6432 
Guizhou 0.0320 0.0300 0.0280 0.0259 0.0239 0.0486 0.1385 0.2220 0.2642 0.3105 0.5682 0.6472 0.6812 0.4203 0.4735 
Yunnan 0.0028 0.0045 0.0030 0.0042 0.0211 0.0325 0.0494 0.0822 0.1202 0.2236 0.3290 0.3916 0.4287 0.4733 0.5241 
Tibet 0.0044 0.0135 0.0227 0.0318 0.0497 0.0729 0.1050 0.1253 0.1308 0.0267 0.0106 0.0254 0.0196 0.1500 0.2500 
Shaanxi 0.0003 0.0146 0.0289 0.0432 0.0575 0.0718 0.0861 0.1004 0.1105 0.1492 0.1622 0.2312 0.2699 0.2998 0.3446 
Gansu 0.0019 0.0016 0.0049 0.0082 0.0573 0.0387 0.0782 0.1989 0.1305 0.1777 0.2313 0.3272 0.3087 0.3683 0.3763 
Qinghai 0.0106 0.0191 0.0276 0.0361 0.0446 0.0428 0.0286 0.0895 0.1729 0.1700 0.3080 0.3045 0.3103 0.3418 0.3049 
Ningxia 0.0032 0.0092 0.0152 0.0212 0.0583 0.0746 0.1369 0.1488 0.1923 0.2976 0.5015 0.5168 0.5887 0.6121 0.6304 
Xinjiang 0.0102 0.0103 0.0098 0.0212 0.0325 0.0439 0.0689 0.1901 0.2195 0.2899 0.2661 0.2422 0.2755 0.3556 0.4131 
                
Source: Various provincial statistical yearbooks 1995-2009. The Data of the Third National 
Industrial Census of the People’s Republic of China in 1995 (中華人民共和國 1995 年第
三次全國工業普查資料匯編), China Statistics Press (1997). China Economic Census 
Yearbook 2004 (中國經濟普查年鑑 2004), China Statistics Press (2006). 
Note: Definition: (POE share) = (registered number of POEs, above a certain scale) /  
(registered number of enterprises with all types of ownership, above a certain scale). 
Missing data, denoted italics, are supplemented through the use of data in adjacent or 
closest years. Some 17.6% of data in this table are ‘supplementary’ (in this sense) but 
74.7% of such data are less than 10% with relative small impacts. Those supplemented 
data exceeding 10% are highly concentrated in two provinces, Guangdong and Hubei. 
Chongqing is included in Sichuan. 
Ave 0.2112 
S.D. 0.1916 
Max 0.6855 
Min 0.0000 
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Table 5A.2b 
Political ideology variable 2 – employees of private owned enterprises to total employees.  
 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  
                
Beijing 0.0151 0.0188 0.0188 0.0169 0.0138 0.0135 0.0146 0.0140 0.2145 0.3113 0.3048 0.3200 0.3235 0.2658 0.2858 
Tianjin 0.0249 0.0321 0.0386 0.0448 0.0667 0.0816 0.0933 0.1129 0.1270 0.1577 0.1817 0.2078 0.2256 0.2278 0.1911 
Hebei 0.0114 0.0230 0.0299 0.0329 0.0439 0.0499 0.0586 0.0487 0.0490 0.0536 0.0656 0.0697 0.0708 0.0727 0.0771 
Shanxi 0.0153 0.0184 0.0236 0.0254 0.0292 0.0293 0.0272 0.0310 0.0372 0.0751 0.0647 0.0557 0.0694 0.0710 0.0792 
Neimenggu 0.0073 0.0100 0.0134 0.0202 0.0287 0.0381 0.0407 0.0449 0.0506 0.0511 0.0601 0.0655 0.0694 0.0766 0.0892 
Liaoning 0.0176 0.0250 0.0302 0.0354 0.0477 0.0578 0.0689 0.0860 0.1010 0.1112 0.1157 0.1274 0.1372 0.1394 0.1377 
Jilin 0.0124 0.0155 0.0182 0.0203 0.0301 0.0258 0.0265 0.0341 0.0310 0.0394 0.0889 0.0800 0.0703 0.0754 0.0873 
Heilongjiang 0.0056 0.0124 0.0151 0.0188 0.0236 0.0305 0.0328 0.0369 0.0403 0.0470 0.0518 0.0586 0.0626 0.0705 0.0847 
Shanghai 0.0276 0.0557 0.0758 0.0952 0.1404 0.1717 0.2242 0.2858 0.3375 0.4123 0.4984 0.5443 0.5460 0.5434 0.5724 
Jiangsu 0.0096 0.0133 0.0162 0.0214 0.0368 0.0489 0.0658 0.0817 0.1037 0.1296 0.1511 0.2056 0.2275 0.2543 0.2936 
Zhejiang 0.0252 0.0390 0.0471 0.0502 0.0577 0.0721 0.1113 0.1252 0.1425 0.1634 0.1673 0.1670 0.1764 0.2100 0.2052 
Anhui 0.0039 0.0056 0.0067 0.0089 0.0128 0.0166 0.0193 0.0232 0.0282 0.0348 0.0409 0.0475 0.0650 0.0606 0.0555 
Fujian 0.0195 0.0252 0.0277 0.0273 0.0305 0.0357 0.0409 0.0458 0.0496 0.0605 0.0612 0.0721 0.0843 0.1013 0.1117 
Jiangxi 0.0073 0.0130 0.0181 0.0206 0.0198 0.0232 0.0244 0.0296 0.0369 0.0473 0.0560 0.0637 0.0747 0.0784 0.0943 
Shandong 0.0111 0.0159 0.0196 0.0227 0.0306 0.0371 0.0459 0.0454 0.0533 0.0755 0.0790 0.0869 0.0979 0.0993 0.0935 
Henan 0.0049 0.0067 0.0085 0.0097 0.0110 0.0119 0.0102 0.0102 0.0118 0.0145 0.0214 0.0245 0.0305 0.0315 0.0356 
Hubei 0.0095 0.0155 0.0189 0.0225 0.0293 0.0326 0.0317 0.0290 0.0379 0.0415 0.0426 0.0458 0.0528 0.0585 0.0704 
Hunan 0.0078 0.0097 0.0117 0.0121 0.0154 0.0159 0.0133 0.0163 0.0236 0.0310 0.0483 0.0548 0.0577 0.0599 0.0622 
Guangdong 0.0257 0.0320 0.0362 0.0404 0.0473 0.0520 0.0563 0.0619 0.0709 0.0872 0.1007 0.1119 0.1306 0.1417 0.1465 
Guangxi 0.0045 0.0067 0.0067 0.0067 0.0092 0.0115 0.0121 0.0125 0.0161 0.0190 0.0251 0.0309 0.0347 0.0449 0.0479 
Hainan 0.0385 0.0435 0.0427 0.0305 0.0468 0.0514 0.0558 0.0603 0.0653 0.0800 0.0791 0.0956 0.1002 0.1167 0.0984 
Sichuan 0.0049 0.0074 0.0096 0.0117 0.0159 0.0188 0.0214 0.0256 0.0304 0.0388 0.0465 0.0543 0.0599 0.0653 0.0752 
Guizhou 0.0056 0.0067 0.0080 0.0086 0.0107 0.0115 0.0125 0.0137 0.0124 0.0139 0.0170 0.0229 0.0233 0.0250 0.0282 
Yunnan 0.0029 0.0043 0.0049 0.0062 0.0114 0.0140 0.0151 0.0197 0.0210 0.0242 0.0320 0.0444 0.0435 0.0550 0.0667 
Tibet 0.0009 0.0018 0.0017 0.0025 0.0034 0.0061 0.0064 0.0126 0.0179 0.0250 0.0322 0.0355 0.0402 0.0611 0.0704 
Shaanxi 0.0072 0.0112 0.0155 0.0185 0.0263 0.0353 0.0460 0.0541 0.0844 0.0838 0.0807 0.0821 0.0824 0.0823 0.0785 
Gansu 0.0060 0.0083 0.0106 0.0110 0.0151 0.0176 0.0189 0.0225 0.0245 0.0278 0.0321 0.0357 0.0393 0.0426 0.0438 
Qinghai 0.0058 0.0071 0.0078 0.0149 0.0208 0.0259 0.0468 0.0584 0.0704 0.0808 0.0932 0.1042 0.1293 0.1326 0.1111 
Ningxia 0.0085 0.0111 0.0156 0.0180 0.0281 0.0305 0.0386 0.0458 0.0536 0.0640 0.0715 0.0780 0.0931 0.1288 0.0978 
Xinjiang 0.0112 0.0139 0.0159 0.0181 0.0217 0.0260 0.0333 0.0410 0.0552 0.0682 0.0769 0.0878 0.0962 0.0979 0.0965 
                
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1995-2009. 
Note: Definition: (Share of POE employment) = (number of POE employees in both urban 
and rural areas) / (number of total employees in both urban and rural areas). Chongqing is 
included in Sichuan. 
Ave 0.0617 
S.D. 0.0782 
Max 0.5724 
Min 0.0009 
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Table 5A.3a 
Decentralisation variable 1 – self-funding share of the investment of capital construction.  
 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  
                
Beijing 0.4081 0.4588 0.4348 0.4564 0.5188 0.4662 0.4953 0.4889 0.5086 0.5369 0.3163 0.3172 0.3143 0.3588 0.3915 
Tianjin 0.3928 0.3767 0.3799 0.3570 0.3541 0.3395 0.4469 0.4448 0.5387 0.5177 0.4935 0.5037 0.5178 0.5059 0.5723 
Hebei 0.5442 0.5172 0.5068 0.5235 0.4604 0.4606 0.4782 0.5159 0.5903 0.6287 0.7082 0.7269 0.7502 0.7535 0.7731 
Shanxi 0.4049 0.4994 0.4807 0.4026 0.3195 0.2632 0.3140 0.3484 0.4077 0.4819 0.5977 0.6129 0.6392 0.6714 0.6823 
Neimenggu 0.3736 0.3663 0.3934 0.3355 0.3297 0.3152 0.3741 0.3184 0.3488 0.5152 0.6667 0.6586 0.7634 0.7975 0.8269 
Liaoning 0.4387 0.3874 0.4729 0.3800 0.4092 0.4061 0.3933 0.4002 0.4681 0.5621 0.6680 0.6792 0.6944 0.6695 0.7197 
Jilin 0.3521 0.3136 0.3829 0.4685 0.3514 0.4417 0.4153 0.4577 0.5603 0.5914 0.6635 0.6339 0.7190 0.7916 0.8387 
Heilongjiang 0.4180 0.4639 0.3937 0.5155 0.4516 0.3976 0.4231 0.4865 0.5916 0.6316 0.7077 0.7038 0.6901 0.7247 0.7415 
Shanghai 0.6240 0.5603 0.5741 0.5236 0.4842 0.4995 0.5193 0.4300 0.4433 0.5021 0.4152 0.4595 0.4555 0.4277 0.4948 
Jiangsu 0.5583 0.5829 0.5127 0.5248 0.5258 0.5606 0.5167 0.5993 0.5911 0.5429 0.5809 0.6145 0.6308 0.6143 0.6437 
Zhejiang 0.5936 0.5909 0.5179 0.5142 0.5242 0.4727 0.4834 0.4841 0.5352 0.5223 0.5151 0.5313 0.5678 0.5665 0.5937 
Anhui 0.4214 0.3764 0.3792 0.4259 0.4382 0.4580 0.4354 0.4378 0.4251 0.4918 0.6271 0.5880 0.6237 0.6594 0.7184 
Fujian 0.4769 0.4286 0.4668 0.4828 0.3729 0.4016 0.3830 0.3774 0.3430 0.4145 0.5041 0.4920 0.4629 0.4887 0.5495 
Jiangxi 0.4121 0.4456 0.4858 0.5119 0.4201 0.3560 0.3237 0.3917 0.3968 0.3962 0.6003 0.6164 0.6277 0.6587 0.6948 
Shandong 0.4634 0.4660 0.5007 0.5643 0.4453 0.4587 0.4972 0.5493 0.5956 0.6352 0.7117 0.7271 0.7246 0.7262 0.7382 
Henan 0.3275 0.3789 0.4104 0.3966 0.3809 0.3732 0.4182 0.4444 0.4568 0.4776 0.6320 0.6836 0.7364 0.7602 0.7860 
Hubei 0.3619 0.3958 0.3835 0.4712 0.3738 0.3756 0.3423 0.3767 0.3579 0.3475 0.5809 0.5930 0.5746 0.5832 0.6701 
Hunan 0.4830 0.5159 0.5235 0.4857 0.4244 0.4204 0.4113 0.4591 0.4931 0.4884 0.6529 0.6665 0.6374 0.6503 0.6785 
Guangdong 0.4372 0.4927 0.5201 0.5310 0.5406 0.5109 0.5346 0.5821 0.5523 0.5812 0.5200 0.5290 0.5029 0.5156 0.5814 
Guangxi 0.4552 0.4254 0.5407 0.6147 0.4795 0.4021 0.3909 0.4630 0.3945 0.3907 0.5262 0.5273 0.5338 0.5611 0.6104 
Hainan 0.4983 0.3954 0.4308 0.4604 0.4413 0.4126 0.4299 0.4520 0.3938 0.3404 0.4997 0.3678 0.3860 0.5479 0.4343 
Sichuan 0.4144 0.3934 0.3977 0.4255 0.3942 0.3942 0.4106 0.4483 0.4301 0.4466 0.5458 0.5782 0.5561 0.5352 0.5914 
Guizhou 0.3684 0.4021 0.3432 0.3801 0.3527 0.3532 0.3157 0.3805 0.3669 0.4811 0.5101 0.5384 0.5412 0.5471 0.5497 
Yunnan 0.5312 0.5593 0.5713 0.5379 0.4792 0.4466 0.4870 0.4264 0.3468 0.3821 0.4904 0.4799 0.4630 0.4794 0.5351 
Tibet 0.4002 0.1970 0.4748 0.4324 0.3154 0.3434 0.2260 0.2347 0.0854 0.2083 0.2243 0.1828 0.2754 0.2425 0.2452 
Shaanxi 0.4232 0.4277 0.4256 0.3634 0.3622 0.3260 0.3610 0.4072 0.3837 0.3939 0.5332 0.5590 0.5761 0.6327 0.6594 
Gansu 0.3514 0.2968 0.2750 0.3840 0.3234 0.3198 0.2856 0.2966 0.2845 0.2958 0.5110 0.5458 0.5518 0.5639 0.5440 
Qinghai 0.2913 0.2801 0.2636 0.3258 0.2891 0.2811 0.2472 0.3146 0.2266 0.4657 0.5772 0.5082 0.4598 0.5493 0.5308 
Ningxia 0.3304 0.3445 0.3227 0.3454 0.3708 0.3525 0.2718 0.2423 0.1899 0.3142 0.5091 0.5350 0.5244 0.5203 0.5243 
Xinjiang 0.4023 0.4238 0.5099 0.5977 0.4658 0.4193 0.4957 0.5368 0.4223 0.4509 0.5769 0.5623 0.5865 0.5922 0.5807 
                
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1995-2009. 
Note: Definition: (Share of self-funding) = (amount of the self-funding in the investment 
of capital construction) / (total amount of the investment of capital construction). 
Chongqing is included in Sichuan. 
Ave 0.4789 
S.D. 0.1235 
Max 0.8387 
Min 0.0854 
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Table 5A.3b 
Decentralisation variable 2 – local revenue share to local expenditure.  
 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  
                
Beijing 1.0134 0.7465 0.8050 0.8006 0.8519 0.8041 0.8125 0.8256 0.8786 0.8228 0.8520 0.8858 0.8755 0.9102 0.9505 
Tianjin 1.3912 1.2984 1.2474 1.0810 1.0962 1.0536 1.0627 1.0756 1.1324 1.1720 1.0317 1.2399 1.2452 1.2301 1.1886 
Hebei 0.5921 0.6274 0.6545 0.6510 0.6857 0.6365 0.5987 0.5514 0.5243 0.5193 0.5192 0.5267 0.5257 0.5238 0.5036 
Shanxi 0.0000 0.6396 0.6320 0.6467 0.6338 0.5891 0.5087 0.4586 0.4512 0.4476 0.4939 0.5508 0.6372 0.5695 0.5688 
Neimenggu 0.3910 0.4277 0.4530 0.5120 0.4939 0.4737 0.4240 0.3494 0.3216 0.3454 0.3953 0.4562 0.6498 0.7720 0.7612 
Liaoning 0.6874 0.6735 0.6725 0.6700 0.6779 0.6106 0.5705 0.5829 0.5785 0.5699 0.5686 0.5607 0.5748 0.6137 0.6297 
Jilin 0.4902 0.5234 0.5250 0.4939 0.4926 0.4317 0.3983 0.3710 0.3626 0.3763 0.3275 0.3282 0.3413 0.3629 0.3583 
Heilongjiang 0.5948 0.5802 0.6075 0.6447 0.6385 0.5307 0.5234 0.4840 0.4720 0.4840 0.4605 0.4558 0.4506 0.4370 0.4466 
Shanghai 0.8901 0.8485 0.8419 0.8214 0.8159 0.7904 0.7995 0.8539 0.8200 0.8156 0.8023 0.8636 0.8823 0.9549 0.9101 
Jiangsu 0.6825 0.6811 0.7177 0.7015 0.6980 0.7085 0.7582 0.7842 0.7483 0.7618 0.7473 0.7904 0.8229 0.8763 0.8411 
Zhejiang 0.6184 0.6480 0.6534 0.6551 0.6907 0.7135 0.7947 0.6998 0.7559 0.7879 0.8476 0.8428 0.8820 0.9129 0.8754 
Anhui 0.0000 0.6169 0.6409 0.6645 0.6572 0.6043 0.5539 0.4761 0.4386 0.4350 0.4566 0.4684 0.4552 0.4371 0.4399 
Fujian 0.0000 0.6841 0.7095 0.7261 0.7373 0.7482 0.7222 0.7350 0.6864 0.6737 0.6455 0.7294 0.7427 0.7681 0.7325 
Jiangxi 0.5356 0.5812 0.5847 0.5796 0.5544 0.5059 0.4992 0.4652 0.4117 0.4401 0.4532 0.4485 0.4387 0.4307 0.4038 
Shandong 0.6155 0.6489 0.6732 0.7191 0.7224 0.7354 0.7563 0.7604 0.7090 0.7063 0.6964 0.7319 0.7397 0.7407 0.7236 
Henan 0.5503 0.6013 0.6348 0.6623 0.6433 0.5812 0.5532 0.5265 0.4716 0.4717 0.4873 0.4817 0.4716 0.4609 0.4422 
Hubei 0.5646 0.6137 0.6306 0.6253 0.6031 0.5779 0.5813 0.4788 0.4760 0.4806 0.4804 0.4822 0.4547 0.4633 0.4307 
Hunan 0.5670 0.6218 0.5987 0.5942 0.5729 0.5317 0.5090 0.4758 0.4337 0.4682 0.4456 0.4526 0.4490 0.4470 0.4094 
Guangdong 0.7166 0.7274 0.7974 0.7968 0.7761 0.7407 0.8511 0.8783 0.7900 0.7758 0.7655 0.7895 0.8536 0.8817 0.8761 
Guangxi 0.4984 0.5651 0.5765 0.5804 0.6033 0.5937 0.5689 0.5081 0.4448 0.4591 0.4685 0.4629 0.4696 0.4248 0.3997 
Hainan 0.6881 0.6732 0.6798 0.6528 0.6344 0.7039 0.6366 0.5864 0.5265 0.5348 0.4924 0.5066 0.5219 0.5310 0.5237 
Sichuan 0.5729 0.6016 0.6397 0.6340 0.6196 0.5731 0.5169 0.4679 0.4297 0.4837 0.4986 0.5277 0.5246 0.5729 0.4560 
Guizhou 0.0000 0.4547 0.4967 0.5086 0.4909 0.4350 0.4228 0.3625 0.3419 0.3748 0.3568 0.3505 0.3714 0.3585 0.3312 
Yunnan 0.3765 0.4183 0.4808 0.4803 0.5129 0.4567 0.4365 0.3853 0.3924 0.3899 0.3968 0.4197 0.4252 0.4287 0.4177 
Tibet 0.0470 0.0616 0.0640 0.0978 0.0958 0.1003 0.1027 0.0695 0.0624 0.0677 0.0881 0.0758 0.0854 0.0828 0.0744 
Shaanxi 0.4980 0.4996 0.5551 0.5820 0.5616 0.5152 0.4231 0.3880 0.3712 0.4240 0.4163 0.4309 0.4408 0.4509 0.4140 
Gansu 0.4018 0.4168 0.4769 0.4630 0.4310 0.3949 0.3256 0.2971 0.2782 0.2922 0.2918 0.2877 0.2672 0.2827 0.2736 
Qinghai 0.2763 0.2985 0.2928 0.2994 0.2897 0.2544 0.2430 0.1957 0.1777 0.1970 0.1966 0.1992 0.1968 0.2010 0.1968 
Ningxia 0.3702 0.3905 0.4296 0.4185 0.3934 0.3803 0.3423 0.2947 0.2311 0.2839 0.3046 0.2978 0.3176 0.3309 0.2927 
Xinjiang 0.4573 0.3971 0.4205 0.4420 0.4479 0.4289 0.4141 0.3611 0.3225 0.3480 0.3698 0.3474 0.3235 0.3595 0.3408 
                
Source: Various provincial statistical yearbooks 1995-2009. 
Note: Definition: (Ratio of local revenue to expenditure) = (amount of local revenue in 
fiscal balance of payments) / (amount of local expenditure in fiscal balance of payments). 
Chongqing is included in Sichuan. 1994 data for Xinjiang are not available and 1990 data 
have been used instead.  
Ave 0.5513 
S.D. 0.2238 
Max 1.3912 
Min 0.0000 
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Table 5A.4a 
Market competition variable 1 – non-state share of industrial output.  
 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  
                
Beijing 0.4464 0.4184 0.4504 0.4549 0.2709 0.2672 0.3207 0.3489 0.4181 0.4615 0.4363 0.4906 0.5463 0.5370 0.5229 
Tianjin 0.4991 0.6070 0.6584 0.6592 0.6308 0.6763 0.6712 0.6686 0.6755 0.6403 0.6507 0.6119 0.5994 0.6184 0.6183 
Hebei 0.4034 0.4488 0.5080 0.5470 0.4393 0.4595 0.4754 0.5007 0.5458 0.5865 0.6130 0.6345 0.6806 0.6924 0.7108 
Shanxi 0.2899 0.2866 0.3322 0.3765 0.3474 0.3315 0.3115 0.3168 0.3737 0.4335 0.4828 0.4775 0.4836 0.4814 0.4813 
Neimenggu 0.2254 0.2294 0.2942 0.3322 0.1620 0.1514 0.2015 0.2373 0.2799 0.4110 0.4703 0.4758 0.5550 0.5996 0.5949 
Liaoning 0.3895 0.3868 0.4204 0.4434 0.3328 0.3485 0.3345 0.3463 0.3757 0.4189 0.4326 0.4664 0.5448 0.5584 0.6084 
Jilin 0.2543 0.2721 0.2845 0.2862 0.1935 0.1816 0.1801 0.1980 0.2209 0.2421 0.3010 0.3319 0.3830 0.4361 0.5166 
Heilongjiang 0.2178 0.2537 0.2964 0.3161 0.1672 0.1584 0.1584 0.1726 0.2041 0.2055 0.2251 0.2349 0.2271 0.2739 0.3252 
Shanghai 0.5222 0.5801 0.6150 0.6537 0.5015 0.4833 0.4834 0.5132 0.5416 0.5682 0.6137 0.6183 0.6269 0.6445 0.6430 
Jiangsu 0.7121 0.7028 0.7184 0.7318 0.6706 0.6840 0.7065 0.7351 0.7721 0.8103 0.8519 0.8456 0.8568 0.8759 0.8864 
Zhejiang 0.7564 0.7401 0.7706 0.7710 0.7351 0.7720 0.8042 0.8484 0.8639 0.8689 0.8503 0.8528 0.8618 0.8715 0.8700 
Anhui 0.4894 0.5265 0.5859 0.6902 0.3416 0.3505 0.3713 0.3899 0.4306 0.4487 0.4747 0.4705 0.5207 0.5660 0.5668 
Fujian 0.6718 0.7217 0.7537 0.7944 0.6667 0.6566 0.6732 0.7032 0.7378 0.7728 0.8040 0.8116 0.8290 0.8514 0.8612 
Jiangxi 0.3517 0.3176 0.3513 0.3960 0.2018 0.1908 0.2090 0.2436 0.2700 0.3571 0.4218 0.4859 0.5360 0.6238 0.6928 
Shandong 0.5963 0.5386 0.5869 0.6076 0.5787 0.5865 0.5805 0.6113 0.6346 0.6652 0.7286 0.7575 0.7620 0.7868 0.7909 
Henan 0.3905 0.4164 0.4583 0.4993 0.4543 0.4565 0.4618 0.4699 0.4860 0.4933 0.5741 0.6146 0.6817 0.6722 0.7315 
Hubei 0.3873 0.4436 0.5250 0.5834 0.3973 0.3827 0.3705 0.3707 0.3959 0.4324 0.4671 0.4788 0.5251 0.5091 0.5559 
Hunan 0.3657 0.3844 0.4498 0.4904 0.2948 0.3290 0.3381 0.3730 0.4119 0.4671 0.4845 0.5574 0.5712 0.6042 0.6625 
Guangdong 0.7186 0.7792 0.7980 0.8165 0.7298 0.7129 0.7495 0.7694 0.8071 0.8164 0.7957 0.8226 0.8346 0.8443 0.8297 
Guangxi 0.3603 0.4245 0.4566 0.4785 0.3259 0.3010 0.3378 0.3877 0.3997 0.4445 0.4572 0.5184 0.5537 0.5908 0.6250 
Hainan 0.3770 0.5017 0.5791 0.5753 0.2944 0.2893 0.3252 0.3439 0.3858 0.3596 0.4864 0.4964 0.5708 0.6847 0.7508 
Sichuan 0.4295 0.4389 0.4482 0.4634 0.3229 0.3420 0.3738 0.4100 0.4428 0.5051 0.5489 0.5648 0.5702 0.6115 0.6527 
Guizhou 0.1551 0.2104 0.2723 0.3028 0.1656 0.1784 0.2072 0.2306 0.2636 0.3170 0.3184 0.3170 0.3420 0.3623 0.3961 
Yunnan 0.1550 0.1860 0.2033 0.2502 0.1747 0.1894 0.1960 0.1966 0.2117 0.2641 0.3142 0.3559 0.3810 0.3941 0.4240 
Tibet 0.1688 0.2122 0.2399 0.2958 0.1738 0.2525 0.2321 0.3082 0.2741 0.2165 0.2533 0.3335 0.4710 0.5633 0.5563 
Shaanxi 0.2526 0.2534 0.3001 0.3610 0.2258 0.2259 0.2174 0.2241 0.2325 0.2593 0.2952 0.3135 0.2876 0.2954 0.3315 
Gansu 0.1879 0.2110 0.2513 0.2884 0.1786 0.2132 0.2360 0.2526 0.2852 0.2325 0.2113 0.2085 0.2028 0.1981 0.2120 
Qinghai 0.1068 0.1108 0.1353 0.1668 0.1083 0.1078 0.1089 0.1272 0.1766 0.2134 0.1885 0.1875 0.2023 0.2577 0.3217 
Ningxia 0.2333 0.2578 0.3039 0.3267 0.1652 0.2356 0.2699 0.2831 0.3375 0.3998 0.4432 0.4460 0.4911 0.5158 0.5133 
Xinjiang 0.1625 0.1602 0.1669 0.1747 0.1117 0.1012 0.1183 0.1546 0.1681 0.1825 0.2025 0.1750 0.1663 0.1998 0.2158 
                
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1995-2009. 
Note: Definition: (Share of non-state-owned industrial output) = [(all industrial output) – 
(SOE industrial output)] / (all industrial output). Chongqing is included in Sichuan. 
Ave 0.4442 
S.D. 0.2022 
Max 0.8864 
Min 0.1012 
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Table 5A.4b 
Market competition variable 2 – openness degree to international trade.  
 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  
                
Beijing 2.3275 2.2172 1.5087 1.3917 1.2562 1.3081 1.6572 1.1497 1.0036 1.1286 1.2917 1.4930 1.6026 1.5690 1.7991 
Tianjin 0.6591 0.7300 0.7198 0.6905 0.6575 0.7194 0.8662 0.7838 0.8779 0.9421 1.1182 1.1803 1.1829 1.0758 0.8788 
Hebei 0.1244 0.1148 0.1010 0.0860 0.0822 0.0830 0.0852 0.0861 0.0917 0.1074 0.1321 0.1304 0.1283 0.1416 0.1648 
Shanxi 0.0847 0.1072 0.0740 0.0751 0.0575 0.0707 0.0889 0.0792 0.0823 0.0896 0.1247 0.1087 0.1120 0.1536 0.1441 
Neimenggu 0.1169 0.0995 0.0886 0.0813 0.0669 0.0845 0.1549 0.0983 0.1038 0.0980 0.1013 0.1025 0.0981 0.0966 0.0798 
Liaoning 0.3584 0.3942 0.3704 0.3540 0.2717 0.2722 0.3374 0.3257 0.3297 0.3655 0.4269 0.4195 0.4187 0.4103 0.3737 
Jilin 0.2568 0.1928 0.1308 0.1062 0.0878 0.1103 0.1168 0.1252 0.1305 0.1912 0.1800 0.1477 0.1476 0.1482 0.1441 
Heilongjiang 0.1293 0.0989 0.0847 0.0754 0.0590 0.0628 0.0760 0.0826 0.0990 0.1087 0.1183 0.1422 0.1653 0.1862 0.1933 
Shanghai 0.7894 0.8260 0.7775 0.7352 0.7036 0.7923 0.9951 0.9674 1.0471 1.3890 1.6405 1.6675 1.7497 1.7646 1.6329 
Jiangsu 0.2497 0.2642 0.2866 0.2932 0.3030 0.3361 0.4402 0.4494 0.5485 0.7558 0.9425 1.0199 1.0459 1.0323 0.8988 
Zhejiang 0.2904 0.2727 0.2512 0.2545 0.2466 0.2825 0.3817 0.3935 0.4339 0.5237 0.6054 0.6546 0.7046 0.7160 0.6824 
Anhui 0.0907 0.0837 0.0790 0.0738 0.0666 0.0754 0.0912 0.0923 0.0983 0.1255 0.1254 0.1390 0.1592 0.1645 0.1580 
Fujian 0.6234 0.5584 0.4992 0.5026 0.4266 0.4108 0.4481 0.4599 0.5261 0.5867 0.6825 0.6785 0.6586 0.6121 0.5443 
Jiangxi 0.1188 0.0917 0.0611 0.0644 0.0558 0.0587 0.0671 0.0582 0.0572 0.0745 0.0845 0.0821 0.1057 0.1306 0.1459 
Shandong 0.2141 0.2328 0.2255 0.2199 0.1922 0.1974 0.2422 0.2606 0.2733 0.3059 0.3342 0.3395 0.3438 0.3587 0.3541 
Henan 0.0634 0.0620 0.0447 0.0384 0.0330 0.0316 0.0368 0.0416 0.0439 0.0568 0.0641 0.0598 0.0632 0.0648 0.0659 
Hubei 0.1260 0.1189 0.0801 0.0770 0.0633 0.0575 0.0624 0.0763 0.0777 0.0889 0.0994 0.1138 0.1237 0.1225 0.1269 
Hunan 0.1094 0.0775 0.0586 0.0524 0.0459 0.0487 0.0563 0.0596 0.0573 0.0663 0.0799 0.0755 0.0781 0.0801 0.0781 
Guangdong 1.9644 1.6126 1.4017 1.4745 1.3573 1.3726 1.4574 1.2134 1.3553 1.4811 1.5669 1.5674 1.6066 1.5514 1.3327 
Guangxi 0.2108 0.1723 0.0992 0.1308 0.1048 0.0743 0.0821 0.0653 0.0797 0.0935 0.1031 0.1041 0.1101 0.1182 0.1282 
Hainan 0.7189 0.5402 0.4830 0.3897 0.3293 0.2138 0.2056 0.2590 0.2484 0.2716 0.3524 0.2328 0.2199 0.2185 0.2155 
Sichuan 0.0961 0.0822 0.0745 0.0619 0.0517 0.0586 0.0640 0.0674 0.0772 0.0896 0.0978 0.0955 0.1087 0.1134 0.1248 
Guizhou 0.0775 0.0880 0.0566 0.0658 0.0617 0.0497 0.0550 0.0472 0.0460 0.0571 0.0747 0.0581 0.0568 0.0630 0.0701 
Yunnan 0.1444 0.1487 0.1031 0.0846 0.0762 0.0741 0.0768 0.0770 0.0797 0.0864 0.1005 0.1119 0.1246 0.1410 0.1169 
Tibet 0.5876 0.3240 0.2268 0.1891 0.1087 0.1305 0.0918 0.0527 0.0648 0.0700 0.0751 0.0670 0.0900 0.0874 0.1343 
Shaanxi 0.1499 0.1407 0.1234 0.1082 0.1230 0.1116 0.1067 0.0849 0.0817 0.0890 0.0949 0.1020 0.0945 0.0958 0.0844 
Gansu 0.0960 0.0905 0.0551 0.0508 0.0426 0.0361 0.0479 0.0573 0.0589 0.0785 0.0864 0.1114 0.1339 0.1554 0.1333 
Qinghai 0.0951 0.0778 0.0580 0.0528 0.0443 0.0375 0.0502 0.0565 0.0478 0.0719 0.1022 0.0623 0.0812 0.0594 0.0498 
Ningxia 0.1113 0.1080 0.0815 0.0888 0.0870 0.1090 0.1381 0.1307 0.0972 0.1214 0.1399 0.1306 0.1612 0.1352 0.1188 
Xinjiang 0.1098 0.1186 0.0856 0.0887 0.1131 0.1251 0.1374 0.0983 0.1382 0.2093 0.2111 0.2498 0.2383 0.2960 0.3671 
                
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1995-2009. 
Note: Definition: (Openness degree of international trade) = (total amount of import and 
export trade) / (regional gross domestic product). Chongqing is included in Sichuan. 
Ave 0.3204 
S.D. 0.4281 
Max 2.3275 
Min 0.0316 
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Table 5A.5a 
Financial pressure variable 1 – asset-liability ratio.  
 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  
                
Beijing 0.6222 0.5589 0.5575 0.5767 0.5868 0.5939 0.5549 0.5264 0.5139 0.5173 0.1909 0.3114 0.3235 0.3404 0.4480 
Tianjin 0.6588 0.6228 0.6445 0.6774 0.6646 0.6553 0.6387 0.6118 0.6015 0.6001 0.5827 0.6019 0.6012 0.6266 0.6316 
Hebei 0.6477 0.6368 0.6126 0.6058 0.6004 0.5961 0.6048 0.6337 0.6283 0.6232 0.6538 0.6401 0.6384 0.6102 0.6439 
Shanxi 0.6129 0.5612 0.5539 0.5754 0.6182 0.6552 0.6362 0.6399 0.6113 0.6376 0.6130 0.6782 0.6797 0.6765 0.6753 
Neimenggu 0.6037 0.5957 0.5925 0.6265 0.6184 0.6124 0.5802 0.5823 0.5625 0.5954 0.5935 0.6432 0.6298 0.6223 0.6626 
Liaoning 0.6255 0.6075 0.5776 0.5790 0.5893 0.5983 0.6075 0.5942 0.6089 0.5942 0.5435 0.5933 0.5775 0.6088 0.6319 
Jilin 0.6949 0.6772 0.6990 0.6870 0.6750 0.6644 0.6627 0.6345 0.6545 0.6316 0.5987 0.6057 0.5496 0.5853 0.5592 
Heilongjiang 0.6400 0.5811 0.5748 0.5789 0.6118 0.6459 0.5656 0.5795 0.5553 0.5408 0.5316 0.5450 0.5325 0.5526 0.5405 
Shanghai 0.5884 0.6045 0.6269 0.6536 0.5594 0.5083 0.4647 0.4278 0.4536 0.4453 0.4179 0.4360 0.4356 0.4562 0.4927 
Jiangsu 0.6639 0.6097 0.6066 0.6136 0.6063 0.6009 0.6024 0.5822 0.5846 0.6025 0.6513 0.5967 0.5758 0.5899 0.6214 
Zhejiang 0.6761 0.6250 0.5961 0.5991 0.5540 0.5224 0.5416 0.5186 0.5039 0.5097 0.3347 0.5741 0.5846 0.5881 0.6265 
Anhui 0.6925 0.6703 0.6874 0.6099 0.6099 0.6099 0.6001 0.5948 0.5737 0.6070 0.6717 0.6283 0.6495 0.6565 0.6639 
Fujian 0.7152 0.6601 0.6335 0.5337 0.5430 0.5487 0.6042 0.6079 0.6027 0.5904 0.5748 0.5615 0.6036 0.5934 0.6027 
Jiangxi 0.7238 0.7031 0.7025 0.6964 0.6960 0.6958 0.6805 0.6662 0.6512 0.6889 0.6881 0.6938 0.6645 0.6512 0.6307 
Shandong 0.8401 0.6186 0.6249 0.6226 0.6237 0.6246 0.5985 0.5839 0.5895 0.5843 0.6339 0.6018 0.6083 0.5902 0.5844 
Henan 0.6480 0.6038 0.6041 0.6144 0.6331 0.6481 0.6613 0.6440 0.6449 0.6655 0.6184 0.6562 0.6491 0.6502 0.6520 
Hubei 0.6294 0.6040 0.6132 0.6138 0.6293 0.6400 0.6233 0.6013 0.6182 0.5741 0.6696 0.5734 0.5408 0.5428 0.5151 
Hunan 0.6491 0.6012 0.6211 0.6432 0.6720 0.6984 0.6690 0.6704 0.6785 0.6576 0.7044 0.6723 0.6536 0.6235 0.6465 
Guangdong 0.6827 0.6888 0.6498 0.6816 0.6045 0.5638 0.5543 0.5296 0.5172 0.5348 0.5202 0.5321 0.4940 0.4865 0.5561 
Guangxi 0.6759 0.6426 0.6426 0.6544 0.6750 0.6922 0.6869 0.6083 0.6608 0.6297 0.6266 0.6291 0.6231 0.6404 0.6827 
Hainan 0.7234 0.6834 0.6188 0.7748 0.7498 0.7347 0.6711 0.6193 0.5528 0.5457 0.4790 0.5423 0.6133 0.4941 0.4393 
Sichuan 0.6655 0.6383 0.6466 0.6463 0.6456 0.6450 0.6471 0.6339 0.6209 0.6216 0.6782 0.6267 0.6176 0.6227 0.6283 
Guizhou 0.6621 0.6577 0.6518 0.6577 0.6748 0.6884 0.6958 0.6157 0.6346 0.6248 0.5486 0.6639 0.6724 0.6569 0.6771 
Yunnan 0.6589 0.6266 0.6375 0.6129 0.5640 0.5281 0.5359 0.5262 0.5262 0.5272 0.4800 0.4744 0.5057 0.4916 0.5494 
Tibet 0.2868 0.2733 0.2937 0.2847 0.3232 0.3453 0.2680 0.2285 0.2756 0.2746 0.2078 0.2548 0.4880 0.2040 0.2105 
Shaanxi 0.7128 0.6718 0.6788 0.7020 0.6968 0.6929 0.6893 0.6388 0.6396 0.6356 0.6374 0.6188 0.5981 0.5728 0.5656 
Gansu 0.6101 0.5887 0.5749 0.6127 0.6566 0.6983 0.6546 0.6533 0.6351 0.6508 0.6235 0.5932 0.5906 0.5838 0.5629 
Qinghai 0.7582 0.6934 0.6294 0.7357 0.6948 0.6640 0.7339 0.6984 0.6866 0.6879 0.7269 0.6856 0.6687 0.6315 0.6298 
Ningxia 0.6297 0.5915 0.5717 0.6109 0.6475 0.6773 0.5839 0.5538 0.6043 0.6477 0.5923 0.6094 0.6045 0.6353 0.6556 
Xinjiang 0.6812 0.6437 0.6392 0.6111 0.6227 0.6334 0.6275 0.5987 0.5783 0.5151 0.5328 0.5058 0.5053 0.4936 0.5105 
                
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1995-2009. 
Note: Definition: (Asset-liability ratio) = (total amount of liability of SOEs) / (total assets 
of SOEs). Chongqing is included in Sichuan. Due to the unavailability of data for 1998 in 
all provinces, data from adjacent years have been interpolated for this year.  
Ave 0.5998 
S.D. 0.0907 
Max 0.8401 
Min 0.1909 
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Table 5A.5b 
Financial pressure variable 2 – deficit budget share.  
 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  
                
Beijing -0.0134 0.2535 0.1950 0.2288 0.1825 0.2079 0.2212 0.1877 0.1502 0.1712 0.1712 0.1314 0.1386 0.0951 0.0622 
Tianjin 0.3213 0.3368 0.3018 0.2678 0.2649 0.2834 0.2857 0.3027 0.3521 0.3436 0.3436 0.2494 0.2321 0.1985 0.2214 
Hebei 0.4080 0.3726 0.3455 0.3490 0.3143 0.3635 0.4013 0.4486 0.4757 0.4808 0.4808 0.4733 0.4743 0.4762 0.4964 
Shanxi 0.3968 0.3604 0.3680 0.3533 0.3662 0.4109 0.4913 0.5414 0.5488 0.5061 0.5061 0.4492 0.3628 0.4305 0.4312 
Neimenggu 0.6089 0.5723 0.5470 0.5376 0.5440 0.5667 0.6157 0.6886 0.7133 0.6512 0.6512 0.5931 0.5772 0.5451 0.5527 
Liaoning 0.3126 0.3267 0.3275 0.3302 0.3220 0.3893 0.4294 0.4170 0.4215 0.4313 0.4313 0.4393 0.4253 0.3863 0.3703 
Jilin 0.5098 0.4766 0.4750 0.5061 0.5074 0.5683 0.6017 0.6290 0.6374 0.6725 0.6725 0.6718 0.6587 0.6371 0.6417 
Heilongjiang 0.4055 0.4198 0.3926 0.3822 0.3938 0.4982 0.5147 0.5533 0.5640 0.5851 0.5851 0.5961 0.6006 0.6290 0.6251 
Shanghai 0.1096 0.1804 0.1582 0.1868 0.1901 0.2129 0.2024 0.1393 0.1779 0.1999 0.1999 0.1390 0.1222 0.0491 0.0907 
Jiangsu 0.3175 0.3189 0.2823 0.2985 0.3020 0.2915 0.2418 0.2159 0.2517 0.2527 0.2527 0.2096 0.1771 0.1237 0.1589 
Zhejiang 0.3816 0.3520 0.3466 0.3449 0.3093 0.2865 0.2052 0.1617 0.2441 0.2418 0.2418 0.1572 0.1180 0.0871 0.1246 
Anhui 0.4137 0.3831 0.3588 0.3219 0.3424 0.3961 0.4475 0.5241 0.5618 0.5434 0.5434 0.5316 0.5448 0.5629 0.5601 
Fujian 0.0000 0.3159 0.2905 0.2739 0.2627 0.2518 0.2779 0.2650 0.3136 0.3545 0.3545 0.2706 0.2573 0.2319 0.2675 
Jiangxi 0.4644 0.4188 0.4153 0.4110 0.4456 0.4941 0.5008 0.5348 0.5883 0.5468 0.5468 0.5515 0.5613 0.5693 0.5962 
Shandong 0.3845 0.3511 0.3268 0.2879 0.2776 0.2646 0.2437 0.2396 0.2910 0.3036 0.3036 0.2681 0.2603 0.2593 0.2764 
Henan 0.4497 0.3987 0.3652 0.3469 0.3567 0.4188 0.4468 0.4735 0.5284 0.5127 0.5127 0.5183 0.5284 0.5391 0.5578 
Hubei 0.4354 0.3863 0.3694 0.3747 0.3969 0.4221 0.4188 0.5212 0.5240 0.5196 0.5196 0.5178 0.5453 0.5378 0.5693 
Hunan 0.4330 0.3782 0.4013 0.4058 0.4271 0.4683 0.4910 0.5242 0.5663 0.5544 0.5544 0.5475 0.5510 0.5530 0.5906 
Guangdong 0.2834 0.3471 0.2026 0.2032 0.2239 0.2068 0.1571 0.1217 0.2100 0.2345 0.2345 0.2105 0.1464 0.1183 0.1239 
Guangxi 0.5016 0.4349 0.4235 0.4196 0.3967 0.4063 0.4311 0.4919 0.5552 0.5315 0.5315 0.5371 0.5304 0.5752 0.6003 
Hainan 0.3119 0.3268 0.3202 0.3547 0.3867 0.3635 0.3886 0.4456 0.4988 0.5516 0.5516 0.5459 0.5313 0.5583 0.5953 
Sichuan 0.4271 0.3984 0.3603 0.3826 0.3991 0.4390 0.4980 0.5464 0.5852 0.5458 0.5458 0.5308 0.5234 0.4882 0.5916 
Guizhou 0.5791 0.5453 0.5033 0.5003 0.5090 0.5650 0.5772 0.6375 0.6581 0.6432 0.6432 0.6495 0.6286 0.6415 0.6699 
Yunnan 0.6235 0.5817 0.5192 0.5197 0.4871 0.5433 0.5635 0.6147 0.6076 0.6032 0.6032 0.5920 0.5748 0.5713 0.5823 
Tibet 0.9530 0.9384 0.9338 0.9227 0.9197 0.9141 0.9102 0.9416 0.9470 0.9251 0.9251 0.9351 0.9273 0.9269 0.9346 
Shaanxi 0.5020 0.5004 0.4449 0.4442 0.4384 0.4848 0.5769 0.6120 0.6288 0.5837 0.5837 0.5691 0.5602 0.5491 0.5860 
Gansu 0.5982 0.5832 0.5231 0.5502 0.5690 0.6051 0.6744 0.7029 0.7218 0.7082 0.7082 0.7123 0.7328 0.7173 0.7264 
Qinghai 0.7236 0.7015 0.7072 0.7006 0.7103 0.7456 0.7570 0.8043 0.8223 0.8034 0.8034 0.8008 0.8032 0.7990 0.8032 
Ningxia 0.6300 0.6095 0.5704 0.5815 0.6066 0.6197 0.6577 0.7053 0.7689 0.6954 0.6954 0.7022 0.6824 0.6691 0.7073 
Xinjiang 0.5963 0.5953 0.5795 0.5580 0.5521 0.5711 0.5859 0.6389 0.6775 0.6302 0.6302 0.6526 0.6765 0.6405 0.6592 
                
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1995-2009. 
Note: Definition: (Share of deficit budget) = (Regional expenditure – revenue) / (Regional 
expenditure). Chongqing is included in Sichuan. 
Ave 0.4654 
S.D. 0.1891 
Max 0.9530 
Min -0.0134 
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Table 5A.6a 
Institutional infrastructure variable 1 – national physical infrastructure index.  
 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  
                
Beijing 0.2555 0.2856 0.3190 0.3614 0.4047 0.4495 0.4846 0.5341 0.5670 0.6156 0.6997 0.7386 0.8011 0.7950 0.7569 
Tianjin 0.1427 0.1680 0.1897 0.2132 0.2402 0.3837 0.4142 0.4537 0.4707 0.5295 0.5816 0.5958 0.5944 0.5683 0.5652 
Hebei 0.0808 0.0919 0.1082 0.1213 0.1374 0.1553 0.1942 0.2617 0.3219 0.4027 0.4682 0.2934 0.3950 0.3902 0.3842 
Shanxi 0.0613 0.0685 0.0791 0.0973 0.1178 0.1352 0.1654 0.1971 0.2273 0.2718 0.3021 0.3289 0.4001 0.4039 0.4068 
Neimenggu 0.0176 0.0254 0.0326 0.0402 0.0489 0.0602 0.0786 0.0969 0.1157 0.1571 0.1820 0.1907 0.1996 0.1957 0.1832 
Liaoning 0.0980 0.1115 0.1249 0.1391 0.1552 0.1751 0.1788 0.2400 0.2815 0.3362 0.3815 0.4098 0.4946 0.4970 0.4896 
Jilin 0.0593 0.0719 0.0822 0.0917 0.1012 0.1114 0.1218 0.1400 0.1511 0.1842 0.2042 0.2945 0.3334 0.3377 0.3074 
Heilongjiang 0.0430 0.0526 0.0631 0.0737 0.0829 0.1092 0.1304 0.1500 0.1733 0.2206 0.2686 0.2595 0.3025 0.3098 0.3044 
Shanghai 0.2040 0.2281 0.2567 0.2836 0.3180 0.4467 0.4505 0.5716 0.6069 0.6283 0.7432 0.8077 0.9509 0.9331 0.9376 
Jiangsu 0.0870 0.1000 0.1156 0.1330 0.1511 0.1693 0.1934 0.3077 0.3391 0.3957 0.4890 0.5518 0.6865 0.7013 0.6911 
Zhejiang 0.1158 0.1340 0.1475 0.1645 0.1891 0.2235 0.2603 0.3112 0.3603 0.4083 0.4632 0.4983 0.6461 0.6550 0.6432 
Anhui 0.0642 0.0783 0.0860 0.0949 0.1059 0.1177 0.1463 0.2053 0.2285 0.2585 0.2805 0.3175 0.4874 0.4879 0.4727 
Fujian 0.1239 0.1408 0.1546 0.1720 0.1878 0.2144 0.2415 0.2931 0.3374 0.3819 0.4163 0.4498 0.5301 0.5306 0.5205 
Jiangxi 0.0582 0.0644 0.0679 0.0821 0.0989 0.1023 0.1234 0.1774 0.1922 0.2152 0.2273 0.2531 0.3718 0.3753 0.3725 
Shandong 0.0903 0.1075 0.1218 0.1350 0.1540 0.1762 0.2168 0.2527 0.2801 0.3151 0.3541 0.3678 0.5797 0.5869 0.5944 
Henan 0.0840 0.0937 0.1024 0.1164 0.1278 0.1476 0.1796 0.2005 0.2116 0.2307 0.2548 0.2810 0.5553 0.5518 0.5284 
Hubei 0.0752 0.0837 0.0939 0.1017 0.1099 0.1356 0.1522 0.2074 0.2210 0.2445 0.2333 0.3055 0.4546 0.4509 0.4418 
Hunan 0.0815 0.0881 0.0953 0.1026 0.1108 0.1221 0.1526 0.1674 0.2029 0.2196 0.2398 0.2665 0.3908 0.3926 0.3956 
Guangdong 0.1637 0.1938 0.2140 0.2316 0.2461 0.2688 0.2857 0.3352 0.3692 0.4282 0.4572 0.4786 0.5902 0.6010 0.5844 
Guangxi 0.0466 0.0532 0.0602 0.0647 0.0750 0.0883 0.1118 0.1268 0.1454 0.1679 0.1976 0.2174 0.2569 0.2555 0.2526 
Hainan 0.1231 0.1410 0.1463 0.1524 0.1695 0.1773 0.1887 0.2358 0.2617 0.3276 0.3607 0.3934 0.3802 0.3707 0.3597 
Sichuan 0.0511 0.0563 0.0633 0.0731 0.0833 0.0969 0.1093 0.1447 0.1513 0.1753 0.2017 0.2349 0.3029 0.3208 0.3289 
Guizhou 0.0464 0.0486 0.0520 0.0553 0.0603 0.0655 0.0756 0.0850 0.1048 0.1099 0.1171 0.1680 0.2782 0.2998 0.2976 
Yunnan 0.0446 0.0546 0.0579 0.0681 0.0828 0.1086 0.1239 0.1760 0.1905 0.1993 0.2111 0.2200 0.2495 0.2471 0.2466 
Tibet 0.0030 0.0052 0.0073 0.0106 0.0155 0.0216 0.0292 0.0445 0.0580 0.0758 0.1142 0.1552 0.1996 0.1969 0.2052 
Shaanxi 0.0542 0.0607 0.0696 0.0795 0.0899 0.1024 0.1294 0.1466 0.1715 0.2086 0.2381 0.2547 0.3457 0.3583 0.3610 
Gansu 0.0229 0.0273 0.0320 0.0372 0.0442 0.0515 0.0731 0.0955 0.1178 0.1428 0.1659 0.1901 0.2412 0.2365 0.2181 
Qinghai 0.0071 0.0139 0.0211 0.0272 0.0334 0.0427 0.0569 0.0737 0.0904 0.1182 0.1459 0.1744 0.1976 0.1947 0.1900 
Ningxia 0.0504 0.0617 0.0742 0.0838 0.0971 0.1138 0.1362 0.2018 0.2654 0.3580 0.4320 0.2374 0.2703 0.2663 0.2408 
Xinjiang 0.0095 0.0183 0.0308 0.0420 0.0528 0.0651 0.0785 0.1197 0.1506 0.1883 0.2220 0.2484 0.2910 0.2814 0.2518 
                
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1995-2009. 
Note: Definition: (Physical index) = [(road index) + (telephone index)] / 2; where the road 
index is calculated by the highway length per square kilometer, and the telephone index is 
calculated by the fixed line subscribers to local population; both indexes are under 
nationwide comparison. Chongqing is included in Sichuan. 
Ave 0.2351 
S.D. 0.1786 
Max 0.9509 
Min 0.0030 
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Table 5A.6b 
Institutional infrastructure variable 2 – national legal infrastructure index.  
 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  
                
Beijing 0.0496 0.0525 0.0488 0.0532 0.0703 0.0918 0.1159 0.1433 0.1588 0.1956 0.2794 0.3197 0.4300 0.5501 0.6430 
Tianjin 0.0132 0.0142 0.0137 0.0149 0.0181 0.0229 0.0258 0.0296 0.0324 0.0406 0.0427 0.0492 0.0622 0.0802 0.0969 
Hebei 0.0161 0.0168 0.0170 0.0182 0.0236 0.0317 0.0272 0.0248 0.0300 0.0321 0.0310 0.0339 0.0409 0.0512 0.0524 
Shanxi 0.0050 0.0055 0.0048 0.0044 0.0056 0.0076 0.0080 0.0091 0.0094 0.0110 0.0125 0.0122 0.0143 0.0201 0.0246 
Neimenggu 0.0027 0.0039 0.0034 0.0044 0.0057 0.0072 0.0092 0.0090 0.0083 0.0118 0.0117 0.0121 0.0131 0.0159 0.0153 
Liaoning 0.0324 0.0332 0.0315 0.0333 0.0391 0.0542 0.0559 0.0557 0.0614 0.0758 0.0830 0.0920 0.0989 0.1227 0.1345 
Jilin 0.0104 0.0091 0.0092 0.0096 0.0130 0.0175 0.0168 0.0159 0.0162 0.0179 0.0225 0.0222 0.0262 0.0315 0.0336 
Heilongjiang 0.0165 0.0167 0.0152 0.0175 0.0196 0.0268 0.0256 0.0205 0.0226 0.0284 0.0287 0.0303 0.0368 0.0517 0.0569 
Shanghai 0.0225 0.0228 0.0254 0.0292 0.0341 0.0474 0.0686 0.0950 0.1125 0.2039 0.1692 0.2144 0.2845 0.3701 0.3852 
Jiangsu 0.0263 0.0283 0.0324 0.0377 0.0466 0.0698 0.0737 0.0754 0.0902 0.1165 0.1350 0.1585 0.1895 0.2942 0.4040 
Zhejiang 0.0198 0.0219 0.0246 0.0320 0.0439 0.0662 0.0738 0.0824 0.1034 0.1419 0.1512 0.1724 0.2691 0.3612 0.4555 
Anhui 0.0054 0.0057 0.0057 0.0066 0.0094 0.0138 0.0149 0.0134 0.0151 0.0172 0.0174 0.0226 0.0270 0.0404 0.0508 
Fujian 0.0071 0.0090 0.0119 0.0152 0.0220 0.0276 0.0326 0.0332 0.0385 0.0514 0.0452 0.0498 0.0572 0.0696 0.0727 
Jiangxi 0.0048 0.0051 0.0052 0.0064 0.0080 0.0106 0.0120 0.0111 0.0115 0.0140 0.0140 0.0164 0.0169 0.0215 0.0223 
Shandong 0.0294 0.0321 0.0320 0.0352 0.0460 0.0661 0.0701 0.0699 0.0757 0.0987 0.1150 0.1345 0.1397 0.2059 0.2472 
Henan 0.0154 0.0152 0.0169 0.0176 0.0231 0.0329 0.0326 0.0311 0.0296 0.0332 0.0366 0.0430 0.0538 0.0691 0.0860 
Hubei 0.0141 0.0143 0.0132 0.0155 0.0193 0.0291 0.0311 0.0342 0.0348 0.0432 0.0489 0.0555 0.0598 0.0787 0.0981 
Hunan 0.0177 0.0173 0.0169 0.0186 0.0238 0.0323 0.0345 0.0336 0.0346 0.0436 0.0463 0.0498 0.0673 0.0683 0.0726 
Guangdong 0.0300 0.0433 0.0489 0.0673 0.0984 0.1322 0.1508 0.1734 0.2168 0.2749 0.2813 0.3521 0.4029 0.5197 0.5981 
Guangxi 0.0057 0.0063 0.0064 0.0065 0.0087 0.0111 0.0104 0.0107 0.0106 0.0127 0.0147 0.0144 0.0121 0.0158 0.0193 
Hainan 0.0005 0.0009 0.0019 0.0031 0.0039 0.0068 0.0026 0.0065 0.0020 0.0030 0.0023 0.0021 0.0024 0.0027 0.0045 
Sichuan 0.0256 0.0271 0.0246 0.0262 0.0327 0.0542 0.0548 0.0569 0.0653 0.0892 0.1018 0.0927 0.1341 0.1544 0.1466 
Guizhou 0.0020 0.0027 0.0047 0.0028 0.0040 0.0050 0.0057 0.0052 0.0056 0.0067 0.0066 0.0080 0.0110 0.0142 0.0149 
Yunnan 0.0041 0.0065 0.0049 0.0082 0.0129 0.0179 0.0189 0.0233 0.0178 0.0209 0.0207 0.0189 0.0172 0.0220 0.0187 
Tibet 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003 0.0006 0.0005 0.0007 
Shaanxi 0.0121 0.0114 0.0100 0.0111 0.0119 0.0166 0.0163 0.0150 0.0196 0.0211 0.0229 0.0244 0.0287 0.0425 0.0567 
Gansu 0.0038 0.0033 0.0035 0.0036 0.0042 0.0052 0.0052 0.0054 0.0058 0.0076 0.0099 0.0128 0.0171 0.0210 0.0229 
Qinghai 0.0005 0.0006 0.0007 0.0010 0.0006 0.0012 0.0009 0.0010 0.0013 0.0011 0.0012 0.0012 0.0020 0.0044 0.0056 
Ningxia 0.0011 0.0010 0.0009 0.0008 0.0009 0.0014 0.0021 0.0023 0.0021 0.0032 0.0030 0.0024 0.0026 0.0027 0.0053 
Xinjiang 0.0038 0.0035 0.0041 0.0035 0.0052 0.0090 0.0090 0.0101 0.0099 0.0119 0.0129 0.0113 0.0133 0.0158 0.0156 
                
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1995-2009. 
Note: Definition: (Legal index) = [(patent index) + (technical market index)] / 2; where the 
patent index is calculated by the number of three kinds of patents (i.e. inventions, utility 
models and designs) granted by local governments, and the technical market index is 
calculated by the total business volume in local technical markets; both indexes are under 
nationwide comparison. Chongqing is included in Sichuan. 
Ave 0.0485 
S.D. 0.0863 
Max 0.6430 
Min 0.0000 
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Table 5A.7a 
Economic efficiency variable 1 – asset-contribution rate.  
 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  
                
Beijing 0.1609 0.1320 0.0621 0.0623 0.0603 0.0601 0.0627 0.0606 0.0633 0.0772 0.0875 0.0450 0.0489 0.0552 0.0464 
Tianjin 0.0727 0.0476 0.0407 0.0380 0.0416 0.0360 0.0549 0.0473 0.0640 0.0881 0.1095 0.1391 0.1756 0.1618 0.1332 
Hebei 0.1072 0.0831 0.0771 0.0718 0.0633 0.0635 0.0756 0.0746 0.0827 0.0960 0.1082 0.1044 0.1062 0.1187 0.0958 
Shanxi 0.0947 0.0732 0.0600 0.0489 0.0457 0.0391 0.0496 0.0492 0.0577 0.0753 0.0957 0.0938 0.1020 0.1128 0.1029 
Neimenggu 0.0844 0.0641 0.0502 0.0608 0.0502 0.0516 0.0586 0.0546 0.0591 0.0661 0.0907 0.0982 0.0975 0.1143 0.0981 
Liaoning 0.0933 0.0505 0.0457 0.0428 0.0460 0.0464 0.0648 0.0559 0.0557 0.0676 0.0926 0.0745 0.0728 0.0886 0.0433 
Jilin 0.0845 0.0526 0.0354 0.0355 0.0504 0.0601 0.0788 0.0753 0.0806 0.1048 0.1090 0.0849 0.0930 0.1514 0.1042 
Heilongjiang 0.1707 0.1351 0.1261 0.1361 0.0901 0.1340 0.2377 0.2034 0.1862 0.2247 0.2852 0.3535 0.3733 0.3367 0.3589 
Shanghai 0.1502 0.1259 0.1038 0.0868 0.0690 0.0757 0.0845 0.0808 0.1110 0.1368 0.1487 0.1172 0.1212 0.1242 0.0867 
Jiangsu 0.1061 0.0922 0.0776 0.0791 0.0614 0.0659 0.0728 0.0792 0.0795 0.0898 0.1115 0.1126 0.1274 0.1402 0.1091 
Zhejiang 0.1391 0.0935 0.0830 0.0919 0.0763 0.0761 0.0874 0.0995 0.1159 0.1237 0.1616 0.1337 0.1322 0.1482 0.1010 
Anhui 0.1214 0.1043 0.0913 0.0978 0.0627 0.0664 0.0684 0.0791 0.0889 0.1081 0.1084 0.1120 0.1001 0.1063 0.1094 
Fujian 0.1970 0.1222 0.1319 0.1281 0.0938 0.0983 0.0967 0.0975 0.1148 0.1262 0.1488 0.1189 0.1151 0.1267 0.0992 
Jiangxi 0.1040 0.0646 0.0465 0.0417 0.0482 0.0473 0.0595 0.0587 0.0664 0.0755 0.0914 0.0974 0.1239 0.1200 0.0941 
Shandong 0.1035 0.0943 0.0979 0.0932 0.0752 0.0761 0.1116 0.1054 0.0997 0.1139 0.1397 0.1584 0.1671 0.1764 0.1665 
Henan 0.1244 0.1006 0.0903 0.0749 0.0570 0.0562 0.0678 0.0669 0.0733 0.0831 0.1005 0.1022 0.1270 0.1302 0.1086 
Hubei 0.1245 0.0794 0.0610 0.0620 0.0548 0.0589 0.0685 0.0733 0.0809 0.0666 0.0823 0.0918 0.1011 0.1065 0.1088 
Hunan 0.1269 0.0908 0.0981 0.0803 0.0824 0.0813 0.0834 0.0885 0.0888 0.1017 0.1230 0.1274 0.1310 0.1662 0.1638 
Guangdong 0.1642 0.1221 0.0869 0.0897 0.0767 0.0839 0.0925 0.0953 0.0934 0.1088 0.1265 0.1303 0.1546 0.1768 0.1549 
Guangxi 0.1838 0.0889 0.0388 0.0396 0.0554 0.0584 0.0760 0.0644 0.0670 0.0895 0.1158 0.1082 0.1248 0.1212 0.0953 
Hainan 0.0894 0.0385 0.0072 0.0117 0.0694 0.0477 0.0551 0.0653 0.0948 0.0928 0.1194 0.1172 0.1528 0.1359 0.1469 
Sichuan 0.0845 0.0639 0.0619 0.0625 0.0592 0.0519 0.0597 0.0622 0.0708 0.0773 0.0821 0.0883 0.0983 0.1107 0.0814 
Guizhou 0.1396 0.1036 0.0827 0.0927 0.0730 0.0701 0.0735 0.0703 0.0695 0.0799 0.1035 0.0970 0.1067 0.1252 0.1009 
Yunnan 0.6112 0.4718 0.4344 0.3845 0.1915 0.1740 0.1726 0.1564 0.1625 0.1739 0.2131 0.2008 0.1972 0.2094 0.1668 
Tibet 0.0225 0.0382 0.0450 0.0668 0.0575 0.0467 0.0435 0.0374 0.0316 0.0498 0.0483 0.0468 0.0431 0.0332 0.0173 
Shaanxi 0.0652 0.0441 0.0284 0.0279 0.0399 0.0504 0.0697 0.0664 0.0789 0.0976 0.1303 0.1587 0.1640 0.1661 0.1679 
Gansu 0.0817 0.0585 0.0453 0.0337 0.0385 0.0446 0.0491 0.0510 0.0613 0.0651 0.0948 0.0954 0.0957 0.1342 0.0742 
Qinghai 0.0445 0.0182 -0.0127 0.0019 0.0346 0.0481 0.0480 0.0463 0.0535 0.0480 0.0927 0.1216 0.1458 0.1458 0.1330 
Ningxia 0.0548 0.0561 0.0400 0.0346 0.0472 0.0426 0.0497 0.0517 0.0536 0.0493 0.0697 0.0562 0.0633 0.0827 0.0609 
Xinjiang 0.0488 0.0418 0.0315 0.0474 0.0583 0.0596 0.1131 0.1061 0.0915 0.1299 0.1906 0.2385 0.2795 0.2584 0.2328 
                
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1995-2009. 
Note: Definition: (Ratio of total asset contribution) = (total profits + tax + interest 
expenditure) / (total amount of fixed assets in original value). Chongqing is included in 
Sichuan. 
Ave 0.0975 
S.D. 0.0621 
Max 0.6112 
Min -0.0127 
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Table 5A.7b 
Economic efficiency variable 2 – asset-output ratio.  
 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  
                
Beijing 0.6492 0.4810 0.4317 0.4159 0.4875 0.4603 0.5209 0.5554 0.5513 0.6056 0.3299 0.3501 0.3510 0.3676 0.4066 
Tianjin 0.6087 0.4054 0.3837 0.3607 0.3933 0.3272 0.3576 0.3877 0.4160 0.5364 0.6783 0.8046 0.9341 0.8983 0.8803 
Hebei 0.5975 0.5109 0.4822 0.4494 0.4475 0.4286 0.4591 0.4540 0.4727 0.5392 0.7111 0.7960 0.7873 0.7860 0.8087 
Shanxi 0.4728 0.4100 0.3814 0.3460 0.3108 0.2940 0.3092 0.3222 0.3432 0.4135 0.4853 0.5575 0.5580 0.6154 0.6216 
Neimenggu 0.4478 0.3953 0.3669 0.3644 0.3330 0.3285 0.3689 0.3802 0.3884 0.4418 0.5138 0.5630 0.5090 0.4911 0.5776 
Liaoning 0.5487 0.4238 0.3973 0.3824 0.3777 0.3717 0.4649 0.4472 0.4588 0.5658 0.6719 0.7934 0.8123 0.8325 0.8151 
Jilin 0.5482 0.4344 0.4292 0.4105 0.4067 0.4354 0.4953 0.5283 0.5891 0.6884 0.7274 0.7806 0.7932 0.9853 0.9063 
Heilongjiang 0.5438 0.4746 0.4703 0.4501 0.4712 0.5179 0.5818 0.5394 0.5325 0.6242 0.7116 0.9055 0.9580 0.9151 0.9412 
Shanghai 0.6723 0.5653 0.5405 0.5021 0.5735 0.4816 0.5101 0.4932 0.5945 0.7067 0.7455 0.7441 0.7891 0.7889 0.8200 
Jiangsu 0.9047 0.7334 0.6892 0.6233 0.6570 0.6100 0.6162 0.6506 0.6397 0.6769 0.7847 0.9148 0.9359 0.9450 0.9278 
Zhejiang 0.8273 0.6300 0.5675 0.5113 0.5643 0.4557 0.5357 0.4999 0.5438 0.6275 0.7956 0.8799 0.9318 0.9730 0.9552 
Anhui 0.7413 0.6249 0.6187 0.5631 0.5402 0.4537 0.4559 0.4939 0.5281 0.5593 0.6815 0.7368 0.7265 0.7205 0.8060 
Fujian 0.7284 0.5663 0.5057 0.4785 0.5880 0.5277 0.5786 0.5695 0.6088 0.6909 0.7597 0.8045 0.8039 0.7057 0.6755 
Jiangxi 0.6740 0.5410 0.5077 0.4706 0.4498 0.4348 0.4515 0.4553 0.5091 0.5309 0.6900 0.7874 0.8939 0.9126 0.9130 
Shandong 0.6934 0.6005 0.5773 0.5317 0.5269 0.5131 0.5700 0.5774 0.6305 0.6875 0.7892 0.8886 0.9215 0.9648 1.0150 
Henan 0.6024 0.5506 0.5491 0.5007 0.4839 0.4456 0.4928 0.4901 0.5091 0.5779 0.6330 0.7491 0.7338 0.9251 0.8419 
Hubei 0.6400 0.5346 0.5065 0.4819 0.5075 0.4552 0.4843 0.5022 0.5215 0.4206 0.4911 0.5239 0.5391 0.5606 0.6113 
Hunan 0.6679 0.5347 0.5197 0.4496 0.4403 0.4412 0.4762 0.4840 0.4881 0.5428 0.6837 0.7493 0.7707 0.8474 0.8270 
Guangdong 0.7439 0.5955 0.5405 0.4928 0.5952 0.5228 0.5589 0.5495 0.5387 0.6240 0.8841 0.9549 0.8406 0.8867 0.9367 
Guangxi 0.8026 0.5554 0.4926 0.4500 0.4771 0.4460 0.4553 0.4031 0.4803 0.5371 0.6308 0.6830 0.7753 0.7140 0.7353 
Hainan 0.5346 0.4007 0.3554 0.3688 0.4877 0.3961 0.4187 0.4870 0.5220 0.6602 0.6025 0.5544 0.6212 0.6208 0.6321 
Sichuan 0.5909 0.4665 0.4641 0.4015 0.3995 0.3546 0.3716 0.3822 0.4141 0.4442 0.5476 0.5859 0.6465 0.6658 0.6151 
Guizhou 0.4794 0.4157 0.3980 0.3748 0.3931 0.3774 0.3696 0.3603 0.3754 0.4012 0.4671 0.5099 0.5298 0.5835 0.5404 
Yunnan 0.8114 0.6312 0.6284 0.5538 0.5239 0.4339 0.4371 0.4160 0.4523 0.4683 0.5243 0.5937 0.6433 0.6753 0.6216 
Tibet 0.2488 0.2303 0.2335 0.1979 0.2204 0.1834 0.1655 0.1606 0.1818 0.2145 0.1795 0.1967 0.2249 0.1442 0.1205 
Shaanxi 0.5261 0.4274 0.4134 0.3825 0.3756 0.3706 0.3992 0.4002 0.4279 0.4685 0.5592 0.6237 0.6658 0.6824 0.6510 
Gansu 0.5495 0.4401 0.4147 0.3807 0.3922 0.3695 0.4205 0.4530 0.4346 0.4766 0.6305 0.8119 0.7519 0.8969 0.8293 
Qinghai 0.3819 0.3205 0.2956 0.2569 0.2510 0.2392 0.2684 0.2444 0.2416 0.2515 0.3525 0.4113 0.4419 0.4619 0.4624 
Ningxia 0.4547 0.4074 0.3980 0.3675 0.3967 0.3556 0.4119 0.3986 0.3850 0.3857 0.5395 0.4975 0.5398 0.5366 0.4925 
Xinjiang 0.4301 0.3983 0.3687 0.3797 0.3637 0.3684 0.4898 0.4649 0.4568 0.5306 0.6369 0.7678 0.8079 0.7562 0.7475 
                
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1995-2009. 
Note: Definition: (Asset-output ratio) = (gross value of industrial output of SOEs) / (total 
assets of SOEs). Chongqing is included in Sichuan. 
Ave 0.5477 
S.D. 0.1768 
Max 1.0150 
Min 0.1205 
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Table 5A.8a 
Firm size variable 1 – provincial index of average number of employees in SOEs.  
 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  
                
Beijing 1.0000 0.8515 0.4579 0.5047 0.7080 0.5035 0.5887 0.6004 0.6067 0.7039 0.6381 0.5617 0.5948 0.7976 0.7716 
Tianjin 1.0000 0.8190 0.7900 0.7746 0.6430 0.6280 0.5447 0.5413 0.5330 0.4873 0.5526 0.4756 0.5456 0.5223 0.7769 
Hebei 0.4572 0.4402 0.4748 0.5089 0.5309 0.5223 0.5348 0.5255 0.5808 0.6779 0.6615 0.7666 0.7969 0.9944 1.0000 
Shanxi 0.3736 0.3634 0.3626 0.3858 0.4149 0.4225 0.4246 0.4299 0.4497 0.4682 0.5663 0.5797 0.6480 0.9559 1.0000 
Neimenggu 0.6197 0.5212 0.5058 0.6507 0.8603 0.8943 0.9724 0.9974 0.9487 0.8387 0.8813 0.9365 0.9454 1.0000 0.9299 
Liaoning 0.5626 0.5732 0.5271 0.5416 0.6272 0.6224 0.6003 0.5786 0.6412 0.7232 0.7834 0.6285 0.6761 1.0000 0.8325 
Jilin 0.5099 0.4786 0.4867 0.5156 0.5447 0.5010 0.4959 0.5240 0.5251 0.5645 0.5466 0.8021 0.8930 1.0000 0.9739 
Heilongjiang 0.4587 0.4265 0.4382 0.4774 0.4968 0.5391 0.5956 0.6386 0.6336 0.5717 0.5598 0.7562 0.7969 1.0000 0.9399 
Shanghai 1.0000 0.5872 0.6053 0.5652 0.7240 0.6146 0.6102 0.6327 0.6526 0.6535 0.6272 0.6194 0.6308 0.6575 0.6229 
Jiangsu 0.7621 0.6771 0.7279 0.7925 0.8479 0.8121 0.8114 0.8502 0.9185 1.0000 0.9821 0.9517 0.9617 0.9800 0.9081 
Zhejiang 0.7941 0.7225 0.7120 0.8173 0.8629 0.8753 0.8835 0.8752 0.8990 0.9608 0.8509 0.9186 0.9131 1.0000 0.9571 
Anhui 0.4628 0.4309 0.4910 0.6564 0.6189 0.6494 0.7378 0.7120 0.7508 0.8349 0.9028 0.9410 1.0000 0.9594 0.9577 
Fujian 0.6811 0.6154 0.5615 0.6488 0.7121 0.6972 0.6856 0.6469 0.6596 0.7127 0.7387 0.8139 0.8454 1.0000 0.9549 
Jiangxi 0.4877 0.4206 0.4154 0.4950 0.4965 0.4743 0.4715 0.5091 0.5782 0.7009 0.7074 0.7776 0.8674 1.0000 0.9967 
Shandong 0.6117 0.5427 0.5288 0.6518 0.7602 0.7677 0.7706 0.8036 0.8586 0.8966 0.8803 0.9338 0.9544 0.9630 1.0000 
Henan 0.5179 0.5006 0.4960 0.5975 0.5608 0.5503 0.5323 0.5447 0.5610 0.6089 0.7306 0.8984 0.9030 1.0000 0.9677 
Hubei 0.6228 0.5963 0.6119 0.6450 0.6502 0.6157 0.6172 0.6666 0.6635 0.7593 0.7964 0.8650 0.9683 1.0000 0.9727 
Hunan 0.7051 0.6735 0.6770 0.8074 0.7738 0.7313 0.7114 0.6768 0.6304 0.7033 0.6760 0.8255 0.8503 1.0000 0.9870 
Guangdong 0.6271 0.5606 0.5145 0.5321 0.5919 0.5645 0.6007 0.6277 0.6265 0.6831 0.7109 0.7343 0.7565 0.8728 1.0000 
Guangxi 0.6701 0.6284 0.6422 0.6558 0.6800 0.6325 0.5870 0.5770 0.5894 0.6440 0.6123 0.6752 0.6496 0.9084 1.0000 
Hainan 0.8129 0.6388 0.6280 0.6352 0.6522 0.6820 0.6721 0.6735 0.7795 0.6569 0.5802 0.6967 0.6701 0.9909 1.0000 
Sichuan 0.6641 0.6240 0.6464 0.7371 0.8533 0.8363 0.8045 0.8374 0.8369 0.9112 0.9045 0.9342 0.9408 1.0000 0.9114 
Guizhou 0.6157 0.5337 0.5005 0.5679 0.5451 0.5317 0.5442 0.5596 0.5591 0.6059 0.6134 0.6376 0.7172 0.9606 1.0000 
Yunnan 0.5393 0.5076 0.5291 0.5860 0.5745 0.6053 0.5888 0.5788 0.5663 0.6125 0.6060 0.7047 0.7123 1.0000 0.8524 
Tibet 0.3426 0.2780 0.2764 0.2509 0.3024 0.3118 0.3112 0.2974 0.3169 0.3243 0.3470 0.3072 0.2820 0.6731 1.0000 
Shaanxi 0.4756 0.4505 0.4607 0.4982 0.5593 0.5655 0.5425 0.5503 0.5589 0.5735 0.5950 0.6958 0.7603 1.0000 0.9628 
Gansu 0.5794 0.5561 0.5594 0.6498 0.6709 0.6006 0.6759 0.7612 0.7345 0.7453 0.7472 0.9699 1.0000 0.9500 0.9837 
Qinghai 0.4974 0.4776 0.4828 0.4337 0.5091 0.4874 0.5408 0.5725 0.6125 0.6960 0.6342 0.9068 0.8460 0.9372 1.0000 
Ningxia 0.4014 0.3796 0.3945 0.4165 0.4308 0.4296 0.5623 0.5455 0.5855 0.6863 0.7499 0.7062 0.6565 1.0000 0.8670 
Xinjiang 0.5158 0.4774 0.4818 0.4758 0.4842 0.5000 0.4274 0.4515 0.4775 0.4905 0.4884 0.6484 0.7089 1.0000 0.9687 
                
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1995-2009. 
Note: Definition: (the average number of SOE employees) = (the total number of SOE 
employees) / (the total number of SOE units). Chongqing is included in Sichuan.  
Ave 0.6781 
S.D. 0.1834 
Max 1.0000 
Min 0.2509 
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Table 5A.8b 
Firm size variable 2 – provincial index of average assets in SOEs.  
 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  
                
Beijing 0.0589 0.0694 0.0437 0.0604 0.1091 0.0874 0.1251 0.1426 0.1631 0.2260 0.6687 0.5261 0.6564 1.0000 0.9947 
Tianjin 0.1065 0.1216 0.1238 0.1393 0.1564 0.1993 0.2120 0.2264 0.2583 0.2724 0.3687 0.3558 0.4867 0.5327 1.0000 
Hebei 0.0456 0.0533 0.0663 0.0835 0.1032 0.1218 0.1423 0.1622 0.1970 0.2571 0.2783 0.4032 0.4806 0.7891 1.0000 
Shanxi 0.0383 0.0476 0.0552 0.0679 0.0880 0.1046 0.1176 0.1358 0.1610 0.1918 0.2742 0.3012 0.4110 0.7959 1.0000 
Neimenggu 0.0353 0.0346 0.0382 0.0548 0.1051 0.1360 0.1681 0.1920 0.2119 0.2400 0.3088 0.4476 0.5809 0.8549 1.0000 
Liaoning 0.0746 0.0877 0.0952 0.1110 0.1579 0.1974 0.2148 0.2594 0.3346 0.4079 0.5447 0.4513 0.5488 1.0000 0.9861 
Jilin 0.0525 0.0596 0.0696 0.0893 0.1219 0.1307 0.1548 0.1899 0.2164 0.2806 0.3161 0.5164 0.7359 0.8806 1.0000 
Heilongjiang 0.0595 0.0659 0.0740 0.0945 0.1210 0.1485 0.2226 0.2714 0.2996 0.3793 0.4130 0.5710 0.6595 0.9402 1.0000 
Shanghai 0.1194 0.0844 0.1016 0.1171 0.1885 0.2332 0.2762 0.3636 0.3521 0.4279 0.4992 0.6019 0.7082 0.9369 1.0000 
Jiangsu 0.0604 0.0706 0.0909 0.1111 0.1349 0.1626 0.2164 0.2558 0.3242 0.4518 0.4898 0.6394 0.7680 0.9898 1.0000 
Zhejiang 0.0458 0.0589 0.0676 0.0964 0.1255 0.1837 0.2254 0.2821 0.3366 0.4135 0.5502 0.6312 0.7371 0.9094 1.0000 
Anhui 0.0416 0.0473 0.0612 0.0882 0.1152 0.1636 0.2140 0.2344 0.2680 0.3628 0.4198 0.5587 0.7303 0.8678 1.0000 
Fujian 0.0449 0.0566 0.0617 0.0778 0.1149 0.1575 0.1867 0.2027 0.2460 0.3170 0.3661 0.4354 0.5464 0.8594 1.0000 
Jiangxi 0.0453 0.0475 0.0541 0.0740 0.0978 0.1122 0.1313 0.1719 0.2264 0.3359 0.3800 0.4881 0.6297 0.9151 1.0000 
Shandong 0.0749 0.0793 0.0886 0.1252 0.1637 0.1922 0.2309 0.2751 0.3351 0.3999 0.4426 0.6256 0.7711 0.8836 1.0000 
Henan 0.0580 0.0700 0.0764 0.1140 0.1203 0.1395 0.1454 0.1701 0.1982 0.2441 0.3573 0.4927 0.5908 0.8340 1.0000 
Hubei 0.0448 0.0490 0.0567 0.0665 0.0842 0.1037 0.1219 0.1475 0.1797 0.3052 0.3337 0.5177 0.6826 0.9148 1.0000 
Hunan 0.0612 0.0741 0.0844 0.1177 0.1454 0.1539 0.1752 0.2008 0.2243 0.2829 0.3123 0.4809 0.5993 0.8345 1.0000 
Guangdong 0.0530 0.0589 0.0653 0.0802 0.1251 0.1668 0.2106 0.2636 0.2896 0.3761 0.4249 0.4621 0.7152 0.9104 1.0000 
Guangxi 0.0559 0.0754 0.0880 0.1012 0.1241 0.1349 0.1458 0.1781 0.1867 0.2403 0.2806 0.3619 0.4318 0.8700 1.0000 
Hainan 0.0730 0.0686 0.0825 0.0949 0.1400 0.1983 0.2044 0.1993 0.2204 0.2343 0.3247 0.4361 0.4639 0.9673 1.0000 
Sichuan 0.0594 0.0752 0.0836 0.1249 0.1750 0.2214 0.2565 0.3107 0.3610 0.4467 0.4775 0.6088 0.6959 0.8815 1.0000 
Guizhou 0.0609 0.0644 0.0678 0.0870 0.1056 0.1207 0.1478 0.1787 0.2004 0.2447 0.3186 0.3724 0.5149 0.7762 1.0000 
Yunnan 0.0473 0.0610 0.0690 0.0886 0.1060 0.1489 0.1593 0.1979 0.2144 0.2933 0.3618 0.4884 0.5776 0.8433 1.0000 
Tibet 0.0263 0.0280 0.0316 0.0394 0.0438 0.0568 0.0667 0.0682 0.0801 0.0796 0.1221 0.1104 0.0988 0.4794 1.0000 
Shaanxi 0.0378 0.0453 0.0519 0.0611 0.0906 0.1110 0.1268 0.1608 0.1784 0.2145 0.2515 0.3529 0.4929 0.8138 1.0000 
Gansu 0.0664 0.0806 0.0924 0.1264 0.1434 0.1472 0.1945 0.2565 0.2783 0.3200 0.3507 0.5196 0.7217 0.8175 1.0000 
Qinghai 0.0464 0.0522 0.0568 0.0707 0.1046 0.1151 0.1622 0.2172 0.2682 0.3396 0.3454 0.6333 0.7050 0.8643 1.0000 
Ningxia 0.0440 0.0501 0.0569 0.0708 0.0857 0.1014 0.1592 0.1870 0.1972 0.2798 0.3250 0.4192 0.4857 0.8719 1.0000 
Xinjiang 0.0622 0.0677 0.0845 0.0959 0.1058 0.1262 0.1515 0.1941 0.2234 0.2670 0.3251 0.4191 0.5200 0.8380 1.0000 
                
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1995-2009. 
Note: Definition: (the average amount of total assets of SOEs) = (the total amount of total 
assets, including fixed and mobile assets, of SOEs) / (the total number of SOE units). 
Chongqing is included in Sichuan. 
Ave 0.3183 
S.D. 0.2930 
Max 1.0000 
Min 0.0263 
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Table 5A.9a 
Human capital variable 1 – scientific and technical personnel share of total SOE employees.  
 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  
                
Beijing 0.1971 0.1536 0.1088 0.1079 0.1262 0.1313 0.1395 0.1473 0.2086 0.2270 0.2145 0.1901 0.1959 0.1969 0.2040 
Tianjin 0.1855 0.1686 0.1492 0.1485 0.2129 0.2462 0.2621 0.2604 0.2617 0.2651 0.2893 0.3127 0.3172 0.3247 0.3215 
Hebei 0.1541 0.1451 0.1358 0.1452 0.1777 0.2037 0.2220 0.2372 0.2579 0.2672 0.2789 0.2902 0.2958 0.3006 0.3184 
Shanxi 0.1550 0.1367 0.1196 0.1263 0.1652 0.1927 0.2054 0.2210 0.2390 0.2492 0.2551 0.2685 0.2711 0.2771 0.2874 
Neimenggu 0.1380 0.1306 0.1235 0.1302 0.1661 0.1953 0.2119 0.2238 0.2373 0.2649 0.2769 0.2915 0.2972 0.3033 0.3055 
Liaoning 0.1629 0.1414 0.1279 0.1308 0.1733 0.2041 0.2152 0.2311 0.2511 0.2525 0.2512 0.2492 0.2507 0.2472 0.2455 
Jilin 0.1622 0.1501 0.1393 0.1493 0.1875 0.2107 0.2256 0.2401 0.2582 0.2679 0.2833 0.3174 0.3212 0.3363 0.3402 
Heilongjiang 0.1299 0.1193 0.1090 0.1130 0.1529 0.1686 0.1891 0.1999 0.2063 0.2229 0.2240 0.2279 0.2324 0.2393 0.2500 
Shanghai 0.1688 0.1488 0.1251 0.1243 0.1588 0.1837 0.2004 0.2184 0.2276 0.2249 0.2569 0.2770 0.2844 0.2897 0.3047 
Jiangsu 0.1891 0.1831 0.1789 0.1856 0.2303 0.2470 0.2716 0.2899 0.3249 0.3388 0.3609 0.3639 0.3716 0.3717 0.3976 
Zhejiang 0.1947 0.1945 0.1977 0.2097 0.2524 0.2880 0.3230 0.3578 0.3725 0.3861 0.3891 0.3869 0.3839 0.3793 0.3848 
Anhui 0.1734 0.1620 0.1535 0.1638 0.2077 0.2411 0.2653 0.2847 0.3078 0.3343 0.3452 0.3586 0.3667 0.3729 0.3954 
Fujian 0.2060 0.2083 0.2090 0.2200 0.2650 0.2929 0.3096 0.3258 0.3441 0.3475 0.3531 0.3569 0.3565 0.3640 0.3764 
Jiangxi 0.1557 0.1481 0.1407 0.1482 0.1985 0.2302 0.2474 0.2621 0.2800 0.2937 0.3071 0.3163 0.3196 0.3245 0.3362 
Shandong 0.1915 0.1805 0.1756 0.1866 0.2218 0.2502 0.2663 0.2805 0.3019 0.3090 0.3113 0.3619 0.3650 0.3630 0.3604 
Henan 0.1497 0.1411 0.1308 0.1490 0.2003 0.2300 0.2525 0.2724 0.2937 0.3176 0.3068 0.3060 0.3198 0.3271 0.3307 
Hubei 0.1719 0.1588 0.1476 0.1553 0.1970 0.2138 0.2197 0.2369 0.2514 0.2574 0.2727 0.2757 0.2860 0.2920 0.2974 
Hunan 0.1720 0.1614 0.1510 0.1609 0.2100 0.2257 0.2443 0.2859 0.2944 0.3068 0.3253 0.3725 0.3637 0.3620 0.3582 
Guangdong 0.1637 0.1665 0.1678 0.1802 0.2208 0.2388 0.2565 0.2756 0.2910 0.2983 0.3141 0.3226 0.3237 0.3328 0.3377 
Guangxi 0.2062 0.2035 0.2011 0.2122 0.2537 0.2712 0.2920 0.3035 0.3384 0.3449 0.3640 0.3837 0.3924 0.3977 0.4108 
Hainan 0.1004 0.1032 0.1090 0.1128 0.1401 0.1467 0.1558 0.1648 0.1849 0.1947 0.2020 0.2075 0.2204 0.2269 0.2428 
Sichuan 0.1948 0.1818 0.1703 0.1818 0.2274 0.2505 0.2688 0.2807 0.3051 0.3100 0.3173 0.3184 0.3221 0.3229 0.3285 
Guizhou 0.2106 0.2034 0.1917 0.2018 0.2470 0.2836 0.2995 0.3176 0.3271 0.3475 0.3593 0.3632 0.3785 0.3712 0.3782 
Yunnan 0.2038 0.1990 0.1911 0.2004 0.2274 0.2531 0.2772 0.3047 0.3284 0.3505 0.3746 0.3843 0.3804 0.3767 0.3834 
Tibet 0.1626 0.1649 0.1650 0.1735 0.1834 0.2073 0.2066 0.2181 0.2366 0.2468 0.2630 0.2474 0.2454 0.2532 0.2703 
Shaanxi 0.1808 0.1538 0.1287 0.1321 0.1707 0.1812 0.1954 0.2063 0.2160 0.2296 0.2407 0.2488 0.2558 0.2581 0.2669 
Gansu 0.1705 0.1539 0.1392 0.1474 0.1766 0.2020 0.2098 0.2248 0.2401 0.2469 0.2595 0.2651 0.3003 0.3049 0.3143 
Qinghai 0.1722 0.1575 0.1450 0.1511 0.1739 0.1883 0.2179 0.2513 0.2476 0.2766 0.2895 0.3144 0.3242 0.3211 0.3166 
Ningxia 0.1783 0.1689 0.1626 0.1650 0.1979 0.2127 0.2277 0.2413 0.2725 0.3055 0.3223 0.3243 0.3417 0.3331 0.3281 
Xinjiang 0.1531 0.1346 0.1158 0.1240 0.1430 0.1549 0.1689 0.1963 0.2061 0.2107 0.2164 0.2217 0.2254 0.2265 0.2295 
                
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1995-2009. 
Note: Definition: (the share of scientific and technical personnel in SOEs) = (the number 
of scientific and technical personnel in state-owned enterprises and institutions) / (the total 
number of staff and workers in all state-owned units). Chongqing is included in Sichuan. 
Data from adjacent years have been used in order to overcome the absence of data for 1995 
and 2004.  
Ave 0.2425 
S.D. 0.0746 
Max 0.4108 
Min 0.1004 
  
 
345 
 
Table 5A.9b 
Human capital variable 2 – provincial index of labour productivity.  
 1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  
                
Beijing 0.1039 0.1137 0.0878 0.1323 0.1778 0.1946 0.2570 0.2813 0.3196 0.4350 0.7199 0.7386 0.8310 1.0000 0.9322 
Tianjin 0.0434 0.0481 0.0403 0.0547 0.0762 0.0920 0.1294 0.1467 0.1748 0.2808 0.3344 0.5743 0.8331 0.9113 1.0000 
Hebei 0.0879 0.0974 0.1082 0.1174 0.1438 0.1659 0.2102 0.2381 0.2811 0.3411 0.3944 0.5889 0.6592 0.8506 1.0000 
Shanxi 0.0715 0.0836 0.0907 0.1008 0.1048 0.1158 0.1333 0.1626 0.2034 0.2914 0.3470 0.4618 0.5860 0.8193 1.0000 
Neimenggu 0.0330 0.0372 0.0405 0.0478 0.0631 0.0724 0.0928 0.1041 0.1269 0.1881 0.2670 0.4516 0.5512 0.7681 1.0000 
Liaoning 0.0954 0.0780 0.0881 0.0946 0.1138 0.1418 0.2012 0.2435 0.2913 0.3900 0.4735 0.6849 0.8055 1.0000 0.9856 
Jilin 0.0675 0.0622 0.0709 0.0730 0.0991 0.1270 0.1674 0.2203 0.2776 0.3937 0.4742 0.5634 0.7606 1.0000 0.9033 
Heilongjiang 0.0581 0.0632 0.0699 0.0779 0.1023 0.1454 0.2162 0.2384 0.2627 0.3953 0.4798 0.6397 0.7658 0.8375 1.0000 
Shanghai 0.0797 0.0723 0.0721 0.0963 0.1434 0.1888 0.2345 0.2850 0.3346 0.4942 0.5591 0.6576 0.7235 1.0000 0.8888 
Jiangsu 0.0657 0.0762 0.0846 0.0857 0.1074 0.1325 0.1717 0.2092 0.2500 0.3403 0.4111 0.5701 0.7688 0.9617 1.0000 
Zhejiang 0.0499 0.0614 0.0671 0.0827 0.1126 0.1420 0.1988 0.2471 0.3543 0.4471 0.5763 0.6938 0.8302 1.0000 0.9655 
Anhui 0.0693 0.0673 0.0844 0.0904 0.1160 0.1426 0.1557 0.1988 0.2420 0.3254 0.3860 0.5461 0.6583 0.8273 1.0000 
Fujian 0.0781 0.0921 0.0970 0.1001 0.1806 0.2277 0.2842 0.3590 0.4764 0.5953 0.6163 0.6556 0.7498 0.9524 1.0000 
Jiangxi 0.0698 0.0649 0.0749 0.0753 0.1018 0.1228 0.1480 0.1922 0.2510 0.3080 0.3910 0.5436 0.7092 0.9028 1.0000 
Shandong 0.0894 0.0993 0.1095 0.1173 0.1291 0.1509 0.2051 0.2414 0.2871 0.3553 0.4461 0.7223 0.8128 0.9275 1.0000 
Henan 0.0678 0.0813 0.0859 0.1023 0.1070 0.1200 0.1324 0.1632 0.1979 0.2512 0.3257 0.4082 0.4805 0.9060 1.0000 
Hubei 0.0758 0.0671 0.0686 0.0834 0.1167 0.1354 0.1678 0.1945 0.2385 0.3080 0.3525 0.5381 0.6197 0.8929 1.0000 
Hunan 0.0523 0.0544 0.0663 0.0665 0.0892 0.0990 0.1226 0.1584 0.1937 0.2468 0.3144 0.4870 0.5973 0.7640 1.0000 
Guangdong 0.0513 0.0518 0.0642 0.0665 0.1152 0.1402 0.1915 0.2228 0.2637 0.3700 0.3866 0.4701 0.7881 0.8966 1.0000 
Guangxi 0.0952 0.0925 0.0903 0.0922 0.1226 0.1373 0.1742 0.1884 0.2248 0.3054 0.3670 0.5244 0.7148 1.0000 0.8843 
Hainan 0.0650 0.0485 0.0509 0.0591 0.1290 0.1543 0.1729 0.1903 0.2210 0.3183 0.5455 0.5567 0.7016 0.9606 1.0000 
Sichuan 0.0765 0.0774 0.0846 0.0931 0.1132 0.1406 0.1694 0.2260 0.2904 0.3438 0.3948 0.5623 0.7335 0.9387 1.0000 
Guizhou 0.0945 0.1071 0.1109 0.1183 0.1554 0.1731 0.1969 0.2265 0.2782 0.3472 0.5032 0.6060 0.8092 0.9867 1.0000 
Yunnan 0.1262 0.1435 0.1621 0.1674 0.1973 0.2120 0.2360 0.2853 0.3448 0.4421 0.5644 0.6709 0.8029 0.8548 1.0000 
Tibet 0.1745 0.1769 0.2581 0.3649 0.2535 0.2650 0.2957 0.2630 0.3727 0.4300 0.5820 0.5684 0.6821 0.9337 1.0000 
Shaanxi 0.0368 0.0432 0.0469 0.0460 0.0569 0.0754 0.0994 0.1216 0.1479 0.1936 0.2617 0.3921 0.5639 0.7329 1.0000 
Gansu 0.0973 0.1079 0.1087 0.1116 0.1311 0.1479 0.1782 0.2357 0.2718 0.3462 0.4928 0.5463 0.7004 1.0000 0.8946 
Qinghai 0.0679 0.0686 0.0683 0.0726 0.1018 0.1186 0.1517 0.2033 0.2390 0.2729 0.3829 0.6281 0.8405 1.0000 0.9686 
Ningxia 0.0722 0.0810 0.0924 0.0955 0.1210 0.1278 0.1731 0.2080 0.1915 0.2496 0.3925 0.4818 0.6143 0.8846 1.0000 
Xinjiang 0.0505 0.0662 0.0672 0.1021 0.0986 0.1178 0.2279 0.2638 0.2761 0.3873 0.5820 0.6725 0.8192 0.8657 1.0000 
                
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1995-2009. 
Note: Definition: (labour productivity of SOEs) = (total amount of industrial value-added 
of SOEs) / (total number of SOE employees). Chongqing is included in Sichuan. 
Ave 0.3498 
S.D. 0.3057 
Max 1.0000 
Min 0.0330 
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Appendix 5B 
 
Table 5B.1 
Principal component analysis and summary statistics of new variables.  
  Component  Rotation 
 Code Variable 1 Variable 2 Unexplained  Eigenvalue Difference Proportion 
         
Privatisation pri1 0.7071 0.7071 0.0000  1.9215 1.8430 0.9608 
SoftBudget ph1ab 0.7071 0.7071 0.0000  1.5297 1.0594 0.7649 
PoliticalIdeology ph2ab 0.7071 0.7071 0.0000  1.4020 0.8039 0.7010 
Decentralisation ph3ab 0.7071 0.7071 0.0000  1.1853 0.3706 0.5926 
MarketCompetition ph4ab 0.7071 0.7071 0.0000  1.4823 0.9646 0.7411 
FinancialPressure ph5ab -0.7071 0.7071 0.0000  1.0903 0.1805 0.5451 
InstitutionalInfrastructure ph6ab 0.7071 0.7071 0.0000  1.7258 1.4517 0.8629 
EconomicEfficiency ph7ab 0.7071 0.7071 0.0000  1.5591 1.1181 0.7795 
FirmSize ph8ab 0.7071 0.7071 0.0000  1.7324 1.4647 0.8662 
HumanCapital ph9ab 0.7071 0.7071 0.0000  1.6907 1.3814 0.8454 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
pri1 450 0.0000 1.3862 -2.2684 2.1334 
ph1ab 450 0.0000 1.2368 -2.8980 2.8426 
ph2ab 450 0.0000 1.1840 -1.3124 5.5989 
ph3ab 450 0.0000 1.0887 -3.7980 2.6555 
ph4ab 450 0.0000 1.2175 -1.6440 3.6751 
ph5ab 450 0.0000 1.0442 -2.6397 4.8111 
ph6ab 450 0.0000 1.3137 -1.3166 6.9398 
ph7ab 450 0.0000 1.2486 -2.6220 6.9013 
ph8ab 450 0.0000 1.3162 -2.3200 2.8860 
ph9ab 450 0.0000 1.3003 -2.0168 2.9746 
 
 pri1 ph1ab ph2ab ph3ab ph4ab ph5ab ph6ab ph7ab ph8ab ph9ab 
           
pri1 1.0000          
ph1ab 0.7394 1.0000         
ph2ab -0.7774 -0.6258 1.0000        
ph3ab -0.2982 -0.1198 0.4881 1.0000       
ph4ab -0.2132 -0.1580 0.5290 0.6570 1.0000      
ph5ab -0.1950 -0.3608 -0.0056 -0.5680 -0.3749 1.0000     
ph6ab -0.5473 -0.4315 0.8079 0.5538 0.7412 -0.1636 1.0000    
ph7ab -0.4280 -0.2797 0.4418 0.5402 0.2904 -0.1751 0.3755 1.0000   
ph8ab -0.7778 -0.6073 0.7241 0.4726 0.3270 -0.0267 0.5414 0.5204 1.0000  
ph9ab -0.8568 -0.7489 0.7832 0.3139 0.2809 0.1817 0.5555 0.5035 0.8253 1.0000 
           
Note: Variable 1 denotes the first variable in each hypothesis, while variable 2 denotes the second. 
Only component 1 is reported. Component 2 is not used.  
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